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Abstract
The future may be something we plan for, something we fear, a ‘place’ where the 
routines of the present continue or the traditions of yesteryear are threatened, or a 
rhetorical realm of fantastical predictions of space colonization and ‘anytime, 
anywhere’ communication. In short we speculate, imagine, and contest these futures 
in attempts to artieulate this perhaps unknowable entity with the tools of our 
eontemporary age. Stories are told about the ‘Wireless World’ and the ‘Post-Industrial 
Society we live in: an unprecedented era where information communication 
technologies have the power to transform our world. Some maintain that we are 
entering a ‘Mobile Age’ where high-speed, mobile telecommunication devices will 
alter the ways in which we live our lives. How might the social researcher interrogate 
sueh ‘future talk’? How are we best able to equip ourselves with the analytieal tools to 
understand such talk and to question the assumptions built into these ‘versions of the 
future circulating within our socio-cultural world? Contemporary discourses 
surrounding mobile communication technologies include dialogues about ‘the future’ 
that serve as a useful starting point for an attempt to answer the above questions.
This research investigates ‘versions of the future’ linked to discourse about 
mobile communication technologies from a variety of sources. These include material 
from mobile telecommunication corporations, the writings of ‘futurologists’ and ‘blue 
sky researchers, data from focus groups with young people, and a number of popular 
and specialist media texts. It is suggested that ‘versions of the future’ are built up 
using a variety of social and cultural resources, which both employ, and are 
implieated in, the symbolic meanings and cultural assumptions of our present social 
world. I explore how this construction of ‘versions of the future’ is achieved, how 
these versions are authorised and made ‘commonsensical’, and how meanings and 
aetions in relation to mobile communication technologies may be delineated by these 
versions whieh form part of our social world.
These ‘versions of the future’ will not be taken as the basis for a predictive 
model of what will ‘really happen’ in the ‘mobile future’. Rather than an exercise in 
forecasting, this study will investigate the ways in which present assumptions about 
technological and socio-cultural spheres are embedded within contemporary futures 
or ‘versions of the future’. Through a variety of devices, including the deployment of
humour, technological and social determinism, the strategic deployment of popular 
science fiction references and a combination of fantastical imaginings and ‘common- 
sense reasoning, accounts of the future are produced and in turn delineate what can 
be said about the future in relation to mobile communication technologies.
Chapter One: Mobiles and the Future
Mobile Communication Technologies
The mobile or cell-phone can be thought of as a key cultural artefact in modem social 
life within ‘developed’ countries. A number of sometimes conflicting and continually 
shifting meanings have been ascribed to mobile technologies. They are ‘status 
symbols’. They are devices which can secure a loved one’s safety if  his or her car 
breaks down at night. They are health-damaging deviees. They are convenient for 
conducting one’s social life (and conducting affairs) and inconvenient when trying to 
sleep on a commuter train. They are regarded as invaluable devices to some. In 
Green’s (2002) research on gay men’s perceptions of their mobiles, one participant in 
response to the question ‘Which piece of technology that you own could you not live 
without?’ answered ‘My mobile phone definitely, without a doubt, I couldn’t live 
without it’ (2002:10). They are deviees owned, loved and personalised by most 
British teenagers. They are mundane devices that we have quickly got used to having. 
Finally, despite their perceived mundanity and ‘pedestrian’ nature, they are produced 
as being ‘cutting-edge’, and even ‘futuristic’. They are often spoken about in terms of 
XhQix future potential: potential, sometimes described as a positive attribute, at other 
times negative, to change the way people communicate, work, play, organise their 
lives, and consume. It is this last aspect of mobile devices that I concentrate on within 
this research. Is there perhaps something specific about the mobile phone that lends 
itself to being related to ‘the future’? Could it be that even now, talk of the ‘mobile 
phone appears out of date as the personal communication device’ begins to fit ever 
more snugly against, or even move inside, our bodies? Mitchell (2000) states.
Most intimately, there will be close-fitting networks of implanted, 
wearable and pocket devices to attend to our most immediate, ongoing 
requirements for maintenance of bodily health and eomfort, for self­
representation and identification, and for remote communication (Mitchell 
2000:53).
Could communication become one among many of the capabilities of the ‘personal 
device’? Whilst this research looks specifically at the mobile phone in relation to the
future-orientated discourses that produce it, there would appear to be scope for 
extending the analysis to personal eommunieation devices whatever form they may 
take. In one sense that is why sociologists should take an interest in these devices that 
have become so ubiquitous in our everyday lives. We do not know what will happen 
in the future in terms of personal/social communication, but it would seem that 
discourses surrounding the mobile may be in the process of attempting to delineate 
what might happen. In my view, future-orientated talk with regards to mobile 
communication devices is not ‘just’ empty words but is in fact of great interest to 
social scientists. In this introductory chapter I begin to demonstrate why this is so.
Rhetoric of the ‘Mobile Age’
In a short missive setting up a ‘postmodern encounter’ between Heidegger, Habermas 
and the mobile, Myerson (2001) asks what the mobile idea of communication entails 
and how it differs from these two philosophers’ utopian visions. Whilst Myerson’s 
interpretation of Heidigger’s and Habermas’ writings is somewhat simplistic, his 
work is useful in considering the ways in which ‘mobile rhetoric’ is produced, 
although it is not always clear whether Myerson is developing a critique of mobile 
rhetoric or merely reproducing its central assumptions.
In Myerson’s view Heidegger (1962) focuses on communication as the hearer’s 
understanding, with the hearer having experience of the subject being diseussed and 
being able to share that experience with the speaker in an attempt to advance towards 
understanding. This definition of eommunieation seems to progress slowly compared 
to the rapidity of the ‘exchange of fire’ through mobiles that we are coming to expect 
and which (we have been warned) ‘will’ become even more rapid in the future.
According to Myerson, Habermas understood communication as dialogue in 
which one seeks to be understood by others and coneomitantly understand them in 
return (Myerson 2001:32). Clearly no modem society can operate through such full- 
scale dialogue all the time, so all kinds of arrangements have to be made to substitute 
dialogue with what we think of as systems (the social security system for example). 
However, Habermas saw a danger in this reduction of dialogue to systemie 
exchanges, ‘a heightening of systemic complexity... unleashes system imperatives that 
burst the capacity of the lifeworld’ (1984:155). If these systems take on a ‘life of their 
own’ then a risk lies in the possible loss of human texture to parts of our lives
(Myerson 2001:31). In contrast to the slow process between humans of reaching 
understanding that Habermas saw as the ideal, the ‘mobile age’ entices us with 
scenarios whereby ‘the system’ will do our communicating for us.
Just register your desires as swiftly as possible. The messages will flow to 
and fro without our needing to engage directly, and that will then be the 
central meaning of eommunieation. In other words, in the age of full 
mobilisation, communication would refer primarily to a flow across a 
system (Myerson 2001:34).
With mobile phones increasingly being described as mobile devices, particularly with 
the advent of mobile commerce (or ‘m-commerce’) and mobile entertainment, the 
agents of communication do not even have to be human. Indeed, we are increasingly 
being encouraged and sometimes forced to cut out the human in our communication 
‘exchanges’, for example through the spread of automated (telephone and Internet) 
banking and bill payment systems. In other instances human agents such as call centre 
employees are encouraged to follow ‘seripts’ that reduce interaction to formal 
exchanges of information. The rhetoric of the ‘mobile age’ promulgates a version of 
communication whereby communication devices and their systems will act as agents 
of eommunieation, ‘...a model to reflect communications between inanimate objects, 
to receive payment for value-added services...’ (Orange Press Release 13^  ^ July 
2000). This is related to communication being redefined in this ‘mobile age’ as a 
registering of needs and desires rather than an expression of attempts to understand 
others. These ideas, namely the mobile scenario of communication, juxtaposed with 
philosophical communicative ideals, are about what ‘the future’ should and could 
look, and be, like.
The mega-advanced communication device will become perhaps as small 
as a stud in your ear...eventually you will simply say what you want 
whenever you want it and wherever you want it (Orange Press Release 
13^  ^July 2000. Emphasis added).
In the ‘mobile age’ utopia one communicates ‘in order to “say what you want”. This 
does not mean what you mean to say - it means what you have to have’ (Myerson
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2001:26). Within the mobile model of communication the exchange of information as 
rapidly as possible is presented as the ideal.
This research focuses upon ‘mobile age’ scenarios such as these with 
particular attention paid to those scenarios that deal explicitly or otherwise with ‘the 
future’. Tackling mobile rhetoric in order to be able to critique such models of 
communication, Myerson (2001) briefly seeks to understand the ways in which the 
future is presented within them. This ‘future-talk’ aspect of ‘mobile age’ rhetorie 
needs more attention. Empirical research and theoretical perspectives related to 
mobile technologies continue to tackle issues surrounding ownership and usage 
patterns, how mobiles become embedded in people’s everyday lifeworlds, ehanges in 
surveillance practices, implications of usage for design and so on. The cultural and 
symbolic meanings of communication and of the future that shape, and are shaped by, 
our understandings of what ‘the mobile’ is should also be examined. We need to think 
about the ways in whieh mobile discourse, ‘mobilisation, the whole promotional 
atmosphere’ (Myerson 2001:59), is implicated in produeing mobile technologies as a 
symbol of a very particular vision of a modem world. This vision seeks to define 
communication as information exchanges, needs and desires fulfilled as rapidly as 
possible with no human intermediary, whilst the search for meaning is replaced by 
messages and our ‘life-worlds’ are reconfigured into ‘l i f e s t y l e s O f  course this is a 
particularly pessimistic and Luddite presentation of mobile discourse, and one that 
most avid users of mobiles would probably not immediately recognise. Various social 
actors and groupings hold different definitions of what ‘counts’ as communication, 
and these are likely to change according to context. Work done on night-clubbers is a 
case in point (Moore 2003a) whereby for some of the interviewees, the ‘exchange’ of 
a smile with a stranger in a nightspot where the dmg ecstasy was available meant 
more to them in terms of emotive mutual understanding than any conversation that 
they could conceive. To a lovelorn teenager a short text message from his/her object 
of desire may mean more to them than any Habermasian search for mutual 
understanding through continuous and (comparatively) slow-moving dialogue. Yet it 
would seem that engaging with ‘m-discourse’ is essential if we are to understand the 
ways in which mobile technology has so rapidly and wholeheartedly become part of 
our lives in the Western world at least. We must also engage with ‘m-discourse’ if we 
are to understand the implications of the changing notions of communication, work.
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play, relationships and time that mobiles bring with them, and that are developing 
around them.
Research Questions
It can be argued that ‘future-talk’ is an integral part of ‘mobile age’ rhetoric. What 
tools are available to the researcher to analyse such ‘talk’ and make strange the 
multiplicity of ‘versions of the future’ that take mobile communication technologies 
as their central theme? How can we investigate this topic using the sociological 
theories and methods at hand and what alterations may be needed to make them of 
more pertinence to the current research topic? In order to retain a tight focus on the 
topic of this research the following research questions are kept in mind throughout. 
Each individually contributes to the main question, namely ‘How are ‘versions o f  the 
future’ built up in relation to mobile communication technologies and what do they do 
in the social world? ’
This research considers the ways in which ‘the friture’ as a general concept is 
presented and understood in modem Western soeiety. Here I take ‘the future’ not as a 
temporal given that inevitably follows on from the past and the present moment. I 
think of ‘it’ instead as a discursive domain that serves both to produce meanings of 
other facets of socio-cultural and material life (including technical artefacts such as 
the mobile), and as the object of discourses in its own right. Thus ‘the future’ 
becomes a concept that can be disturbed and made strange. Mobile communication 
technologies are used as a vehicle through which to achieve this troubling. We often 
talk of ‘the future’ with little or no consideration about how it is produeed, what it 
involves, why we think about it in certain ways and not in others. A recent example 
may serve to highlight my point. Following the ‘end’ of the war in Iraq in 2003, 
debates have been raging about what sort of regime the Iraqi people will ‘choose’ to 
substitute the one in place during Saddam Hussein’s reign. US government officials, 
Iraqi aids, BBC presenters, academic experts and Iraqi people are all involved in what 
is effectively a discussion about the future direction of the Iraqi state. Clearly this 
debate could have very tangible material effects on Iraqi residents. One can feasibly 
think of ‘the future’ then as an organising concept and a discursive domain in which a 
myriad of moral and political stances, most noticeably ‘democracy’ in the above
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example, vie for ascendancy. One recent quote from a speaker on Radio Four drew 
my attention to this point, ‘What will the US think if the people of Iraq choose not to 
have democratic rule in the future?’ (‘The Today Programme’, Radio Four, 24^ April 
2003). Questions of ‘choice’, of right and wrong, of knowledge and of power are all 
played out within the arena of ‘the future’, whilst ‘the future’ itself (as the subject and 
object of discourses) is being produced by these wranglings.
This research considers what the main contradictions and continuities are 
between different ‘versions of the future’ in relation to mobile technologies. It 
questions what, if anything, is revealed about these versions by these eontradictions 
and continuities, and the possible tensions between them; what, for example, is 
understood by ‘progress’ and the ‘new’ within them? In my view ‘the future’ is a 
discursive domain active in the present moment which is in turn produced (as an 
abstract temporal entity) by discourse. What then are the contemporary assumptions 
about the social world that are embedded within these ‘versions of the future’ in 
relation to mobile technologies? How do these assumptions manifest themselves, 
what forms do they take, what do they ‘do’ within a version, and what implications 
might they have for the future possibilities that are considered ‘commonsensical’, 
‘irrational’, ‘risky’, and ‘inevitable’.
If producing ‘the future’ is a continuous and fluid process then where should 
the researcher ‘go’ to study it? I argue that mobile communication technologies have 
a particular significance in this regard given that they are often positioned as an 
‘essentially’ future-orientated technology. Studying them in relation to such futuristic 
discourses helps to narrow the scope of this research into a manageable ‘topic’. Yet 
even focusing on one form of technology still leaves the researcher facing a myriad of 
possible research sites. I could study the processes of producing ‘versions of the 
future within the Research and Design facilities of large telecommunication 
corporations. I could involve myself in the Delphi research undertaken by Foresight 
programmes. I could look at the ways in which the 1ST projects funded by the 
European Commission under their Framework Five and Six programmes build up 
viable versions of the future in relation to mobile entertainment. These are simply a 
few of the possible options and choices inevitably have to be made. Hence, this 
research predominately asks how teenagers, futurologists, corporate imagineers and 
those specifically employed in promoting the mobile communication industry manage 
the ‘task’ of producing viable ‘versions of the future’. In managing this task of
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producing viable ‘versions of the future’ within their relevant local contexts, this 
research asks how these versions are made to make sense within the actors’ everyday 
life-worlds. This point relates to my concern with the socio-cultural resources that are 
deployed to render versions of the future ‘commonsensical’ and perhaps even 
seemingly inevitable.
Finally this research attempts to coneeptualise the interrelations between 
(notions of) past, present and future without resorting to the position that versions of 
the future within contemporary life determine all possible outcomes in that future. 
This is perhaps the most difficult of the research questions to tackle given that it 
involves trying to think about what these ‘versions of the future’ might actually do in 
the social world that they are simultaneously part of. There is of course no way of 
reasonably asserting that versions have a tangible and ‘real’ impact upon our actions 
and meanings in the present or the future. However, one link that I consider useful in 
this respect is that of delineation. I question whether ‘versions of the future’ in 
relation to mobile communication technologies can delineate the range of possible 
meanings and actions at our disposal, if meanings and representations are thought of 
as doing something in the social world? However, given the nature of my empirical 
work the focus will predominately be on how versions of the future are produced. I 
argue that it is within this very process of production that versions do something in 
the social world. There is, in my view, no need to look ‘outside’ of the versions for 
evidence of their ‘impact’ on the social world. By thinking about the ways in whieh 
versions are produced, I am able to say something about what they may be doing as 
particular socio-cultural phenomena.
My research questions can be summarised as a set of aims towards 
understanding the following,
• The contemporary presentation of ‘the future’ in relation to mobile 
communication technologies (which includes the contradictions and 
continuities present both within and across versions).
• The management of the task of producing versions and the subsequent 
deployment of resources to render versions ‘commonsensical’.
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• The delineation of meanings and actions through the production of 
‘versions of the future’, based on the suggestion that versions are in some 
way consequential within the present social world.
My research strives to gain insight into the ways in which ‘versions of the future’ in 
relation to mobile communication technologies are authorised, legitimised and 
challenged. This strand of understanding is reached via an analysis of the socio­
cultural resources that are employed to construct ‘versions of the future’. In addition 
to analysing versions themselves, one may ask how are they made to perform, where 
and how they circulate and what uses are made of them by the various actors and 
organisations involved? It is maintained throughout that the construction of ‘the 
future’ in terms of new hybrid social and material practices are constrained and 
enabled by equally hybrid pre-existing practices (Law and Singleton 2000). How do 
these ‘new’ and ‘pre-existing’ but ever-changing practices ‘make the future’ and 
‘future artefacts’? Lastly I aim to reach a greater appreciation of the present (social 
and cultural world) via an analysis of predictions for the future of mobile 
telecommunication technologies.
I have set out the research questions I aim to tackle. I now turn to why mobile 
communication technologies in particular warrant the attention of social scientists and 
how those who have tackled this phenomenon have chosen to approach the task of 
studying them.
Mobiles’ Media Penetration
Mobile phones, or ‘devices’, merit the attention of sociologists given the role they 
play in many people’s lives in the ‘developed’ world and the central position they 
have within technological discourses of the 21®^ century. Clearly one cannot feasibly 
examine this ‘mobile age’ without acknowledging that mobile rhetoric is extremely 
adept at forgetting about countries where mobiles are not owned or used in numbers 
deemed significant. Reports from consultancy firms refer to sueh countries with the 
rather disconcerting acronym ROW, meaning the ‘Rest Of the World’, as if somehow 
non-participation in the ‘mobile age’ entails a certain invisibility and ‘wiping out’ of 
the regional differences that are so keenly studied within the Western European, 
Pacific-Asian and North American markets. The executive summary of ‘Future
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Mobile Handsets’, an Arc Group report from 2001, lists the ‘regional influences’ on 
the ‘evolving mobile communications industry’, with regions examined being ‘Japan, 
Western Europe, USA and the Rest of the World’ (2001:2). Both the visionaries of 
our ‘mobile age’, and the promulgators of the creation of a ‘global village’ through 
the Internet, have to contend with the fact that not everyone in the world has access to 
these supposedly emancipating technologies. This research will not be concerned in 
any detail with discourses of the ‘Digital Divide’ (see McSorley 2003, 2003a for a 
detailed analysis of these issues). Suffice to say here that the rhetoric of the ‘mobile 
age’ is far from aware, or prepared to be aware, of the global context of technological 
distribution and use. When mention is made of extending mobile provision to the 
‘Rest of the World’ it is dealt with in terms of the vagaries of market forces and 
technological ‘solutions’ such as standardisation and interoperability, ‘...the 
economies of scale made possible through an integrated third generation standard 
should help drive down equipment and handset costs, bringing mobile telephony 
within reach of a larger number of people in the world’s poorest countries’ (‘Third 
Generation Mobile’, International Telecommunication Union, 1999:1). The key point 
here is that when dealing with material on any aspect of this ‘mobile age’, the first 
starting point of a critique could simply be that there are a large number of people 
excluded from this ‘Wireless World’. Talk of a ‘mobile age’ in this context seems 
rather naïve until acknowledgement is given to its geographically restricted relevance.
Many commentaries on mobile technologies commence with breathtaking 
statistical run-downs, whether or not the given text goes on to criticise or exalt mobile 
technologies in general. Statistics on mobile phone penetration rates according to 
region, age and income, statisties on consumer willingness to pay for mobile content 
(Mobinet #5 2002), figures on the possible correlation between a fall in teenage 
smoking and their use of mobile phones (Chi et al 2000): there seems no end to the 
different data permutations available with regard to mobiles. However, it is hard to 
get a feel of the discursive presence of mobile technologies in today’s media from 
penetration figures and statistics on the likelihood of 278 million consumers owning 
‘feature rich smartphones’ by 2007 (Analysys 2002). As Myerson (2001) writes,
...as the new millennium starts, we are witnessing, and being addressed
by, a ubiquitous campaign to promote the mobile phone. This mobile
propaganda is extraordinary in its energy, its resources and its cultural
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impact. There are the old style ads, but there is also a torrent of 
information released through diverse media, on the web, via other 
produets and sales outlets (2001:3-4).
This ‘ubiquitous campaign’ is often couched in terms relating to and referencing ‘the 
future’. In addition the use of quantitative material helps to make the ‘rise’ of the 
mobile phone appear inexorable and inevitable: who can argue with such stunning 
statistics? The eampaign continues and is expanding to inelude new devices and 
services being developed by mobile communication companies, mobile games 
developers, WAP content providers, teleeommunieation consultancy firms, and 
standardisation committees. These new devices and services include polyphonic ring­
tones, enhanced messaging services (EMS) and multimedia messaging serviees 
(MMS), mobile gambling and gaming, mobile ‘adult’ services, mobile commerce, the 
mobile Internet, m-cash (your mobile as an electronic wallet), mobile ‘infotainment’ 
and mobile music. As Taylor and Harper (2001) note in the introduction to their work 
with teenagers and mobiles, we are all accustomed to the rhetorie used with respect to 
mobile technologies. It takes the following form: we will always be available, we will 
always be able to access whatever information we want, wherever and whenever we 
want it, and we will always be just a phone call (or a text message, or now a picture 
message) away from our loved ones and our work colleagues. The media profile of 
mobile technologies remains high, with The Guardian recently devoting a whole ‘G2’ 
section of the paper to mobiles^.
Continuing concern over the safety of mobile phones has meant that articles 
on mobile devices have made the front pages of many British newspapers^. In 1999 
the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones, headed by Sir William Stewart 
began its work. The resulting recommendations were published in May 2000 and 
received considerable attention from the British press. A follow-up research 
programme has since been assembled, attracting £7 million of government funding" .^ 
Other aspects of mobile technologies have been the focus of media debate. The 
British government’s auction of third generation lieenses received extensive coverage 
on television and within newspapers and magazines. Articles continue to eirculate 
about mobile phones and crime, particularly street robberies.
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Mobile phones’ ‘intrusiveness’ in public places has frequently been 
complained about in newspaper editorials, as this quote from a Sunday Express 
column demonstrates.
For the many of us driven close to acts of psychopathic frenzy by the daily 
tyranny of mobile telephones users there is little cause fo r  optimism.
There is no stopping the terror. Even threats of brain damage have had no 
impact (‘How One Man Went to War over Mobiles’, Sunday Express, 23"^
April 2001:32. Emphasis added).
The tenacity and violence of the views expressed here is striking. The last sentenee 
exemplifies how other aspects of cultural discourses surrounding mobile technologies 
are incorporated within, and elaborated on, across texts. Whilst such texts do not deal 
directly with ‘the future’, they still contribute to the ways in which ‘future trends’ in 
relation to mobiles are spoken about and made to ‘make sense’. The line ‘...there is 
little cause for optimism’ tells us something about the way the writer envisages ‘the 
future’ in the pessimistic terms of ‘invasive’ technologies and ‘thoughtless’ users. By 
placing individual texts in the context of wider discourses of mobile technologies that 
often present them as both inevitable and desirable, we ean begin to assemble an idea 
of how different positions towards such technologies are taken up, maintained and 
challenged. This returns us to the assertion that mobile communication technologies 
warrant the attention of sociologists, or more precisely as is demonstrated in this 
research, that sociological methods can be employed to study mobile communication 
technologies and ‘the future’ from a fresh perspective. Over the last few years, social 
scientists have indeed begun to look at mobile communication technologies and it is 
to their work that I now turn. The main purpose of the following section is to outline 
work on mobiles that has already been undertaken so the reader may become better 
aequainted with this field of interest. I simultaneously highlight the distinct lack of 
research into the ways in which mobile communication technologies are eontinuously 
linked to ‘the future’.
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Ubiquitous and Invisible: Research into Mobiles
In line with the rise in mobile ownership and usage, and the proliferation of private 
sector research, there has been a growth in academic literature about mobiles and 
mobility. In 1999 there was relatively limited académie material within the social 
sciences and humanities about the ‘soeiaT and ‘culturaT aspects of mobile telephony. 
In 2003 the academic landscape looks very different. Edited collections (Brown, 
Green and Harper 2002, Katz and Aarkhus 2002) have emerged. Conferences dealing 
with various aspects of mobile technology have been organized (the ‘Wireless World’ 
conference series run by the Digital World Research Centre for example). In addition 
there exist various websites dedieated to mobile communications and the .‘Sociology 
of the Mobile Phone’ such as http://socio.ch/mobile/index_mobile.htm. Despite this 
flurry of academic activity, research into the ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ aspects of mobile 
communications remains at the borders of research into Information Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) more generally, with the Internet tending to be the focus of 
attention for many academics. Geser (2002) maintains.
Evidently, the cell phone seems to evoke much less intellectual 
enthusiasm and scientific research endeavours than the World Wide Web.
In the theoretical perspective of Manuel Castells (1996/1998) for instance, 
only the Internet is given the status of a mega-innovation that really 
counts, while mobile communication facilities are almost totally 
neglected. Sueh views ignore the basic facts that in comparison with PC’s 
and Net technologies, cell phones are used nowadays by broader strata of 
the population all over the world, and that for many users, they have 
stronger impacts on social life (Hession 2001) so that most of them are 
more ready to spend much larger sums of money on monthly phone bills 
than on Internet provider services (Geser 2002:5).
It has been suggested that mobiles did not receive the attention they deserved from 
academics since, compared to the Internet, these devices just did not seem that 
interesting. As Townsend (2002) suggests, ‘The mass diffusion of inexpensive mobile 
communications technologies avoided scholarly attention, perhaps because it seemed 
pedestrian compared to the fantastic, nebulous depths of cyberspace’ (2002:62). Ling
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and Haddon (2001) reviewing the literature on technologies’ role in generating or 
reducing mobility overall (i.e. whether they lead to more or less travelling) suggest 
that to date far more emphasis has been placed on ICTs such as the Internet than on 
the relation of the mobile phone to mobility.
Generally speaking this situation does appear to be changing, with more 
research on the ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ aspects of mobile telephony being undertaken. 
Moreover as mobile devices shift from having ‘simple’ voice (and later text) 
capabilities to being ‘entertainment and information centres’, their ‘pedestrian’ 
reputation is being challenged. Cooper (2002) notes how the recent proliferation of 
research into the mobile may be a direct result of the ‘.. .promise of convergence, and 
the imminence of its changed status as a point of access to other forms of information, 
and in particular to more widely discussed visually based technologies’ (2002:21) Just 
as the mobile phone is supposedly converging with other technologies to become a 
‘mobile entertainment device’ and the ‘mobile Internet’, so literatures may converge 
in an attempt to understand this emerging device. Academic work that was only 
recently not thought to apply to the mobile (on ‘new media’ and ‘cyberspace’ for 
example) may become more relevant (Cooper 2002:20). This shift indeed 
demonstrates the ongoing process of re-definition with regards to personal mobile 
technologies. What ‘a mobile’ is (or rather what it is defined/produced as) has 
changed considerably between 1999 and the present (2003) and seems likely to 
change again over the coming years.
Academic work on mobiles has played a part in this (re) definition process. 
Actor Network Theory and feminist technoscience studies for example ‘wrestle with 
the fact that they (and therefore their own aecounts) are socially located, non-innocent 
and therefore political performances...we take it that to tell technoscience stories is, 
in some measure or another, to perform technoscience realities’ (Law and Singleton 
2000:2). This implies that academic work cannot be said to offer simple descriptions 
of technologies (here mobile technologies) but instead produce performative stories 
that can have consequences for their own ‘descriptions’. In short supposedly ‘innocent 
descriptions’ can do things, contributing to the ever-shifting redefinition of 
technologies.
Current academic literature on mobiles includes work on national differences 
and cultural variations in uptake and usage of mobiles (Katz and Aakhus 2002). Ling 
and Yttri (1999) have looked at the ‘micro-co-ordination’ and ‘hyper-co-ordination’
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that people undertake with their mobiles. Micro-co-ordination is defined in this 
context as the role of the mobile in managing nuanced, instrumental co-ordination, 
whilst hyper-co-ordination refers to the expressive dimension of social and emotional 
communication, and the role the mobile plays in self-presentation to one’s social 
groupings (Ling and Yttri 1999, Green 2002). Work on the ‘micro-eo-ordination’ and 
/or ‘hyper-co-ordination’ (Ling and Yttri 2002) of people’s everyday lives that 
mobiles can make possible suggests that the mobile has had an impact on issues such 
as trust between spouses (Licoppe and Heurtin 2002), parent-child relationships and 
familial interactions (Baehen 2001), work-leisure balances (Gant and Kiesler 2002) 
and the mutability of arrangements and appointments between business colleagues, 
friends and family members on the acquisition of a mobile phone (Palen, Salzmann 
and Youngs 2001, Ling and Haddon 2001). Dealing with the prospect of ‘perpetual 
contact’, the ‘anywhere, anytime, anyone’ dream of a mobile life, these studies 
concentrate on the obligations and dependencies involved in ‘perpetual contact’, seen 
as both a blessing and a curse.
Academic study of mobile technologies tends to focus on current usage 
patterns and the meanings that are being conferred upon mobiles in the present. 
Whilst this work is extremely important given the ubiquitous nature of mobiles in 
people’s everyday lives, at least in the Western world, issues surrounding mobile 
technologies and the ways in which they are talked about in terms of the friture have, 
in my view, been neglected. If to talk about ‘the future’ is to delineate the meanings of 
mobile technologies that are possible it would seem that current academic literature 
on the socio-cultural meanings of mobiles can be complemented by shifting our 
attention to this under-researched discursive domain.
Some investigations of ‘mobile culture’ attempt to understand differenees in 
uptake, usage and meanings of mobiles between the various industrialised countries. 
One section in Katz and Aakhus’ (2002) edited collection on mobile communications 
deals exclusively with national perspectives and contexts. We learn that Finland 
currently has the highest number of mobiles per head in the world (Puro 2002:19), 
and that in Bulgaria the mobile has become the ultimate status symbol in a post­
communist setting (Varbanov 130-131) where currently only 2.5% of the population 
can afford the high cost of handsets and ‘talk time’. Academic literature on individual 
nations and mobiles frequently focuses on cultural specifics and political contexts of 
usage such as these. Puro’s (2002) work in Finland for example uses qualitative
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methods to study the implications for Finns of ‘perpetual availability’. ‘Perpetual 
availability’ is placed in the context of the stereotype of the ‘shy Finn’, leading to the 
hypothesis that Finns have taken to the mobile as a way of ‘making up for’ this 
‘natural’ national trait of communicative reticence (Roos 1993, 1994). Yoon (2002) 
has studied, via ethnographic methods, the use of, and cultural meanings of, mobiles 
amongst teenagers in Seoul, South Korea. Yoon argues that that ‘young users often 
tend to use the mobile phone in collectivist ways re-articulating the traditional norms 
of society’ (2002:1). It is suggested that in the context of Confucian and family- 
orientated South Korean society, teenagers have embraced mobile technology to 
extend these norms into non-familial areas, whereby ‘in the society which is grounded 
on kinship networks, the use of mobile phones strengthen and extend the kinship-like 
network outside the family, for example between peers or acquaintanees (2002:17). 
Work on mobile technology use in national settings has also been concerned with 
North America’s ‘failure’ to match trends of consumption in Western European 
countries. Robbins and Turner (2002) note that ‘the US mobile phone industry early 
on adopted stringent credit requirements that have been a significant barrier to mobile 
phone adoption for both young people and the ‘credit challenged” . Drawing on the 
work of Katz and Aspden (1998) they argue that it is this credit barrier that, more than 
anything else, has contributed to the ‘digital divide’ of ethnic/race, age and 
educational differences. In their view the extensive introduction of pre-paid mobile 
services in 1996 has gone some way to tackling this ‘digital divide’.
National differences and similarities with regards to mobile communication 
technologies are also the focus of research outside of the academic sphere. Sueh 
research generally focuses on the current and projected uptake of mobile devices and 
services. Research by consultancy firms (BWCS 2002, A.T. Kearney 2002) often 
concentrates upon the ‘success’ of mobile communication within the Asia-Pacific 
regions, holding them up as a kind of ‘ideal model’ for Europe and the US, as this 
quote exemplifies.
Consumers are sensitive to premium pricing of SMS and MMS messages 
- over two-thirds say they never send premium-priced messages. To date 
only Japan has managed to create acceptance o f premium pricing, and 
lessons learned there may be valuable worldwide (A.T Kearney 2002:32. 
Emphasis added).
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Such research tends to be primarily quantitative. Within academic literature there is 
relatively little comparative statistical work on mobile uptake and usage across 
regions and nations, although there is some regional comparative material on 
regulatory issues surrounding the telecommunications industry in general (Kerf and 
Geradin 1999). Comparative work tends to be incidental since researchers are often 
confined to their countries of residence when undertaking (qualitative) research on 
‘mobile culture’ and tend to take ‘snapshots’ of their own immediate socio-cultural 
settings. We have detailed studies of the behaviours of mobile users in Scandanavian 
countries (Ling and Yttri 2002, Kasesniemi and Rautiainen 2002) and in Britain 
(Murtagh 2002). However, there have been few attempts so far to compare the 
behaviours and attitudes of end-users’ from different countries and regions, although 
Kotamraju (2002) and Mante (2002) are notable exceptions.
Another concern for academics within the social sciences has been the use of 
mobiles in public spaces. Mobile phones users now have conversations with remote 
others in which the receivers’ half of the dialogue is usually audible to those whom 
are co-present. Some of these ‘conversations’ are of a profoundly intimate nature. In 
the past we have been privy to other people’s conversations in public spaces (in public 
houses or on public transport for example when quite often one overhears people’s 
conversations). Yet the advent of the mobile brings with it the lack of a co-present 
other. The ‘private’ phone call, through the mobile, has been brought into the ‘public’ 
sphere, leading researchers to consider the ways in which this challenges the supposed 
discreteness of both spheres.
The public/private distinction in social life and academic thought has long 
been under scrutiny, with writers attempting to confront the complexity and ambiguity 
of this ‘grand dichotomy’. The lines between public and private have served as key 
organising principles within Western thought in terms of social and political analysis, 
legal practice and jurisprudence and in moral and political debates (Weintraub and 
Kumar 1997). Feminist scholars have been partieularly critical of the eonstruetion of 
the dichotomy between these spheres, arguing that such a sharp distinction does not 
provide a useful or insightful way of making sense of soeial activity. It is asserted that 
a clear separation, despite not being generally borne out by empirical study, does 
provide an ideological function that has structured forms of political theory whieh 
marginalise women (Baker and van Doome-Huiskes 1999).
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Researchers reflecting on the public/private diehotomy in light of mobile 
phone use are by no means the first to challenge the division of these spheres, but 
nonetheless the growing body of work on mobiles does offer an interesting slant on 
the problem. Geser (2002) for example has looked at the influence of the mobile on 
face-to-faee gatherings. He sees mobile phone calls being taken in the ‘public’ sphere 
as having a ‘negative, destabilising influence’ on faee-to-face gatherings (ibid:2 1 ). 
Since calls tend to occur at unpredictable times, and ‘deeply anchored norms and 
habits’ (ibid:2 1 ) demand that calls are answered the moment they are received, a 
situation of normlessness and insecurity is created, whieh increases exponentially 
with the length of the call, and is related to the uncertainty among those co-present 
about how long the call will last (ibid:21). Plant (2000), focusing on the ringing 
mobile rather than mobile conversations, mirrors his concerns.
Many people feel irritated and disconcerted by this new electronic 
soundtrack. All ringing tones are disruptive and arresting...Like a calling 
bird, a ringing phone demands a response. Public uses of the mobile 
spread this tension to all those within earshot, while leaving them 
powerless to intervene: only the person to whom the call is made is in 
(Plant 2000:30).
Research on the relationship between public/private spheres and mobile devices 
frames debates about the possible ‘effects’ of these developing technologies and 
everyday social norms and practices. As mobile phones are produced as ever- 
changing, possibly convergent devices, so discourses shift to what might happen to 
the public/private dichotomy in ‘the future’. Recent debates about the appropriateness 
of adult services for mobile devices offer an example of these ever-changing 
concerns. Would it be appropriate for example to access pornographic material on 
one’s mobile whilst in a public space?^ What ‘versions of the future’ are being 
produced in relation to this issue? Futures where children are ‘at risk’ from such 
mobile-related aetivity? Futures that would see adult entertainment content driving 
operators’ revenues up? I argue that thinking about ‘the future’ in relation to mobile 
technologies can offer us a different perspective on the issues that current academic 
work is concerned with.
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As is demonstrated above, some academic work (Plant 2000, Geser 2002) on 
mobiles focuses on their ‘negative effects’, mirroring the popular press’s response to 
the ‘intrusiveness’ of mobiles in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However other 
researchers, drawing on Goffman (1963, 1971) and Schegloff (1986), have looked at 
the ways in which the ‘intrusiveness’ of mobiles in public spaces is skilfully managed 
by social actors. Based on observational investigations primarily in train carriages in 
Britain, Murtagh (2002) for example, notes ‘how activities with and responses to 
mobile phone use were almost invariably non-verbal in nature’ (2002:82). Murtagh 
(2 0 0 2 ) suggests that an ethnomethodological approach to situated practices is well 
suited to understanding how such non-verbal actions may be indicative of the ‘rules’ 
of cellular usage behaviour in public spaces. He found that users tended to avert their 
eyes, looking downward as they raised the ringing phone to their ear, and staring into 
‘neutral’ space throughout the call, only occasionally glancing elsewhere, whilst also 
adjusting their body posture, tending to turn way from co-present others (2002:84-86). 
Interestingly in light of Plant’s (2000) comments above about the intrusiveness of the 
ringing mobile, Murtagh (2002) also tentatively asserts that there may be certain 
‘rules’ about the number of phone rings ‘reasonably allowed’ in public spaces. He 
notes that ‘A number of instances were observed where the ringing of the phone 
continued for a longer period. In these instances there were two noticeable responses. 
The first is that those co-present would begin to stare in the direction of the ringing. 
The second is that others co-present would check to see if it was their phone ringing’ 
(Murtagh 2002:86). Ethnographically informed observational work of this kind has 
formed the basis for suggestions as to handset design, mobile applications and 
supporting hardware (Taylor and Harper 2001).
In recent years work has been undertaken on the role that mobile devices may 
play as ‘technologies of surveillance’. Green (2002) for example looks at the limits 
and possibilities of previous work on ‘surveillance’ in relation to mobile technologies 
(Foucault 1979, Lyon 1994, Spender 1995). From empirical work on and with 
teenagers. Green suggests that.
There are two kinds of monitoring to which teenagers and their activities 
with mobile technologies are subject. The first is monitoring the 
teenager’s state, whereabouts and activities through communicating via 
the mobile technology....the second...is in their use of mobile phones.
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where the object itself and the activities carried out through it become the 
focus of parental and school/institutional monitoring activity (2002:38- 
39^
Teenagers resisted ‘surveillance’ on both fronts. Green (2002) found that they would 
tell ‘half-truths’ about their whereabouts to parents, skilfully managing mutual 
accountability. They would go to the ‘unmonitored’ school toilets to use their 
mobiles, despite a ban on use on the school premises. However, the teenagers also 
cited the importance of communication with parents and ‘safety’ issues as reasons to 
have a mobile phone, and seemingly acknowledged the more specific ‘danger’ of 
ownership in and around school from muggings that fed the black market in mobiles 
and SIM cards.
Mobile technologies are also involved in surveillance dynamics through the 
promotion of self-regulation which ‘adds a number of mutual monitoring and 
accountability relations to more institutionalised forms of surveillance studied in the 
past...Quite apart from the use of devices for voice or text communication, 
monitoring other teenagers’ possession of mobile phones, the brand of phone and the 
service...are important ways that teenagers negotiate their status positions within 
complex teenage community relations’ (Green 2002:40). Teenagers, and people more 
generally, are making one another and themselves accountable through the mobile 
phone. Laurier (1999) argues that this accountability or routine/mundane surveillance 
comes to the fore with regard to location; the “where are you?” question that one asks 
and hears so often in mobile exchanges. This ‘mobile surveillance’ also consists of the 
creation and extension of our ‘digital personae’ (Clarke 1994) with our mobile 
consumption patterns coming under scrutiny through transaction-generated 
information (Phillips 1996, Green 2002) whilst ‘privacy’ renegotiations are occurring 
at the advent of location-based services on mobile devices (Dempsey et al 2001).
Teenagers have often been the focus of academic studies regarding the 
‘impact’ of the mobile on socio-cultural life (Green, forthcoming). This literature has 
focused on current patterns of mobile usage by young people as well as the symbolic 
meanings that are conferred on mobiles by this age group (Ling and Yttri 2002). 
Industry also conducts research on young people and mobiles. Wireless World 
Forum’s recent report ‘Mobile Youth’ (2002) being a case in point. The issues 
surrounding young people and mobile technologies are considered in more detail in
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later chapters, but perhaps the main point to make here can best be done through an 
anecdote. At the beginning of my involvement in the Socio-technical Shaping of 
Mobile, Multimedia and Personal Communications (STEMPEC) project it was 
suggested to the industry sponsors that the research team could look at different 
demographic groups in terms of their usage of, and their relationships with, mobiles. 
The suggestion that older people, perhaps even retired people, would be an interesting 
group to study was met with resistance from the sponsors’ representatives. Young 
people are so keenly associated with mobile technologies that the sponsors genuinely 
did not see the point of studying ‘older’ people, apart from those in work settings. As 
Green (2003) asserts there is a common assumption about ‘an affinity between young 
people, technology and ‘the future’...by implication placing all teenagers in the same 
identity and behavioural categories, and implying the formation of youth ‘subcultures’ 
(2003:1).
This chapter has introduced my research topic and contextualised its aims 
through a review of past and current research on mobile (communication) 
technologies. It should now be clear why the mobile is an important social, cultural 
and technological artefact in the modem industrialised world and why it deserves the 
further attention of social scientists. I have however argued that the future-orientated 
discourses that produce certain aspects of what we understand the mobile to be are an 
underdeveloped area of research. In the following two chapters I develop a framework 
with which to analyse these ‘versions of the future’ in relation to mobile 
communication technologies.
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Chapter Two: Resources for the Analysis of Future- 
Orientated Discourse
An Introduction to the Sociological Analysis of ‘the Future’
Using mobile communication technologies as a focus, this research principally deals 
with the ways in which different ‘versions of the future’ are produced as ‘factual’ and 
‘legitimate’, presented as self-evident and sometimes inevitable. It is beyond the 
scope of this study to look at ‘versions of the future’ in any general sense. 
Nevertheless, by reporting the literature I deem relevant to the sociological study of 
‘the future’, the ways in which future-orientated discourses can be interrogated is 
explored. I suggest that whilst this research concentrates on mobile communication 
technologies, it is possible to apply the study of future-orientated discourse to other 
technologies, material artefacts, different fields of knowledge, and a variety of social 
and material practices. As Brown, Rappert and Webster (2000) maintain, the future 
has come to be ‘defined as a contested object of social and material action: if actors 
are to secure successfully for themselves a specific kind of future then they must 
engage in a range of rhetorical, organisational and material activities through which 
the future might be able to be colonised’ (2000:3). This research seeks to detail these 
activities, whilst this chapter documents how certain sociologically-orientated writers 
can be used to aid this process.
Thacker (1998), in an example of the sociological analysis of future-orientated 
discourses, has looked at the ‘modes of legitimation - that is, the discourses and 
practices - through which bio-tech lays claim to the future of medicine, the body and 
normativity’ (1998:1) and how, in his view, these ‘modes of legitimation’ are 
becoming more and more reliant on the domain of science fiction. He takes the 
following excerpt from a Consulting Resources Corporation Newsletter as an example 
of this penchant for assertive prediction.
Rapid progress in genome science and a glimpse into its potential 
applications have spurred observers to predict that biology will be the 
foremost science o f  the 21st century. Technology and resources generated 
by the Human Genome Project and other genomics research are already
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having a major impact on research across the life sciences. The potential 
for commercial development of genomics research presents U.S. industry 
with a wealth of opportunities, and sales of DNA-based products and 
technologies in the biotechnology industry are projected to exceed $45 
billion by 2009 (Thacker 1998:1, www.ctheory.com/event/e087.html. 
Emphasis added).
Within corporate and popular literature, we find similar narrativised futuristic 
extrapolations and speculations in relation to the ‘development’ of mobile 
communication technologies and their potential for ‘impact’ upon our social worlds. 
How can sociologists trouble these and other accounts of ‘the future’ without 
resorting to empiricist distinctions of true and false beliefs? This question features 
throughout the following chapter.
As noted, talk of ‘the future’ is prevalent within contemporary commentary on 
mobile communication devices. Such talk may be specifically about mobile 
communications devices and ‘their’ future, and/or it may be about ‘the future’ in a 
wider sense (the future of family life for example), with aspects of that future linked 
to the advent of ‘new’ mobile communication technologies. The focus on mobile 
communication technologies acts primarily as a case study on which to base a more 
general consideration of notions of ‘the future’ as an important facet of our 
contemporary social world. However before the specifics of future talk about mobile 
communication technologies can be examined it is necessary to think about how ‘the 
future’ in more general terms has been approached within the social sciences.
Contested Futures
The approach I take here is to examine the textual schemas that are employed in order 
to make certain ‘versions of the future’ ‘commonsensicaT, including the processes of 
authorization within these texts. This involves scrutinising the ‘versions of the future’ 
embedded in texts on, and people’s accounts of, mobile communication technologies, 
and the reflections these versions yield on contemporary social life. How are these 
versions employed in everyday life, in terms of how they circulate and establish 
connections within the social world? What are they used for?
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This concern with the ways in which texts are made to be credible and appear 
‘objective’ pushes the issue o f reflexivity to the fore. As Potter (1996) notes,
If the book is revealing that facts are constructed by devices, what of the 
devices that it uses to construct the fact that facts are constructed by 
devices? Put another way, do the conclusions of the book have any 
implications for the book itself? (1996:9).
In a sense certain rhetorical devices employed throughout this research are used to 
construct an argument that predictions made about the future can be thought of as 
‘stories’ or ‘narratives’ about that future. This could amount to an attempt to render 
this account of the creation of ‘versions of the future’ more credible and ‘objective’ 
than the versions examined. In subsequent chapters the ways in which those who wish 
to produce a ‘version of the future’ frequently seek to create a safe space in which to 
do so are discussed. It can be argued that by relativising the predictions examined, a 
similar ‘safe space’ is created in which to critique them. Whilst this may be so, I argue 
that relativising predictions, that is moving away from thinking of them as ‘true’ or 
false’, opens up an invaluable critical space in which to analyse how such predictions 
are produced, authorised and legitimised.
This research draws in part on the tradition of ethnomethodological reflexivity 
(Lynch 2000). Descriptions from this viewpoint are not just about something but are 
simultaneously doing something. This point relates to the probing o f how accounts are 
formed. Looking at how accounts are formed replaces, or at least complements, work 
into why such accounts are formed, deepening the analysis of what those accounts are. 
Describing how representations are formed, and what resources are used to form 
them, does not necessarily evade the possibility that such descriptions are still 
representations in themselves. Describing how an account is formed still involves the 
creation of a representation. How have those writing within social studies of science 
tackled this problem?
Firstly, new literary forms are suggested. These forms write reflexivity into 
the account of accounts so to speak. The aim of such writing is to ‘shatter the “naïve 
belief’ of the reader in the text and make her more aware of the text’s artificial nature 
by constructing it so it more or less deconstructs itself (Knuuttila 2002:6), an 
example being Ashmore’s (1988) ‘The Life and Opinions of a Replication Claim’.
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Whilst experimental reflexive writing can be fun to do and to read, there are various 
critiques of such an approach. Firstly any literary innovation can become convention 
over time and through continued usage. Secondly it is often difficult to draw a line 
between what is the reader’s experience and what is the text, given that readers bring 
their own backgrounds and interpretations to any written material. Thirdly, such new 
literary forms, whilst claiming to be ‘open’ can often be impenetrable to all but those 
who are familiar with the debate surrounding epistemological reflexivity. Finally 
when concentrating on deconstructing one’s own account of the accounts of others, 
the content or ‘topic’ of one’s work can get lost in the twists and turns of self­
reference. This research has a clear ‘topic’, namely ‘the future with regard to mobile 
communication technologies’ and it would be a pity potentially to dissipate this 
clarity. Reflexivists make a vital point about ‘the epistemological demands of 
wholesale constructionism’ (Knuuttila 2002:6). Respecting this debate on reflexivity, 
consideration is given to the rhetorical devices this account of accounts of ‘the future’ 
utilises, such as the creation of a ‘safe space’ in which to analyse versions by 
relativising their truth claims.
Moreover, by ‘making exotic’ claims about ‘the future’ in relation to mobile 
technologies by questioning their truth claims, one achieves a sense of detachment 
that does not necessarily have to involve an assumption of superiority (Latour and 
Woolgar 1986, Woolgar 1988). One does not have to claim that one’s account is 
necessarily more ‘true’ than the accounts one is examining, more that an alternative 
view-point is being offered that employs different devices to make its assertions. 
Hesse (1980) used for example the notion that questioning the ‘truth’ of scientific 
claims (and this can be applied to any claims about ‘the future’) entails having a 
different relation to the notion of truth. ‘Truth’ for the relativist becomes something 
that works within a localised culture, meaning that it fulfils the criteria of ‘truth’ for 
that culture. Thus one can examine localised truths, that is how they are produced and 
how they ‘make sense’ to participants in that culture. This can work as a hypothesis 
from which we could then consider ‘whether its consequences are consistent with the 
rest of what we wish to affirm about knowledge’ (Hesse 1980:42). This means we can 
question whether the findings of the production of ‘knowledge’ about ‘the future’ in 
relation to mobile communication technologies could perhaps be related to knowledge 
about the future in other areas of social life. Looking at the ways in which ‘truths’ 
about the future of a mobile age are produced involves both immersing oneself in that
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‘local culture’ (of telecommunication companies, of end-users, of the writings of 
futurologists) and attempting to make strange those cultures and the localised truths 
they construct. Can ‘versions of the future’ be seen as ‘facts’ generated by certain 
devices, devices that make these futures seem ‘real’ and almost inevitable? I argue 
that stories are told about ‘the future’ based on what are viewed as the ‘facts’ of 
today. This means that versions of the future can be studied to reveal what 
assumptions are being made about our present social world, and how those 
assumptions are being extrapolated into the future realm (as a discursively produced 
domain).
Futures analysts or futurologists attempt to build up ‘factual’ accounts of ‘the 
future’. Their versions are (supposedly) built on present ‘facts’ (market figures, 
contemporary consumption patterns and scientific ‘truths’ for example). One way to 
approach these accounts could be to counter their claims to factuality with ‘truths’ of 
my own (produced through empirical research for example). However this is 
problematic, not only in the face of a relativised view of ‘truth’, but also because 
those working to produce accounts of ‘the future’ often attend to the role of 
imagination and science fiction references as part of the creative process of prediction 
(see Chapter Six for more detail). They also counter their claims to truth with 
warnings as to how difficult it is to predict the future, although clearly they go ahead 
with attempting the task. Approaching the study of ‘versions of the future’ through 
divisions of ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’, fact and fiction, would involve moving away from 
the relativism that sociologists of scientific knowledge have found so pertinent to their 
work. As Potter (1996) maintains.
Like money on the international market, truth can be treated as a
commodity that is worked up, can fluctuate, and can be strengthened or
weakened by various procedures of representation (1996:5)
This, in my view, is a helpful way of thinking about truth in the context of the 
construction of versions of the future. Accounts of the future-possible in relation to 
mobile communication technologies attempt to ‘work up’ their claims to truth through 
various representational devices. Pointing this out does not amount to a criticism in 
itself. Most accounts of phenomena (including my research) aim to produce feasible 
versions of their topic. The interest lies in how this working up of truth is undertaken.
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‘Versions of the,future’ as they are manifest in corporate literature, the popular 
press, science fiction and even sociological texts are built up as ‘future truths’ or 
rather ‘future-possibilities’, via the employment of various authorisation devices. 
How have those writing from a sociological perspective looked at the ways in which 
‘versions’ within different fields of social life are created, the ways in which ‘stories’ 
are made believable, the ways in which ‘facts’ are generated, and the manner in which 
‘factual accounts’ are produced and rendered coherent? Sociological tools of the past 
and present are employed to scrutinize the construction of ‘versions of the future’ 
within this research. Some of these versions are presented as ‘fact’, especially given 
the tendency for technological determinism that underpins many of these versions (of 
the ‘inevitable impact’ of mobile technologies on society for example). This research 
also constructs ‘facts’ of its own, about sociologically useful ways to think about ‘the 
future’, with a view to heightening overall credibility.
It is argued for example that there are profound epistemological differences 
between, (a) viewing ‘the future’ as open to prediction, control, and evaluation on the 
basis of ‘knowledge’ of the past and on present predictions, and (b) thinking of ‘the 
future’ as a socially produced concept which can be examined using discourse 
analytical techniques, as other ‘stories’ or ‘narratives’ of our past and contemporary 
social worlds can and have been. The above distinction correlates with Brown, 
Rappert and Webster’s (2000) analytical division between looking into the future and 
looking at the future. They note how,
.. .the intention here is to turn the analytical gaze towards the phenomenon 
of future orientation itself. The purpose of this analysis is not the future 
per se, but the ‘real time’ activities of actors utilising a range of different 
resources with which to create ‘direction’ or convince others of ‘what the 
future will bring’. As such our purpose is to shift the discussion from 
looking into the future to looking at how the future as a temporal 
abstraction is constructed and managed, by whom and under what 
conditions (Brown, Rappert and Webster 2000:4).
Brown, Rappert and Webster’s (2000) explicit focus on contested futures is dealt with 
in Chapter Three. In contrast the following sections of this chapter deal with literature 
that is not directly concerned with sociological ways of looking at the future (of
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which there are few) but which does provide relevant theoretical perspectives and 
useful resources for such a task.
It would have been possible to take a very different approach to studying ‘the 
future than the one proposed. To give an example, past predictions about future 
mobile technology markets could have been studied to see how they ‘measure up’ to 
the present situation, to ask whether they were ‘true’ or ‘false’ versions. Below, a 
brief examination of Merton’s (1973) approach to the sociology of science expands on 
this alternative. To look at how past predictions ‘fit’ with the present would mean 
embarking on, epistemologically speaking, a markedly different exercise than the one 
offered here. However, interestingly, Aldridge (1999) notes that social scientists 
usually shy away from making predictions or overtly challenging the predictions of 
others, ‘Prediction should not be seen as something confined to the caste of scientists. 
It is an everyday activity...’ (Aldridge 1999:5). Hence this work is probably more a 
product of a certain form of ‘training’ in sociology than one would care to admit. A 
market analyst would have little doubt about the viability of predicting ‘the future’.
Using Social Constructionism
This research relativises future-possible ‘truth’ claims in order to argue that there are 
multiple versions of the future which are constructed, authorised and made 
commonsensical using a variety of socio-cultural resources. Looking at the future 
rather than into the future involves the contention that ‘the future’ is socially 
constructed. Hacking (1999) usefully asks, ‘The social construction of what?’ As he 
points out, within recent years a vast array of topics have been approached in this 
manner from knowledge (MacKenzie 1981, Myers 1990) through to facts (Latour and 
Woolgar 1986) and technological systems (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1987). Will this 
chapter add to this melee? It is indeed asserted that ‘the future’ is socially constructed. 
Why else put the phrase in inverted commas? It may seem nonsensical to argue that 
the future is socially constructed. After all we all know that it is coming, the future, 
our future, the future of technologies, perhaps even an apocalyptic future in which the 
human race has no future at all. Indeed to talk about something having ‘no future’ 
acknowledges the possibility that other things will have a future. So what is the point 
of thinking about ‘the future’ in this way?
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The main tenet propounded in this research is that it is the very idea of the 
future that is socially constructed. Here ‘idea’ may not be the most appropriate word. 
We could replace idea with notion, or, as has been done here, version. So it is the 
social construction of versions of the future that are examined. However, as Hacking 
points out using the example of the social construction of women refugees.
Ideas (or versions) do not exist in a vacuum. They inhabit a social setting.
Let us call that the matrix within which an idea, a concept or kind, is 
formed.. .The matrix in which the idea of the woman refiigee is formed is 
a complex of institutions, advocates, newspaper articles, lawyers, court 
decisions, immigration proceedings. Not to mention the material 
infrastructure, barriers, passports, uniforms, counters at airports, detention 
centres, courthouses, holiday camps for refugees. You may want to call 
these social because their meanings are what matters to us, but they are 
material, and in their sheer materiality make substantial differences to 
people (1999:10. Emphasis added).
Following Hacking’s lead, we can think of the idea or the notion of ‘the future’ as 
being formed from within, and by, a matrix, or perhaps a web, of institutions. These 
incorporate national governments, academic institutions, think-tanks, regulation 
bodies, advocates (fiiturologists, environmental campaigners, technologists, policy 
planners), newspaper, magazine and web articles, lawyers and court decisions, and the 
proceedings of standard setting bodies (OFTEL and the European Commission for 
example). As Hacking asserts, whilst such a complex of institutions can be thought of 
as ‘social’ it is also profoundly material in the difference that it makes to people.
If notions of ‘the future’ are constructed by a matrix, or web of institutions, 
which can have a material impact upon people then it can be argued that ideas about 
‘the future’ have a role to play in the construction of meaningful technologies. The 
word meaningfril is added here because whilst notions of ‘the future’ may have an 
impact upon the very materiality of technologies, it is the meanings of mobile 
communication technologies (through the ‘matrix’ of the institutions and individuals 
concerned with ‘the future’) on which this research concentrates.
It is argued that the idea or notion of the future is socially constructed: what it 
will ‘bring’, what will or could happen, who will gain, and who will lose. Again, so
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what? This is where relating the social construction of ‘the future’ to a particular 
technology aids clarification of the issue. It is argued that not only is the idea of the 
future constructed from within a matrix of institutions and material settings. The idea 
or notion of mobile communication technologies is also socially constructed. What 
does this involve? It is to say that the ways in which we make sense of mobiles, what 
we think them to be capable of, and not capable of, are socially constructed. Mobiles 
are also called, although less so now, wireless phones. Here is an example of the ways 
in which we come to understand technology through linguistic depictions. It is a 
phone (which we understand from having telephones in our homes) without wires. 
But this depiction has shifted somewhat. Wireless phone is now more commonly used 
to describe a phone that does not have wires but is located in a house, that is a static 
wireless home phone. Now we have the phrase mobile phone; a phone without wires 
that can move around (with us) and is taken out of the house. Language is used to 
denote artefacts and in doing so indexes their possible meanings, uses, and 
capabilities. More recently we hear talk of ‘mobile entertainment devices’ and 
‘picture messaging’. We understand each word separately but brought together they 
change meanings, and change our understandings of the capabilities of artefacts. Ideas 
about the ftiture of mobile communication technologies are powerful in that they 
shape and are shaped by our understandings of the capabilities of material artefacts. 
The idea of the future within this matrix is socially constituted through talk of mobile 
communication technologies of the future whilst the meanings that are accepted, 
declined and debated all have material elements that do something in the social world. 
These material elements may consist of texts that circulate within a company’s 
intranet about a future-possible consumer market that remains untapped. They may 
also consist of ‘new’ high-end mobile devices that ‘look futuristic’ to low-end users 
and thus shift their notions of what is stylish in the ‘low-end market’, which in turn 
may feed back into the Research and Design departments of a handset manufacturer.
To adopt a purely social constructivist approach to versions of the future 
would involve a concern with the ways in which human actors are involved in 
constructing ‘the future’, the rhetorical devices they employ to make their versions 
‘commonsensical’ for example. Here the temptation is to cast technological artefacts 
as ‘merely’ the product of texts. Conversely a strong programme of technological 
determinism would involve looking at the ‘impact’ that certain technological 
artefacts, in this case mobile communication devices, may have on the (future-
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possible) social sphere. As Akrich (1997) points out, to adopt one or other of these 
approaches involves a separating out of the social from the technological.
To give an example, in setting out the ways in which mobile devices ‘impact’ 
upon ‘the social’, one has to make certain assumptions about what ‘the social’ 
consists of, now and in the future. ‘The social’ is thus viewed as an entirely separate 
entity to the technological tsunamis that continuously swamp it. Albertsen and Diken 
(2001) note that even within sociology there are a myriad of diverse notions of 
‘society’ and ‘the social’, which renders them essentially contested concepts. Rather 
than concentrating on the ways in which technical artefacts ‘impact’ upon human 
society, we may be better served thinking about the ‘associations’ between the two, 
the ways in which the human and non-human implicate one another in attempts to 
stabilise society’ (Latour 1986). So versions of the future from this perspective are 
neither purely technical nor purely social, but are constructed by hybrids of what we 
might call ‘social’ and ‘technical’ elements. What does this mean? A 
telecommunications corporation employs consultancy to advise them on building a 
value-chain model for a new mobile entertainment service. One consultant writes a 
proposal, circulates it via e-mail to a colleague who has had past experience in this 
field. Further advice is sought from a Digital Rights Management expert within the 
consultancy, who looks at precedents in the field and then seeks advice on appropriate 
billing models for this new service. A senior consultant visits various handset 
manufacturers to glean their understandings of their role in the value chain and whilst 
there plays with the latest mobile Java enabled handset, relating its capabilities to his 
colleagues when he returns^. We have here an example of the ways in which frames 
of interaction between non-human and human actants are not clearly demarcated. 
Rather they stretch across time and space, and move between different built 
environments, work practices, localised cultures, traditions of consultant employment, 
a ‘multiplicity of highly diverse dates, people and places’ (Latour 1986:231). Finally 
our consultancy has its report ready and sends it to the telecommunications 
corporation that later adapts and adopts it, for the time being. Without the material 
elements within these interactions, ‘human actions and words (would) not spread very 
far at all’ (Law 1994:23). It is through paying attention to both human and non-human 
elements (with regard to the ways in which versions of the future are produced) and 
the way that they are associated with one another, we can understand what these 
versions might do as part of the ‘society’ they hold together.
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Future-talk in relation to mobile communication technologies frequently 
forays into making predictions both about the ‘society’ that will or at least could exist 
if mobile technologies fulfil their promises. Here mobile technologies are ‘black- 
boxed’ so that they appear to be tangible entities with essential qualities that have the 
power to change society. Bowker and Star (1997) look at the missing work that makes 
certain technologies look and appear ‘magical’ when we do not understand them. For 
Bowker and Star, an examination of the production of classificatory schemas and 
(technological) standards help us move towards an understanding of the stuff that 
makes up networks of human and non-human actants (1997:2). Focusing on 
standards, Bowker and Star (1997) make a number of points whose relevance to 
exploring versions of ‘the future’ of mobile communication technologies soon 
becomes apparent. A standard is taken to be any ‘set of agreed-upon rules for the 
production of (textual and material) objects...they are often deployed in the context of 
making things work together...often enforced by legal bodies...(and) there is no 
natural law that the best (technically superior) standard will win - the QWERTY 
keyboards.. .and VHS are often cited in this context’ (1997:3). How does this relate to 
‘the future’ and mobile communication technologies? We can take the development 
of standards for mobile gaming as an example of the ways in which sociologically- 
orientated researchers can look at the work that goes into ‘black-boxing’ technologies; 
that is make them seem like magic’. In doing so one can question the assumptions 
about their (and our) future.
Classification schemes and standards are ubiquitous: within the ‘mobile arena’ 
there are a myriad of different technological standards that work at ensuring the user 
has a ‘smooth experience’^ . In mobile gaming for example, there are a number of 
trade organisations that are working towards standardising the programming language 
that the games are written in so that content developers can develop material that 
‘works’ cross-platform and cross-device. As Bowker and Star note, ‘The magic of 
modem technoscience is a lot of hard work’ (1997:14). The Mobile Gaming 
Interoperability Forum (MGIF) is one such standards organisation and attendance at 
one of their mobile interoperability workshops^ demonstrated just how much 
‘practical politics of classifying and standardising’ (Bowker and Star 1997:4) was 
involved. The programming language or mobile platform Java for instance would 
appear to be becoming the ‘favourite’ for standardisation, ‘winning’ over BREW^ 
although remaining in competition with proprietary platforms and operating systems
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such as Palm OS. Java is ‘winning’ (although whether it will ‘win’ remains to be 
seen!) not necessarily because content developers perceive it to be ‘the best’, but, at 
least in part, because mobile network operators appear to favour content written in 
this language, something which some developers are angry about, but are perhaps 
open to persuasion on^ .^
Most interesting with regard to the focus of this research were the frequent 
references to ‘the future’ that were made within the workshop, and within MGIF 
material handed out and available online^ \  End-user future scenarios were drafted out 
for discussion and it was debated which (technological) standard would be best suited 
to ‘satisfy’ the imaginary, future user. Why is this of interest? Bowker and Star (1997) 
go on to assert that classifications and standards are materially textured, ‘...both have 
material force in the world, and are built into and embedded in every feature of the 
built environment’ (1997:4). If current debates about standards in mobile gaming are 
in part based upon assumptions about future users and ftiture scenarios then does this 
not involve the intermeshing of ‘the future’, as an abstract temporal entity with ‘real’ 
effects, with the materiality of the here-and-now? The (presumed) future is enacted 
and acts within the present on decisions about ‘material’ issues. Thus it is suggested 
that the future’ has material force in the world, just as standards and classification 
schemas do (Hacking 1995). The standardisation of programming languages for 
mobile gaming relates to versions of the future in that what is deemed ‘best’ for the 
industry (to remain and/or become successful) as a whole, and for individual players, 
is constantly being related to ‘ideal’ future scenarios. Various actors argue (whilst 
others disagree) that Java is the most viable (present/future) option available if the 
industry wants gaming applications to be successful in the future, fulfilling the 
potential they are considered to have.
How are the characteristics of future-possible objects (such as a mobile 
entertainment device) defined? What subsequent hypotheses are made about future- 
possible social worlds? In what ways do certain ‘versions of the future’ insert these 
future-possible (technological) objects into future-possible social worlds that are 
created by this complex combination of what we think of as ‘the social’ and ‘the 
technical’? In later chapters data is used from a series of focus groups with young 
people to maintain that ‘versions of the future’ are produced through the fantastical 
imagining of future-possible technical devices, devices which are then (through talk 
and interaction with peers) embedded in participants’ (contemporary) everyday life-
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worlds and problematised there. What we tend to think of as separate spheres (the 
social and the technical), are skilfully combined by the teenagers to produce plausible 
‘versions of the future’.
One of the basic premises of social constructionism is that human actors 
socially shape technical devices and therefore ultimately have the ‘last say’ as to the 
uses and meanings they can have now and in the future. Technological determinism 
on the other hand takes the line that something inherent within mobile devices is 
futuristic, say their ‘anywhere anytime’ capabilities, and that such devices and their 
capabilities will have a particular impact on social relations in the future, that can be 
rightly or wrongly predicted. These dichotomous standpoints need to be questioned. 
This point is important since to concentrate on unpacking versions that deal with ‘the 
future’ in relation to mobile communication technologies, whilst an important 
analytical exercise in itself, can leave questions about what such versions do in the 
social world unexplored. ‘Versions of the future’ could be viewed as (non-human) 
actants themselves and it is in this sense that ‘the future’ may have material force in 
the world. Conversely, to concentrate solely on the ‘futuristic’ physical properties of 
mobile technologies (devices and services) and the ways these supposedly ‘drive’ 
human action and create wholly new patterns of social behaviour and perception, 
ignores the very socio-cultural work that goes into the production of these artefacts. It 
also fails to probe the attempts made by the various actors to ‘predetermine’ socio- 
technical relationships (Akrich 1997:208). Foucault (1991) for example concentrated 
on the material/technological as well as the social and discursive aspects of the 
assemblages investigated, and looked at the ways in which material forms, people and 
languages mesh to perform a series of effects (Foucault 1991, Law 1994). A version 
of social constructionism can by employed as part of a research framework to look at 
‘the friture’ without having to deny the materiality of mobile communication 
technologies, and without having to close off the possibility that versions of the future 
have material force in the world. However despite this concern with the ways in 
which versions may have material force in the world, here I concentrate on how these 
versions are constructed by the various parties involved. Whilst I see the process of 
the production of versions as a hybrid of the social and the material, my analysis 
focuses on how these versions are discursively constructed.
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Realism and Rhetorical Devices
This research does not amount to an exercise in forecasting what will happen in the 
future with regards to mobile communication technologies. Nor does it attempt to 
build a critique of current versions of the future by presenting ‘factual information’ to 
counter their claims. Finally it does not try to criticise past predictions about the 
future that is now our present. In my view none of these three research aims would 
trouble the very notion of ‘the future’ using information communication technologies 
(ICTs) as an example, and it is this that remains of primary interest.
To give a working example, a critique of past predictions about ‘the future’ 
that is our present would involve looking at the ‘errors’ (and their ‘sources’) that 
futurologists, market analysts and forecasters have made in the past in terms of their 
predictions for the present. To look at the fit between people’s predictions for the 
future and what ‘really happens’ (see for example Bell and Man 1971) implies a 
naturalistic approach to the social world - where the truth is out there to be discovered 
if the right tools are employed - an approach which has been much criticised by 
sociologists of scientific knowledge such as Collins (1981, 1983). In relation to talk 
about the future and mobile technologies we do not have to restrict ourselves to 
looking at mistaken predictions about the future. We can discard a concern with 
true or false predictions and look at talk about ‘the future’ in a much more general, 
‘everyday’ sense. Fields where there are controversies (about future uptake of third 
generation devices for example) and general agreements (that mobile ‘adult services’ 
will be a massive revenue generator in the future) may be studied without having to 
make judgements about the truth or otherwise of ‘future-talk’ in relation to mobile 
technologies. Rather we can look at the ways in which ‘truths’ about the future are 
generated.
However, we must be careful of pushing the debate about true and false beliefs 
too far, since to maintain the analogy would be to somewhat exaggerate futurologists ’ 
commitment to realism. Some writers, for example Arthur.C.Clarke (2000:35), add 
caveats to their work, maintaining that the ultimate unpredictability of the future 
always leaves forecasts open to error. Hottois (1981, 1984) notes how the 
futurological studies he surveyed contained disclaimers, usually in the introductory 
section, about the predictive power of the work. Those engaged in making predictions 
about the future do not always assert that their versions are right and that time itself
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will make them ‘real’. Rather my interest lies in how certain accounts of the future are 
constructed to make them seem the most plausible, or at the very least internally 
consistent.
I argue that if a version of the future succeeds in being convincing, then overt 
appeals to its ultimate truth are unnecessary. More subtle devices are frequently 
used within certain versions of the future to critique other versions. Sometimes writers 
produce extreme utopian and/or dystopian models of the future (Stephenson 1994, 
1995, Gibson 1984) that can be used to criticise the paucity of imagination of future 
‘realists’ and future instrumentalists. Future ‘realists’ on the other hand tend to 
maintain that extrapolation from present trends is all that can be done. From this 
viewpoint any ‘mistakes’ made are deemed to spring from ‘knowledge errors’ in the 
present, or from the unrealistic hopes of life’s dreamers. For means-orientated 
instrumentalists the ends entailed in the future are pretty much the same as those that 
inform the present’ (Michael in Brown et al 2000:27), with government linked 
programmes such as Foresight tending towards the projection of present-day 
conditions (market driven, global capital, national competitiveness) into the future.
To add another dimension to this story, there appears to be the possibility of 
crossover and strategic ‘borrowing’ at work in some versions of the future. Some 
instrumental accounts contain elements of (reductionist) utopianism. One example is 
the envisaged prospect of self-realisation and the transcendence of the supposed 
restrictions of corporality through consumer devices and services as in recent 
television advertisements for BT’s Genie services^^. On the other hand, ‘radical’ 
environmental activists insist that utopian futures are the only truly plausible ones if 
humans are to continue to exist. ‘The future’ is indeed a contested space, with a 
multiplicity of versions and visions all vying for ascendancy, attempting to assert 
what ‘the future’ will be, and/or should be, like. A simplistic critique of examples of 
overt realism is insufficient to deal with the myriad of devices employed to make 
versions of the future coherent and plausible.
The above discussion of the diverse rhetorical devices used by those 
producing versions of the future leads us to the question of why such effort is made to 
establish particular versions as more or less viable than others. Why exactly is ‘the 
future’ such a contested space? What benefits may be accrued by those that are able to 
establish a (relatively) stable version of the future in relation to mobile 
communication technologies? One has to not only contemplate how versions are
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made ‘commonsensicaT, but also reflect on what such versions of the future may be 
able to do in the ‘social’ world. Without going so far as maintaining that (temporarily) 
accepted versions of the future wholly determine present and future-possible talk and 
action, we can consider the possibility that having ‘ownership’, however transitory, of 
a version of the future that is considered viable or even inevitable, may at least be 
seen to have possible implications for what talk and action is deemed acceptable and 
feasible in the present moment.
Social Interests and ‘The Future’
The theory of social interests, developed by Barnes (1977), Bloor (1991) and Shapin 
(1982) among others attempts to explain the content of scientific knowledge in terms 
of various kinds of interests. What are the possible advantages and disadvantages of 
studying the production of scientific knowledge from such a perspective? Can such a 
theory of social interests lend anything useful to explaining the content of ‘knowledge 
about the future’? One question to keep in mind here is ‘Where and how should the 
analyst locate future-orientated agency: in a future representation, in its authors or in 
agents who cannot properly be said to harbour expectations of any kind at all?’ 
(Brown, Rappert and Webster 2000:10) It is suggested, via a critique of reductionist 
interest-based theories, that to locate future-orientated agency primarily within 
‘authors’ in terms of their social interests, can be rather problematic. However, there 
are some elements of social interest theories of knowledge production that can be 
utilised when considering ‘versions of the future’.
The grammar used in making claims about the future in relation to mobile 
telecommunication technologies involves certain conceptions of agency that are 
projected onto the future itself. This is manifest in the repeated use of will. Authors 
frequently envisage ‘what the future will bring’ or what ‘the future will be like’. The 
use of assertive grammar frames claims as facts, that one day certain 
technologies/practices will be reality. Within reductionist theories of social interests it 
is suggested that scientists make certain claims about reality because it is in their 
interests to do so. In order to study the relation between social interests, scientific 
truth, indeed the very production of scientific knowledge, it was deemed relevant to 
look at all the possible factors causally relevant to the acceptance of a scientific idea.
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Would it be possible to look at all the possible factors causally relevant to the 
acceptance of an idea about what the future will be like?
Writers such as Barnes (1977) Bloor (1991), Shapin (1982) and Pickering 
(1984) place emphasis on the role of scientists’ background culture and broader social 
allegiances. Macro-analytical approaches, such as those associated with the so-called 
strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, treat these social relations 
as an external variable (external to ‘science’ that is) and scientific judgement as a 
dependable variable (i.e. affected by social interests). Those within this tradition 
primarily attend to the role of social phenomena, such as widely held social and 
political ideologies or group professional interests, on the settlement of scientific 
controversies. Their focus also encompasses interests as a product of the local 
disciplinary context in which scientists (or say futurologists) act - getting work 
published, bringing ‘innovations’ to the attention of specialist or mass media, working 
up potential ‘competitive advantage’. Andrew Pickering’s (1984) study of competing 
professional interests in the interpretation of high-energy particle physics 
experiments, and Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s (1985) study of the controversy 
between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes about the proper interpretation of 
experiments with vacuum pumps are two examples of work using the (reductionist) 
‘social interests’ approach. Wynne (1979) for example attempted to demonstrate the 
part played by social interests in a debate about the nature of ‘ether’ in late Victorian 
times. He asserted that ether theory as proposed by Cambridge University professors 
was drawn upon as a moral discourse to legitimate the group’s own social ideals, in 
opposition as it was to the fast-growing secular ideology of scientific naturalism and 
individualism. As Potter (1996) notes, Wynne asserts that.
It (Ether theory) was believed because of the ideology of its proponents,
and these proponents used the theory to justify that ideology (Potter on
Wynne, 1996:39).
There is much to be gained from thinking about social interests in this manner. The 
voices that present particular versions of the future as involving the ‘inevitable’ 
adoption of certain ‘new technologies’ are frequently those employed in the ICT field, 
for example futurologists employed by telecommunication companies and technology 
journalists. To look at the issue in this manner would be to understand how such
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groups’ social, and financial, interests are implicated in the content of ‘versions of the 
future’, that is the ‘knowledge’ they produce and the attempts they make to stabilise 
them as ‘truth’. To such ends interest theory proves extremely useful when thinking 
about how the content of particular ‘versions of the future’ can be linked to certain 
groups’ social allegiances. The Mobile Entertainment Forum (MEF) for example has 
put out this press release on its website.
The Mobile Entertainment Forum (MEF), the world's leading open 
industry forum dedicated to all aspects of the mobile entertainment, 
including games, invites press and analysts to a panel of industry leaders 
& pundits examining the implications of wireless for electronic 
entertainment. The past twelve months have confirmed that mobile 
entertainment including game-play via mobile phones is one o f  the biggest 
growth areas in the content and entertainment industries today, with the 
capability o f reaching hundreds o f millions o f users around the world.
The MEF's panel on the future of mobile gaming assembles industry 
leaders to explore the challenges and opportunities of mobile games for 
publishers, developers, and media companies entering this market 
(www.mobileentertainmentforum.org/on_the_road.shtml, 28/11/2002. 
Emphasis added).
The assertions highlighted in this press release are common within trade organisations 
representing the mobile industry. There is nothing particularly surprising about this, 
but what could be considered interesting from a ‘social interests’ viewpoint is the 
ways in which the industrial allegiances of MEF lead to certain technoscientific 
events occurring. In such meetings, debates about standards, about funding for white 
papers on issues that industry players feel need attention, and about the advantages 
and disadvantages of certain prediction models are debated^^ Many of these debates 
relate to what the future will, and/or could bring, i f  the industry ‘gets it right’. Clearly 
theories about the future direction of the industry, models of the behaviour of future 
consumers and so on, are of critical importance to companies and their employees. 
MEF presents itself as a not-for-profit organisation dedicated to serving the industry. 
It is also an organisation that needs to attract new members (as it is run on 
subscription fees from industry players), has an interest in the buoyancy of the mobile
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entertainment industry (without the survival of old members and the recruitment of 
new members it would cease to exist), promulgates a positive outlook for that 
industry, and promotes industrial self-regulation (in adult services for example) as a 
way of protecting friture profits and markets. Here we see how upon further 
investigation, it may be possible to align MEF’s social and political allegiances with 
its pursuit for more ‘secure’ knowledge about that friture, and possibly the content of 
that knowledge.
However there may be a danger in the tendency to strive to produce a realist 
account of a particular area of trade organisation members’, futurologists’, or say 
science and technology journalists’ work, particularly as it requires co-ordinating 
accounts of scientific and technological events, beliefs and groupings with social 
groupings, classes and their ideologies (Potter 1996:39). Practically speaking 
producing such a correlation can rest on producing a homogenising, often rigid, 
account of social allegiances, a device which the advent of postmodernist thinking has 
questioned (Owen 1997). Perhaps the trick is to consider broader socio-political 
narratives such as ‘liberal democracy’, fr-ee market capitalism and identity discourses 
(such as gender and age) and their relation to the production of certain ‘versions of the 
future’ rather than locating social interests within individual authors and/or social 
and/or corporate groupings. As Brown et al (2000) argue for example, powerful 
political narratives can capture future promises; liberal democratic political narratives 
promise those in subordinate positions the rewards experienced by the better - off if 
they play the ‘rules of the game’ as set out by those already in dominant positions. 
Similarly,
There is...a politics of the future which involves different forms of
selection and boundary work - that of gender and the patriarchal future
which informs literature, including science literature (Brown et al 2000:9).
A later examination of some ‘versions of the future’ as produced by corporations and 
futurologists should serve to further highlight this point (see Chapter Six). It may be 
problematic to search for a ‘fit’ between authors’ social allegiances and background 
cultures and the content of versions of the future produced, or scientific work 
produced as Wynne (1979) attempted. We need to be aware of the possibility of 
manifestations of diverse social interests within data collected, for example the ways
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in which ‘the consumer’ is represented as a dominant model for social relations in the 
future. To give a specific example, how might an inquiry into the ways that 
‘expertise’ is called upon to authorize predictions of a ‘Wireless World’ within texts 
help us understand exactly how different social interests and allegiances are 
employed? Such questions tackle how interests are managed when constructing (and 
undermining) ‘factual’ accounts of ‘the future’ and how ‘category entitlement’, that is 
entitlement to speak on a certain issue, is established. Mobile telecommunication 
companies may employ expertise (for instance from independent research bodies) to 
justify investments in certain technological developments and to authorise their claims 
about the future. The notion of category entitlement demonstrates the crude 
tendencies of reductionist interest theories, which have been subject to much criticism 
in its above formulation. Social interests do seem to be involved here, but what is 
important is not merely to point out the role of social interests in knowledge creation, 
but to look at how those interests are built up and managed through talk about what 
the future should and/or will be like.
To speak of category entitlement indicates that social interests cannot be 
thought of as essentialist facets of certain actors. In Barnes’s (1981) version of social 
interests, the researcher’s task is to seek out and make explicit the role of supposedly 
given, causally effective ‘background interests’, explicating their operation in the 
production of (scientific) knowledge. Summarizing a fascinating debate between 
Barnes, Woolgar, and Mackenzie^"  ^ on the merits or otherwise of a ‘naturalistic’ 
version of social interests theory. Gallon and Law (1982) propose a ‘third way’ which 
avoids the discarding of an interest in interests so to speak. Using a case study on a 
group of scientists working on the effects of a polymer called DIVEMA, thought to 
have chemotherapeutic qualities, on pinocytosis^^ they attempt to demonstrate, in 
agreement with Woolgar (1981), that ‘scientists are constantly engaged in monitoring, 
evaluating and attributing the potential presence or absence of interests in the work 
and activities both of others and themselves’ (Woolgar 1981:371). Gallon and Law 
(1982) use excerpts from interviews with two groups of scientists working on the 
project to demonstrate the ways in which interests themselves are produced within the 
work setting, and that choices (in this instance about which journal to submit the work 
to) are relational to the imputed interests of other actors involved. Interests thus are 
constituted within the local context and do not necessarily need to be seen as 
springing from essential identities of the actors involved (in the MEF example as
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broadly speaking ‘middle-class’ liberals and entrepreneurs). Gallon and Law (1982) 
talk of the ultimately precarious nature of these actors’ ‘interest maps’ (1982:617), 
pointing to the ways in which the actors’ interests became revised, their ‘interest 
maps reworked, in light of the ‘failure’ to translate their interests to the journal 
referees (following a letter of rejection).
This manner of exploring the role of interests in the creation of ‘knowledge’ 
(and success or otherwise of actors, ‘big’ or ‘small’) refutes the idea that interests are 
somehow external, located in the ‘real’ social world which impact upon actor’s 
actions and experiences. The view that interests are located within the actor in the 
form of beliefs linked to essential identities and immutable social positionings is 
disputed. Rather this take on interests (thought of as fluid, provisional, relational) 
presents them as being constituted within patterned networks of diverse (not simply
human) materials (which would include the demands of writing for scientific 
journals). Gallon and Law (1982) uphold.
We are concerned with the manipulation and transformation of interests, 
since we see all social interests as temporarily stabilized outcomes of 
previous processes of enrolment...the theoiy of enrolment is concerned 
tvith the ways in which provisional order is proposed, and sometimes 
achieved (1982:622).
By asking what actors are trying to achieve when they say ‘it is in your interests to ...’ 
or ‘it IS in our interests to ...’ (present a particular versions of the future of mobile 
devices to consumers for example), we can get to the ways in which they are tiying to,
...impose order on a part of the social world. They are tiying to build a 
version of social structure. In this view interests...are not to be seen as 
background factors to be imputed by the analyst...In the present context 
our concern is thus with the fate of interests and social interest groups as 
one important part of the (contingently) coercive entities that influence 
and structure action (Gallon and Law 1982:622).
This approach hence avoids criticisms of essentialism, and the criticisms of attributing 
certain actors’ motivations to ‘behind the scenes’ social interests which the researcher
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must ‘uncover’ to explicate the ‘real’ cause of certain forms of knowledge production 
over others. My research draws on this version of non-essentialist interest theory to 
look at how interests are ‘manipulated and transformed’ (Gallon and Law 1982:622) 
in attempts to propose (and sometimes achieve) forms of order, or patterns of 
ordering, on ‘the future’ in relation to mobile telecommunication technologies. 
Through the analysis of various versions of the future we can move towards a better 
understanding of the ways in which interests themselves are produced, broken down 
and reworked. It is in this sense that we can think of versions of the future as 
persuasive accounts with the possibility of material force in the world.
The Production of ‘Factual’ Accounts
Gontinuing with an examination of the theoretical perspectives and resources brought 
to bear on this examination of ‘versions of the future’ as ‘factual accounts’ and 
‘truths’ produced and worked up by various social actors, we now turn to 
ethnomethodology’s contribution to our understanding of fact production and the 
representation of reality. Ethnomethodogy’s view of language in everyday life has had 
a vital influence on studies from the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. Within the 
Mertonian model of science (Merton 1957, 1970, 1973), the concentration is on 
explaining scientific error; asking how and why ‘mistakes’ are made within 
descriptions of the ‘natural world’ that science is meant to be generating. Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge sought to highlight the epistemological difficulties with such a 
‘storybook’ view of science. Similarly, ethnomethodology has sought to challenge 
and move away from a traditional view of language in which descriptions are 
evaluated in terms of their ‘fit’ with the ‘object’ of concern. The traditional view of 
language assumes that factual accounts are the linguistic impressions left by the 
‘actual’ object (Potter 1996). This model restricts analysis to explaining the ‘errors’ 
made in factual accounts, predominantly achieved by pointing to social or 
psychological processes that are supposedly interfering with processes of ‘describing 
reality’.
The relevance of ethnomethodology in relation to an examination of the 
production of ‘versions of the future’ as ‘factual’ or at the very least viable, resides in 
its approach to language, where accounts considered elsewhere as ‘true’ or ‘false’ are 
treated in the same way. Ethnomethodology’s concern with reflexivity is also
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relevant, in that it explores the ways in which descriptions and representations of 
facets of the world are not just about something but are also doing something. This 
corresponds with Brown et al’s (2000) distinction between looking into the future and 
looking at the future. We may analyse descriptions of the future in order to look into 
it, if we believe that such descriptions somehow correlate with the ‘object’ of 
description. We can ask whether such descriptions are true or false. However, to 
follow ethnomethodology’s concern with reflexivity, we can look at the future, to 
question what such descriptions are doing, to ask how such descriptions are involved 
in the world in a practical way (Garfmkel 1967), which breaks down the dualism 
commonly assumed between a description and its object. We can think of the social 
world as replete with stories, versions and representations of that self-same social 
world. Writers such as Sacks (1970/1992, 1978) and Garfmkel (1967, 1986) 
evocatively portrayed such versions and representations as highly organized and 
consequential’, doing things within the social world they are supposedly ‘merely’ 
describing. Social reality for ethnomethodology is an intersubjective accomplishment. 
Garfmkel writes,
I use the term ethnomethodology to refer to various policies, methods, 
results, risks, and lunacies with which to locate and accomplish the study 
of the rational properties of practical actions as contingent ongoing 
accomplishments or organised artful practices of everyday life 
(1972:309).
The role of text and talk in the daily accomplishment of activities (often in 
institutional settings) is examined, with texts being thought of as ‘active social 
phenomena’ (Watson 1997:80). In a sense, if, as Giddens (1999, 1999a) has asserted, 
we live in an age where knowledge production ironically makes ‘the future’ ever 
more unknowable, then the stakes for competing versions of the fiiture to attempt to 
achieve something, to produce ‘what will be’, to be consequential and ‘active’, are 
raised significantly, since
...there is no way that the accumulation of knowledge will allow us to 
simply colonize the future, to carve out the future as a space which we can 
just invade and colonize. The very development of knowledge actually
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makes the future more rather than less opaque...The idea of risk only 
develops when you have a society, which actively tries to break away 
from the past and conquer the future.. .But with the rise of Modernity you 
have a society bent on changing the future (Giddens 1999).
Could it be that within attempts to authorise certain versions of the future, for 
example the British government’s Foresight programme’s attempt to produce a sense 
of a commonly shared future, there exists an element of risk minimization? Below is a 
summary of the outputs that are expected of Foresight funded projects, with an 
emphasis on ‘discovering’ through the creation of future scenarios, ‘what success will 
look like’ and linking business and government in this process.
All Foresight projects should deliver: thorough and up-to-date information 
and analysis of recent developments in relevant science and technology, 
including an international perspective, and forecasts of what the next 
developments might be; visions of the future, reflecting the potential 
impact of science and technology, and of forecast social and economic 
trends, i.e. what success will look like; recommendations fo r  action, by 
research funders, business, Government or others, to make the most o f the 
potential o f science and technology; networks of people who recognise 
the importance of the issues addressed by the project, and are keen to take 
the recommendations forward. Given the long term nature of the 
programme, we expect that recommendations will most often focus on 
research and development, though they may also, as in previous rounds, 
tackle issues such as Government regulation, skills and training, where 
these affect the scope for science and technology to bring economic and 
social benefits {Outputs, www.foresight.org, November 2002. Emphasis 
added).
If certain accounts become successful in their attempts to be considered ‘factual’, 
which in turn may render them more consequential or ‘active’ within the social world, 
the risks perceived as inherent in an unknowable future would be minimized for the 
‘winners’. Why indeed invest so much time and energy in trying to produce ‘factual’
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versions of the future and contesting rival versions of the future if these accounts were 
completely inconsequential^ To attempt to possess a dominant version of the future is 
to act to minimize the risk of the unknowable ‘Other’ of alternative ‘versions of the 
future’.
Garfmkel’s work on the ‘documentary method of interpretation’ has been 
employed to consider the generation of factual accounts within institutional settings 
(see Atkinson 1978), although his original work concentrated on interactions between 
two individuals. Garfinkel (1967) emphasizes the role that people’s background 
expectancies, models and ideas play in understanding events and actions. As 
understanding is gained, people’s background expectancies are modified to account or 
‘make room’ for their ‘new’ understandings. Garfinkel’s experiments, involving a 
‘student counsellor’ returning yes/no answers to participants’ questions in a random 
manner, pointed to the ways in which people modify their past understandings of 
accounts on the advent of contradictory ‘evidence’. Garfinkel (1967) found that 
subjects would rework the sense of the therapists’ answers to fit in with their 
normative understandings and background expectations. His experiments, whilst in no 
way naturalistic, and somewhat unethical, did make explicit the work involved in 
generating meaning. In particular, Garfinkel’s notion of the retrospective-prospective 
orientation of ‘the documentary method of interpretation’ points to the flexibility 
involved in incorporating ‘new evidence’ into certain views of the social world; the 
sense of what had passed was constantly open to reworking for the participants in 
Garfinkel’s ‘student counsellor’ study.
This point has been made in relation to the fluidity of ‘factual’ accounts of 
(macro) historical events, an argument that calls into question the simple and linear 
passing of time, since the past can be ‘reworked’. It also has implications for ways of 
exploring ‘versions of the future’. If people understand the world in terms of 
background expectations, models and beliefs which are in turn modified by 
understanding gained in a circular process, then our understandings of ‘the future’ can 
be said to rest on our (present) background expectations which are in turn modified as 
we interpret ‘new evidence’ about ‘the future’ and ‘what it will be like’. Contesting 
‘versions of the future’ thus becomes firmly grounded in processes of everyday life 
and the ways in which we strive to understand events and actions in the past, present 
and future. In addition, analytically speaking, an exploration of ‘versions of the
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future can serve to illuminate those self-same background expectations, models and 
beliefs.
Layers of Meaning and Mobiles
Post-structuralism places discourse analysis at the heart of the social-scientific 
endeavour, with consequences for disciplines as varied as anthropology, history, law, 
social psychology and sociology. For instance, post-structuralist logic maintains that 
historic facts or legal facts’ are discursive constructions. As a consequence, 
histories of technologies fall within the scope of narrative analysis, while judicial 
decisions can be seen as products of discursive practices that are socio-historically 
dependent. Researchers in the (post) structuralist tradition have developed, for the 
most part, an explicitly critical stand towards fact construction. They have sought to 
demonstrate the ways in which particular representations of the world (and in relation 
to my work this could be extended to representations of future worlds) are partial, 
related to interests, or work to shroud the exercise of power. Such a concern relates 
closely to what I intend to achieve in relation to versions of the future, but as 
mentioned above (see critique of reductionist theories of social interests), there are 
difficulties with the consideration of power thought of in terms of interests when 
interrogating texts and exploring fact construction. Despite these reservations, what 
theoretical resources can writers within these traditions offer to an analysis of 
‘versions of the future’?
De Saussure’s (1974) work aimed to dispel the traditional view of the 
correspondence between word and object and argued against the notion that somehow 
words derive their meaning by standing in for things in the world. He asserted instead 
that terms draw their meanings from sets of relationships or contrasts. In short he 
maintains that,
...in language there are only differences. Even more important: a 
difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference 
is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms 
(De Saussure, 1974:120).
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The wider implications of de Sassure’s work involve understanding language as much 
through what is not present as through what is. In trying to understand the underlying 
system that de Saussure argued gives words their full sense, looking at one utterance 
is never sufficient. The process of linking or connecting expression (say ‘mobile’) and 
content (say ‘communication’, ‘high-tech’, and ‘information’) is social, depending as 
it does upon the perspective of the observer(s). A sign (something that represents or 
stands for something else) is essentially incomplete since it requires an interprétant, 
and/or context. Understanding the system involves looking at the whole set of 
possible ‘utterances’, be it in the fields of language or even fashion, the latter forming 
part of Barthes (1972, 1983) prolific writings on language.
Barthes utilised de Saussure’s assertion that meaningful units or signs are 
produced by the combination of concepts and ‘sound images’. To give an example, 
the concept of a portable communication device is combined with the ‘sound image’ 
of mobile phone to make up a meaningful linguistic sign: ‘mobile phone’. The 
possession of signs such as this enable people to communicate with each other. We 
can say things like ‘My mobile rang late last night’ and (hopefully) be understood. 
This seems like an obvious point, but Barthes (1972) extended it by maintaining that 
in human cultures signs are combined with new concepts at another level, in what he 
calls cultural association myths. To apply this process to my example, if  mobile 
phones are seen in business environments, mainly in the hands of ‘wheeling and 
dealing’, sharp-suited ‘city lads’, they can come to signify those things; hence the 
former association of mobiles with ‘Yuppies’ as seen in the 1980s.
That is of course not the end of this particular story. Since mobile phones may 
be used as ‘posturing’ or ‘lekking’ devices (Lycett and Dunbar 1999), then they may 
develop a further ‘layer’ of signification; that the user is fashionable, or indeed 
unfashionable. Similarly, as new users take up such devices, new layers of 
signification are built up, some of which may challenge previous significations. The 
association between teenagers and text messaging (SMS) is a case in point. The 
materiality and technical capabilities of ‘mobile phone’ are indexed to socio-cultural 
significations. These meanings also rely on the cultural membership of the ‘reader’. 
So mobile phone can come to signify youth and sociability, an essential business tool, 
and an indication of the ‘arrival of the future’. Advertisers seek to build on and extend 
these ‘cultural association myths’ for the purposes of brand awareness and profit 
making. This process means that a simple correspondence between a term’s dictionary
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definition and its cultural significance(s) is rare. In the year 2000, saying someone 
owns a Nokia WAP-enabled mobile can be used to imply certain things about that 
person; that they are fashionable and an ‘early adopting’ technophile who probably 
likes science fiction for example, just as saying someone was wearing Red Tab 
Twisted Levi jeans in the same year would imply something about that person, 
perhaps that they were youthful, fashionable and a relatively well-off urbanite. 
Similarly meanings change as new models are launched and new services and 
applications are added to what we currently ‘know’ to be the ‘mobile phone’. Cultural 
association myths thus can have material objects and practices that they seek to 
represent. Here the boundaries between the material and the textual, the social and the 
technical are troubled.
Two related criticisms have been levelled at work on the process of semiosis. 
The first deals with semiology’s cognitivist tendencies. De Saussure tends to place the 
system of differences in the minds of speakers, producing in effect a psychological 
map that moves us away from actual language practices and towards cognitive 
scientific models of mental processes (Thibault 1997). The second criticism is linked 
to exactly how the underlying system of differences that make up language is to be 
investigated. Asserting that a system of differences exists can be a useful argument in 
principle but practical investigation can prove more problematic. Indeed it is 
interesting that Barthes’s (1972) Mythologies does not use in any systematic manner 
the categorizations developed by semiology. Rather he employs his own ‘member’s 
understanding’ of French culture to investigate its underlying assumptions, much as 
was done in the above example of the possible second-order significations of mobile 
phone.
The writings of Barthes are complex and it is impossible to do them full 
justice here. However, an attempt is made to draw on some of semiology’s ideas, 
especially those which deal most explicitly with ‘fact production’, to consider how 
they can be related to an exploration of contemporary ‘versions of the future’. It has 
been hinted that Barthes’s (1972) work on second level signification could be used to 
analyse the ways in which mobile communication devices can be made to have 
futuristic significations and can become culturally associated with certain (techno- 
scientific) ‘versions of ‘the future’. Further, whilst Barthes was concerned with 
exploring the construction of realism from the outset, he later distanced himself from 
semiology and lost confidence in the possibility of a definitive ‘science’ of meaning
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(Barthes 1991). Barthes maintained that realism, rather than reflecting the world in a 
naïve manner, was itself an enticing story that has nature producing its own 
representations, a story which obscures the human work that goes into the production 
and generation of ‘facts’ and ‘truths’. We gain a hint of the power of realism’s 
representations of the future in the grammatical use of ‘will’ in visions of the future. 
Obscuring the human work that is involved in producing such futures, time is 
represented as a natural force that brings inevitable consequences. As Brown et al 
(2000) argue,
.. .time itself is reified into acting determinately raising broader questions 
of how it is that agency becomes a property of time and ‘the future’ rather 
than the ordering practices that produce it. Such practices thus become 
concealed behind the future acting as a powerful agent on our present 
(Brown et al, 2000:9).
For Barthes (1974, 1977) the task of the analyst is to ‘decode’ realism’s devices for 
obscuring human work in fact production, troubling that which is deemed natural and 
criticizing realism’s emphasis on denotation. Barthes argues that denotation, whereby 
a word stands in for an object in a supposedly unproblematic manner, is treated as 
primary, whilst connotation, such as the second-order significations discussed above, 
is treated as secondary. It is Barthes’s view that over-emphasis on denotation by the 
‘realist fiction’ sustains authoritative discourses in science, literature and philosophy. 
Rather than attempting exhaustively to characterize the meaning of a whole text, 
Barthes (1974, 1978) breaks it down into fragments, contrary to traditional literary 
criticism, and explores the ways in which connotations work within these fragments, 
concentrating on how realism itself is produced via connotation. Due to the incessant 
layering of cultural associations in second-order significations, Barthes (1974) 
criticizes the project of tracing the ‘origins’ of meanings, within the author’s 
psychological make-up for example. If Barthes’ work was related to the study of 
‘versions of the future’, such an analysis would involve exploring how authoritative 
discourses of modem technological progress are produced as part of the ‘realist 
fiction’. This task would be achieved via the researcher’s deployment of his or her 
subjective knowledge of the cultural context in which the text in question was written, 
without recourse to a search for the ‘original’ intentions of a given author.
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Texts constantly take on new meanings and are used in new ways. This in a 
sense is what they do within the social world whilst simultaneously serving to create a 
meaningM social world of which technical artefacts are part. ‘Versions of the future’ 
are constantly being contested and reworked to produce new understandings of ‘the 
future’. Rorty (1980) argues that metaphor and the workings of language, rather than 
being a rhetorical ‘flourish’ added to ‘real’ assertions, are actually responsible for the 
appearance of truth in discourse. Thus a troubling of these flourishes should aid the 
analyst in exploring the human work which has gone into making ‘truths’, for 
example, about the future, seem ‘natural’ and inevitable, whilst directing attention 
away from the (‘original’) intentions of the speaker or author.
‘The Future’ as a Discursive Space
This section deals primarily with particular aspects of Foucault’s work and amounts to 
an argument for its relevance to the study of future-orientated discourse. Due to space 
limitations, a thorough review of his writings is not attempted here. Extensive 
overviews of his ideas, and his impact upon contemporary thinking, are already 
available (see Lloyd and Thacker 1997, Mckinlay and Starkey 1998 and Moss 1998 
for example). However, since this research employs several of his concepts, especially 
in terms of the construction of subjectivities within versions of the future and the 
relationship between power and knowledge that he has so famously and rigorously 
discussed (Foucault 1972,1977,1980), it is only correct to explicate his influences on 
this research in more detail.
Discourse is perhaps the most important concept in Foucault’s work. It is 
centrally pre-occupied with, although not irreducible to, language (Foucault 1972). 
From a Foucauldian perspective, discourses can be thought of as sets of ‘deep 
principles’ incorporating grids of meanings which generate and establish relations 
between all that can be seen, said and thought (Shilling 1993, Dreyfus and Rainbow 
1982). Notions of discourse sweep away traditional distinctions between what one 
says (language) and what one does (practices) and have had far-reaching implications 
for the ways in which we can think about human agency and subjectivity (McNay 
1994). Discourse constructs the topic in that it governs the ways that a topic can be 
meaningfully talked and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas, including ideas 
about the shape of future temporal moments, are put into practice and how those ideas
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can regulate the practices of others. Discourse is a slippery term, and restrictive 
definitions go against the way that Foucault represented the notion,
.. .instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 
‘discourse’, I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings; treating it 
sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an 
individualisable group of statements, and have I not allowed this same 
word ‘discourse’, which should have served as a boundary around the 
term statement, to vary as I shifted from my analysis or its point of 
application, as the statement itself faded fi*om view (Foucault 1972:80).
Foucault’s fluid way of thinking about discourse and practice is vital to an 
examination of ideas about the future. By questioning what ‘versions of the future’ are 
attempting to do, we are really asking what kinds of contingencies might they 
introduce to the possibilities of future actions i f  they are accepted as authoritative and 
i f  these ideas become couched in notions of common-sense and inevitability. Of 
course in light of the rejection of a predictive quality to this work no attempt is made 
to read off from such future-orientated ideas the ‘realities’ of what the future holds. 
This would go against the very grain of what Foucault’s clarifications entail. Instead 
to examine future-orientated discourses is to ask what kinds of practices are versions 
attempting to govern, regulate and create, and how, within texts that construct 
versions of the future, are different interpretative resources drawn upon to produce 
accounts of the ‘future-real’.
It is suggested that risk-management (with risk as a mediated social concept) 
may be a factor in this future-orientation equation, whereby possession of a 
(temporarily) stable, authoritative and even dominant ‘version of the future’ serves to 
reduce (perceived) risk in the future. This is akin to the adage ‘the only way to predict 
the future is to create it’. Dominant versions of the future lend power in the 
Foucauldian ‘productive’ sense to particular future practices, as those versions 
attempt to govern the way that ‘the future’ can be reasoned about and acted upon 
meaningfully. Foucault proposes that, ‘...there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations’ (Foucault 1977:27). 
Future-orientated discourse produces books, treatises, web sites, conversations.
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papers, policy documents and mission statements. In the sense that power could be 
said to be productive, we could say that the multitude of material concerned with ‘the 
future’ indicates efforts to colonise and control the very object of knowledge that such 
material constructs. This future-orientated discourse appears across a range of 
different texts, and, as forms of conduct, at a number of different institutional sites 
within society. These include governmental departments (the Department of Trade 
and Industry for instance), corporations, aspects of entrepreneurial and libertarian 
rhetoric (Boorsook 2000), and cultural commentaries posted on, and about, the 
Internet (Thrift 1996) to name but a few.
Foucault’s concept of regimes of truth (Foucault 1970, Dean 1994) declares that 
certain forms of power are productive, that is they produce potentially oppressive 
‘truths’ that constitute certain objects and subjects. To give an example, certain 
discourses about self-starvation, which have developed and adapted over the course of 
history, have produced the ‘object’ of anorexia and have also produced the 
intertwined subjectivity of ‘the anorexic’ (Hacking 1999). These predominantly 
psychological and bio-medical regimes of truth generate new entities, producing 
‘viable’ experiences, new ‘ways of being’, and new positions fi*om which to speak, 
which remain firmly rooted in historical discourses of gender, the body and 
‘normality/abnormality’ (Hacking 1995, 1999). In Foucauldian theory’s strongest 
form, these regimes of truth are also said to produce the ways in which they can be 
resisted. In linking factuality to institutions and issues of power with individuals and 
their practices, discourse becomes the central dynamic of the social system. To give a 
taste of the implications of Foucault’s take on power, one question we could ask here 
is how forms of speaking about both ‘the future’ and ‘mobile devices’ generate 
particular identities, or ‘ways of being’, stressing the procedures and assumptions that 
go into their production and looking at how these are related to institutional 
organization.
Drawing on Foucauldian thinking but moving on to my own interest in future- 
orientated discourse, I suggest that ‘the future’ can be thought of as a discursive 
space, with mobile communication technologies being but one domain within it. It is 
vital to think about how mobile communication technologies are linked in with other 
domains within this future-orientated discursive space such as personal, home and 
family life, work-based practices and the environment. Much of the material 
examined here combines technological-talk with the personal, the home, family life.
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leisure and the workplace in ways that serve to make seem inevitable the place of the 
(‘futuristic’) mobile device within these domains. Mobile technologies and the future 
can be conceptualised in two key forms:
Mobiles of the Future: The portrayal of mobile communication devices as 
physical objects (i.e. what devices will look like and be like in the future).
The Future of Mobiles: The portrayal of mobile communication devices’ place 
(whatever their ‘form’) in future (social) life, including personal, family and work 
domains.
The two are usually intimately linked within and across texts and the splitting of these 
two perspectives is really a methodological and rhetorical tool to make analysis of 
empirical material more cogent and systematic. The notion of discursive space draws 
attention to the broader social practices and the interpretative resources that construct 
such spaces. Here discourse incorporates meaning-making activities that include the 
textual and the visual (pictures of 3 G prototypes embedded in Internet sites for 
example). From this perspective, mobile devices become objects that can make the 
future mean, whilst in themselves gaining futuristic connotations. It is suggested that 
talk about technological developments is but one example of future-orientated 
discourses. Talk about the future in terms of the environment, of public services, of 
national security^^, and the threats/opportunities it presents, continuously circulates. 
The linking of the various domains (work, home and family life, the environment, 
government and corporate sectors) discursively and physically mediated through 
technologies, means that looking at versions of the future in relation to one particular 
technology (mobile devices) makes it feasible to say something about the assumptions 
embedded in other realms of contemporary life and imagined future life. In doing so a 
framework is built with which to understand the discursive space of future-orientated 
‘talk’, particularly in relation to mobile communication technologies.
How might the notion of discourse be useful in practical terms in this 
research? Parker argues that ‘discourse is a system of statements which constructs an 
object’ (1990:189). Taking this into account one can maintain that this study explores 
the system of statements, in whatever form they may take, which construct, or
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produce ‘the future’ as an object. Howarth (1998) uses the notion of discourse in 
relation to another field of study, namely apartheid. He has written on the Black 
Consciousness Movement in South Africa, showing how black activists were able to 
‘reanimate the discursive resources upon which they drew while, at the same time, 
giving them different meaning’ (Howarth 1998:288). In this sense we may expect 
participants to draw on a diverse range of discursive resources when constructing a 
given version of the future, perhaps reshaping their meaning of both ‘the future’ and 
mobile communication technologies in the process. It is in this way that ‘Discourses 
do not simply describe the social world, but categorise it, they bring phenomena into 
sight’ (Parker 1990:191).
Our grasp of a given discourse has to be drawn from the multitude that shapes 
our reality. In an analysis of technology discourses, use is made of other (open) 
systems of terms that characterize and evaluate actions, events and so on. A discourse 
is realized in texts and as such we do not ‘find’ complete discourses. We are only ever 
able to grasp fragments of discourses within texts, texts in the wide sense of forms 
that produce meaning and can be interpreted. What kinds of connotations, allusions 
and implications do texts invoke? What kinds of subjectivities are produced by those 
texts? Rational consumer? Visionary entrepreneur? What kinds of agency are 
proffered? What does the text assume about the way that ‘truth’ is arrived at? What 
other ‘truths’ are marginalized, excluded? How does the text go about authorising its 
‘world view’? In what ways is technology presented as ‘causing’ social change? All 
these questions relate to how discourses are actualised within texts. They must be 
tackled, as they are within later chapters, if we are to approach an understanding of 
the ways in which discourses produce ‘commonsensical’ and authoritative ‘versions 
of the future’.
Within the account of discourse analysis I present here, which is one of many, 
one does not try to trace the meanings within a given text to one author, which would 
amount to a closed search for ‘origins’. Analysis can bring in other readers and 
listeners, and should use their understanding of a discourse to bring multiple 
meanings out. This is an exercise I have pursued using focus groups with young 
people (see Chapters Seven and Eight).
The reflexivity of discourses, that is the way in which discourses reflect upon 
their own ways of speaking, is a useful resource to deploy during analysis. A 
consideration of discursive reflexivity helps one to consider the terminology being
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used, treat the discourse itself as an object, and reflect on the terms one wishes to use 
to describe (and perhaps criticise) the discourse. The latter seems to involve the 
analyst taking up a ‘moral’ position in relation to the discourse. Whilst a discourse 
may reflect on its own way of speaking it may also refer to other discourses. It is 
proposed that the articulation of our reflections on discourse must require the use of 
other discourses. We can ask ourselves what other discourses are at work if there 
appear to be contradictions within a discourse. Wise (1997:150-155) for example 
explores the political discourse contained in Wired magazine, identifying strains of 
communitarianism (the Net community) and libertarianism (anti-government, 
deregulatory stance). In examining the tensions between the two political strains he 
unpicks the magazine’s appeal to its readership, the assumptions it makes about 
agency, and its exclusionary tendencies. Explorations of apparent tensions, say in 
terms of mobile devices being presented as simultaneously ‘mundane’ and ‘bleeding 
edge’, can open us up to the possibility of other discourses being at work and if so 
help us pursue an analysis of discursive interrelationships. Thus discourses are fluid, 
unsurprising if  we think about the interrelationships between discourses, which 
change and develop through the process of reflection.
How do notions of time and historicity relate to discourses? It is crucial to 
consider the temporal elements of discourses, particularly given this study’s 
consideration of ‘versions of the future’. Thinking of discourses as systems of 
statements located in time helps to account for the ways in which ‘versions of the 
future’ mutate over time. Discourses are about history ‘for the objects they refer to are 
constituted in the past by discourses or related discourses. A discourse refers to past 
references to those objects’ (Parker 1990:198), or possibly to past/present references 
of imagined future objects. Perhaps it is in this way that ‘talk’ of ‘the future’ can be 
located so firmly in present discourses, as ‘versions of the future’ are created with the 
‘tools’ of present discourses and the residue of past ones. We might ask quite simply 
what ideas about the world and our place in it, or relation to it, do we obtain from 
discourses of technology and the future?
To fully analyse discourses of the future and technology, we need to explain 
how present discourses arose, explaining their structure and force by showing other 
instances of that discourse. Du Gay et al’s (1997) study of the Sony Walkman 
provides many examples of the various discourses which were used to constitute the 
Walkman as a discreet cultural artefact, and to build it as a meaningful object, whose
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meaning still remains open, given the advent of MP3 and mini-discs. ‘New 
technologies’ are brought into being, ‘former’ or what become known as ‘old 
technologies’ are given fresh meanings and thought about within different frames of 
reference. In other words these meanings can never be stable and are always open to 
re-interpretation. ‘Mobile phones’ are produced as becoming ‘mobile entertainment 
devices’, which may in turn become ‘objects’ that we do not yet ‘know’. This 
possibility of unknowability however does not deter futurologists, teenagers, novelists 
and sociologists from continually speculating whilst deploying the very discourses of 
‘the future’ that they are produced by and are implicated in producing.
The Politics of Representation
Discourses can be viewed as constitutive, meaning that discourses ‘build worlds’, or 
perhaps more accurately, they build versions of the world, of the past/present, and ‘the 
future’. Language is constructive, constitutive of social life, and can function to re­
present, from existing but ever shifting discursive resources and practices, possible 
versions of 'the future' and provide discursive mandates for possible future actions 
(Blackman 1999). As accounts and discourses become available and are widely 
shared within a given society, they can become ‘social realities’ to be reckoned with. 
Indeed it is suggested that accounts and discourses become efficacious in future 
events, especially when versions of the future are used as ‘building blocks’ for 
assertions about desirable present directions and future actions.
The problem here is building a framework with which to understand such a 
process since simple causal models are insufficient in the face of such complexity. 
Accounts construct versions of possible ‘future realities’, but what is especially 
interesting is the question of why particular versions are produced when many others 
were possible. Why this version in this context over and above another? It can be 
asserted that one vital property of language is that it allows for multiple versions, 
creating an argumentative and rhetorical context. This leads us to explore why certain 
versions are constructed in a particular context. Related to the importance of asking 
what such versions do once produced, what is a given text and the version it produces 
hoping to achieve?
If multiple versions are possible, how and why do some versions come to 
dominate discourses about the future in relation to mobile technologies? In a sense
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one must be careful of over-stating the existence of multiple versions since the 
domination of a select few versions of the future means that what can be meaningfully 
said about ‘the future’ is restricted. However, what is said is often produced, heard 
and read in relation to things that are not said, hence versions are frequently orientated 
to other invisible, but possible accounts. Once we have a certain notion of ‘reality’ 
and/or ‘the future’, then it can become difficult to construct events alternatively. 
When analysing versions of the future we can highlight how versions are built up to 
pre-empt and ultimately to exclude alternatives. This exclusion is sometimes achieved 
paradoxically via incorporation of alternatives to the point where those alternatives 
are rendered silent, although generally alternatives bubble under the surface, creating 
tension in the holding together of the ‘winning version’. The notion of constant 
contestation highlights the way in which power is produced through the stabilisation 
of versions via their recognition as ‘authentic’.
Such stabilisation is always at risk of de-stabilisation however, although of 
course some versions can be thought of as much stronger than others if the ‘players’ 
producing those versions have greater social and economic capital at their disposal 
(Van Dijk 1993). Setting out the principles of critical discourse analysis. Van Dijk 
(1993) focuses on the role of discourse in both the (re)production of, and challenges 
to, dominance. He examines the role of social representations but locates them 
predominately in the minds of social actors. Van Dijk (1993) argues that critical 
discourse analysis should concentrate on the discursive strategies that legitimate 
control, naturalise the social order and create and continue relations of inequality.
What is important here is to recognise the deep-seated differences between 
approaches to discourse as set out by Van Dijk, and those of Foucauldian thinking. 
Van Dijk (1993) focuses on the use of discourse by existing elites to maintain power. 
This goes against Foucauldian thought somewhat, in which power and knowledge are 
inseparable (although not one and the same), with the pair constituting social actors 
(including elites). However, Van Dijk argues that privileged or preferential access to 
discourse could be seen as a crucial power source in its own right. Corporations for 
example, have access to research and design facilities in which authoritative versions 
of the direction of future technologies are built up. These technologies still have to be 
‘spoken’ (they do not speak for themselves) so privileged or preferential access to 
discourse can act as an aid to the process of dissemination of ‘versions of the future’ 
through the circulation of texts about ‘the future’ and technology.
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If one follows Van Dijk (1993), one can conceptualise a somewhat circular 
process occurring whereby ‘stronger’ versions of the fiiture provide socio-cultural 
capital for their (temporary) owners, whilst simultaneously producing the possibility 
of the creation of greater economic capital, if the ‘winning’ version is able to reduce 
the perceived ‘risk’ (as mediated knowledge) of unknowable futures. ‘Ownership’, 
however temporary and instable, of a dominant, or most ‘socially-accepted/authentic’ 
version of the future, one that is part of a ‘normalised’ network (Gallon 1991:151, 
David 1987), is deemed desirable, given that those versions of the future include 
justifications o f mandates fo r  action in the present and the future. One feature of 
versions of the future is their attempts to reduce the risk of the unknowable future, by 
creating the impression that the future has already been ‘taken’ or ‘colonised’. Studies 
of the semantics of the Internet have noted the dominance of ‘Frontier metaphors’ 
(Thrift 1996) with the Internet constructed as a dangerous domain for some (mostly 
women and children), and an exciting possible ‘territory’ to be conquered for others 
(mostly men). Is a similar, subtle, ‘semantic game’ being played out over the future in 
relation to mobile communication technologies? From this perspective the importance 
of the examination of ‘alternative’ versions of the future becomes more urgent. If ‘the 
fixture’ as a temporal abstraction can be discursively colonised, then is that not one 
step on the way to the creation of future presents, a pre-emptive writing of future- 
history?
Meaning is relational, and co-produced. ‘Futuristic’ signifies as it does 
because other terms, such as anachronistic, old-fashioned and obsolete, are currently 
available as contrastive resources^^ Accounts of the future are also indexical. Their 
sense depends to a certain extent on their context of use. One important question then 
is how the sense of a ‘futuristic’ device, or ‘the future’ in more general terms, shifts 
depending on context? Meanings are never fixed - hence the notion of ‘work’ linked 
to account-building. Discursive practices are flexible and creative resources (daym an 
1992). Since meaning is a joint production between text and reader, then texts are 
always open to other readings. This very process of co-production is being undertaken 
in this research, since via the analysis of empirical material using particular 
sociological understandings of textual relations, a very different reading of this 
material is given than a potential business partner or government official may offer.
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Making Meaning
In this chapter I have explored the possibility of building up a framework with which 
to analyse ‘versions of the future’ in relation to mobile technologies. To achieve this I 
have detailed the ways in which numerous writers, including Barthes and Foucault, 
and certain theoretical approaches, such as ethnomethodology and post-structuralism, 
have tackled questions of ‘truth’, the social construction of ‘reality’ and the discursive 
production of subjects and objects. This chapter in effect sets out the various 
resources that the sociologist has to hand when investigating the notion of ‘the future’.
Several important points have arisen in the course of this chapter. Firstly it is 
argued that there is the possibility that ‘the future’ has material force in the world. 
This point will be explored in more detail in later chapters but I argue that ‘versions of 
the future’ must be seen as being somehow consequential The time and effort that is 
invested in creating what are hoped to be viable versions of the future is not, in my 
view, spent in vain. This is where the notion of versions doing something in the world 
comes to the fore. If a version of the future succeeds in becoming ‘naturalised’ and 
the future that it produces is made to seem inevitable, then it enables human and non­
human actants to have a mandate for action now and possibly in the future. This 
relates ultimately to the contention that descriptions and representations of facets of 
the world are not just about something, but are also doing something. We do not have 
to seek ‘outside’ of versions of the future to ‘find’ what that something is. The very 
process of producing ‘the future’ is what they are doing. We can then turn to how 
versions are produced rather than searching for their possible ‘effects’ through a cause 
and effect model.
Secondly it is argued that the characteristics of future-possible ‘technical’ 
and/or ‘social’ subjects and objects are constantly being (re)defmed through the 
production of versions of the future. The question remains, and indeed is tackled in 
detail within my empirical work, of precisely how ‘versions of the future’ go about 
their ‘business’ of definition. This relates directly to the ways in which mobile 
communication technologies are ‘made to mean’. Through talk of the future, we come 
to ‘know’ what mobile devices were, are and ‘will’ be. To this end I think it is useful 
to focus on one part of the discursive domain of ‘the future’, here mobile 
communication technologies. However I acknowledge, indeed hope, that the 
framework for looking at ‘versions of future in relation to mobile communication
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technologies, could be applied, with adaptation, to other parts of this discursive 
domain. It is not that I have ‘uncovered’ this discrete domain, rather I have produced 
a version of a discursive domain that will make this study meaningful.
Finally I maintain that producing, and indeed contesting, ‘versions of the 
future’ is firmly grounded in the processes of everyday life. We do not have to go 
elsewhere (particularly not ‘outside’ of the socio-technical realm) to uncover how ‘the 
future’ is produced. It is being built right under our noses, through words, texts, 
material artefacts and so on. The aim of the following chapter, which concentrates 
more specifically on how sociologists have studied ‘the future’, is to consider whether 
we have the tools to understand the ways in which ‘the future’ is built. Is it possible 
that through that building or production process, our present meanings and actions 
both shape, and are shaped by, ‘versions of the future’? Concentrating on mobile 
communication technologies serves to make such questions more manageable, whilst 
empirical analysis of one discursive space of future-orientated ‘talk’ helps to ground 
any theoretical assertions.
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Chapter Three: Sociology and ‘the Future’
Multiple Versions of the Future
This research is not an investigation into what will happen in the future. It does not 
amount to a set of predictions about how mobile communication technologies will 
impact on our everyday lives in the future. An investigation into the circulation of 
present discourses about mobile communication technologies’ role in the future is a 
very different exercise from attempting to build predictive models. In a sense all 
‘versions of the future’ are predictive models, whether an ‘expert’ or a ‘lay person’ is 
articulating them. It thus becomes a question of how, through what means and via 
what processes, these ‘predictive models’ are built or worked up, rather than a value 
judgment on their predictive power.
Mead (1932/1980:11) maintains that it is customary to think of the past as ‘out 
there’. The past is deemed not to be subject to change. However it could be said that 
‘the past’ is continuously re-created and reformulated into a different past from the 
standpoint of the emergent present, that each moment is recreated afresh in the light 
of a new present. This is where historical contextuality comes to the fore as it seems 
possible that each new ‘future’, or ‘version of the future’ can be recreated afresh in 
the light of a ‘new’ present, in much the same way that the past can be recreated 
during a series of momentary presents. This is how it can make sense to talk of 
‘versions of the future’ that are culturally and historically specific, and of sociological 
interest. In common parlance we say ‘one cannot go back on the past’ but we also say 
that someone, and/or something can ‘change the course of history’. These simple 
phrases can be viewed as a window onto modem Western versions of time and 
historical progress. We generally work with notions of the past being fixed once it has 
happened, the present as ‘our’ current moment in the ‘course’ of history’, and the 
future which may or may not be open to change depending on one’s perspective. 
Perhaps the cmcial difference is that the future has yet to be ‘made’, although this 
may not be so much of an analytical problem if we think of the past as continuously 
being ‘remade’.
An investigation of ‘versions of the future’ from a wide variety of sources 
could help sociologists understand the ways that people experience ‘time’ in Western
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culture and how notions of time inform our everyday lives (Adam 1995). What for 
example are the ‘time frames’ that people employ to make sense of possible futures? 
It would seem that ‘the future’ is continuously being reproduced within people’s 
everyday life-worlds and by corporate imagineers and futurologists as a ‘moving 
target’. ‘The future’ is not always referred to being in one year’s time, in ten years 
time, or in fifty years time. ‘It’ is built up as being any of these, and at points between 
and beyond these time-scales, depending on the context and the referent of its 
production. The notion of ‘versions of the future’ provides an analytical framework 
for the exploration of the cultural meanings of mobile technologies in our present. 
Could it heighten our understanding of the articulation of mobile technologies as 
simultaneously mundane and ‘cutting/bleeding edge’ for example? It would seem that 
the time-frames that form part of our understandings of ‘the fiiture’ also enable 
technologies to have multiple meanings. Mobile communication technologies may be 
thought of as mundane and ‘pedestrian’ when produced as a contemporary (mere) 
communication-enabling tool. Concomitantly they can be thought of as cutting-edge 
when the time-firame produced as relevant to the technology is extended beyond the 
present moment. Without an understanding of people’s notions of time and ‘the 
future’ we are unlikely to be able to build a coherent picture of how ‘new’ 
technologies are understood in our contemporary age.
My research assumes that the sociologist (as presumably a member of a given 
society) has the tools to investigate a topic or problem, and perhaps shed new light on 
it. This assumption does not amount to asserting that the sociologist is ‘objective’ in 
her studies, but rather that via a systematic analysis of a given area of interest, she 
may be able to render her subjective knowledge explicit, and in turn say something of 
interest and validity about our social world. As Parker (1990) notes.
We have to bring a knowledge of discourses from outside onto any 
example or firagment of discourse for it to become part of a coherent 
system in our analysis (Parker 1990:193).
The difficulty of this task is to ‘make strange’ that which is often taken for granted. 
How can we think about the ways in which we think about the future? Making strange 
that which we take for granted is a central tenet of discourse analysis as informed by 
social constructionism (see previous chapter for more detail), the conclusions of
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which can seem counter-intuitive (Hacking 1999). However if one’s aim is to 
interrogate ‘common-sense’ and ask how different ‘realities’ are built up, then it 
would seem that counter-intuitiveness goes with the territory.
Two such counter-intuitive notions are that the past can continuously be 
‘remade’ and that there are many versions of the future rather than one towards which 
we march inexorably, as grand narratives of historical progress tend to presume. The 
notion of the future continually being remade is, in my view, less contentious, since 
the future, unlike the past, has no concrete referent. However I argue that whilst there 
may be no concrete referent of the future, we do share common cultural referents, as 
the use of science fiction to produce ‘real’ versions of the future demonstrates (see 
Chapter Six).
Further I suggest that these common cultural referents can be more easily 
employed in what we think of as non-personal contexts. Imagine that you ask 
someone else to plan your weekend. Having someone else plan your (immediate) 
future in a manner that you would recognise (and perhaps be comfortable with) would 
require that person to have a certain degree of contextual ‘information’ to work with. 
If they do not know you personally they may not have the relevant resources, such as 
knowledge of your current routines, your preferences, limitations and relationships, to 
produce what you would consider a viable version. Producing the future trajectory of 
a technical artefact can be utilised to mediate the ways in which people are expected 
to behave in the future. Whilst such planning activities, or more loosely imagineering 
activities, may be explicitly focused upon a technical artefact, due to the intimate 
relation between the artefact and its users, users also become implicated in the visions 
that are subsequently produced. Thus versions of the future are necessarily built up 
through a process of an intermeshing of the notions of the ‘technological’ and the 
‘social’. I propose that one cannot have a version of the future in relation to mobile 
communication technologies without incorporating the ‘human factors’ that are 
deemed relevant. Thus technological and social projections become interlinked.
Documenting multiple versions of the future seems to go against the 
normative perception that there can only ever be one future, the one that is bound, by 
the laws of ‘nature’, to occur beyond the present. On the one hand ‘the future’ can 
seem to be ‘out there’, waiting for us to reach it. What is ‘out there’ is represented as 
something over which those living in the present moment have little or no control. On 
the other hand, the fiiture is represented as ‘there’ for us to control, sometimes
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expressed in terms of moral responsibility to ‘take charge’ of one’s future. It is also 
represented as a dangerous and risky place (Lash et al: 1996:96), or a land of 
opportunities and possible ‘new’ experiences. Adam notes that there is a multitude, or 
rather a layering^^ of ‘social times’ (Adam 1995:13). It is suggested that there may 
also be a multitude, or layering of ‘social futures’. Proposing that there may be a 
multiplicity of versions of the future does not seem overly counter-intuitive. Given the 
relative uncertainty about ‘the future’ the existence of competing speculations about it 
is perhaps unsurprising. Thinking about how we think about the future however can 
be surprising, just as considering the way we think about the past is. To focus on 
‘versions of the future’ in relation to mobile technologies involves a specific 
theoretical orientation to the data collected. In order to be able to say anything of 
sociological relevance about the ways in which these versions of the future are 
authorised, legitimised and challenged, it is vital to understand the ways in which the 
study of ‘the future’ has been approached by other sociologists in the past.
A Sociology of the Future?
Bell and Man’s (1971) The Sociology o f the Future presents a set of essays primarily 
arranged around the theme of ‘images of the future’. These essays attend to the uses 
of plans for, and images of, the future. In a sense they seek empirical evidence for 
what visions do in the social world but deploy a deterministic and causal model to do 
so. My empirical research does not match such a model. The current (for them) 
consequences of envisioned future states are considered. The contributors do not try 
to describe what the future will be like and within this research their caution is shared. 
The Sociology o f the Future (1971) contains
(1) a theory of social change based on the concept of image of the fixture;
(2) some research strategies for studying the future; (3) a paradigm for the 
analysis of time perspectives and images of the future in social science 
literature, which is then applied by several of the authors in (4) an effort to 
tease out the implicit images of the future in action; and finally, (5) an 
annotated bibliography on social science studies of the future (Bell and 
Man 1971 :xii).
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The Sociology o f  the Future (1971) locates the writers within a naturalistic, rather than 
hermeneutical tradition of inquiry. This fits with their dedication to social science, or 
more precisely the scientific study of society to determine rules governing behaviour. 
Bell and Man (1971) do qualify this tendency, maintaining that neither developmental 
constructs nor images of the future are dogmatic predictions, ‘...yet we see no reason 
why they cannot be used scientifically’ (Bell and Man 1971:16). Bell and Man (1971) 
maintain that images of the future could be studied using scientific methods, stating,
“If, then” statements can be based upon knowledge of causal 
relationships, the implications of which are carried into the future: what 
are the probabilities for the future under specified conditions? Quite 
directly, individual and collective images of the future can be measured 
just like other beliefs and attitudes, and these can be tested against 
subsequent developments as they occur (Bell and Man 1971:17).
The idea of ‘testing’ people’s images of the future implies that it is the researcher’s 
task to ‘discover’ whether these images are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in light of the ‘actual’ 
emergent future. This view of course assumes the ultimate knowability, via 
objectification, of the social realm. To criticise the notion of ‘testing’ participants and 
their respective images of the fiiture does not however exclude the task of criticising 
versions of the future, based on for example, a particular version’s assumption that 
agency is equally distributed amongst social actors. In terms of methodology how 
does a ‘scientific’ approach to ‘future-possibles’ differ from the approach offered 
here? Principally, Bell and Man’s (1971) naturalistic line of inquiry contrasts with 
discourse theory. Howarth (1998) explains discourse theory’s conception of the 
relationship between understanding and explanation.
Discourse theory is placed within the hermeneutical, rather than 
naturalistic, tradition of inquiry. This means that discursive accounts are 
concerned with understanding and interpreting socially produced 
meanings, rather than explanations of observed behaviour based on 
universal laws of cause and effect (Howarth 1998:281).
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Howarth (1998) goes on to examine how, from a discursive perspective, certain forms 
of causality are rejected, such as those based on assumptions about the essential 
nature of things. Whilst wary of causal explanations, Howarth notes how,
...other, looser forms of ‘causal explanation’ are compatible with a 
hermeneutical perspective. In other words, questions about why and how 
certain discourses emerged and flourished while others did not, or why 
certain forms of identity were constructed, and how they came to prevail 
over others in certain historical contexts...(Howarth 1998:282).
This research incorporates a loose version of ‘explanation’, which distances it from 
Bell and Man’s (1971) premises about the relationship between understanding, 
explanation and truth. It is clear that as ‘scientists’ they remain dedicated to the 
‘demand that theories or generalisations be evaluated in terms of their logical 
consistency and consonance with facts’ (Merton 1957:541). Their conception of 
society fits with the notion of historical transition from one state to another. People’s 
beliefs about the future are tested in terms of how well they measure up to the ‘real’ 
future, which can be said to ‘have arrived’ when based on a notion of historical, linear 
transition. Bell and Man’s (1971) directives for the conduct of a social inquiry which 
aim to heighten the relevance of social science to the fiiture, an ‘entity’ which remains 
uncontested in their work, include ‘The directive of dynamic orientation’ whereby.
Society should not be viewed as a static system existing only in the 
present. Rather, past, present, and future should be viewed as moving 
from  something to something else. A dynamic orientation leads the 
researcher to think in terms of what Lasswell calls “developmental 
constructs” where the time dimension is built in and “trend-thinking” is 
required. (Bell and Man 1971:30. Original emphasis).
The difficulty here lies in the much-criticised notion of ‘development’ and historical 
progression from one stage to another in an incremental manner, especially given 
post-modern challenges to totalising ‘grand’ or ‘master narratives’ (Lyotard 1984). It 
is difficult to justify using the notion of ‘the past’ as causing, or ‘leading onto’ the 
present, (and similarly the present leading onto the future) since this involves working
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with a materialist/empiricist notion of a past that is ultimately, objectively knowable. 
However it is important here not to conflate Bell and Man’s (1971) suggestion that 
society moves linearly from one (knowable) state to another with the suggestion that 
building ‘time dimensions’ into social investigations necessarily involves endorsing 
progress as a state of continuous improvement. One may indicate that we move 
linearly from one temporal state to another without necessarily assuming that this 
involves modernist notions of progress.
Yet I do think it is problematic to assert that visions of the future have a causal 
relation to our actions and meanings in the present. It may be reasonable to assume 
that constructed notions of the past can provide the basis for an understanding of the 
present, and similarly may be employed to construct images of the future. However, 
an inquiry into the ways in which ‘knowledge of the past’ is built upon to construct 
‘versions of the future’ does not have to entail viewing ‘the past’ as an immutable 
object waiting ‘out there’ to be uncovered or discovered, a ‘point’ in (linear) time that 
(inevitably) moves to the next ‘phase’. In her fascinating study of how two inventions 
- the telephone and the electric light - were publicly envisioned, Marvin (1988) makes 
a similar point. Focusing on late-nineteenth century fantasies of the twentieth century, 
she writes.
That we no longer remember the excitement of electric light spectacles 
testifies both to the fact that mass communication was implemented more 
directly in other forms (television for example) and to the tendency o f  
every age to read history backward from the present. We often see it as 
the process by which our ancestors looked for and eventually discovered 
us, rather than as a succession o f  distinct social visions, each with its own 
integrity and concerns. Assuming that the story could only have 
concluded with ourselves, we have banished from collective memory the 
variety of options a previous age saw spread before it in the pursuit of its 
fondest dreams. Of course, our amnesia only complements theirs. In the 
same way that we often see our own past as a less-developed version of 
ourselves, the late nineteenth century projected its past as a simpler 
version of itself, and its future as a fancier one (Marvin 1988:154. 
Emphasis added).
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Reading Marvin’s accounts of visions of the future as they were in the late-nineteenth 
century is informative. There were dreams of having the skin of a friend 
‘transplanted’ onto one’s arm, and vice versa, with the resulting ability to ‘trace on the 
piece of alien skin with a metal point the letters of the words in his message, and his 
friend could read these letters in his own arm, no matter how far they were separated’ 
(Marvin 1988). Such fantastic visions give us an idea of, or rather a different 
perspective on, our present visions, and they ways in which they are steeped in the 
assumptions of our age. It is this perspective that is pushed to the fore in this analysis 
of contemporary ‘versions of the future’.
Stories of the Future
I now move away from Bell and Man’s (1971) The Sociology o f the Future, although 
it does remain a useful starting point for an investigation into ‘images of the future’, 
despite my misgivings about the epistemological premises it is built upon. Taking up 
Marvin’s (1988) proposition, it could be said that our ‘versions of the future’ tell us 
more about the cultural context in which they are made than they may do about ‘the 
future’ itself. These ‘versions of the future’ may be built up from available social and 
cultural resources, much as an account of a past event may be built up using such 
resources via narrative bricolage. Indeed Wise (1997) uses the notion of narrative 
within his analysis of the various portrayals of the Manhattan Project^®. He asserts that 
‘For something to be referred to as narrative indicates the presence of structures that 
may or may not be external, i.e., the necessity for beginnings, endings, causes and 
effects’ (Wise 1997:90). Writing on narrative analysis, Reissman (1993) notes how.
Narrative analysis takes as its object of investigation the story itself...The 
methodological approach examines the informant’s story and analyses 
how it is put together, the linguistic and cultural resources it draws on, and 
how it persuades a listener of authenticity (Reissman 1993:2).
From this the relevance of narrative analysis to studying ‘versions of the future’ is 
apparent. For some narrative analysts, language is not viewed as a transparent 
medium that reflects stable, singular meanings. Rather,
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Sceptical about a correspondence theory of truth, language is understood 
as deeply constitutive of reality, not simply a technical device for 
establishing meaning. Informants’ stories do not mirror a world “out 
there”. They are constructed, creatively ordered, rhetorical, replete with 
assumptions, and interpretive (Reismann 1993:4-5).
This is pertinent to this study’s concern with analysing predictions of the future rather 
than making them. If versions, or perhaps ‘stories of the future’ are ‘replete with 
assumptions’ (Riesmann 1993), then surely an analysis of those assumptions could 
tell us something about social life in the present. Riessmann maintains that.
To the sociologically-orientated investigator, studying narratives is 
(additionally) useful for what they reveal about social life. Narrators speak 
in terms that seem natural, but we can analyse how culturally and 
historically contingent these terms are (Riesmann 1993:5).
The principal difference is that narrative analysis tends to focus on past events and 
experiences of informants. The narratives, or stories of the future such as those told by 
futurologists tend to be focused on ‘possible’ future events, although a concomitant 
(re)production of past events is also common which is an interesting phenomenon in 
itself. Descriptions of the past are offered by many versions of the future before 
‘future-possibles’ are discussed. In my view this could be a way of pre-empting 
criticism by attempting to ‘pre-set’ the readers’ view of the past which could add or 
detract from the viability of the versions of the future that is offered afterwards.
Research about ‘the future’ needs to make certain strategic moves to deal with 
the complexities of future-orientated narratives. My strategy involves analysing 
individuals’ and social groupings’ versions of the future with a view to providing a 
better understanding of the ways in which such versions are built up using available 
social and cultural resources. My strategy also involves creating a ‘futurology of the 
present’, a strategy developed from Foucault’s attempt to build a history of the present 
via a genealogy of the past. Foucault’s problematizing strategy led him to engage with 
archaeological and genealogical dimensions of analysis. Via the ‘archaeology of 
knowledge’, Foucault sought to describe discursive orders, the conditions that made 
them possible, without recourse to a constitutive subjectivity. Following difficulties
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with the archaeological method, especially the problematic notion of description 
without interpretation, Foucault turned to the genealogical approach. Rather than 
isolating the rules of discursive practices, he sought to give an account of the 
historical emergence and political constitution of the rules themselves. Foucault’s 
work aids our understanding of how the ‘weight of the past’ is dragged with us into 
the present. Is it possible, via a ‘futurology of the present’, to examine the politics of 
contemporary constructions of objectivity, to show their contingency and challenge 
their assumptions? Could we not interrogate ‘the future’ in relation to mobile 
communication technologies, as it is discursively produced, to understand how the 
‘light of the future’ beams down on us in the present?
Stories about Future Agency
What other strategies drawn from sociologically-orientated work are available? 
Continuing with the notion of ‘the future’ as discursively produced. Brown, Rappert 
and Webster (2000) maintain that.
Like all discourses, ‘the future’ is constituted through an unstable field of 
language, practice and materiality in which various disciplines, capacities 
and actors compete for the right to represent near and far term 
developments (Brown, Rappert and Webster 2000:5).
Their emphasis on competing for ‘the right to represent’ leads to a consideration of 
the possible resources that ‘disciplines, capacities and actors’ have to hand in order to 
assert that certain ‘versions of the future’ are ‘factual’, or at least are the most 
plausible. Brown, Rappert and Webster (2000) note the difficulties facing analysts 
looking at ‘the future’ with regards to agency. A  salient question to ask here is why is 
agency important in this context? I argue that the framing of certain versions of the 
future in terms of particular forms of agency can obscure the ways in which other 
possible forms of agency are undermined by socio-politically dominant forms. If 
agency for societal change in ‘the future’ is located solely in technological solutions 
(again note the characteristic separating out of the social and technological) then 
arguments for the ‘inevitability’ of certain technological ‘progressions’ become 
strengthened. For example, Norris, Moran and Armstrong (2000), writing on the
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rollout of CCTV in Britain, note the related circumvention, within the debate about 
surveillance technologies, of human and communal agency in tackling crime.
When examining the ways in which ‘new’ technologies come to be accepted, 
and knowledge about ‘the future’ secured, where can agency be located? One could 
think of agency as being attributed to human and non-human actants through story­
telling (in this case in stories about the future). Again, there is no singular way of 
approaching this problem, and as Brown, Rappert and Webster (2000) note, futures 
are formulated by locating agency in diverse actors and contingencies, a process that 
they assert often obscures alternatives. The stories told about certain technology 
business leaders for instance assign to them a form of agency upon which supposedly 
rests products’ success or failure and the security or otherwise of the future of ‘their’ 
company. As Du Gay et al point out, the ‘story’ of the Walkman and the success of 
Sony is often told hand in hand with the story of Akio Morita, the founder of Sony in 
1946, and President of the company until Norio Ohga took over in 1982 (Du Gay 
1997:46). Company and personal biographies are represented as being intimately 
intertwined. In the Sony story, Morita is the ‘hero’ who acted when others should 
have hut did not. Similar ‘hero’ stories are being told in the present day about 
Tachikawa, the President and Chief Executive of NTT DoCoMo since 1998. As with 
Morita, Tachikawa is represented as being the ‘creative force’^  ^ behind DoCoMo. 
Being mindful of ‘the future’, a trait of Tachikawa’s as produced by the Tachikawa 
himself and a Newsweek article^^, forms part of this heroism: the perceived ability to 
act on (future-orientated) ideas before others see the opportunity. For the company 
president to ‘have vision’ is created as being integral to the success of NTT DoCoMo. 
Through talk about a 3G promotional video, the technologies that DoCoMo construct 
are produced as springing from one man’s visions, visions which are then ‘made real’ 
by his trusty lieges. Here a story is being told about agency, a story of one man acting 
(or getting others to act) on his ideas.
Agency can be located in a person, a corporation, a product, a service or a 
scientific claim. Mobile technologies, particularly ‘innovations’ currently being 
developed such as Internet enabled mobile devices, are presented as inherently 
containing the ability to ‘change society’. This form of representation can mask the 
many other actors and contingencies upon which a product or service’s future once 
depended, or still depends. Akrich (1992) for example in her work on the 
technological transfer of a briquette machine from Sweden to Nicaragua, and the
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resulting ‘translation’ of (Nicaraguan) networks (the machine, social relations, 
‘Nature’), explores the ways in which the building and maintaining of networks is an 
uphill struggle (speaking of seven negotiations involved in the transfer). She 
maintains that enrolment is precarious, with resistances (from human and non-human 
actors) forming, disintegrating and re-forming in different ways at every turn. Her 
work avoids what Law (1992) warns against.
The reductionist versions tell that either machines or human relations are 
determinate in the last instance: that one drives the other. However, 
though these reductionisms are different, they have two things in 
common. First, they divide the human and the technical into two separate 
heaps. And second, they assume that one drives the other (Law 1992:3).
When agency is attributed, through story-telling about the future, to particular 
technologies such as mobile devices, (social) change is formulated as resulting 
‘naturally’ along certain inevitable lines. In these stories of the future, machines 
determine human relations. For a version of the future to gain plausibility, stories 
must be told about possible agents of change (human and/or non-human). This point 
belies the general assumption made that ‘the future’ will bring change. With this 
assumption in place, attention can turn to what and/or who will bring this (inevitable) 
change (for example the ‘Mobile Internet’ or ‘Knowledge Workers’). Without the 
assumption that the future is likely to be noticeably different from the past and 
present, versions of the future would he little more than ‘descriptions’ of the present.
The scope of the time-scales involved in this ‘future-as-change’ model is vital 
here in understanding how agency is attributed to present ‘new’ technologies, future- 
possible technologies, and ‘the future’ itself. If agency, produced as the potential for 
harbouring change, is discursively located within a certain technology and that 
technology ‘arrives’ in the contemporary moment, then the normatively separate time- 
scales of present and future seem to collapse. Change is depicted as likely to occur in 
the present due to a ‘futuristic’ technology, or rather through the agency for change 
that is concurred upon that ‘futuristic’ technology. In relation to ‘new technologies’, 
‘the future’ can be constructed as ‘here soon’ or even ‘here now’. There appears to be 
an element of the exercise of inevitability (with this present/future as ‘inevitable’ and 
natural) as a device to render alternative versions of the present/future defunct. Whilst
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the representation of ‘the fixture’ as ‘here now’ may seem nonsensical (surely only 
‘the present’ can be the here and now), in a way it makes sense in the context of many 
currently available mobile communication technologies being constructed as 
‘futuristic’. Hill (1988) maintains.
The experience of technology is the experience of apparent 
inevitability...Each of the technological determinist positions tend to see 
the technological ‘frame’ as autonomous, with social and cultural 
transformations being the consequences of a technologically-inspired 
trajectory, not the creators of this path...The technological determinist 
stance aligns with many people’s everyday experience (Hill 1988:23-24).
So agency can be attributed to particular technologies and/or services, with certain 
behaviours, certain forms of social life and even certain forms of society (Bell 1974, 
Toffler 1980) unfolding as the ‘self-evident’ benefits of products incite users to adopt 
them. Stories about how the Internet will usher in a new electronic era (a ‘radical’ 
change from the present and past) provide an example of this process. The telling of 
stories about the future is one way in which agency is attributed to these diverse 
forms. So we learn,
.. .your cell phone is a broadband browser, a smart wallet, and a passport 
to the wireless community of the future. And your fellow citizens are the 
content, 24 hours a day (‘In Helsinki Virtual Village’, Wired, March 
2001:156).
This excerpt produces a (near) fixture in which communities are (re)built through 
digital solutions. The Wired article portrays ‘democratic’ electronic communities as 
being more convenient and ultimately more interesting than ‘old’ face-to-face 
communities. Here a story is being told about the fixture in which agency is being 
attributed to certain entities; the device is depicted as providing ‘better’ agency (as 
control over one’s social and informational networks) for the user, and it is suggested 
that the user could harness this agency to bring change to his or her own life. As 
mentioned above there are mxmerous ways to think about agency in relation to
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contested futures, some of which are explored within the analyses conducted upon 
various ‘versions of the future’.
Contested Knowledges: Looking ‘the Future’
The difference between looking into the future in a predictive sense, as futurologists 
and corporate imagineers are wont to do, and looking at the future as a ‘temporal 
abstraction’ (Brown et al, 2000:4) and a discursive sphere has been emphasised. By 
shifting the focus in this manner, a space is opened up to investigate the ways in 
which ‘the future’ can be contested and managed, by whom and how, that is via what 
resources, using what rhetorical devices and to what designated ‘ends’. I consider 
these designated ‘ends’ not from a desire to find out why versions are produced in a 
certain manner but from a concern with how such ‘ends’, or ‘reasons’, for particular 
versions are produced (within and between versions). What interests are deemed to be 
served, for example, from constructing a version of the future in which consumers 
will use their mobile as a form of electronic smart wallet (as in the Wired article 
above)?
To achieve the task of looking at the future it is essential to explore the work 
of social theorists who have explicitly directed their attention towards different 
futures as contested rhetorical entities. Firstly, writers such as Adam (1990, 1995, 
1998) and Lash et al (1998) have examined aspects of ‘the future’ in terms of the 
ways in which time and the temporal are talked about and experienced. In asking 
‘What is the fixture?’ Adam (1990) for example notes how past and future could be 
thought of as not beyond the present, but rather as representations within it. On the 
one hand, time is viewed as passing, in a series of seconds, minutes, days and so on. 
This is what Adam (1990) refers to as ‘clock time’ pointing out that we often use this 
perspective on time to structure our biographical narratives (Freeman 1993). 
However, we can also think of time as being ‘lived temporal duration’ (Adam 
1990:4), meaning that time can be thought o f not as linearly spatialised, with past, 
present and future situated on a line of progression, but rather as a process of constant 
recreation of past and future in a momentary present. To manage this present we 
constantly employ versions of both the past and the future. In fabricating these 
versions of the past and future we can make certain modes of action seem inevitable, 
commonsensical and ultimately ‘do-able’. This may initially take the form of locating
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and presenting a difficulty in the past. A relevant example here would be the problem 
of 2^  ^generation standardisation:
Roaming with a 2G network is possible because Europe and most of Asia 
has standardised on one technology - Global System for Mobile 
Communication (GSM). The downside is that the US and Japan haven’t 
standardised on GSM (‘The Future’s Wireless’, PC Direct, June 
2001:160).
Thus some absence is reported (lack of world wide standardisation), and/or some 
wrong highlighted (inability to roam). The future is represented as a place in which 
solutions will be realised, although there is often mention of ‘barriers’ to that future 
having to be overcome before we can ‘reach’ it. In the following excerpt an ‘old’ 
technology is rhetorically deployed to construct the ‘obviousness’ of the ‘new’,
One major aim with 3G is to create a truly global mobile telephone 
system. After all, your home telephone is compatible with fixed line 
phones all around the globe, so why shouldn’t the same compatibility 
apply to mobiles? (‘The Future’s Wireless’, PC Direct, June 2001:160).
Here we can see the setting up of an inevitability factor in the argument. Since 
standardisation has been achieved for one closely related technology (home 
telephone), it is asserted that the same process can occur to this ‘new’ one (mobile). 
Industry standardisation is one example of certain actors defining the characteristics 
of their objects (standardisation, roaming, mobile communication devices and 
services), making hypotheses about the world and ‘the future’ (the possibility and 
desirability of ‘truly global’ wireless communication), and arguing about the ways in 
which ‘their object’ is to be inserted into the world (through negotiation between 
relevant organisations).
Micro-examples such as these relate to wider issues of technological progress. 
Van Lente (1998, 2000) notes that one of the most striking facets of talk about 
technological futures is that it often appears in the imperative mode:
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...once defined as a promise, action is required. Statements about future 
technological performance are not received as factual descriptions to be 
verified or falsified in due course. Instead they mobilise attention, guide 
efforts and legitimate actions. Technological futures, are then forceful and 
render technological developments a specific dynamic (Van Lente 
2000:43).
Van Lente (2000) argues that technological futures are embedded in well-established 
vocabularies, a key element of such vocabularies being technological progress that 
cannot or should not be stopped. He maintains that the enduring strength of notions of 
(technological) progress is the term’s flexibility. This flexibility allows linkages to be 
made with earlier instances of ‘progress’, from 1®‘ generation analogue phones, 2"  ^
generation models to 3^"^  generation devices for example, or with other ‘ideographs’ 
(McGee 1980) such as freedom, democracy and independence. Such terms have a 
recognisable and understandable narrative history, ‘...a forceful plea must be 
embedded in history, in a narrative of which the lines and lessons are recognisable 
and interpretable for the audience. From the bridge that the ideograph builds between 
past and present, implications for action follow...’ (Van Lente 2000:46).
As a term, technological progress’s strength lies in its ability to connect diverse 
historical situations and highlight the advantages of certain actions based on historical 
precedents, moving from fixed line to wireless communications for instance. Using 
HDTV as an example. Van Lente (2000) points out that promises in the sphere of 
technology are a vital part of the discourse of progress. In a sense developers of ‘new 
technologies’ have both to convince themselves, and convince a wider audience 
(usually framed as consumers and/or business clients), that the ‘development’ itself is 
promising and that the promises they are making, for better communication, better 
usability, a larger and more profitable share of the market, and so on, can be fulfilled. 
These promises also need to be depicted as ‘inherently’ desirable. So Van Lente 
(2000) notes, ‘It is only because HDTV is defined as promising that the interest 
politics can come into play. If HDTV were not seen as promising, nothing would be at 
stake’ (2000:55). Recent debates about (mobile) telecommunication companies who 
paid billions of pounds to the British Government in a ‘lottery’ for 3G licences could 
be cast in this light^^. If 3G devices, or the development of mobile entertainment 
services, were not seen as promising then it can reasonably assumed that companies
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such as 02  (previously BT Cellnet) would not have bid such vast sums of money for 
licences^" .^ However, as questions were asked about whether the companies involved 
would be able to pass these massive costs onto the consumer, the ‘promising’ 
perspective on generation began to falter, as did the companies’ share prices. Van 
Lente argues.
In the case of technology, boundaries are also debatable. This can be seen 
very clearly in the contested nature of technology as such. It is exactly the 
times when boundaries are threatened, that spokespersons come to the 
fore to speak in the name of the mandated territory. They are enthusiastic, 
concerned, encouraging or reproachful in the name of ‘health’, ‘justice’, 
or ‘technological progress’ (Van Lente 2000:54).
Again the issue of the ‘potentiality of the future’ is highlighted. If the future is to be 
successfully ‘colonised’ (Giddens 1990) then debates on the promising nature or 
otherwise of ‘new technologies’ are vital for those involved in attempts at 
‘colonisation’. ‘Technological progress’ and the related notion of the ‘potentiality of 
the fixture’ serve at such times as crucial rhetorical tools in the process of 
‘colonising’^  ^ that future. So we hear Hans Snook, former director of the UK’s 
Orange mobile phone network maintain, ‘The price operators have paid for 3G 
generation licenses will ultimately be seen as conservative once the true potential of 
these networks is realised’ (E.Business Review, May 2001:12. Emphasis added). One 
aspect of this research involves a consideration of the rhetorical devices engaged by 
those concerned with mobile telecommunication technologies that contribute to the 
presentation of convincing fixture-possible and even seemingly fixture-inevitable 
scenarios. The work of Michael (2000), which is reviewed below, goes into more 
depth about the binaries employed within fixture-orientated discourses and the ways in 
which they are used as declamatory and performative devices.
Versions of the Future and Performativity
Michael (2000) asks us to look at representations of ‘the fixture’ in terms of 
performativity^^. In this context the notion of performativity is used to explore the 
relational nature of representations of the future, that is the ways in which versions
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seek to structure relations between human and non-human actants. He questions how 
such representations ‘perform’ in terms of the presentation of self, the production of 
subject positions for readers/viewers, the enrolment and alignment of others and the 
bringing into being of a particular state of affairs. The latter relates to attempts to 
‘colonise’ the fixture through the production of seemingly ‘inevitable’ versions. 
Michael emphasises that such representations are not a-material. Rather ‘they are 
substantiated, objectified on paper, verbally, on the screen, pictorially’ (ibid:23) and 
as such do not significantly differ from any other representation. Michael draws up a 
series of dichotomies and looks at the manner in which they are deployed as rhetorical 
devices within fixture-orientated discourses.
He notes for example that one fixture representation rhetorical dichotomy 
amounts to a division between the ‘distal’ and the ‘proximal’. This concept of 
distance relates to whether a version of the fixture is represented as being near or far 
from the present time. Here ‘the fixture’ is being made to perform as a particular 
moment in time which is viewed as relational to the present moment, that is ‘the 
fixture’ is represented as either near or far from that present moment. There is no 
single ‘true’ fixture but only a representation that is in part made to mean through its 
‘distance’ from the present. The key question here is what does saying a fixture is 
near, as opposed to far, or vice versa, do for the claimant? For Michael the purported 
distance of the fixture rhetorically positions the reader in a number of ways. If the 
fixture is represented as near, or even here, then swifi action can be presented as 
warranted, to prepare for ‘the fixture’. However, the ‘here now’ or the ‘here soon’ 
fixture can also lay advocates open to accusations of opportunism, lack of long-term 
vision and scare mongering. The related criticism runs that these ‘new’ technologies 
are little more than reworked present technologies given that they are coming to us in 
the almost ‘too near’ fixture (how can they be ‘truly fixturistic’ if they are almost ‘here 
now’?) or that advocates are pressurizing ‘late adopters’ of ‘new’ technologies 
through the threat that they will be stuck with useless ‘present technologies’ if  the 
near fixture is not embraced.
Michael’s focus on such rhetorical moves within versions of the fixture can be 
used in relation to mobile communication technologies to investigate the ways in 
which those within the industry place ‘new’ services and devices on a ‘progress scale’ 
(see Chapters Five and Six). Do they present them as being ‘revolutionary’, that is as 
forming a radical hreak with past and present technologies, or are they embedded in
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an ‘evolutionary’ discourse, calling on notions of selecting out failed technologies, 
learning from past mistakes, and developing improved products from the basis of past 
successes? Are versions of the future in relation to mobile communication 
technologies portrayed as ‘distal’ or ‘proximal’ or a combination of the near and far? 
What do such rhetorical moves achieve? Michael also points out that if  ‘the future’ is 
presented as distant it can ‘diffuse urgency: there is no dire need to do anything 
immediately’ (ibid:25).
Another dichotomy cleaved by the forms of future-orientated rhetoric Michael 
highlights concerns speed. Writers on time such as McNaghten and Urry (1998) and 
Adam (1990, 1998) reflect on the notion that there are emerging different times and 
different rates of change, which work both alongside and in contrast to clock time, for 
example glacial time (slow environmental change) and informational or nanotime 
associated with new technologies such as the Internet. Michael maintains that these 
differing versions of time and speed have implications for the ways in which we view 
the future and how it is represented, ‘Indeed, the speed with which we approach a 
future can be a major part of the performativity of a representation of the future’ 
(ibid:31). Talk of technology ‘accelerating’, for example ‘as technology accelerates, 
many futuristic ideas are becoming today’s reality’ (‘Futurama.ie’, Business and 
Technology, January 2000:16), demonstrates that in this instance part of technological 
futures’ rhetoric entails an assumption of change taking place at an ever increasing 
pace, a pace which must be kept up with if one is to be a ‘future winner’. This aspect 
of future representations could be said to be deeply embedded in modem Western 
rhetoric, that of continual acceleration and of constant improvement on past speeds. 
We expect each ‘new’ technology to work ‘faster’ (and via connotation ‘better’) than 
its predecessor. Such representations of speed also relate to subjectivity and agency. 
Are we incited to ‘ride’ this accelerating future vehicle of technology, or are we 
encouraged to wrest the controls away from the ‘inhuman’ technology driver and try 
to slow down its acceleration? Michael notes how
Low speed, or deceleration, can be negative (mindless inertia) or positive 
(reflexive obstruction). Similarly, high speed, or acceleration, can be 
negative (headlong, irresponsible mshing) or positive (entrepreneurial 
grasping of the future moment) (Michael 2000:33).
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For some, the pace of change in the mobile technologies market is deemed to be a 
cause for concern. With talk of an ‘uncertain future’ and ‘future developments’ 
(‘Techno Dread’, Marketing Week, 16^ March 2000:24), marketers are encouraged to 
understand the fast pace of technological change to better communicate with actual 
and potential consumers now and in the future. This relates not only to ideas about 
speed and rates of change but also to modes of subjectivity and future-possible ways 
of being. In Chapter Six various texts are analysed with regard to how those within 
the mobile telecommunications industry are told they should (strategically) approach 
‘the fixture’ as it is represented within those texts: how they can ‘get to’ a certain 
future, in which future-possible products become present ones at an accelerated pace, 
and how they can avoid ‘bad’ fixtures which, in basic terms, involves market failure 
via lack of control of ‘the fixture’. In such discourses we see a complex ‘layering’ of 
different futures, whose possibilities represent both threats and opportunities. This 
‘threat/opportunity’ dichotomy within ‘versions of the fixture’ will be explored in 
more detail through empirical research in Chapters Five through Eight. Future- 
orientated threat/opportunity rhetoric tends to represent alternative voices’ worries 
about technological ‘threats’ as the mere missing of fixture opportunities and 
sometimes presents them as an indication of entrepreneurial weakness and luddism. 
Representing the fixture as here soon, far off, slow, or fast, all play an important role 
in the performativity and rhetorical success or otherwise of various versions of the 
fixture.
Risk and ‘the Future’
One body of literature related to the study of fixture-orientated discourses is on risk, 
particularly risk-construction and perception. Beck’s (1992) Risk Society is probably 
the best known text in this field, but writers such as Lash (1996) and Douglas (1983, 
1992) have all contributed to sociological debates about risk. Key writers maintain 
that one of the most important aspects of so-called ‘risk society’ is the need to involve 
ourselves with ‘a sense of ‘construction’ in the configuration of risk-perception’ 
(Adam, Beck and Van Loon 2000:2) whilst engaging with the im/materiality of risk. 
Adam, Beck and Van Loon argue.
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...on the one hand, the materiality of technologically-constituted hazards 
always include the virtual domain of latency, invisibility and contingency.
On the other hand, socially constructed risks are also lived as potential 
harm (Adam, Beck and Van Loon 2000:2).
Risk is intimately linked with the future. Future potentialities and future hazards are 
frequently constructed as entities which are yet to ‘reveal themselves’, but which are 
constantly being ‘uncovered’ by the language of prediction and control. Notions of 
predictability of the future based on past knowledge and subsequent extrapolation to 
the present and beyond have been challenged, particularly in light of their failure to 
secure any calculable future (Adam, Beck and Van Loon 2000:6). The interest then is 
in how these futures are represented in terms of potential risks or otherwise, here 
linked to mobile communication technologies. A key strand of such an investigation 
into the ‘hazards of the future’ would be to look at the politics of ‘risk definition’. The 
very immateriality and invisibility of threats of the kind associated with mobile 
communication technologies means that the ‘knowledge’ that we hold about them is 
necessarily mediated and as such is dependent on interpretation. When interpretation, 
and of course the perspective one is making one’s interpretations from, becomes this 
important, then notions of risk, particularly the potential risks ‘the future’ brings, 
become highly contested.
It is not argued here that there are necessarily risks involved in modem 
technologies such as mobile devices, since this would involve adhering to the well- 
worn ‘technology as inherently threatening and apt to go out of control’ argument. 
However, scepticism towards this argument does not mean that the politics of risk- 
perception as linked to the sphere of ‘new’ mobile communication technologies is an 
invalid topic for analysis. To give a brief example of its relevance, some participants 
in a recent focus group^^ on mobile commerce spoke of the threats they associated 
with having bank details ‘on’ a mobile commerce device, mentioning the ‘risk’, if  this 
device was to become available to consumers, from both muggers and hackers. Some 
were not convinced by the focus group leader’s assurances that in the future, when 
this product had been fully developed, their details would be held on a central server 
and would therefore be safe. The issue here is not whether these devices and services 
being developed are or are not ‘risk-free’, but rather the ways in which risks are 
perceived and talked about by the different parties involved, and also what this talk of
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future risks does, in terms of calls for preventative action for instance. Talk of 
potential risks in relation to mobile technologies is part of the production process of 
versions of the future. ‘The future’ is represented as the harbinger of dangers that 
need attention if the ‘right’ future is to be reached or created.
In the above empirical example such talk may lead to those within the mobile 
industry feeling obliged to highlight the ‘lack of risk’ from such future-possible 
devices. A similar point can be made about the proposed risk to health from the use of 
mobile phones and mobile phone masts. Even the state of the mobile industry itself 
may be perceived to be a ‘risk’ (presumably with consequences for current and 
potential investors and certain corporations), as is exemplified by Fortune’s question 
‘Is a new wireless technology really worth $300 billion?’ (First Telecom’s Game of 
Risk, Fortune, 30^  ^April 2000:4-15).
Beck (1992) argues that the inescapability of interpretation in relation to risks 
makes them malleable and ‘open to social definition and construction’ (1992:23). This 
point can be extended to perceptions of risks related to mobile telecommunications, as 
hazards with consequences for people’s future health, and as ‘risky’ surveillance 
technologies. In a recent Times article^^ the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr 
George Carey, was said to have given his approval to proposals for installing mobile 
phone aerials atop thousands of churches in England. The proposed guidelines sent 
out in mailshots to 13,000 parochial church councils include ‘reassurance’ from the 
government commissioned Stewart Report that ‘research to date does not suggest that 
emissions from mobile phones and base stations put the health of the UK population 
at risk’^ .^ Opposition mentioned in the article is cited as coming from the Cornwall 
Wildlife Trust worried about ‘possible harm to bats in the belfnes’^ ®. This is an apt 
example of the ways in which different interpretations of risks make them highly 
malleable. Here mobile phone masts are constituted as possibly harmful to humans 
who have to be ‘reassured’, and possibly harmful to bats, who are offered no such 
reassurance, whilst simultaneously securing the risk-filled future of cash-strapped 
parishes. Risks are situated in the potentially unknowable realm of the fixture, and it is 
this ‘unknowability’ that renders them so malleable. Future-possible risks necessarily 
entail a high level of indeterminacy and mediation that multiplies the likelihood of 
contentions over their exact nature.
Risks may be located in the potentially unknowable realm of the future. Yet 
material and empiricist notions of ‘the fixture’ construct ‘it’ as a knowable entity, or at
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least as a realm that can be ‘colonised’ if the ‘correct knowledge’ is created. The 
construction of a viable version of the future may act as a ‘risk-management’ tool vis- 
à-vis that future. If particular social groupings have ‘ownership’ of a viable version of 
the future, the future-possible may be deemed to be less risky by and for those 
groupings. Minimising the risk associated with an unknown future is symbolically 
linked, via the process of authorization of future-orientated discourses, to maximizing 
the potentiality of that very future. Through it ‘becoming knowable’, the future is 
recast as a controllable entity. To give an example, the development of ‘advanced’ 
mobile telecommunication technologies is frequently posited as the ‘key’ to unlocking 
potential markets in or of ‘the future’. Here ‘potentiality’ in the future is a key 
concept. ‘Potential’ is represented as residing in the technology ‘itself and in its 
consumption, as a source of revenue through the ‘untapping’ of as yet unexploited 
markets. Adam (1995) writes how within a materialist/empiricist conception of the 
past and future,
...the future is conceived as a realm to be conquered and colonized. It is 
considered to be a calculable realm of potential, a world amenable to 
prediction and control on the basis of past experiences (Adam 1995:168).
Actions undertaken and meanings created in the present moment are represented as 
being implicated in the success or failure of business in the future. ‘Knowledge’ of 
that self-same future is deemed to be an invaluable instrument to help make decisions 
in the present. Within a materialist/empiricist conception of past and present, ‘the 
past’ is that which can be known through its material records (past market trend 
figures for example), and this knowledge of the past is used for the prediction and 
control of the future.
This research investigates ‘versions of the future’ in relation to mobile 
communication technology, without asserting that these versions determine people’s 
actions in the present. Instead I propose that through the very process of production, 
visions of the future delineate what future-orientated meanings and actions are 
considered most plausible. The process of building plausible versions is intimately 
related to the perceived plausibility of the mandates for action that certain versions 
suggest. To put this point across succinctly one could say that if we believe a certain 
version of the future, what might we think we should do to create or reach that future?
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Are those actions we might take deemed the most ‘commonsensical’ for example 
given the ‘threats’ or ‘opportunities’ that make up a certain vision of the future? Are 
alternative actions proposed and how are they represented? Are they represented as a 
‘last resort’ or ‘too drastic’ for instance? Versions of the future thus contain mandates 
for action although that does not automatically mean that those actions will be taken. 
These mandates for action may guide present actions and meanings although simple 
cause and effect models fall far short of explaining how, or even whether, this may 
occur. To give a recent example. President George W Bush has used the potential or 
possibility of further terrorist acts being perpetrated against the USA in the near future 
as a mandate fo r  action in certain spheres, both in terms of domestic security and 
‘affirmative action’ against those within the ‘axis of evil’^ \ Discourses of future- 
possible threat can indeed be a powerful tool for the justification of action in the 
present moment (and/or proximal future). It is possible to investigate ‘the future’ 
without falling into the trap of predictions that tend to follow technologically 
determined paths and become de-contextualised from the social world. This can be 
achieved by approaching materials on ‘the future’ as a ‘topic’ in themselves, to be 
analysed using the tools of sociology, semiotics and discourse analysis. By using the 
notion of ‘versions of the future’ it is made it clear that there may be no single ‘future’ 
that can be predicted but rather a multitude of versions created in our present that are 
significant in themselves.
To summarise, this chapter has reviewed the ways in which sociologically- 
orientated researchers have approached ‘the future’. Their work has been interpreted 
and adapted in order to aid the construction of a viable research framework. Work on 
risk perception for example has been discussed in relation to how versions of the 
future produce notions of ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’. I now turn to the methods I have 
employed in order to study how versions in relation to mobile communication 
technologies are produced.
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Chapter Four: Making Connections: A Research Rationaie
Alternative Research Universes
‘The future’ can be thought of as a discursive space, with mobile communication 
technologies being but one domain within it. It is vital to think about how mobile 
communication technologies are linked in with other domains within this future- 
orientated discursive space such as home/family life, work, and the environment. 
Indeed much of the material examined combines talk of technologies with personal, 
work, home and family life in ways that serve to make seem inevitable the mobile 
device’s place within these domains. Mobile technologies are examined with two 
perspectives in mind. ‘Mobiles of the future’ concentrates on the portrayal of mobile 
communication devices as physical objects, for example what devices will look like 
and be like in the future. Conversely ‘the future of mobiles’ focuses on the portrayal 
of mobile communication devices’ perceived place in future (social) life, including 
personal, family and work domains. The two are usually intimately linked within and 
across texts and the splitting of these two perspectives is really a methodological and 
rhetorical tool to make analysis of empirical material more cogent and systematic. 
The notion of discursive space draws attention to the broader social practices and the 
interpretative resources that construct such spaces. Here discourse is employed in its 
broadest sense, as meaning-making activities that include the textual and the visual 
such as pictures embedded in Internet sites. From this perspective, mobile devices 
become objects that can make the future mean, whilst simultaneously gaining 
futuristic connotations.
This chapter focuses on research design. It details the pilot study undertaken in 
the early stages of research, and offers a rationale for the methods subsequently 
employed. It concentrates on exactly how ‘future-possible talk’ in relation to mobile 
technologies was investigated and the various advantages and disadvantages of the 
approaches taken here. A discussion of the decision to investigate futurology and the 
discipline’s take on mobile communication technologies is followed by a 
consideration of the issues involved in researching corporate versions of the future, 
and using data from the Internet. Here the Internet is taken to be both a technology 
and a communications medium, a culture and a cultural artefact, whose status as a 
way of communicating, as an object and as a site for community relations is
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accomplished and maintained through the ways in which it is used (Hine 1998), and 
understood, by various social actants, including corporations. My interest lies with 
certain forms of corporate communications that are part of the Internet. Details are 
given of the ways in which corporate texts concerned with the future of mobile 
technologies were selected for analysis, as well as the decisions made about when, 
where and how to ‘enter the field’ and when, where and how to leave it (Illingworth
2001). Here the research ‘setting’ is the Internet and in particular corporate websites, 
and some of the texts embedded within those websites. As Mitra and Cohen (1999) 
note, by focusing on Internet texts, which they conceptualise as the ‘glue’ that hold 
the Internet together, one can ask questions about how those texts present information 
and what their significance may be in wider (online and offline) social life. Mitra and 
Cohen suggest that critical textual analysis is the most suitable method with which to 
explore questions about ‘the effectivity of the text and what it says about the 
community of people who produce and consume the texts’ (1999:181).
The reasoning behind the decision to explore teenagers’ ‘future-talk’ through 
the use of focus groups is also explained in this chapter. Details are given of the 
nature of the focus groups, including limited information regarding the members of 
the groups. I did not gather detailed information about the socio-economic status of 
the teenagers who participated in the focus groups, drawn as they were from the 
student population of South East Essex College of Arts and Technologies (SEECAT). 
Predominately this was because I would have had to enquire about the status of their 
parents/guardians. I did not feel (and on the advice of my gatekeeper) that this would 
be appropriate to the context of their participation. From my ‘members’s knowledge’ 
(Campbell 2003, Garfmkel 1974:18 in Turner 1974, Smith 1984) of the local areas 
from which the college recruits students (Southend-on Sea, Basildon and Canvey 
Island), I knew that the majority of the participants were likely to be from relatively 
low status socio-economic backgrounds. SEECAT has a localised reputation for 
taking in ‘less-able’ students from less well-off areas, as compared to South East 
Essex Sixth Form College (SEEVIC), which, situated as it is in the more affluent 
Castle Point area of Essex, remains renowned for taking the ‘better’ students.
According to 2001 census figures from the Office of National Statistics'^, 
Basildon and Canvey Island (two areas from which SEECAT’s student population is 
drawn) have rates of unemployment slightly higher than the national average. 
Southend has a higher than national average International Labour Organisation (ILO)
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unemployment rate (5.7%) amongst working age people^l The number of people in 
Southend and Canvey Island attaining qualifications at degree level or higher (13.6% 
and 6% respectively) is well below the national average for England and Wales 
(19.6%), whilst in Basildon and Canvey Island the number of young people leaving 
school with no qualifications (31.2% and 37.2% respectively) is higher than the 
national average (29.1%). According to ‘Essex Trends 2002’ (Essex County Council 
2002) the county as a whole is relatively affluent, with total household income 11% 
higher than across the UK and disposable household income 9% higher than the 
national average in the year 2000. However, the catchment areas of SEECAT are 
amongst the least affluent in Essex. To give an example, on overall deprivation 
measures, Basildon is in the most deprived 50% of English districts (Essex Trends
2002). On average Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) score, Basildon is amongst 
the most deprived 30-40% of local authorities in England. On the ‘local 
concentration’ score (the intensity of deprivation for the most deprived 10% of 
people) the highest levels in Essex are in Basildon, Tendring and Harlow. The 
numbers of income deprived people (36,000) and employment deprived people 
(8,200) are far higher in Basildon than any other part of Essex (Essex Trends 2002).
I felt that by asking the participants information on their socio-economic 
backgrounds, I would be compromising their trust in me and that it would undermine 
my self-presentation to them as primarily interested in what they had to say about the 
future of mobile communication technologies. This concern with exploring young 
people’s perspectives on certain issues on their own terms and in their own words has 
several well-known precedents within sociological and ethnographical research. 
Willis’s work on ‘working class’ boy’s experiences of education (1978) is a prime 
example here. ‘Learning to Labour: How working-class kids get working class jobs’ 
(1978) contains substantial excerpts firom group discussions that Willis conducted 
with the ‘Lads’ in whose culture he was interested. Willis succeeds in getting across 
the specificities of working-class boy’s (here school-based) culture through the 
analysis of these excerpts. The reader is thus able to examine for his or herself the 
participants’ own words, whilst Willis’ intercedes between group interview extracts to 
theoretically illuminate the material. As Willis (1978) states.
The qualitative methods...and the ethnographic format of the presentation
were dictated by the nature of my interest in ‘the cultural’. These
94
techniques are suited to record this level and have sensitivity to meanings 
and values as well as an ability to present and interpret symbolic 
articulations, practices and forms of cultural production (1978:3).
With my focus groups, I explore teenagers’ ideas about the future of a particular 
technology. I consider the possibilities of ‘symbolic creativity’ that young people 
have open to them when thinking about the future, and the ways in which their ideas 
about the future are firmly embedded in their everyday informal lives. Again we can 
turn to Willis (1990) here, as he argues.
Language is the most fundamental means of symbolic work and 
throughout [this chapter] we use and quote the words that young people 
themselves use to express and explore their possibilities (Willis 1990:99.
My emphasis).
Whilst I wanted to the teenagers to express the possibilities of a particular technology, 
the research principals and approach stated by Willis remain relevant to my 
endeavour. Youth researchers looking at dance music culture, clubbing and ‘clubbers’ 
have often used qualitative methods, highlighting the importance of giving young 
people involved in these ‘scenes’ the opportunity to speak about the meanings (say in 
terms of social identity) such recreational activities have for them. Malbon (1999), 
Thornton (1995) and Measham, Aldridge and Parker (2001) have used qualitative 
methods such as participant observation and in-depth interviewing to explore the 
behaviours of youthful ‘clubbers’ and the meanings young people attribute to club 
culture. My exploration of the ways in which young people envisage socio-technical 
futures is part of this tradition within youth research of exploring young people’s 
perspectives on facets of social life in their own words and through their own 
experiences. Focus groups offer the opportunity of in-depth exploration of a topic 
which may not lend itself to opportunities for observation, and indeed are 
recommended by some ethnographers to extend analysis of social phenomenon 
beyond observational work (Suter 2000). Compared to observational work, focus 
groups are helpful in practical terms, allowing the researcher to gather a relatively 
large amount of information in a shorter period of time.
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Gibbs (1997) states that focus groups are methodologically useful when there 
are power differences between the participants (here young people) and decision­
makers or professionals (here those involved in the mobile communications industry), 
since participants can offer support and insight to each other. Researchers have used 
focus groups when the everyday use of language and culture of particular social 
groupings is of interest to them (Gibbs 1997, Morgan and Kruger 1993). Similarly I 
have highlighted my concern with the ways in which versions of the future in relation 
to mobile communication technologies are produced by young people on their own 
terms, in their own words and through drawing on the socio-cultural resources (such 
as popular science fiction) available to them. Focus groups tend to elicit a multiplicity 
of views, and in that sense the data gathered can be ‘richer’ than that from individual 
interviews (Morgan and Kruger 1993). Powell & Single (1996) used focus groups to 
generate and explore hypothesis, whilst Hoppe et al (1995) and Lankshear (1993) 
used them to develop questions or concepts for questionnaires and interview guides. 
Given that there is little work on the ways in which young people imagine 
‘technologies of the friture’, the use of focus groups seemed highly appropriate for my 
research given their exploratory and relatively open-ended nature. Given my interest 
in the processes by which ‘versions of the future’ are produced, the interactive 
element of focus groups offers an insight into these processes, as is home out in 
particular in my work on young people and their use of humour to imagine the future 
(see Chapter Seven).
Focus groups are however limited in terms of one’s ability to generalise 
findings to a whole population, mainly because of the small numbers of people 
participating and the likelihood that the participants will not be a representative 
sample. I hold a cautious approach to generalising my findings from the focus groups, 
and this caution is typical of social research using focus group material (Gibbs 1997). 
I do not think that the strategies and resources the teenagers employed to imagine the 
future are unique to this particular group, given their ‘membership’ as young people 
to wider social groupings and wider British culture. However, I have remained 
reticent in claiming that their perspectives would necessarily be shared by all young 
people. This caution avoids homogenising young people (as a static social grouping 
based solely on age) whilst retaining the possibility that young people may hold 
similar perspectives on, and positions towards, the future of technologies, such as a 
position of scepticism towards ‘logic’ perpetual technological progress and its links to
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consumer culture. On the strength of my empirical material and the processes of 
production I identify, it is possible to say something about the ways in which versions 
of the future are constructed in particular local contexts, here within certain 
technology corporations, and amongst a particular group of young people. I do not 
assert that there is one ‘set’ way of producing versions that I have subsequently 
‘discovered’ and which ‘works’ across all social settings. To remain mindful of the 
particular context, say the specific ways in which localised ‘social interests’ are built 
up and managed (Gallon and Law 1982, Woolgar 1981), seems to me the most 
important facet of utilising qualitative material such as that produced via analyses of 
corporate texts and focus group transcripts
The rationale behind my interest in young people is in part biographical, home 
out of my ongoing interest in young people and ‘clubbing’ as a leisure pursuit, and a 
previous interest in eating disorders of which many of the sufferers are young people. 
I had already encountered the use of focus groups in research from my previous work 
in medical sociology, as within health-related fields focus groups are often used to 
elicit ‘client’ perspectives (Cunningham-Burley, Kerr and Pavis 1999), although their 
use in these contexts have criticised (Catterall and Maclaran 1997). In addition, within 
sociology there exists an on-going concern with the ‘age oppression’ that young 
people experience, which tends to forgotten as one gets older (Hearn 1988). My initial 
interest in corporate versions of the future grew into a concern with young people’s 
versions of the future when I realised that whilst corporate versions of ‘the mobile 
future’ often produced young people as being the consumers of the future, rarely were 
the young people themselves consulted about their ideas of the future in this socio- 
technical sphere. Focusing on child abuse, violences and sexualities towards young 
people, Hearn (1988) called for, ‘a (new) sociology that devotes as much space and 
energy to the position and experiences of young people as that now given to the 
position and experiences of older people, adults, relative elders’ (1988:532). In 2003 
we hear similar calls for youth research not to be marginalised within mainstream 
sociology, and for it not to be solely focused on ‘youth problems’ (Roberts 2003:13- 
16). My work with young people does not focus on an explicit ‘youth problem’ such 
as bullying or substance use. Rather it gives ‘space and energy’ to the experiences and 
perceptions of young people, whilst seeking to problematise the (essentialist) age- 
based assumptions that those within the mobile industry make about young people 
and their consumption of, and understandings of, technologies.
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Finding the Future as a Topic
This research focuses on the production of versions of the future in relation to mobile 
communication technologies, but a question remains. How did it become apparent 
that ‘the future’ was a key aspect of the rhetoric of the ‘mobile age’? The theme of 
‘versions of the future’ emerged from a pilot study I conducted in 1999. The aim of 
the pilot study was to provide a starting point for further analysis of the social and 
cultural meanings of mobile communication devices in everyday life. It became clear 
that there were a number of different paths my research could take. The pilot study 
became an exercise in refining the research topic and limiting the research’s focus to a 
reasonable and workable range of ideas and material. Cultural representations of 
mobile communication technologies seemed a fertile ground for further investigation. 
Given an initial interest in representations, the British media was taken as a starting 
point for ideas.
The study of media representations touches on the territory of numerous 
disciplines, including linguistics, discourse analysis, semiotics, sociology and social 
psychology. Research into media discourse is hugely varied, incorporating work into 
representations of males and masculinity in the media (Hearn et al 2003), 
representations of women with cancer in Anglophone countries (Seale 2002) and 
images of the cultural figure of ‘the nerd’ in US popular culture (Kendall 1999). Bell 
(1991) notes the importance of defining the kind of media discourse one wants to 
study and deciding how it will be collected. Consistency is vital to a coherent study of 
whichever area of media discourse is of interest. Bell (1991) argues that the researcher 
must make a clear and consistent delineation of exactly what it is to be collected (in 
my case newspaper articles on ‘mobile devices and/or phones’ and ‘mobile 
communications’) whilst ultimately,
...limiting the amount of data to be gathered to manageable proportions 
while ensuring it remains representative. The first step defines the 
universe of discourse or the population, and the second draws a valid and 
reliable sample of that universe (Bell 1991:10).
Deciding on one’s ‘universe of discourse’ and drawing a sample from that universe is 
problematic and has been approached in a myriad of different ways by other
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researchers. Bell (1984) for example studied copy from local and international news 
agencies from a five day constructed week, a sample similar to that of my pilot study. 
In one review Van Dijk (1988a) looked at clips of one story reported in 250 
newspapers in a hundred countries, whilst in another he took several days’ sample of 
six national and two regional Dutch newspapers, national news agency copy, and 
source materials (Van Dijk 1988b). Bell (1991) recommends thinking about one’s 
media sample in terms of genres, outlets and outputs. Genres refer in this instance to 
the particular kind of media content one is interested in. For my pilot study the ‘genre’ 
was British news on mobile tele/communication devices. Outlets are the publications 
(or television channels, radio stations and web sites) which carry content. For my pilot 
study the outlet was British national newspapers. Outputs are what these media outlets 
produce and the time period covered, which will vary depending on the researcher’s 
aims and whether there are time-specificities built into the research topic (say how 
long a particular story ‘runs for’ within the media). For my pilot study the outputs 
were British national newspaper articles about mobile communications, and the time 
period was one (seven-day) week. I decided on this particular time-period based on 
antecedents within research into the media which tend to set time frames in order to 
pragmatically limit the volume of material gathered for analysis (Smith 1994).
Even from a cursory look at the popular and technical media (from the Sun to 
ComputerWire) it became apparent that mobile communication devices have been, 
and still are, portrayed in a variety of different ways, and that it would be fiiiitful to 
concentrate upon one particular aspect of these representations. I enter into more 
detail about the processes of my pilot study later in this chapter. Suffice to say here 
that there are precedents within social and linguistic studies for the analysis of 
newspaper discourse about certain topics, but that the ways in which these studies are 
undertaken vary enormously. This forced me to make certain decisions about the 
exact nature of my newspaper analysis based on what was most appropriate for my 
particular aims, namely to begin to explore the representations of mobile 
communication technologies within the British (news) media.
It could be argued that media writing about mobiles has simply adapted to the 
technological changes and consumption patterns associated with these technologies. 
From this viewpoint media writing would be perceived as ‘mirroring’ wider 
technological and societal changes, and the media would be cast as an institution that 
informs us as to what is going on in the ‘real world’. The difficulty with this model is
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the assumption that events (such as new technological products being launched) are 
reflected objectively in media writings, which act as ‘mere descriptions’. In contrast 
to this view I contend that these ‘events’ are built up as significant, interesting and 
something worth writing about. They are written about in a particular manner, which 
is in itself a product of the media as an institution, of professional and editorial 
decisions, and market demands.
Moreover, it can be asserted that media texts are themselves socially organised 
(Smith 1990). Following from this, what we ‘know’ about mobile phones, is also 
socially organised. Our ‘knowledge’ is not embedded within the device itself in a 
technologically determined manner, nor can it be wholly socially determined or even 
wholly idiosyncratic, as it must refer back to the device itself and the uses, users and 
mobile context of the device. ‘Knowledge’ of mobile devices, users, uses and contexts 
all interlink. Smith maintains.
Social reality is not external to she who experiences, makes, or observes 
it. Conceive of it this way: people bring into being for one another a 
‘structure’ (I use this term metaphorically here) which they inhabit 
temporarily and which drops away behind them; of course it is not made 
any way we want; what we put together in the past shapes the direction 
and the framework of the future; what we build interlocks with what 
others build; we build what we know how to build with the materials that 
come to hand. Nevertheless we move into the future as into a building, the 
walls, floors and roof of which we put together with one another as we go 
into it. It is an ongoing creation of and in action (Smith 1990:53).
It is suggested that we cannot empirically investigate what people say about, and do, 
with mobile devices without having an idea of the sources and contexts of people’s 
‘knowledge’ and the ways it may be socially organised. This passage in my view is a 
useful starting point when thinking about how we could approach the portrayal, and 
ultimately the production of, the ‘mobile arena’^ "* within other media, either as the 
sole subject of documentaries, as TV news items, or within soap operas, and films^^ It 
is not suggested that there is any ‘real’ meaning of mobile phones, which is either 
discoverable within texts, or distorted by the media who produce those texts. This 
position towards the ‘real’ is by no means a denial of the fact that mobile devices
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remain very tangible in their presence in our everyday lives as anyone that uses public 
transport can attest. Nor does this methodological position exclude the possibility that 
there is something peculiar to mobile communication technologies that lends itself 
particularly well to ‘futuristic’ portrayals. One possibility is that the notion of 
convergence in relation to mobile devices may act as a platform from which talk of 
‘futuristic’ devices that have multiple functions can be launched. However 
acknowledging this possibility is not akin to asserting that the mobile is intrinsically 
futuristic . Rather the ways in which mobiles are made to mean are built upon so that 
they can be discursively shaped into ‘futuristic’ devices: from a simple person to 
person communication tool to a ‘anywhere, anytime, anyone, anything’ personal 
organising and monitoring device for example (Mitchell 2000).
The ‘arrival’ of mobile devices into our lives was pre-empted by advertising 
and media discourse about what these devices ‘are’, ‘would be’, what they are ‘for’ 
and so on. This process of definition continues today as ‘new’ mobile technologies, 
services and applications are produced which have to be ‘understood’ and captured by 
all concerned. Mobile phones came into the public arena with attached, but by no 
means fixed, meanings and uses that were explicated for us, often with reference to 
similar gadgets or technologies. Du Gay et al (1997) speak of a similar process for 
the launch of the Sony Walkman. As time passes, layer upon layer of ‘chat’, debate, 
adverts, documentaries, and direct/‘witness’ experiences are built up around the 
mobile phone as a cultural and technological artefact. We all ‘know’ what a mobile 
device is, what it can and cannot (but perhaps soon will) do. We know what it is used 
for, what it is not used for, how, when and why. This ‘knowledge’ is never finished or 
complete. ‘New’ information is assimilated and interrelated with recourse to 
appropriate schema . This ‘knowledge’ needs to be examined if  we are to understand 
the place of mobile communication technologies in our everyday lives. Within my 
pilot study a tiny snapshot of the material that we have available and make use of 
within this ‘knowing’ process was studied. We can think of texts as both constituents 
of social relations (Smith 1990:121) and constituted by social and organisational 
relations (Fairclough 1995) and thus interesting resources for sociological analysis. 
From the observations we make we can have, as Smith suggests,
...access (to) the ontological ground of institutional processes which
organise, govern, and regulate the kind of society in which we live, for
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these are to a significant degree forms of social action mediated by texts 
(Smith 1990:122).
The pilot study material gathered over the space of a week was available 
simultaneously for the purposes of analysis. In ‘everyday life’ people do not usually 
have diverse media material on one subject in front of them to contrast and compare. 
Smith points out that it is only within a (academic) research setting that such 
comparison is possible. In ‘everyday life’ media writing about mobile devices is 
‘located in temporally ordered sequences of events, things, persons, objects etc’ 
(Smith 1990:124). Using the notion of social relation. Smith argues that we can locate 
particular experiences or texts of a social process, as constituents of sequences of 
action in which many people and people’s actions play a part. This means that what 
we commonly think of as mere descriptions of occurrences, such as the media 
coverage of the launch of a ‘new’ mobile service, constitutes a series of actions in 
themselves.
So what kinds of things do we ‘know’ about mobile devices? Within the pilot 
study an attempt was made to delimit and categorise this ‘knowledge’ in a way that 
made the choice of a research focus possible. The pilot study was organised as it was 
due to my initial interest in media representations and the ‘work’ they do in 
delineating the meanings and actions deemed possible in our social world. This 
concern with representations informed my previous work on the discursive production 
of eating disorders and eating disorder sufferers within the medical/therapeutic 
domains firom a Foucauldian perspective (Moore 1998). My interest in mobile 
communication technologies first began when working for two PR and ‘media 
monitoring’ companies with predominately communication technology company 
clients. I shall now give some brief details of how my time with Romeike and Curtice 
and Press Select (now Precise) shaped my research interests given that PR 
environments can be difficult to access as a sociologically-orientated researcher and 
so may be of concern to some readers.
Between January 1999 and September 1999 I worked full-time for what was 
then Romeike and Curtice (now Romeike, see www.romeike.com/Romeike/) in 
London. Between September 1999 and January 2001 1 worked full time, and then part 
time for Press Select (see www.nrecise-media.co.uWnrecise/index.asp). also based in 
London. At that point both corporations specialised in ‘monitoring’ British, European
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and North American technology industry press, national newspapers and some 
Internet ‘newswires’ for predominately communication technology clients. Both 
positions involved scanning industry-orientated publications such as Wireless Week, 
Information Week, consumer-orientated magazines such as T3 and on-line 
publications such as ZDNet UK for ‘client-based mentions’ (i.e. the name of the 
client) and/or for ‘sector mentions’ (i.e. a keyword or key phrase such as ‘mobile data 
services’ or ‘PC software’).
At the start of each week ‘team members’ (teams were predominately based 
around technology sectors) would receive a list of client names, and/or sector 
mentions, and a (long) list of publications to be covered. We spoke to each client to 
confirm the sort of coverage they were looking for (or expecting in the event of a 
corporate press release) and arrange presentation and delivery methods for every 
single ‘clipping’ we found, or in the case of newswire coverage, each ‘download’ we 
sent. My general experience of this work was that it proved to be incredibly 
monotonous, and reasonably ‘stressful’ since if we overlooked a press clipping for a 
client our ‘team leader’ would (often publicly) chastise us for missing it. The 
monotony of the work, its technology focus, and my continued passion for 
sociological research (having recently finished my M.A. and living in the hope of 
receiving funding for a PhD) combined into a growing consideration of the ways in 
which industry and consumer-orientated publications represented technological 
innovations and ‘new’ products. I spent a lot of time ‘day-dreaming’ on the job! The 
sheer volume of the industry publications we were expected to read, coupled with my 
later ‘promotion’ onto the weekend national newspaper team and both media 
monitoring company’s focus on technology, meant that I began to get a rather good 
overview of the ways in which (communication) technologies and technology 
companies are spoken about in the media. I began to photocopy articles about mobile 
communication technologies which were of interest to me. After a year or so of doing 
this (by which time I had started to apply for PhD funding) I had assembled a sizeable 
collection of clippings on what were presented as ‘ftituristic’ technologies (3G was a 
particularly hot topic at the time). My on-going love of science fiction and popular 
science probably lead me to gather those clippings which had a ‘futuristic’ spin to 
them. Only later, after I had left Press Select and was in the first year of my PhD, did 
the chance to start thinking more sociologically about the ways in which ‘the ftiture’ 
is produced in relation to ‘new’ (consumer) technologies arise. My boxes of clippings.
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which I had not collected with this purpose in mind, became a source of material and 
ideas.
Methodologically I think that working for PR and ‘media monitoring’ 
companies offered me an insight into journalistic material on ‘new’ technologies. 
However, such an overview was, in my opinion, by no means sufficient to say much 
of import into the ways in which ideas about the fiiture in relation to technologies are 
produced. Despite the wealth of material I had gathered over the year, I was still 
concerned that any pilot study I conducted about representations of mobile 
technologies should be more ‘systematic’. This concern probably stemmed from my 
awareness of the extremely haphazard way in which I had collected the clippings 
firom Press Select, given that I did not expect to be using them in academic analyses at 
a later point. In addition, my concern with being ‘systematic’ (as opposed to 
‘haphazard’) and perhaps more importantly my awareness of the sheer volume of 
media material produced about (mobile) communication technologies during those 
long hours spend scanning publications for client mentions, led me to conclude that 
my pilot study should look at a bounded research site (i.e. British national 
newspapers) in a very specific and relatively short time period (again given the 
expected volume of material). My interest in representations and discursive 
production, my experience of working at Romeike and Press Select, and finally my 
pilot study, would prove to be the impetus for the rest of my research and its focus on 
‘versions of the future of mobile communication technologies’. In retrospect it would 
have been usefiil if  the pilot study had been used to study more diverse forms of 
media rather than concentrating solely on British newspapers. However, as I have 
detailed, my previous employment had already equipped me with an awareness of 
other media which dealt with communication technologies such as specialist/technical 
press and technology news wires.
Between Sunday 21st of November and Saturday 27th of November 1999 
three British newspapers from the ‘populist’ or tabloid press, two from the ‘middle 
market’, and three ‘quality’ or broad-sheet publications were chosen for analysis. The 
‘middle market’ is perhaps too ambiguous a term here. By ‘middle market’ I mean the 
newspapers which are often highly conservative in their copy, but which are presented 
as an ‘intelligent’ read to ABCl adults, namely The Daily Mail and the Express. The 
Daily Mail, published by Associated Newspapers, continues to be the most successful 
of these ‘middle market’ publications^^. Barry Allsop, Circulation Manager for the
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Daily Mail, defines ‘middle market’ as what the publications in this sector are not, 
“We’re not tabloid, like the Sun and the Daily Sport, but we’re not broadsheet either. 
The other middle market paper is the Express. We aim at Middle England”^^ . 
According to the Daily M ail’s own figures for July to December 2003 provided by 
Barry Allsop and confirmed by ABC Media (see www.abc.org.uk), its readership of 
5,634,000 during this period was weighted towards older people (the largest 
readership group for this time period being the over 65s, the second largest being 55- 
64 year olds), towards females (2,983,000 females compared to 2,651,000 males) and 
towards ‘social class’ Cl (2,044,000 CJ as opposed to 1,659,000 AB).
Publications to include in this study were chosen on the basis of what were 
then recent circulation figures^l From these figures the following newspapers were 
selected, all of which were either first, second or third in their respective markets, as 
the table below demonstrates.
Publication
European
Dailies
1998/9
averages
British 
Circulation 
Figures 1999
British 
Circulation 
Figures 1999
Name Readership Circulation October November
feHH
The Sun 
The Mirror
The Mail 
The Express
Daily
Telegraph 
The Times
10.048.000
6.393.00
Daily Record 1.843.000
3.613.000
2.290.000
674.000
3,666,189
2,346,970
637,112
5.108.000
2.455.000
2.300.000
1.096.000
2,370,695 
1,082,024
2,411,000
1,906,000
The Guardian 1,123,000 
News of World n/a
1,026,000
729.000
366.000
1,042,002
724,996
391,908
3,549,570
2,276,783
640,251
2,370,534 
1,043,681
1,030,777
720,049
397,991
4,106,937 4,062,194
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Publication
European
Dailies
1998/9
averages
British 
Circulation 
Figures 1999
British 
Circulation 
Figures 1999
Sunday People n/a n/a 1,597,958 1,554,688
Mall on
Sunday
n/a n/a 2,290,698 2,309,886
Sunday
Express
n/a n/a 993,224 959,902
Sunday Times 
Sunday
n/a n/a 1,343,119 1,374,641
Telegraph
n/a n/a 822,021 816,612
The Observer n/a n/a 400,296 409,794
Clearly these figures exclude regional publications (such as The Herald, the Evening 
Standard and the Manchester Evening News) and free local newspapers (such as the 
Guildford Times). The key criterion for inclusion in the study was that the article 
should mention, in a substantial manner, the words ‘mobile phone(s)’ and/or ‘mobile 
tele/communications devices’. From the outset it became clear how difficult it is to 
apply such criteria. Some of the issues to be negotiated were whether articles dealing 
with laptops, pagers, game-boys or ‘walkie-talkies’ should be included, and whether 
the debate over call centre working conditions was relevant^^. The sheer volume of 
material on telecommunication corporations was overwhelming and it was decided 
that articles dealing with corporate identity and national interests would be better 
analysed separately. However this wealth of material does not necessarily have to be 
seen as a research problem but as an indication that there is something interesting 
going on in relation to these particular technologies. This may relate to their (now) 
ubiquitous presence in people’s everyday lives, and the ways in which they are cast as 
‘developing’ technologies that continue to have ‘new’ applications and services added 
to them i.e. Multi-media Messaging Services (MMS).
The pilot study began with a basic numerical analysis. For the seven days from 
Sunday 21st of November to Saturday November 1999 inclusive, 53 articles were
collected. A breakdown of the number collected from each publication is detailed 
below:
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T h e  S u n  2 
T h e  M i r r o r  4 
D a i l y  R e c o r d  1
N e w s o f W o r i d  1 
S u n d a y  M i r r o r  0 
S u n d a y  P e o p i e  3
T h e  D a i l y M a i l  5 
T h e  E x p r e s s  4
M a i l  o n  S u  n d a y  0 
S u n d a y  E x p r e s s  0
T h e  T e l e g r a p h  5 
T h e  T i m e s  1 7  
T h e  G u a r d i a n  8
S u n d a y  T e l e g r a p h  0 
S u n d a y  T i m  e s  1 
O b s e r v e r  2
All articles were read and ‘key themes’ that came to attention were noted. Herein lies 
the crux of the difficulty with such analysis. Interpretative apparatus enters into a 
‘relation’ with the text that structures any ‘work’ conducted on it. The knowledge that 
is made use of to analyse the text is a resource that can never be made wholly explicit. 
Both the analyst and the reader of the results ‘must read in what is not actually present 
in the text by reading in background knowledge to accomplish its meaningful 
character’ (Smith 1990:88). Since the reader does not have all of the original texts 
available to read, she relies on the writer’s ability to make a ‘description’, or analysis, 
which is ‘objective’. As Smith (1990:87) notes.
What is meant by an objective account is not one which says everything 
which could be said (impossible) but one which needs to be said for the 
sociologist who must rely on such a description for her knowledge of the 
original (Smith 1990:87).
Smith goes on to assert that, ‘Social phenomena arise for the sociological observer 
only in an interpretative act’ (1990:88). The ‘interpretative act’ in the pilot study, and 
which extends across this research as a whole, amounts to the process by which ‘key 
themes’ (and key texts, key theories, even principal conclusions) were chosen or 
‘presented themselves’. These ‘key themes’ are not entirely and innocently a product 
of the texts gathered and analysed. They are part of a performance (Law and 
Singleton 2000).
Whilst acknowledging this, the generation of key themes remained useful as 
an organising principle for material to be analysed. Whilst some of the texts could be 
related to one relatively ‘discreet’ theme (at least within this particular schema).
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Others could be related to two or more themes. To give an example, ‘And now the 
news at platform 10’ {The Guardian, November 1999:12) refers directly to 
content provisions, ‘...you simply press a button, dial up and then scroll and click 
your way to the headlines’. The article frames this in near-futurist terms, ‘I’ve seen 
the future of news and it’s lovely’ and constitutes the mobile phone as a gadget which, 
‘...made even the most gadget-repellent members of our office go weak when a 
sample arrived’. Due to this complexity it became more helpful to talk in terms of 
general themes, such as ‘mobile device as gadget’, and give particularly salient 
examples of each one, rather than to relate in detail the themes of each and every 
article collected. The main themes within the 53 articles gathered were as follows. I 
have listed them in terms of the number of times across texts these themes (that is the 
codes relating to certain words/phrases) were apparent:
Mobile devices as ‘gadgets’ and/or fashion items 
Corporate analysis of mobile device and content provision markets 
Mobile devices as ‘the future’/futurism 
Mobile devices and safety issues 
Comment on users of mobile devices 
Consumption of mobile devices in general 
Consumer guides to mobile devices and networks 
Comment on contexts of mobile device use 
Comment on uses of mobile devices 
‘Funny Old World’ stories
All the texts that I gathered from my newspaper sample incorporated elements of talk 
about mobiles, framing this artefact in a variety of different ways. Coding elements of 
these articles involved close reading and marking at the edge of the text near a key 
word/phrase such as ‘on the train’ (indicating ‘comment on contexts of mobile use’). 
This approach differs somewhat from the coding regimes of grounded theory, 
developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) who later diverged in their views on the 
approach to qualitative data, from the importance of using qualitative data to develop 
emergent theory (Glaser 1992) to a more rigid codified operation (Strauss and Corbin 
1990, Stem 1994). Grounded theory stipulates that as data is collected it should be
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analysed simultaneously by looking for all possible interpretations. This process 
involves using particular coding procedures which usually begin with open coding, 
moving through to axial coding and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990).
The first stage, namely open coding, involves breaking down the data into 
distinct units of meaning, whilst sections of text are ‘tagged’ with codes. This is akin 
to the process that I undertook with the newspaper material. Open coding is a highly 
fluid process, and again the researcher must draw on his or her socio-cultural 
knowledge and academic background to illuminate the text’s account in relation to the 
experience or phenomenon at hand. Here I was looking at the newspaper material on 
mobile tele/communication devices in terms of the ways in which these artefacts were 
being textually produced, deploying what possible discourses, say of ‘gadgetry’ or 
‘futurism’, to make sense of them and their place in the socio-technical world. The 
second ‘stage’ of the grounded theory coding paradigm (Strauss and Corbin 1990) is 
axial coding, involving the comprehension of concepts in terms of their dynamic 
interrelationships (Goulding 1999). When axial coding is undertaken, the researcher 
must abstract from the codes or themes that have come out of the initial open coding 
stage, to produce the basis for subsequent theory. Here the theoretical significance of 
a (core) concept springs from its relation to other identified concepts, its connection 
with the broader canvas of social life, and its explanatory power and ‘fit’ with the 
data.
Given that in my pilot study I wanted to concentrate on the variety of ways in 
which mobiles were being talked about within the texts in my sample, and not why 
they may have been talked about in those ways, I did not move onto this next ‘stage’ 
of data interpretation (as viewed through the lens of grounded theory at least), feeling 
that a basic ‘open’ coding process was sufficient for such an exploratory point in the 
research. Open coding is predominately associated with early concept development, 
and thus speaks to the process I undertook with the newspaper articles. I wanted to 
explore the ways in which mobiles were being spoken about and understood, but not 
in terms of the interrelations between these ways of understanding (that would come 
later in my research). As Spiggle (1994:493) notes, open coding works at ‘identifying 
a chunk or unit of data (a passage of text of any length) as belonging to, representing 
or being an example of some more general phenomenon’ (1994:493).
The pilot study, despite its considerable flaws, acted principally as an idea 
generator for this research. Idea generation within sociologically-orientated research
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can take many different forms and be undertaken using different research tools, such 
as the use of ‘memos’ at the open and axial stage of coding in grounded theory 
(Goulding 1999) or the use of qualitative data analysis software such as Atlas.ti. 
Ultimately it can be a rather messy process (Lather 1991). Katz (1993), speaking of 
the production of concepts through analytical induction, argues that if  we are to view 
social life as a ‘continuous symbolic process’ then we might expect our concepts to 
have rather vague boundaries. He goes on to suggest that.
If analytical inductions follows the contours of experience, it will have 
ambiguous conceptual fringes...for the statistical researcher, practical 
uncertainty is represented by statements of probabilistic relations; for the 
analyst of social processes, by ambiguities when trying to code border line 
cases into one or the other of the “explaining” or “explained” cases (Katz 
1993:133)
During the reading/coding/interpretation process in my pilot study it soon became 
apparent that mobile communication technologies were spoken about, ‘made to 
mean’, in a wide range of different ways. Discussions of the mobile as ‘the future’, a 
‘futuristic device’, as part of ‘the future’ in its present and changed forms, and as 
‘impacting’ upon ‘the future’ and our ‘future lives’, made up a sizeable proportion of 
the media coverage and ‘description’ of mobiles in 1999, a situation which looks set 
to continue in contemporary times.
Finding Corporate Future-Work
Following the pilot study and the final decision to focus on ‘the future’ in relation to 
mobile communication technologies, I further developed my research rationale and 
the methods I would deploy to investigate the topic at hand. In my view versions of 
the future in relation to mobile communication technologies are produced and 
circulated within and across different social and organisational settings. The question 
then was how to choose which settings to investigate, and once chosen, how to 
undertake a study of the material produced within and across these settings.
Whilst searching the Internet for mention of mobile communication 
technologies and the future it became evident that futurologists were being employed.
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or ‘outsourced’ by (usually large, trans-national) companies to imagine ‘the future’. 
To give an example, when looking at the web site of BT Exact, I saw an ‘Our People’ 
link, detailing those involved in the Research and Design activities of this arm of BT. 
Ian Pearson, whose job title is listed as ‘Futurologist’, appears at this point on the web 
site^°. This alerted me to the possibility of thinking about how futurology and 
futurologists are used within (telecommunication) corporations. It seemed that to 
study futurology, as a discipline, would add to my understanding of the ways in which 
‘the future’ can be viewed as discursively constituted. Following research into the 
history of futurology as a discipline and its changing fortunes throughout history, it 
was decided that a discussion of the ways in which futurology constitutes ‘the future’ 
and the assumptions that are made about ‘the future’, ‘society’, ‘the consumer’ and so 
on would be a valuable addition to the empirical chapters. Given that I was also 
interested in the ways in which futurologists within telecommunication companies 
produce versions of the future I sought to link a study of the discipline with the 
contextualised practices of, as I call them, ‘corporate imagineers’. Chapter Five 
concentrates on futurology as a discipline, whilst Chapter Six can be seen as a case 
study into how the central tenets and assumptions of futurology work at producing 
versions of the future deemed suitable for the corporate environment. Chapter Five 
concentrates on the ‘background’ issues related to futurology, that is its status as a 
discipline and its rationale for the methodology it employs, rather than on its 
predictive outputs. Chapter Six on the other hand concentrates on several working 
examples of futurology ‘in action’.
Chapter Six primarily deals with ‘versions of the future’ as they are 
represented within corporations involved in (mobile) telecommunication technologies. 
There is a vast corpus of corporate literature on ‘the future’ in its most general sense 
and ‘the future’ in relation to mobile communication technologies incorporating 
handset design, mobile services, mobile content, mobile applications, mobile 
entertainment, possible consumer trends, and current and emerging markets. Given 
the wealth of material the main difficulty was how to narrow down the scope of the 
chapter to a manageable size without discounting potentially useful material. A series 
of texts are used to illustrate the ways in which organisations build versions of the 
future in relation to mobile technologies and the work of corporate imagineers within 
and across such organisations. As it stands the focus remains on the large British 
network providers such as BT Cellnet (now 02). Answering pragmatic
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considerations, I decided that an analysis of materials from sources that are 
simultaneously most high profile (02 and Philips for example are well-known 
communication/networked technologies corporations) and most theoretically 
illuminating (principally concerned with the future and mobile communications) 
would fit best with the aims of this research. Below I go into more detail about the 
processes of selection of these particular corporations, and the selection of the texts I 
have analysed.
Versions of the future in relation to mobile communication technologies are 
only one aspect of ‘the future’ as a discursive sphere. Yet the linking of the various 
domains, discursively and physically mediated through technologies, may mean that 
looking at versions in relation to one particular technology makes it feasible to say 
something about the assumptions embedded in other realms of contemporary life and 
imagined future life. The main aim is to build up a framework with which to 
understand the discursive space of fiiture-orientated ‘talk’ in relation to mobile 
communication technologies and work through how this framework may be 
practically employed using the domain of mobile communication technologies as a 
vehicle. There are numerous sources of future-orientated material about mobile 
communication technologies for example the popular press, technical publications and 
papers produced by government departments and initiatives such as the Foresight 
programme^\ Faced with a vast corpus of potential material for analysis, it was 
decided that the scope of this study would have to be limited in order properly to 
focus on a few key areas in which future-orientated discourses occur. A decision was 
made to concentrate on two corporate organisations that generate versions of the 
future, namely BT Cellnet (02) and Philips.
Wise (1997) notes how producing visions of the future was formerly an 
activity confined to the military-industrial complex"^  ^ but has since become the 
undertaking of Western (trans-national) corporations. Looking at future-orientated 
material generated by mobile communication companies offers the researcher a 
strategically bounded space in which to follow the processes of the production of 
versions of the future. However this is not to argue that such versions have little or no 
relevance beyond the corporate world. I argue that such versions form part of the 
future-orientated rhetoric on which others can draw. For example, a search of the 
BBC news Internet site (www. news.bbc.co.uk) offers countless examples of articles 
written using quotes from those within the mobile industry about ‘the f u t u r e A
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similar trend is noted from trawls of the Internet sites of all of the major UK nationals. 
Corporate versions form part of our wider understandings of what ‘new’ technologies 
are and ‘will’ be. Where might the researcher finds versions of the future? When 
using the Internet to procure the contact names of possible interviewees it became 
clear that corporations were only too willing to share their visions of the future, 
although most definitely not their patent work, in this domain. Following further 
investigations it became clear that the Internet sites of mobile corporations were a rich 
source of information about how such corporations envisaged the future. As well as 
presenting versions of the future, corporate Internet sites are spaces in which 
corporate activity, institutional promotion and contact with clients occur, and where 
corporations can demonstrate their ‘visionary’ tendencies (Suchman 2003).
This brings us onto a theoretical difficulty related to finding out where 
corporate ‘future-work’ is done, one which relates to the wider issue of the gathering 
(and/or generation) of material for sociological analysis. If, for example, one wanted 
to research ‘recovery’ from a physical or mental ailment, where would one go to 
gather empirical material? Perhaps ‘recovery work’ could be viewed as taking place 
in the physical space of an Accident and Emergency department, of an out-patient 
clinic, of a hospital ward, and a physiotherapy room, or a self-help group. Perhaps one 
would consider doing interviews with people who are recovering, or recovered from 
their illness, but what if  their professional carers disagreed that the person was indeed 
recovering, or recovered? Where to look for instances of recovery now? This example 
demonstrates the highly fluid, relational nature of the ‘social phenomena’ that we 
investigate. Future-work is multi-faceted and multi-sited. For some future-work goes 
on in the pages of science fiction novels, for others it occurs in the high-tech labs of 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It is not that the ‘end-product’ of the 
future-work that transpires in these hallowed places finally ends up in national 
newspaper articles, or posted on the Internet. Future-work takes place in all and not 
one of these places at the same time. Lynch and Bogen (1997) note how the sociology 
of scientific knowledge (SSK) has sought to demonstrate how ‘scientific knowledge is 
produced collectively and historically, and that scientific methods are instances of 
situated social actions’ (1997:483). Writers such as Latour and Woolgar (1979), 
Knorr (1981) and Lynch (1985, 1993) have all undertaken studies to explore the 
literary, material and practical contents of scientific inquiry. ‘Scientific-work’ does 
take place in laboratories but it also takes place during dinner-party discussions, at the
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meetings of peer-reviewers and funding bodies, on the pages of distinguished 
journals, and in conference halls. The dissemination of the work of mobile 
corporations into the wider social sphere, in journal articles, in the popular press, and 
on the Internet, is future-work, and forms part of future-orientated discourses.
The main reason I chose BT Cellnet (02) and Philips, was due to both 
companies high visibility within corporate and consumer spheres. BT is a large, well- 
known communications corporation, although within the mobile arena, others such as 
Orange also enjoy high public visibility. As a manufacturer. Philips holds a relatively 
high profile status in Britain. I chose Philips because of the detailed nature of the 
company’s corporate vision of the future. In addition I chose Philips since its vision 
seemed to epitomise the linking between different spheres of social life and 
technological ‘progress’ that I had come to expect from the corporate versions I read 
right from the start of my interest in socio-technical futures. The perceptions I held of 
both companies’ ‘influence’ and visibility within British corporate and consumer life 
meant that BT and Philips seemed to be ideal candidates for further investigation. 
Again this highlights the ways in which research choices are often made on the basis 
of the ‘member’s knowledge’ of a given research context.
So how did I ‘enter’ the field and select the texts that form the focus of my 
research into corporate versions of the future? Using the notion of ‘web sphere 
analysis’ to structure their approach to virtual methodology and methods. Foot and 
Schneider (2003) note that as an evolving arrangement of structures which may 
enable (or hinder) various kinds of on-line action, the ephemeral, hyperlinked and co­
produced nature of the Web challenges traditional approaches to sociological 
research. For them, the ‘web sphere’ can be deployed as a useful tool to conceptualise 
a unit of analysis that is bound by time and/or object orientation and is sensitive to 
developmental changes. In my study for example the ‘object orientation’ amounts to 
‘the mobile’ and its relation to ‘the future’. Foot and Schneider (2003) argue that the 
selection of key ‘nodes’ within this abstract ‘web sphere’ is crucial to researchers 
attempting to limit the scope of their analysis. For me, the selection of two large 
corporations that I perceived to be influential and visible within the ‘mobile arena’ 
amounted to a starting point, or a ‘point of entry’ into the ‘world’ of corporate future- 
orientated activity on the Internet. However, as I have highlighted previously, the 
selection of key ‘nodes’ or corporations, texts and indeed themes, are not necessarily 
an innocent product of systematic or even ‘rational’ research choices. Rather the
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‘selection’ of research materials amounts to an interpretive act by the researcher, and 
is part of a performance (Law and Singleton 2000) that one stages when presenting 
academic work. I did not ‘enter’ the research setting having already decided on these 
two corporations, but chose these two corporations after inferring that the material I 
was able to procure on and from them would offer valuable insights into the processes 
of producing corporate versions of the future.
The point of entry into the virtual ‘field’or virtual ‘space’ (Wittel 2000) for BT 
and Philips differed. With BT I started gathering material right from the point of entry 
into the main website (www.bt.com). From there I surfed between the different ‘arms’ 
of BT as they are presented on the corporation’s website. This meant moving away 
from the main ‘front page’ to the links that I inferred would be most pertinent to my 
interest in versions of the future. When mention was made of research and design, 
‘fiiture technologies’, ‘future life’ and mobile communications, I followed the links, 
making records (usually by printing out the page) of where I had been and what I had 
viewed. Moving back and forth between different pages and across diverse links made 
this process somewhat ‘messy’ in research terms so I gradually concentrated on texts 
on the pages of BT Exact (BT’s research technology and IT operations arm), Adastral 
Park (presented as BT Exact’s physical ‘home’) and Brightstar (an ‘technology 
incubation’ company linked to BT Exact). Here mention was made of the future, 
particularly the future of mobile communication technologies, more than at other 
points on the BT website as a whole. From there the selection of texts was made 
predominately on the basis of a substantial mention of ‘the future’. Additional texts 
that supported my arguments (such as that from Euroscom, the European Institute for 
Research and Strategic Studies in Telecommunications) were then combined with 
material from BT Exact, Adastral Park and Brightstar, all of which were presented on 
the BT website as ‘futuristic’ and/or ‘future-orientated’.
My interest in the ways in which ‘old’ and ‘new’ technologies are made to 
mean involved me supplementing material from my key three ‘nodes’ (Foot and 
Schneider 2003) with texts such as ‘The Future of the Phone Box’ (explored in 
Chapter Six). This then drew me to the sites of Ian Pearson and Peter Cochrane (both 
have sites linked to BT Exact) as key futurologists ‘outsourced’ by the corporation. 
This description of the process of text selection belies the somewhat ‘messy’ nature of 
research when using web-based material and combining it with texts from other 
sources. My (limited) use of material from my telephone interviews with both these
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futurologists further highlights this ‘messiness’. Having looked at the websites of both 
Pearson and Cochrane I decided (without much hope) that I would try and conduct 
interviews with both of them to generate supplementary material to that which I could 
procure from their websites. Telephoning them from the contact details on their 
websites, I jotted down a few preliminary questions I wanted to ask in a more formal 
setting, my idea being that I would ask if I could meet them face-to-face. To my 
surprise I was put through directly to Pearson, and having been told that a face-to-face 
interview would be impossible due to time constraints, he kindly agreed to chat to me 
there and then. Cochrane also indicated that he would be unable to meet me face-to- 
face but would e-mail me his thoughts on (in my words) ‘the future of mobiles’, an e- 
mail he dutifully sent the following day.
This story indicates the sometimes serendipitous nature of social research. 
Presented, to my surprise, with my probably one and only chance to ‘chat’ to these 
corporate imagineers I felt I had to seize it there and then, despite my relative lack of 
preparation. Perhaps if I had been more confident about my chances of speaking to 
Cochrane and Pearson I would have prepared a more structured interview but what 
had been an idea one morning was realised that same afternoon! The selection of 
material for my analysis of Philips’ version of the future was somewhat ‘neater’. 
Having already identified the ‘Philips Vision of the Future Project’ as a series of texts 
and images I wanted to analyse in more detail, particularly given their characteristic 
linking of various spheres of social life (home, work, family, environment) with 
discourses of technological progress, I was able to be more systematic in the ways in 
which I approached the texts. I worked my way through them from the front page to 
each subsequent online issue of the ‘Vision of the Future’ series and from each 
separate issue to each of the links within that issue. More details of this process are 
given in Chapter Six but suffice to say here that the exploration of Philip’s Vision of 
the Future Project was more systematic (traditionally-speaking) than my exploration 
of BT’s website.
Combining data from a wide variety of sources for an exploration of corporate 
versions and corporate imagineering has rendered my research methodology 
somewhat ‘messy’, yet I think that the richness of material gained from this 
combining process strengthens the arguments and ultimately the conclusions about the 
processes of production of versions of the future. ‘Messiness’ in social research is 
often thought of as rendering results ‘invalid’, yet with the advent of post-modernism
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and post-structuralism, the very notion of (scientific-based) ‘validity’ has been 
questioned within the social sciences. A number of feminist writers have engaged 
with (and contested) discourses of positivist research in the social sciences and 
exulted the ‘messiness’ of the research process. Lather (1991, 1997) and Viswasnaran 
(1994) have critiqued the ‘certainties’ of research in all its facets, from ‘data’ to 
‘findings’ to the different identities of research and researcher. Mcwilliam, Lather and 
Morgan (1997) argue that such certainties are ‘dead’ in post-modern culture. Self- 
evident, foundational beliefs, knowledge and values have found to be partial, located 
as they are within historical and cultural assumptions. Subsequently, poststructuralist 
feminist researchers have argued that one must embrace (research) incoherencies and 
contradictions. Indeed one can point to the very socio-cultural and historical nature of 
notions of incoherency and inconsistency in research. Morgan (1997) argues that 
incoherencies and contradictions of various kinds in representations of researched 
knowledge should be brought to the fore, not repressed in the process of writing up a 
‘tidy’ methodology (Morgan 1997). From this perspective one does not have to 
‘excuse’ messiness in research but rather celebrate it.
Using a combination of materials from various sources means I seek to understand 
the differences and similarities in processes of production across these different 
settings and localised contexts. In addition, given my aim to build a framework which 
sociologically-orientated researchers can deploy with modification to other sites of 
production of the future (for example the ‘versions of the future’ produced by energy 
companies such as Shell), the consideration of materials from different corporations, 
and from different sources, makes this research more amenable, and more useful, to 
the wider social research community.
Internet Site Studies
In using material from the Internet one remains focused on the resources and 
rhetorical devices which are employed to build versions of the future. Furthermore, 
materials on the Internet are for the most part (based of course on the spurious 
assumption of wide public access to the Internet) available for the perusal of those 
outside of the industry. They form part of the general circulation of future-orientated 
texts, and can be used to form other future-orientated texts, and so in a sense are 
‘doing’ something in the social world. The writings of Dorothy Smith are helpful
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when thinking about how the analysis of texts could become relevant to a wider 
theory of social life. What can be seen as the account-building process of creating any 
given ‘version of the future’ is something in which we all participate. Smith (1990) 
suggests that the analysis of texts should display,
...what the subject knows how to do as a reader and what the subject 
knows how to do in reading, and in so doing (also) display(s) the 
organising capacity of the text, its capacity to operate as a constituent of 
social relations (Smith 1990:5).
Smith (1990:128-158) herself makes a detailed analysis of two texts, both dealing 
with the ‘same’ event, namely a confrontation between police and people on the street 
(Smith 1990:123). One is a letter with editorial comments, written by a professor who 
observed the event and criticised police action. The letter was published in an 
underground newspaper in Berkeley, California in the 1960s. The other is a response 
to the professor’s letter from the Mayor of Berkeley, defending the police. Smith 
notes how the two texts ‘entered the public textual discourse at a particular moment in 
local political history’ (Smith 1990:125). This signals the importance of the context of 
any given text, when and how it enters the public arena, who its possible audience 
may be, and its relationship with other texts. When using material from the Internet to 
investigate the production of versions of the future I have attempted to be mindful of 
such issues.
The use of Internet materials brings into play a set of considerations about 
Internet site studies that are now dealt with. Silver (2000) charts the history of 
studying the Internet and the Web'^ '^ . The history he details starts with popular 
cybercuture, which consisted of mainly descriptive texts written by wired journalists 
and early enthusiasts. Cyberculture studies (Stone 1991, Rheingold 1993, Turkle 
1995) follows this period. It took a generally enthusiastic stance on cyberspace and 
focused mainly on virtual communities and online identities. In the late 1990s critical 
cyberculture studies began to grow and become more sophisticated in its approach to 
cyberspace. The main aims of the latter tradition are to explore the social, cultural and 
economic interactions that take place online, to examine stories we tell about such 
interactions and to analyse a range of social, cultural, political and economic 
considerations that encourage, make possible and/or thwart individual and group
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access to such interactions. Finally this approach seeks to assess the deliberate, 
accidental and alternative technological decision-and-design processes which, when 
implemented, form the interface between the network and its users (Silver 2000). This 
explanation of (critical) cyberculture studies is set out in order to locate the way in 
which material from Internet sites is used within this research. All the material 
gathered was approached as sets of textual accounts about mobiles and the future. 
Empirical evidence was extracted from Internet sites as described above and 
combined with primary and secondary interview data and media output in the form of 
company press releases and media texts.
Future-orientated texts are disseminated and circulated in a variety of different 
ways, in the International Journal o f Future Studies and The Futurist for example, 
and future-orientated material can be found in newspapers, magazines, and 
advertisements. This research focuses on the stories that are told about the future in 
relation to mobile communication technologies and the versions of the future created 
through this story-telling. Many of these stories are found on the Internet but why 
concentrate on those located within this domain?
Cyberspace is not simply a site for communication and community. It is also a 
space for corporate activity and institutional promotion. Drawing from Gauntlett 
(2000), cyberspace can be thought of as a generator of discourse; as a location in 
which discourses circulate, and as being produced as an object of knowledge itself. 
With regards to the latter, Gauntlett (2000) maintains that cyberspace is a very real 
and very imagined place, where a variety of interests claim its origins, its myths and 
its future directions. Cyberspace itself, and electronic telecommunications in general, 
is often written about in techno-epic terms, where new techno-epochs are heralded 
(Thrift 1996). The fiiture directions of other ‘new technologies’ such as mobile 
devices are also imagined and (re)presented in cyberspace, in part due to the Internet’s 
supposedly ‘futuristic essence’. Retaining and exploring scepticism about concepts of 
the ‘essential’ characteristics of technologies (Grint and Woolgar 1997:18) leads us to 
ask ‘who says these are the future directions of the new technology, under what 
circumstances, how and why?’ An analysis of the materials that construct versions of 
the future in relation to mobile technologies helps explicate how divergent 
constructions of the technology are built up. If different versions of technological 
change and of progress are apparent in relation to mobile devices within these texts.
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then it can be expected that divergent constructions of the technology itself arise from 
those disparate versions and vice versa.
Web pages can be thought of as socio-economic and cultural constructions. 
They seek to (re)present versions of reality, truth and the future. They are both 
material objects for consumption and the outcome of (highly) skilled labour and 
production processes (Wakeford 2000:34). Chandler (1997, 1998) maintains from his 
research into personal homepages and the construction of identities on the web, that 
there are generic features that a constructivist web researcher can use to interrogate a 
given web page and /or site. Firstly, he argues, one must try to identify themes such as 
what the web page is trying to convey about either a person or an organisation, or 
sometimes a person within an organisation. Secondly, he argues that one must ask 
how the layout of the page/site is culturally resonant. Does it use certain images and 
structures for example to convey a welcoming, domestic sentiment? Does the site 
contain perceived ‘high-tech’ features which culturally speaking imply a ‘futuristic’ 
agenda? Chandler (1997, 1998) also asks what kind of iconography is embedded in 
the page/site and what is the main ‘mode of address’? Is it informal, formal, colloquial 
or ‘business-like’? As competent members of a given society we should be able to 
recognise and at the same time make strange these different characteristics and 
constructions.
Although this research primarily concentrates on the content of the texts 
posted on web pages/sites, it helps to be aware that there are a number of immediate 
other-textual dimensions to consider. These include advertisements, hypertext, visuals 
(Becker 1998) and links to key Internet sites. Temporal issues are also pertinent. All 
the empirical material within Chapter Six was gathered between June and October of 
2001. Whilst much of the material will remain constant in the near future, some or 
even most elements are likely to change rapidly (as new stories are posted on 
corporate Internet sites for example) over time. Others are likely to remain more or 
less constant (the BT logo for example), although of course change is possible, as 
with the re-branding of BT Cellnet as 02.
Analysing Focus Group Data: Topic or Interaction?
My empirical work can be divided into two inter-related bodies of work. The research 
rationale for the empirical work undertaken for Chapters Five and Six has now been
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explained. Following my assertion that versions of the future in relation to mobile 
technologies are produced by various means and in diverse domains I decided that 
looking solely at futurology and corporate imagineering was insufficient to explore 
the multifaceted nature of future-work. What of the people who are implicated in the 
production of versions of the future? For research purposes I predominately refer to 
these people as consumers and/or users, although I must make clear that the notion of 
‘the consumer’ and ‘the user’ is itself produced within and through discourses, 
discourses of the future being no exception here. In seeking a practical research link 
between ‘the consumer’ that is discursively produced within corporate versions of the 
future I resolved to conduct a series of focus groups with young people. These focus 
groups were used as a forum for ‘working up’ versions of the future. Chapters Seven 
and Eight thus amount to an investigation into the ways in which young people, often 
thought of as ‘symbols of the future’ themselves (Holloway 2003:1), produce stories 
about the future in relation to these communication technologies which are so often 
associated with their age group (Mobile Youth 2002).
The use of focus groups needs further justification and explanation. Fielding
(1993) notes how for social researchers ‘the strength of group discussions is the 
insight they offer into the dynamic effects of interaction on expressed opinion’ 
(1993:137). In my view the production of stories about the future is best thought of as 
a process in which interaction with others can become a crucial part of the meaning- 
making process. When imagining the future I argue that we draw on a wide variety of 
socio-cultural resources, which include the opinions expressed by our contemporaries. 
To give an example, recent work conducted on ‘clubbers’ and clubbing as a leisure 
activity attests to the ways in which perceptions of long-term physical/mental harm 
from illegal substance use is profoundly linked to interactions with other clubbers 
both within and outside of clubbing spaces (Moore 2003b). Given that studying such 
interactions in naturalistic settings is extremely difficult, focus groups offer a platform 
through which to investigate the ways in which peer-group interactions shape the 
stories people tell, here about the future and mobile communication technologies. 
Further it is assumed that discussing the future in relation to mobile technologies is 
not something that teenagers do on a regular basis so research in naturalistic settings 
is inappropriate here, although if the research focus was on teenagers’ current usage 
of mobile technologies observational work would indeed be suitable. Given the 
contested and uncertain nature of ‘the future’ I argue that focus groups were the most
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suitable method for assessing ‘how several people work out a common view, or range 
of views, about some topic’ (Fielding 1993:141). In addition it was recognised that 
teenagers may struggle with imagining future technologies and scenarios if they were 
asked to do the task alone, so it was decided that focus groups would be the best way 
of overcoming their possible shyness. There exist a number of precedents within 
sociologically-orientated research with respect to using focus groups to elicit the 
views of young people, particularly in relation to work on ‘sensitive issues’. Hoge et 
al (2001) for example, used a combination of 80 in-depth interviews and six focus 
groups to explore the views of young Catholics in the USA, arguing that the 
interactive element of focus groups lends itself well to the discussion of ‘sensitive 
topics’ (here religion), whilst Krueger and Casey (2000) maintain that focus groups 
can be beneficial in eliciting the views of ‘shy’ participants if the moderator is skilled 
in managing focus group interaction (by verbally encouraging reticent participants to 
contribute without pressurising them for example). Brooks (2002, 2003) has used life 
history interviews and focus groups to elicit the views of young people on higher 
education and notions of ‘life-long’ learning. Focus groups have also been used in 
feminist research to explore how meaning is co-constructed within group interactions 
(Wilkinson 1998).
When analysing material from focus groups, the researcher must choose which 
stance to take towards his or her data. What participants say about the topic in hand 
could be one focus of the analysis. Data could be taken as evidence of certain 
‘attitudes’ about mobile phones and mobile devices in the ftiture in particular, 
attitudes or views which could be said to reside within individual participants, but 
which may change over time. If this stance was to be taken, we would expect to be 
able consistently to extract the same or similar views from participants, say in a 
follow-up study using qualitative interviews. This stance tends to ignore the dynamics 
of the focus group as an interaction itself (see below for further discussion of focus 
group dynamics).
General semiotic/semantic trends in what participants say during the course of 
focus group meetings could also be picked out. As evident from the transcripts, the 
teenagers involved made liberal use of the third person; ‘They’, ‘They will’, ‘They 
always’ and so on, in building their accounts of what people in the mobile industry 
have done, do now or might do in the future. This use of the third person is interesting 
in that it marks the invocation of the Other (the mobile user who anti-socially tries out
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different ring tones on the bus for example) which could help participants maintain 
the cohesion of the group in hand. It is always the Other that is culpable and gullible, 
and participants create themselves through their opposition to this Other.
Conversely we could concentrate on the focus group data primarily as an 
example of an interaction. Whilst the ‘topic’ of the interaction would be important to 
the ways in which that interaction was managed by participants, it would be the 
interaction itself that would take analytical precedence. If this stance were to be taken 
we would be able to justify undertaking a conversational analysis of the data. The 
intonation of people’s voices, the pauses that occur in talk, the emphasis on certain 
words and sometimes the repetition of certain words can aid our understanding of the 
manner in which participants are managing the interaction. In looking at certain 
sections of talk in more detail one can concentrate on the work that is being done on a 
micro-social level. The context of the interaction may also be an important 
consideration if  such a stance was taken, for example how might the relationship 
between observer and participants be implicated in the sort of talk deemed appropriate 
by the latter. In Chapters Seven and Eight I interrogate the themes that emerge as 
pertinent during the teenager s talk. Numerous questions are asked. What are the ways 
in which participants build up their ideas about the future of mobile devices within the 
context of this particular moment of interaction? How is humour used to manage the 
interaction? How are instances from present experiences reformulated to represent a 
future-possible device? This presents a way of retaining the notion of the focus group 
as a peculiar instance of interaction without losing the insights to be gained from 
concentrating primarily on the topic of the discussions undertaken.
The exchanges within the focus group setting (between the researcher and 
participants, and between participants themselves) produced stories about the future: 
stories that emerged as the interaction proceeded. Past, present and possible future 
events and experiences were constituted, partly at least, through their telling and re­
telling. However, there was no singular simplistic version of the future in relation to 
mobile technologies produced by any one group. Rather similar themes came up 
within the interaction and were tackled by the participants. Within the focus groups, 
this telling (by one participant) was sometimes acquiesced to by some or all of the 
group members and sometimes refuted. The lively debating process which occurred 
within the focus groups provides wonderfully rich material about both the topic in 
hand and the production of accounts throtigh talk and interaction.
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I conducted ten focus groups overall. Krueger (1994) drawing on grounded 
theory’s notion of ‘theoretical saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967) recommends that 
three focus groups are undertaken, stating that ‘if new insights are provided in the 
third group, then conduct additional groups as needed’ (Krueger 1994:88). The 
number of focus groups researchers undertake varies greatly. Boni (2002) in his work 
on masculinity as it is represented Italian M en’s Health magazine, used nine focus 
groups, alongside media discourse analysis, to study ‘audience frames’ (the ways in 
which male readers ‘make sense’ of the publication). Griffiths (1999) conducted five 
focus groups (alongside structured interviews) with twenty-five women in all, to 
explore their experiences and perceptions of control and choice regarding Hormone 
Replacement Therapy (HRT). The number of groups I undertook was for the most 
part driven by practical considerations, the wishes of my gatekeeper and my desire to 
collect rich and varied data on young people’s ideas about the future of mobile 
technologies. With five days to do the focus groups (I felt I would be ‘over-staying 
my welcome’ beyond that period) it was arranged that I would travel to the college 
with my gatekeeper, and return home when she did. This meant that I was in the 
college for eight or nine hour days, and given that the average length of the focus 
groups was between 60 and 90 minutes, it seemed reasonable to attempt to conduct 
two a day. In addition, a sizeable number of students had indicated to my gatekeeper 
and the Head of the Social Sciences Department that they wanted to participate. It was 
felt that doing any fewer than ten focus groups would do an injustice to the young 
people who were proving to be so enthusiastic. I also felt that doing any less than two 
focus groups a day would mean I could not reasonably justify my ongoing presence in 
the college.
The focus groups I conducted took place over the course of a single week in 
November 2001. At the time my younger sister taught A-level politics and various 
Key Skills courses at a sixth form and vocational college called South East Essex 
College of Arts and Technologies (SEECAT) in Southend-on-Sea, Essex. SEECAT 
offers AS and A-Levels, various BTEC qualifications. City and Guilds, and has 
recently started to offer B.A. Hons and BSc. Hons in a limited number of subjects. 
My sister, acting as a gatekeeper, approached her departmental head to request 
whether I could conduct a series of focus groups with studeiits drawn from my sister’s 
two tutor groups, one comprising of first year students, the other of second years. This 
meant that the age range across all my ten focus groups was between 16 years old and
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18 years old, with two students aged 19 years old (both were repeating their second 
year). I prepared a summary, aimed at the departmental head, of what I wanted to 
achieve by undertaking the focus groups, whilst my sister supplied a supporting 
statement about what the students would gain jfrom the exercise. The departmental 
head seemed positive about the exercise from the start, and remained ‘hands-off after 
she gave her initial permission and received that of others. The departmental head sent 
a note (which I never saw) to the parents or guardians of possible participants 
requesting that they should indicate if they did not want their offspring to partake. As 
far as I was made aware, no parent or guardian actively withdrew their consent. The 
relaxed attitudes of both the departmental head and the parents/guardians of the 
teenagers were, in my opinion, due to the non-sensitive subject matter of my focus 
groups (at least in this particular setting).
It was arranged that I would introduce myself to both tutor groups on the 
Monday, conduct two focus groups that first day, and two on each subsequent day of 
the week. This arrangement worked well and was received with gratitude by the 
teachers of the various pupils involved, as many of the colleges’ classes were 
oversubscribed, with groups of more than thirty students being the norm. A ‘quiet 
area’ in the Social Studies department was arranged to be the setting for the groups, 
with screens put up on three sides of the space allowing for access in and out. Soft 
chairs were arranged in a circle within this space, with a table in the middle where I 
placed my two mini-disc recorders and a video recorder. Practically speaking, I used 
the video recorder due to its superior sound recording quality and as a contingency in 
case of the failure of the mini-disc recorders. I kept the lens cap on the video recorder, 
much to the chagrin of the participants who wanted to be filmed. I decided not to film 
participants mainly due to wider cultural concerns about images of young people 
being placed on the Internet (Renold and Creighton 2003) and now on 3G mobiles 
(Childnet International 2003). I thought that the departmental head may have been 
more reluctant to allow me to conduct the focus groups if she knew the young people 
would be filmed. The teenagers’ desire to be captured on video, and my reluctance to 
do so, speaks, in my view, of the power relations which construct the 
researcher/researched interaction. My reluctance to film was in part due to my 
‘knowledge’ of ethical issues surrounding research with young people, and of 
contemporary discourses surrounding the exploitation of young people in a wider 
context. I suggest that for groups of teenagers who are familiar with reality TV shows
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such as Shattered (Channel Four) and of course Big Brother (Channel Four), to be 
filmed was of little or no cause for concern. Being filmed may even have proffered 
participants a degree of prestige amongst their peers. As, or at least perceived as, the 
more ‘powerful’ in the (research) relationship, my initial decision not to film held 
sway.
Each of the ten focus groups lasted between roughly an hour and an hour and a 
half. Given that I wanted to conduct an unstructured discussion around the fiiture of 
mobile communication technologies, I used a limited number of questions to prompt 
the group. As Goulding (1999) argues in relation to research interviews, a totally 
unstructured approach can lead to confusion and fiiistration amongst participants, 
creating meaningless data, whilst a rigid focus group or interview schedule can mean 
the data produced amounts to an extension of the researcher’s expectations of the 
participants. The ‘trick’ then in to strike a balance between these two dichotomies, 
although it is usual to expect certain elements of data if  one has been immersed in the 
relevant literature before conducting qualitative research. When formulating these five 
basic questions I noted issues that I expected and hoped would be discussed by the 
young people. I used these as prompts if I felt that the discussion was waning 
somewhat, although the vitality of the students meant that I rarely had to ‘kick-start’ 
the debate about any of the topics. My main remit was to prompt a consideration 
amongst the participants about the possible futures of mobiles and what the teenagers 
thought these fiitures (near-term and long-term) would ‘look like’ or ‘be like’ in 
relation to mobile communication. The five key questions, or rather prompts, were all 
variations on the following (with areas of interest in brackets):
• Warm-up question: So who do you all have mobile phones? (pre-pay or
contract, models, text and voice, usage patterns, general perceptions of
mobiles)
• So what do you think mobiles will look like/be like in the future? (size, design, 
capabilities, use of technologies in the future, role of consumer in the future, 
relationship between young people and mobile technologies, health and other 
‘risks’ , role of technologically-mediated communication in the future)
• What about in 10 years time? (as above)
• What about in 50 years time? (as above)
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• On production o f  the focus group images: What do you think of these images? 
(as above, see Appendix 2 for images used)
I conducted ten focus groups in all with an average of six participants in each, the 
smallest group being three, the largest eight. The traditionally recommended size of 
the focus group ranges from six to twelve participants (Hamel 2001) with the ‘ideal’ 
falling between six and nine (Krueger 1994). Too large groups mean that participants 
will be reticent about talking (alone) in front of the whole group, limiting individual’s 
chance to share insights and observations. Hamel (2001) traces the development of 
the focus group within French sociology as opposed to the social intervention method 
proposed by Touraine (1981). Hamel (2001) argues that the role of the moderator is 
vital to its dynamics. He indicates that.
It [the focus group] immediately becomes a ‘laboratory’, as it were, from 
which the solution to the problem confronting the group will emerge 
through the ‘explanation’ produced by its own dynamic. That dynamic, it 
bears mentioning, is focused by a qualified moderator (2001:2).
Group dynamics alter when participants want but are not able to divulge their 
experiences (Krueger 1994:78). To give an example, if participants do not have the 
opportunity to share with the whole group (if the group is too large, or one person is 
allowed to dominate the conversation) they may whisper their concerns to the person 
sat next to them. The size of the group, its gender/age/ethnicity/‘class’ distribution, 
and the ways in which the moderator handles ‘dominant talkers’, sensitive subjects 
and so on, all have a bearing on the subsequent dynamics of the session.
Despite my hopes (and a request) for an equal gender mix, only two of the 
groups were exactly equally split in terms of gender"^ .^ Indeed out of my 57 
participants overall, 38 were female and 19 were male. It is not immediately apparent 
why this was so as the tutor groups from which my sample was drawn were relatively 
equal in terms of gender. There is one possible reason as proposed by my gatekeeper. 
She suggested that being willing to participate in what appears to have been perceived 
as an ‘extra curricular activity’ was not deemed sufficiently ‘cool’ by the males in the 
tutor groups to warrant their involvement, since ultimately participation was not 
compulsory. My initial perception that more males would be willing to participate
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given that the focus groups were ostensibly about technologies was thus unfounded. 
This may be because the mobile, as a mundane artefact, as a communication tool, and 
as a ‘descendent’ of the home telephone, has gender-related connotations; that is as a 
‘female’ technology (Kirkup 1998), although formerly its ‘yuppie’ connotations 
embedded it within discourses of masculinity. I must then acknowledge the possibility 
of gender ‘bias’ in my findings from my focus group material, although the lack of 
male physical presence in my focus groups was counterbalanced by their vocal 
presence in all of the sessions. However, I do remain cautious about generalising my 
findings to young people perceived as a homogenous age cohort. The resources and 
strategies employed by these particular young people were used in this particular 
localised context, and they could have been different in a different context with a 
different group of young people (perhaps from difference socio-economic 
backgrounds), although this is not to dismiss the possibility of similarities in 
processes across contexts of production of ‘the future’ and across diverse social 
groupings.
Given my reluctance to directly gather information about the socio-economic 
status of the students due to trust and self-presentation issues, I now offer some 
background information on Southend-on-Sea, the town from which most of the 
college’s population is drawn. Here I draw on my personal knowledge of the area. 
SEECAT is located in the town centre of Southend. South Benfleet, between 
Basildon, Pitsea, Canvey Island and Southend was my home town until I was eighteen 
years old and I regularly return to the area to visit relatives. Much of my youth was 
spent ‘hanging around’ Southend, an estuary town which is home to relatively 
disadvantaged inhabitants. Other nearby towns such as Leigh-on-Sea and 
Shoeburyness are similarly disadvantaged, although rail-links (Fenchurch Street and 
Liverpool Street) to London’s financial centre have traditionally been a source of 
hope and income for (young) people in the area. Southend’s town centre itself, despite 
various local authority initiatives, is run-down. The seafront in contrast is relatively 
well-maintained, although the pubs and clubs which line the main promenade have 
rather violent reputations. Various high-street chains do still have a presence in the 
town centre, although there are numerous retail outlets which are either boarded-up or 
operate as charity shops. The town-centre went into serious decline after the building 
of Lakeside and later Bluewater, two ‘out-of-town’ shopping centres, the first located 
in Thurrock, and the second hulking at the Kent mouth of the Dartford Tunnel.
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Despite this rather depressing picture I paint of the area, Southend and 
surrounding towns are vibrant, with local theatres, multiplex cinemas, cafes, 
restaurants and thriving clubbing and live music scenes. A recent spell living on the 
outskirts of Manchester City Centre have given me a different perspective on the 
relative poverty I witnessed during my years in Essex. This said, the experience of 
working at SEECAT my gatekeeper related to me was one of considerable difficulty 
with students whose backgrounds were socio-economically disadvantaged. 
Considerable racial tension also exists in the area, not aided by the targeting of the 
area by right-wing groups. In May 2000, William Hague made a flying visit to 
Southend announcing that the town, which at that point had roughly 2,000 refugees, 
had already taken “too many”, whilst Conservative councillors have controversially 
described Southend as a ‘dumping ground’ for asylum-seekers (Campaign Against 
Racism and Fascism, 2000).
I have made no assertions about the focus group data based on socio-economic 
status, nor indeed gender. My interest lies with the ways in which the participants in 
my focus groups tackled the ‘task’ of producing versions of the future in relation to 
mobile communication technologies. I did not feel that a ‘class’ or gender analysis 
was pertinent to my investigation of these issues. These young people, relatively 
disadvantaged or otherwise, are part of wider Western consumer culture and part of 
the age cohort on which much mobile and ‘future’ discourse focuses. It is for these 
two reasons that I argue my findings can be thought of as a sociologically-relevant 
contribution to the study of contemporary future-orientated socio-technical 
discourses.
Reflexivity and Transcription Issues
Sociologically-orientated researchers are concerned with producing more ‘reflexive 
accounts’ of their topic of investigation, often attending to the ways in which the 
social sciences construct the object of its knowledge (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
So what can it mean to be reflexive when examining the accounts of the future that 
young people produce? May (1999) argues, ‘If authors were really (sic) reflexive, 
they would recognise the futility of any attempt to ‘mirror reality’ (1999:5). 
Examining what was said, as ‘leader’ of the teenage focus groups, during the
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interaction proved to be an insight into the ways in which the futility of such attempts 
at ‘mirroring’ becomes apparent within the intricacies of ‘gathering’ data. My 
‘explanations’ to the participants about how things ‘really’ were, ostensibly to help 
them move the discussion on from my point of reference to create their ‘own’ 
versions of the future, became part of the very versions which are taken to be data. 
Towards the end of each focus group, the participants were shown a series on images 
collected from the Internet sites of Nokia, Motorola and Philips (See Appendix 2). 
Since some of the images were unfamiliar to the teenagers I felt obliged to make the 
technologies ‘speak’. Here we were discussing the possibility of having more games 
on mobile devices,
L: So you think there’ll be more games?
Hannah: I think first off you’d play them but then they’d lose their novelty value like 
the others did.
L: Like with Snake (game on Nokia phones). Ok, I’m going to show you some 
Images of communication devices. Has anyone heard of third generation phones?
All: No.
L: They might look a bit like this (pointing to Image 1). This Is an Introductory 
model. What do you think?
Hannah: I’d lose It.
Lee: Are these the actual size?
L: I Imagine It would be a bit bigger, er...
Shannaz: What are they? I don’t...
L: Basically they’d have videos and stuff on It. Images. Movie clips. That kind of 
thing. That one you can send pictures to people (Image 2).
Hannah: That would be good. I like the picture thing. That would be good (Focus 
group 6:11).
Surprisingly (to the ‘leader’) the teenagers had not heard of Third Generation devices 
(3G). Given their unanimous negative response I found myself in the unenviable 
position of having to ‘explain’ what 3G will be and finally resorted to showing the 
participants some of the prototype images collected. In this sense a near-future- 
possible technology was made to ‘speak’, i.e. ‘...it would be a bit bigger’ and in doing 
so it was brought into being within the interaction.
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Here I was, at a basic level, re-producing my ‘common-sense’ understandings 
about 3G. This does not necessarily have to be viewed as a problem. It can be thought 
instead as an example of the ways in which representations pervade, or rather 
constitute, our understandings of technology and indeed our socio-technical world. In 
a sense I had no alternative but to ‘speak’ the (mobile) technologies within the focus 
group context. I suggest that surprise at the degree to which I had to do this says more 
about the ways in which technologies are made to mean through representation than 
about any methodological ‘error’ on my part. It also indicates my residual notion of 
‘objectivity’; namely that artefacts should ‘speak for themselves’ so that ‘reality’ can 
be commented on by participants.
In addition to making technologies speak, ‘the future’ was also made to speak. 
Here members of group three are deliberating over the size of possible future devices 
in relation to image two,
Chris: If It’s like that big It would be difficult to read your e-mails.
Allen: I dunno. It would be easy to touch two things at the same time.
Hannah: You’d have to have little fingers, or a pen.
Chris: It would be really slow...Have they planned this all out? Is this an actual
thing that’s going to be made? (Question directed at me).
L: Well they’re called ‘Future Terminal Concepts’ by Nokia so I guess they’ll be
coming out In the future.
Allen: Surely a thing that small...(Focus group 3:20. Emphasis added).
Chris asks the leader to confirm the ‘reality’ of the image that he has been presented 
with by asking whether it is ‘actually’ possible. My reply produced a future-possible 
device and moved it beyond an ‘idea’ to a tangible creation. I was not deliberately 
lying or misleading Chris. I might have said instead, ‘No I don’t think they’ll ever 
make something like that’, to which Allen (or someone else) may have responded in 
an entirely different manner to what is set down above. In the midst of the data is an 
example of what May (1999:5) alludes to. It is impossible to ‘get at reality’ (here 
people’s ‘real’ versions of the future) using the tools of social science if we 
acknowledge that there may be no one ‘real’ version of reality, just as it has been 
argued that there is no one ‘real’ version of the future. Within the focus group 
interaction I, as ‘leader’, participated in the common-sense construction of future-
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possible devices alongside the participants. Thus the data ‘gathered’ amounts to a 
joint production of versions of the future, and cannot be said to be a mirror of what 
the teenagers ‘really’ think about mobile technologies.
Woolgar and Ashmore (1988) spoke of the reflexive project as being the ‘the 
next step’ in the sociology of knowledge.
In a recent manifestation - the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) - 
this tradition had deployed a form of relativism to make the point that 
scientific and technical knowledge is not the rational/logical extrapolation 
from existing knowledge, but the contingent product of various social, 
cultural and historical processes. The general issue of reflexivity emerges 
in the specific area of the social studies of science, once it is recognised 
that the same point can be made about the knowledge produced by SSK.
Its determinations, results, insights, and so on are themselves the 
contingent product of various social processes (1988:1).
Throughout this research a relativist stance to ‘knowledge’ about ‘the future in 
relation to mobile technologies’ has been adopted. This is evident by the use of 
‘versions of the future’ throughout the text, displaying a belief that no one ‘true’ 
account of the future in relation to mobile technologies can be said to ‘exist’. 
Sociologists of Scientific Knowledge have sought to create ‘self-exemplifying’ texts 
that display their own constructiveness (Garroutte 1999). Through the use of irony, 
recursive footnotes and other devices, the form of the text is the argument (Ashmore 
1989). This strategy has been criticised for its inherent assumption that the analyst’s 
‘new’ text is somehow better and ‘truer’ than the analysand’s. Latour and Woolgar 
(1986) assert instead that there are no ‘true’ accounts. No one account is deemed 
superior to another. Put simply accounts are different versions of ‘reality’, different 
stories about the (here future-possible) world. Such uncertainty does have its pitfalls. 
What for example is the value of SSK’s accounts if  we take this relativism on board? 
Do we have to ask how relativists make their claims viable? However uncertainty aids 
the researcher in approaching her topic of interest in a reflexive manner, helping to 
illuminate the assumptions inherent in her approach to the topic.
What has become clear during the analysis of the focus group material is that 
my own ‘common-sense’ notions of what the future may hold are implicated in the
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manner in which the ‘problem’ at hand has been tackled. The assumption has been 
that there will be multiple versions of the future that can be interrogated. Drawing on 
SSK’s call for reflexivity, it should be pointed out that this research is itself an 
exercise in knowledge production.
Reflexive concerns arise from an acknowledgement that the knower and 
known cannot be separated. This is nothing new and dates back to early 
philosophical pre-occupations. If not new, however, what has changed in 
recent times to bring reflexivity to the forefront of sociological 
writings?...As the knower and known are implicated it is necessary to 
consider the mode and consequences of this relation for the status of 
social scientific knowledge (May 1999:2).
A historical perspective on issues of reflexivity highlights that there is no one correct 
solution to the ‘problem’ of the production of social scientific knowledge. In addition 
an acknowledgement of the challenge that reflexivity brings to the social sciences 
does not have to descend into intellectual inertia.
To guard against the descent into the self-referential, calls to reflexivity 
should be regarded as sensitising symptoms and not solutions to the issues 
they raise (May 1999:7).
During the focus groups, the participants and the researcher were involved in 
producing local knowledge within a specific context that included a temporal 
dimension"^ .^ In terms of the ‘problem’ of reflexivity within social science, 
highlighting instances of the process of local knowledge production and the possible 
consequences of this production process may be part of one ‘solution’. For example, 
one may ask ‘Why choose to concentrate on teenagers’ versions of the future?’ On 
reflection it can be acknowledged that part of the researcher’s common-sense 
understandings of technology involves the ‘myth of the cyberkid’ (Facer 2000, Facer 
and Furlong 2001, Holloway and Valentine 2003). The researcher’s common-sense 
understandings of the social world impact upon, at the very least, the literature which 
seems pertinent to a particular phenomenon and the (age) group chosen to be studied. 
A critique of the ‘myth of the cyberkid’ is developed in Chapters Seven and Eight.
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However it is useful to point out here that within the mobile communications industry 
(and in other spheres of social life), young people are seen as the possible saviours of 
certain communications markets (ring-tones, SMS, MMS and mobile gaming for 
example). There would seem to be an assumption that young people are ‘natural’ 
technophiles, and ‘essentially’ technically adept. Such cultural myths continue to be 
promulgated by research that focuses exclusively on young people. However young 
people’s use of mobile technologies is fascinating, and does demonstrate patterns, and 
has cultural and symbolic values, which do to a certain degree diverge from those of 
other age groupings (Green 2003).
It can be argued that the level of transcription required is dependent on the 
type of analysis that is to be performed on the data"^ .^ For the most part the corpus of 
data from the focus groups would not be considered to have been transcribed at a 
sufficient level of detail for a conversational analysis to be undertaken. However one 
of the aims of Chapters Seven and Eight is to tackle some of the more general themes 
that arose in talk about the future rather than concentrate on the micro-level 
interactions that occurred. Given this aim I chose to transcribe to a level appropriate 
to what I  wanted to do with the data. In this sense transcripts may be viewed as 
rhetorical devices. A balance needs to be achieved between the readability of the 
transcripts'*^ and the desire to fully represent what ‘actually’ happened. Each 
transcription is a ‘translation’ of an ethereal interaction. We have no hope of ever 
capturing the ‘original’ moment in its entirety and must recognise that the manner in 
which we transcribe (what we leave in, what we add in brackets and so on) is marked 
by the theoretical perspective to which we adhere. An apt example of this is the notion 
of turn-taking in conversations which involve noting down participants’ contributions 
in a linear manner (i.e. he said, then she said and so on). The use of double square 
brackets can be used to indicate moments when participants talk at the same time, yet 
even with their inclusion, the complexity of multiple voices is lost somewhat. Given 
this dilemma, one has to make practical methodologically driven choices about what 
notations to include and how to present one’s raw data. Inferences and interpretations 
of (focus group) data start prior to what we ostensibly call primary analysis. Decisions 
about the advantages and disadvantages of particular levels of transcription can rest 
on what one wants to do with the data and do not necessarily have to rest on attempts 
to ‘capture’ the ‘original’ interaction in its entirety.
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Summary
In this chapter I detailed the methodological reasons and practical considerations 
involved in choosing my research topic and employing the methods I have. From my 
initial interest in representations of mobile communication technologies I undertook a 
pilot study of a section of the British newspaper press during one week in 1999. From 
this flawed but useful study I developed an interest in looking at how ‘the future’ was 
produced in relation to mobiles and how these communication technologies could be 
represented as both mundane and ‘cutting edge’. When thinking about where such 
representations are produced I decided to investigate the work of futurology as a 
discipline. I developed the aim of looking at the versions of the future created by 
‘corporate imagineers’ when studying futurology as a discipline since it came to my 
attention that many telecommunication companies employ the services of 
futurologists to produce visions of the ‘mobile age’.
In thinking about where I might access ‘versions of the fixture’ I decided to 
focus on visions presented on the Internet as itself one of the ‘zones that script the 
future’ (Haraway 1997:100). There are clearly problems with this focus on material 
produced on the Internet. Versions of the future are found not only on the Internet but 
also within newspaper/magazine articles, TV programmes, press releases, academic 
journals and films. However, I suggest that by focusing on material posted on the 
Internet a bounded research space is created which aids the process of choosing what 
data to analyse. Following a discussion of the history of Internet site studies which 
contextualises my approach, I have detailed my methodological and practical reasons 
for using both focus groups and teenage participants. Given that ‘the user’ and ‘the 
consumer’ are key subjects and objects of corporate versions of the future, I 
developed a rationale for looking at how a certain group of ‘consumers’ and ‘users’ 
(as they are discursively produced), namely teenagers, spoke about the future. This 
methodological decision was also undertaken with a view to illuminating some of the 
continuities and contradictions found in versions of the future produced within and 
across different social settings. The following four chapters present this ‘evidence’, 
looking in particular at how ‘versions of the future’ are produced in and across these 
various contexts.
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Chapter Five: Futurology and Its Discontents
Examining Futurology as a Discipline
I now turn to my analysis of futurology as a discipline. To re-iterate, futurology is 
examined as a ‘topic’, or as data in itself. I do not attempt to ‘do’ futurology, but 
rather examine its central tenet as part of my work towards developing a framework 
with which sociologically-orientated researchers can look at ‘the fixture’ as a 
discursive domain and temporal abstraction that is made to mean through various 
textual production processes. This chapter investigates the processes that occur, and 
the disciplinary assumptions that are made, when producing ‘the future’. It links to the 
previous chapter in that it examines the disciplinary background of the work of those 
who produce corporate visions of the future.
Why look at futurology when considering how ‘the fixture’ of mobile 
communications technologies is produced? Firstly at a practical level, within the 
‘mobile arena’ telecommunication companies draw on futurology and the work of 
fixturologists to aid in the research, design and production of ‘new technologies’. 
Secondly, the tenets of futurology (as a discipline), and scenario creation in particular, 
are used as a basis for predictive work within the ‘mobile arena’'*^ . Thirdly fixturology 
provides a prominent example of the ‘matrix’ (or social setting) in which versions of 
the future are produced. It is not that there would be no ‘versions’ or ‘visions’ of 
mobile technologies without the discipline of fixturology. Corporations would 
probably still produce versions of the future of their products, themselves (as 
organisations) and ‘society’ (which they are certainly not averse to doing now), but 
these versions may have been different without the growth in, and (political) historical 
shift in futurology and the ‘fixtures field’. Westwood (2000) writes how there is a 
growing area of concern that forecasters wish to call ‘futurology’ or the ‘futures 
field’. She describes how.
Constructing the ‘futures field’ is a quintessentially modem project in 
which a form of social forecasting around trends is used as a means to 
rational planning against the turbulence of global finance markets and 
crisis management (Westwood 2000:187).
136
Futurology is a well-established discipline. As Wise (1997) points out, the 
philosophical and political underpinnings of the practice of futurology, defined in a 
narrow sense as ‘the systematic forecasting of the future especially by the study of 
present trends in society’ (Oxford Talking Dictionary, CD-Rom, 1998) has shifted 
somewhat. He tells the story of the field’s changing fortunes.
Futurology, once upon a time, was the domain of the Left, back when the 
Left stood for progressive (i.e. ftiture-directed), even revolutionary ideas. 
However, ftiturology has institutionally been the domain of the Right 
since before the start of the Cold War (Wise 1997:150).
Wise (1997) goes on to assert that for a time the task of imagining the future fell to 
the military-industrial complex, but has since shifted predominantly to Western 
(trans-national) corporations, and specifically to ‘imagineers’ and their attendant 
imagineering departments. Looking at futurology forms part of this research’s 
motivation to understand how ‘the future’ is being constituted in the way it is, since it 
could have been different. Imagine, in an exercise in forecasting, how ‘the future’ 
may have looked if the industrial-military-transnational complex had never begun to 
work with predictions?
The Story of Futurology
What is futurology and how is it used to build versions of the future in relation to 
mobile communication technologies? What are some of the claims to ‘knowledge’ the 
discipline makes? Futurology is posed as both an indicator and a driver o f  progress. 
Within Science Net for example, contemporary futurology is presented mainly 
as a business tool that helps companies increase their profit margins. This model of 
what futurology is would appear to dominate in certain spheres of social life.
In today's fast moving world with companies spending millions of dollars 
on the development of new products, they want to get it right. The 
problem has become increasingly acute in the last decade, particularly for 
businesses in the computing and telecommunications arena. British 
Telecom and IBM are just two companies which are opting not to leave
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things to chance and they now employ their own futurologists to enable 
them to develop the technologies that will be in demand five, ten or even 
fifty years in the future
(www.sciencenet.org.uk/soundofsci/future.html, August 2001. Emphasis 
added).
Here prominence is given to the role of prediction in gaining competitive (market) 
advantage. Being ‘first to market’ with a ‘futuristic’ technology that is at the same 
time a much ‘needed’ and desired consumer product is seen as the ultimate aim of 
futurology within this model. It is interesting here that the companies, IBM and BT, 
which employ their own futurologists are mentioned (although it is also worth noting 
that IBM sponsors Science Net UK) and so are portrayed as forward thinking. Hence 
in the social context of the ‘fast-moving world’ presented by the text, there is prestige 
involved in employing futurologists to demonstrate that these companies are not only 
part of, but leaders in, this fast moving world. It also seeks to convey that they intend 
to continue their role in the future. Thrift (1996:147) notes how discourses of new 
(technological) eras are driven by a desire to fix on metaphors of modem life like 
speed, circulation and travel. He points to a number of identifiers that characterise 
accounts of informational spaces. These identifiers include the invocation of new 
modes of time (Lash and Uny 1993, Urry 1994), comprising an instantaneous world 
time that results in ‘a kind of general arrival in which everything arrives so quickly 
that departure becomes unnecessary’ (Virilio 1993:8). It can be argued that ‘the 
future’, through ‘new technology’ talk, is being produced as one such informational 
space with concomitant identifiers. The study of ‘the future’ becomes linked to the 
perceived continuation of progress.
Futurology is a difficult discipline to pin down. Who are these futurologists 
and what do they do? We can start with the stories that are told about them and the 
stories they tell about themselves. As I indicate in Chapter Six, organisations such as 
research centres are continuously required to manage their identity, located as it is in a 
shifting landscape of relevant events, actors and disciplines. Such processes of 
affiliation and differentiation involve multiple forms of ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 
1999) within scientific/technological networks as well as between 
scientists/technologists and the general public. Futurology and the corporate identity 
of technologically-orientated companies, such as those in the telecommunications
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sector, are intermeshed in this ongoing process of ‘strategic affiliation and 
differentiation with tangible, albeit uncertain consequences’ (Suchman 2003).
As with all disciplines futurology ‘polices’ its borders. If claims to knowledge 
about ‘the future’ are to be made authoritative, then ‘the future’ has to be produced as 
an ‘object of knowledge’, following Foucauldian notions of ‘truth’. ‘The future’ has 
to be made into a meaningful object of study and futurology is subsequently 
constructed via discursive and material practices as the principal discipline with the 
socio-cultural and historical resources to study it. This is achieved through two 
intimately related processes. The first is the policing of disciplinary borders and the 
second is the creation of tools for analysis of the future that are deemed most 
appropriate to the field and to ‘the future’.
Policing the Borders of Futurology
There are several stories of ‘origin’ in relation to futurology, and different texts tend 
to emphasise certain parts of these origins depending on the argument they are 
attempting to build. However the Rand Corporation is most frequently mentioned as 
the ‘founding father’ (sic) of the approach:
While the speculative and descriptive aspects of futurology are traceable 
to the traditions of utopian literature and science fiction, the methodology 
of the field originated in the “technological forecasting” developed near 
the end of World War II, of which Toward New Horizons (1947) by 
Theodore von Karman is an important example. At the RAND 
Corporation in California during the 1950s, Herman Kahn and others 
pioneered the so-called scenario technique for analysing the relationship 
between weapons development and military strategy. Later Kahn applied 
this technique in On Thermonuclear War (1960), a book that examines the 
potential consequences of a nuclear conflict. During the time of Kahn’s 
first studies, the mathematician Olaf Helmer, also at RAND, proposed a 
theoretical basis for the use of expert opinion in forecasting 
(www.plausiblefuture.com/text/def.html, 20**" August 2001  ^*).
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‘Plausible Future’, from which the above quote is taken, is an Internet site dedicated 
to those involved in futures studies, strategic planning and scenario work. The above 
quote is an example of the stories futurologists tell about themselves and their 
discipline, just as sociologists tell stories about ourselves and our discipline’s 
historical, theoretical and political ‘origins’. As with many stories of ‘origin’, the 
creation of a field is credited to a number of pioneers. This conjures up socially 
meaningful images of the conquering of a frontier of knowledge. Similar metaphors 
have been employed in talk about cyberspace (Ogden 1996). ‘The future’ is presented 
within fixturology as a frontier in itself, but one that incorporates all of the socio- 
technical world, including the frontier of scientific research, of new technologies, of 
space exploration, and of social trends (divorce, crime, consumption, immigration, 
population studies). The focus of futurology is hence extremely malleable, although 
the ‘impact’ of science and technology on ‘the future’, or what the future will ‘bring’ 
in terms of ICTs, remain the main topics of research.
The inception of futurology in its current form is frequently juxtaposed with 
utopian world-views. Utopian writing (and it is never really stated what exactly this 
comprises) is presented as a ‘bad’ example of futurology, or rather presented as not 
‘real’ futurology at all. Utopian visions are deemed to be just that - highly unlikely to 
ever come about in the ‘real’ future - a rather pointless formalisation of daydreams 
(Michael 2000:29). Yet utopianism is by no means dismissed as completely as is 
implied here or rather ‘utopianism’ is bent to fit the formula of the contemporary 
futures field (Brown, Rappert and Webster 2000). A purported balance is struck 
between ‘visionary thinking’ and hard-nosed practicality, between imagination and 
juxtaposition from ‘real’ socio-economic and technical trends. Contemporary 
fixturology is presented as dating back to the development of scientific methods of 
finding knowledge out about the ‘future world’ and in so doing seeks to distance itself 
from utopian literature and science fiction that imagine the fiiture. The ‘finding’ of 
knowledge implies an extra-discursive future world that is rendered amenable via the 
application of scientific method.
However, disciplinary boundaries are relatively pliable and futurologists such as 
Ian Pearson of BT and Peter Cochrane of Concept Labs both ‘admit’ to imagining the 
future via, in Pearson’s case ‘thought experiments’, and more generally, via science 
fictional accounts of the future. Thrift (1996) notes that this use of science fiction is
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common in ‘new era’ thinking on electronic telecommunications and it can be argued 
that it is also very common in futurological writings. As he puts it,
Cue moody or even menacing music, soaring corporate towers that are lit 
up like Christmas trees, slowly moving rivers of headlights, and all the 
sub-Bladerunner cliches we now see almost nightly on television 
documentaries about the growth of cyberspace (Thrift 1996:146).
Futurology, whilst policing its own borders, remains a broad church and seems to be 
able to absorb more ‘left-field’ imagineers, particularly as they tend to be attached to 
well-known corporations (Day 2002) which are already in the discursive domain as 
being ‘future-aware’. One example of the use of science fiction to authorise an 
account of the future is the writings of Cochrane (1997). In his texts artefacts are used 
from popular science fiction to denote the ‘fact’ that progress has occurred and indeed 
that we have, in modem society, somehow ‘overtaken’ the future in our technical 
sophistication. I argue that such suggestions reaffirm the constitution of ‘the future’ as 
a realm ‘out there’ external to the social world we live in. This is because without this 
externalisation of the future from our social world, it would be problematic to build 
up an account of the present that was somehow superior to the imagined future,
Tuesday nights were special, dorms would be packed and full of 
anticipation, people waiting to see James T Kirk beam down to some 
unknown planet. His first act was always to confirm his safe arrival 
through his flip-top communicator. This remarkable device seemed both 
convincing and far-fetched at the same time. Thirty years later Jean-Luc 
Picard merely wears a badge, and stroke of the hand is all it takes to 
contact anyone or anything of choice...So perhaps we are catching up 
with the future, and may even overtake it, with wearable devices of even 
greater capacity than those of Star Trek on the horizon (Cochrane 1997:6. 
Emphasis added).
As with the way in which the young participants in Chapters Seven and Eight handled 
the task of imagining the future via the use of popular science fiction references, so 
we see here an account of ‘the future’ being made ‘commonsensical’ through visual-
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based popular media. I maintain that popular science fiction offers ‘ready-made’, 
fi*equently familiar and accessible (to a particular audience) ‘descriptions’ of future 
artefacts, and so amounts to a commonsensical way of creating a version of the future. 
Rather than having to describe a communication badge one only has to refer to that 
which has already been made ‘concrete’ through visual-based media, and through this 
process one’s account of the future is lent a certain ‘reality’ factor.
Returning to futurology as a bounded discipline, it is contended that another 
aspect of futurology’s ‘policing of borders’ is its insistence as to what it is not.
Many people confuse futurology and astrology, but they are very 
different. Futurologists normally use techniques which are based on 
logical deduction, science and mathematics. Astrologers simply talk 
nonsense, dressed up as science. There are two kinds of astrologers, the 
fools and the frauds. The fools actually believe what they say and are 
simply misguided. The frauds know it is rubbish but persist because it 
offers them a living. Both mostly use such woolly language so that their 
predictions can be interpreted to fit any set of circumstances that arise.
The rest of the time they are found to be wrong 
twww.innovate.bt.com/neoDle/Dearsonid/ August 2001^^).
Policing the borders of futurology serves to define the other (here astrology) and in 
doing so creates a supposedly secure identity for the discipline. Yet it is ‘secure’ in a 
loose sense as constant work needs to be done to ensure that the borders do not break 
down and the authority of the discipline and those who work under its rubric remain 
respected. The purported use of ‘scientific methods’ and ‘logical deduction’ is vital to 
this process and explains the distinctions made between different ‘futures methods’ 
(Ling 2000). Distinctions are drawn within the futures field between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
methods and approaches, as demonstrated in the diagram below:
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Soft
(Intuitive/leaming) 
Embracing ambiguity
Hard
(Analytical/control) 
Aiming for certainty
Poetry, Behavioural Scenarios Modelling Forecasting Extrapolation
Collage stimulation
(‘Methodological developments in futures thinking’. Ling 2000:262)
On the one hand we are presented with ‘soft’ methods of imagining the future as 
deployed by writers of utopian literature and poetry, socialist utopian visionaries and 
‘imagineering futurologists’, who combine technology and social trend tracking with 
more fantastical material. Placed in juxtaposition with these ‘intuitive’ practices are 
the ‘hard’ methods deployed by ‘scientists’ such as market trend forecasters, who 
employ ‘scientific’ methods to produce predominately quantitative material on which 
to base future business strategies. However, a number of individuals who work from 
the subject position of futurologist span two or more of these boundaries. The writer 
Arthur C. Clarke is but one example of this interdisciplinary straddling, with his 
famous mixture of ‘hard science’, science fiction and ‘subjective predictions’ (Clarke 
1962/2000). His predictive writing on the principles of the satellite communication 
with satellites in geostationary orbits is a classic example of the discourse of the 
pioneer predicting a futuristic technology. Moreover, the above representation 
concentrates only on those who ostentatiously look into the future. Thinking about 
‘the future’, however defined, is an everyday part of life and in the broadest sense of 
the label we are all ‘futurologists’. The sociologist who writes about versions of the 
future and claims to have original ideas about the implications of a ‘new’ way of 
looking at the relationship between past, present and future in relation to a particular 
technology is attempting to look into the future to gauge the possible reactions of 
other writers and pre-empt future-possible criticisms.
Interrogating the policing of the borders of futurology as a discipline is 
important to an analysis of versions of the future in relation to mobile communication 
technologies. It demonstrates the way in which ‘the future’ has been produced as an 
object of knowledge, and the ways in which claims to the legitimate production of
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truths about the future are worked up and secured against the potential ‘threat’ of 
disciplinary border breakdown. After all if everyone could make an equally legitimate 
claim to be able to look into or at the future in a socially meaningful way then 
forecasting consultants and futurologists would be unemployed. It is suggested that 
critics of futurology on the grounds of its subjective nature are missing the point 
(Galbraith and Merrill 1996). All accounts of the future could be thought of as 
subjective, whether produced by scientists or science fiction writers. Debates about 
‘subjective’ vs ‘objective’ accounts are familiar. What is interesting is the diverse 
ways in which accounts of ‘the future’ are built up as authoritative and 
commonsensical: whether that be the ‘common-sense’ demanded by the need to 
create future corporate strategies or the ‘common-sense’ (or internal consistency) 
demanded by the reader of a science-fiction story. The exact nature of ‘common- 
sense’ building in accounts then is closely orientated to the implied audience and the 
demands of the genre and (local) social context.
In what ways do claims about the use of scientific methodologies legitimate the 
‘knowledge’ produced by futurology, aside from serving as a tool with which to 
police the discipline’s boundaries from charlatans? One example is the manner in 
which the development of ever more accurate scientific methodologies and analytical 
tools serves to head off criticism of subjectivity.
Criticism of these and other studies has centred mainly on the limitations 
of models and the subjective, interpretative nature of projections based on 
them. Futurologists generally acknowledge these difficulties but 
emphasise the increasing sophistication of their analytic techniques, which 
draw from such fields as mathematics, economics, environmental 
research, and computer science 
(www.plausiblefuture.com/text/def.html August 2001).
Such criticisms implicitly assume that with better, more objective, tools, the 
‘problem’ of subjectivity would be overcome. This leads futurologists to seek ever 
more ‘sophisticated’ analytical techniques and ever more ‘pure’ (read unbiased) 
knowledge as a counter-attack against subjectivity critiques. This is a micro-example 
of the way in which Foucault (1977, 1980) identified power as productive. If 
futurology is to retain its position as an authority on ‘the future’, then it needs to
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produce continuous discursive justification for this authority, and the objectivity of its 
methods is one way this is achieved. However, if subjectivity is disregarded as a 
problem per se then we can focus on the ways in which this voice of authority on ‘the 
future’ (as an object of knowledge) is built up and stabilised. Some futurologists 
embrace the ‘criticism’ that their views are subjective and in a sense turn that 
criticism to their advantage.
My day-to-day work is tracking technology developments across the 
whole field of information technology. I then use this knowledge for 
thought experiments to develop future scenarios for BT. So many 
predictions in the past have been proven wrong because they were made 
in a vacuum, ignoring one or more important factors such as technology 
progress.../ also try hard not to make predictions but to say what could 
happen.
(www.innovate.bt.com/peonle/nearsonid. Emphasis added).
In these cases the tracking of technology is used as a ‘substitute authority’ in place of 
the ‘purity’ of scientific method. Since the experience of technology for most people 
is one of inevitability, then it follows that if technology drivers are used as the basis 
for a prediction, then the familiarity of technological determinism lends authority to 
the prediction as a whole.
Futurology names, as with most disciplines, a number of ‘pioneers’ or 
‘pioneering institutes’ (the Rand Corporation for instance) from which the discipline 
was ‘bom’. It is a discipline that encompasses a variety of methodologies and 
methods, although scientific methodologies and ‘logical reasoning’ are usually cited 
as the principal foundation of subsequent models of the future. Futurology as a 
discipline is concerned with the creation of ‘objective knowledge’. Criticisms of 
subjectivity are either confronted with calls for more objective methodology and 
methods, or with an avowal of the benefits of subjectivity via the role of 
‘imagineering’, or sometimes, somewhat paradoxically, with both. It creates the future 
as an object of knowledge and a space/place amenable to calculation via extrapolation 
of present trends. It is a thoroughly modernist discipline.
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Scenario Work and Controlling the Future
In Ling’s (2000:262) continuum model of futures methods a distinction is made 
between ‘soft’ methods that embrace ambiguity and ‘hard’ methods that seek 
certainty and aim to determine what the future will look or be like. The presentation 
of new technologies in relation to the future is often written in a deterministic manner 
whereby technologies are assumed to ‘impact’ upon individuals and societies in 
certain, non-ambiguous ways. Given that I am interested in ftiturology in relation to 
mobile communication devices such assumptions lead me to ask whether a non- 
deterministic futurology is possible. Can there be such a thing as a non-deterministic 
version of the future, particularly in relation to technologies? What would be the 
point? This section examines this possibility through the lens of scenario work and 
futurology. Stout (1998) argues that scenario work is the best methodology within 
‘futurology’ if one is aiming to produce a non-deterministic view of the future. What 
would a non-deterministic view of the fiiture entail? The opening up of debate about 
alternative futures would seem to be at least one condition on which to premise a non- 
deterministic view. Within futurology this ‘opening-up’ process is undertaken but as 
we shall see that does not necessarily incorporate fluidity or the embracing of 
ambiguity into the proceedings.
Within scenario work ‘the future’ is cast as a realm that, through effort, 
particularly collective effort, can be controlled. This is often the case within future- 
orientated talk. Unexpected occurrences are to be factored in to scenario work so that, 
rather paradoxically, when the unexpected ‘inevitably’ occurs, one will be ready for 
it. How can this be so? The answer relates to the ways in which ‘proper’ futurology is 
defined or defines itself. In scenario work that is deemed able to cope with the 
unexpected, and factors in this ‘inevitably’ of the unexpected, there is no place for 
visionary thinking. Again we see the production of a rational model of the socio- 
technical world that continues to dominate mainstream futurology.
It is not always appreciated that scenarios should not be confused with 
goals or “visions'” either. They are not statements o f what we should like 
to happen. Some of the more high-profile scenario exercises of recent 
years - the Mont Fleur process designed to achieve political consensus in 
South Africa is an example - perpetuate this confiision and have smuggled
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in a utopian vision among clearly inferior scenarios in order to encourage 
a political consensus (Stout 1998:2. Emphasis added)
This statement is an attempt to ‘de-politicise’ futurology, and amounts to an example 
of the process of distancing (from utopian thinking) and discipline boundary 
management mentioned previously. Ironically, despite Stout’s call for more fluid (and 
perhaps less deterministic) future modelling techniques, this desire to distance 
scenario work from utopian visions serves to strengthen ftiturology’s deterministic, 
and ultimately conservative, tendencies. This is primarily because extrapolation from 
the present typically involves a constant iteration of entrenched social and political 
orders or orderings. The assumption of the essentially progressive nature of 
technology for example translates into scenario work that either seeks technical 
solutions to ‘the unexpected’ or explores the possibilities of re-educating those that 
remain ignorant of the possibilities of future technologies and techniques.
Another factor that was missing (in past scenario work) was that the 
burden of existing infrastructure is difficult to dismantle - while potential 
consumers perceive risks in what seem to them to be radically new 
procedures (Stout 1998:2).
The implication here is that for as long as consumers are reticent about embracing 
technological changes, ‘re-education’ about the potential benefits of new technologies 
needs to be undertaken. This clearly casts ‘lay knowledge’ as consisting of false 
beliefs and unnecessary doubts that need attention before the ‘experts’ can resume 
their progressive trajectory. In this construction of ‘the future’ consumers are 
constituted as barriers to the realisation of preferable and even progressive futures, 
and also as barriers to the control of the future, given the unpredictable adoption and 
usage behaviours they may display. Note also the frequency by which human actors 
are produced solely as consumers.
The re-education model is prevalent amongst the scenarios of those within the 
mobile gaming industry. In its scenario work, MGIF locates one near-future scenario 
in which consumers ‘fail’ to understand that mobile gaming will not match up to their 
experiences of gaming on a GBA or static gaming platform such as the X-Box^^. Both 
technical solutions and ‘re-education’ of users (via press releases and advertising
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highlighting the advantages of owning a networked gaming device, such as the multi­
player opportunities they present) are suggested to cope with this near-future scenario. 
To achieve useful scenarios, it is suggested that one should avoid ignoring ‘market 
size, consumer appetite, cultural, social and economic circumstances (on which) 
profitable exploitation of new technology depends’ (Stout 1998:2). Does this amount 
to a non-deterministic futurology? It would seem that futurology continually slides 
back into determinism but why is this so? Cultural, social and economic 
circumstances are not always ignored. It would be easy to admonish such simplistic 
accounts of the technological impact of society in the future. However, what is 
apparent is that these ‘cultural, social and economic’ circumstances are reductionist 
versions of ‘consumer attitudes’. These ‘circumstances’ are conflated with consumer 
behaviours, and in effect recast everything in light of market potentialities. Thus we 
have technologies determining social actions, and consumers determining the take-up 
of potential technologies.
Scenario work within futurology attempts to adopt a proactive rather than 
reactive mode. It is maintained that in order to ‘act’ on, and in, ‘the future’, attempts 
should be made to control it. What does this control model involve? Primarily it is 
assumed that the larger the organisation the greater the likelihood of success, success 
measured in terms of control. This ‘control model’ advocates a totalistic approach to 
the future, that is, the larger an organisation the more scope (through in-house 
expertise for example) it will have to predict possible barriers to growth and progress. 
It is this deployment of ‘total knowledge’ of the future that is assumed to strengthen 
power to ‘maximise the segment of the future that is controlled’ (Stout 1998:3). 
Control here is related to the heightening of correspondence between imagined 
(advantageous) futures and what ‘actually’ happens. Minimisation of (unpleasant) 
surprises is judged vital to success and ‘correct’ scenario work. In terms of future 
commerce, this maximisation is directly linked to competitive success.
Despite the admission that the ‘unexpected’ may happen, ‘the future’ 
continues to be considered as a realm in which ultimately control is possible. It would 
seem that a non-deterministic futurology remains an unlikely possibility given that 
this view is dominant within futurology, at least as a discipline. How can this remain 
true if unexpected events are acknowledged? Surely ‘the future’ posited as a 
controllable realm breaks down at the point of this acknowledgement? It is suggested 
that the creation within scenario work of ‘alternative fiitures’ continues rather than
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disrupts this version of the future as controllable. This is because alternative futures 
are posited both as models of barriers to (usually corporate competitive) success or as 
‘worst-case scenarios’ whereby alternative plans are made in the event of those 
barriers being insurmountable. Large corporations are willing to consider alternative 
scenarios that may be disadvantageous to them but this comes with the remit to turn 
them to their advantage, for example arguing,
...that development begins with the ‘big idea’ of where the company 
wants to be, in the long run. As Shell saw it, a circle (then) runs from 
pooling knowledge about the main drivers of change - several of which 
may point in more that one possible direction - to the imagining o f  
scenarios that feature a succession o f plausible events. This in turn leads 
to states of the future world which, whatever their probability, are both 
highly significant in their potential impact upon the profit outcome of 
alternative decision paths and also capable o f being exploited in some 
way (Stout 1998:3. Emphasis added).
This process also takes part in a bounded space, in that futures, within scenario work 
at least, are considered principally in terms of market opportunities. Whilst multiple 
futures may be envisaged, each of those futures is limited in its forced relation to the 
market above all else. Here we see the management of ‘alternative futures’ that are 
brought under ‘control’ (in that the future remains controllable) via a process of 
reducing them to market based exploitation, with the attendant disregarding of 
‘utopian visions’.
Being Paid to Day Dream: Futurology and Technological Determinism
Grint and Woolgar (1997) point out that examples of blatant technological 
determinism are hard to find, particularly within academic literature. Within 
futurology texts there are some examples of crude notions of technological progress 
that can be criticised, although most accounts of the future purport to consider the 
social as well as the technical. So as the futurologist associated with BT asserts.
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So many predictions in the past have been proven wrong because they 
were made in a vacuum, ignoring one or more important factors such as 
technology progress. I am determined to cover as many technology and 
social trends as possible to reduce such ‘blind-sighting’
(www.innovate.bt.com/people/pearson, August 2001).
I am in agreement with Grint and Woolgar (1997) about the mythical status of overt 
technological determinism and its near absence from academic accounts of
technology and society. A detailed analysis of futurology texts demonstrates that 
technological determinism does flourish in some environments, particularly corporate 
ones. Again, overt technological determinism is rare. Future-orientated technological 
determinism is somewhat covert in its nature, but exists nonetheless. Thrift (1996) has 
made a similar point regarding technological determinism embedded in frequently 
breathless writings on electronic telecommunications and ‘techno-epochs’. The 
important factor in both cases may indeed be ‘the future’. Since the future can be said 
to be a reasonably unknown entity then, as a temporal abstraction, it is relatively easy 
to produce it as a place where technology is the determining factor, especially in 
terms of human relations. In a sense technological determinism offers a semblance of 
certainty in an otherwise uncertain future.
Technological determinism can be identified as one example of the historical 
dichotomy between the ‘technical’ and the ‘social’. Debates continue to rage over the 
relative weight that should be given to technological and social factors. Bromley
(1994) cited in Grint and Woolgar (1997) notes how each of the following three 
positions distinguishes itself from the others in terms of the stress it places on either 
the technical or the social. These positions can be linked to versions of ‘the future’ in 
relation to mobile communication technologies. Firstly technological determinism 
reads technology as the root determinant for either good (technophilia, utopia, hype) 
or evil (technophobia, dystopia). An analysis of futurology texts demonstrates that 
there is considerable emphasis on the technical side of the dichotomy, and that notions 
of the ‘impact’ of technology on ‘society’ is built up within texts and made 
‘ commonsensical’.
Social determinism on the other hand gives almost unqualified freedom to 
society as a determinant of technological development. Thus social shaping is 
emphasised in relation to technological development (in ‘the future’). In relation to
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futurology texts, humans are given almost untrammelled free will to shape technology 
and to build a better or worse future with it. Technical factors are assumed to be 
subject to human will, and change dictated by social institutions, through more 
scientific research for example. Finally there is the position that takes technology as 
essentially neutral which means the contexts of consumption (use and abuse) become 
the focus. What counts is the ways in whieh technology (or science) is used. Some 
versions of the future emphasise the neutrality of technology yet pose questions about 
its continuing viability due to its abuse by certain groups of humans and/or 
organisations (hackers, advertising spam, mobile phone bullys "^  ^ and terrorists for 
example).
These approaches define themselves in terms of their concentration on either 
technical or social factors. This assumption that the technical and the social are 
separate domains is linked to a fundamental dichotomy in Western thought, namely 
that between free will and determinism. Grint and Woolgar (1997) highlight this 
difficulty.
This dichotomy centres on two broadly competing ways of explaining 
human behaviour: the notion that humans are largely free to decide their 
own fate (and hence free to decide how to behave, think and build 
institutions, structures and social systems) and the contrary notion that 
their behaviour is largely determined by circumstances (history, the 
essential nature and characteristics of human beings, the aforesaid 
institutions, structures and social systems) (1997:68).
A consideration of this dichotomy helps us to comprehend the nature of the paradoxes 
within some versions of the future in relation to mobile communication technologies. 
Within the work of futurologists the technical/social dichotomy is repeatedly played 
out through discussions about the role of technology in the future. Futurologists, as 
sociologists continue to do, struggle with these tensions about the basis of human 
behaviour. Does it spring from within the human or does it arise from circumstances 
external to the human? How can this dichotomy be tackled? One way is to turn this 
difficulty into a topic rather than a resource using the strategies of interpretivism and 
ethnomethodology (Cooper and Woolgar 1994, Grint and Woolgar 1997). So it is 
suggested that.
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...we should study the ways in which the distinction (technical/social) 
features in discourse, how it is used, when, by whom and to what effect?
On what occasions and for what purposes is the technical distinguished 
from the non-technical? To what extent does this distinction perform 
different communities, how does it implicate the actions and 
responsibilities of some actors, perhaps at the expense of others.. .and how 
and why (can) they interchange the ‘positions’ listed above (Grint and 
Woolgar 1997:68).
This is broadly the approach taken here to futurology texts and the writings of 
corporate imagineers. Instances of technological/social determinism are highlighted 
and the ways in which the aforementioned technical/social divide is engaged with are 
analysed to ask and possibly answer those ‘how?’, ‘why?’ and ‘what effect?' 
questions. I have maintained that studying instances of technological determinism can 
be fruitful when considering the ways in which versions of the future are made 
‘commonsensical’. Technological determinism frames versions of the future as 
inevitable, even when caveats about the ultimate ‘unknowability’ of the future are 
incorporated within futurological texts. So how is technological determinism manifest 
in examples of futurological writings?
Conjuring up a Mythical Beast: Instances of Technological Determinism in 
Futurology Texts
Technological determinism involves attributing considerably more weight to technical 
factors whilst human action is deemed to be largely determined by external 
circumstances rather than being attributed to any form of free will. In terms of 
versions of the future in relation to mobile technologies how are technologically 
deterministic assumptions built up within texts? ‘Time-lines’ which are basically lists 
of technologies that ‘will’ become available at a predicted time are one example of the 
ways in which technology is presented as being a driver of change. The ‘Tomorrow: 
The Future - What If?’ Internet site’s fwww.bt.com/btti/tomorrow/index.htm) main 
content is a list of ‘time-lines’ for new technologies under a series of subject 
headings, including wearable technology and telecommunications as reproduced
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below. Linking technologies to particular years in this manner lends them an air of 
inevitability. The ‘Wild Card’ section differs in this respect as occurrences are listed 
in no particular order since they ‘could happen (at) almost anytime’. The list also 
includes more ‘social’ and generally apocalyptic events such as ‘Asteroid hits Earth’, 
‘bugs resistant to all known antibiotics’, ‘civil war between Soviet states goes 
nuclear’, ‘climatic instability, turn for the worst’, ‘collapse of the sperm count’, 
‘collapse of the United Nations’ and the ‘collapse of world's fisheries’. When dates 
are not imposed on possible future events the list becomes more concerned with 
ostensibly ‘social’ issues. From this it could be argued that within discourses of 
technological progress, the grafting of ‘new technologies’ onto particular time scales 
is one device that renders ftiture technologies more ‘authentic’. Only the ‘Wild Cards’ 
escape this drive for authenticity and indeed they are singled out as quite possibly 
‘inauthentic’ by their lack of a time-scale and their more ‘social’ nature. This contrast 
serves to strengthen the seeming inevitability of the technologieal progress charts. The 
marking of relatively rigid time boundaries in the future serves to strengthen the 
experience of technological inevitability.
The model of technological determinism usually marked out for criticism is 
either concerned with contemporary times, or with past ‘successful’ technologies. 
What of the ways in which technological determinism takes shape within versions of 
the friture? I suggest that technological determinism is a different ‘beast’ when it is 
located in speculation about the future. ‘The future’ as it tends to be understood - a 
‘place’ towards which we travel in a linear manner - seems elusive to many. How can 
we ‘know’ what a place is like before we arrive? We can only imagine it using the 
resources available to us from the past and within the present. We ask ‘What will ‘the 
future’ be likeT This emphasis on ‘being like’ alludes to the comparative nature of 
versions of the future. Meaning is built up from notions of how this ‘place’ will 
somehow be the same and different to what we already ‘know’ about the world. If 
versions of the future rest upon comparison, then technological determinism becomes 
a way of thinking about the future in terms of the technologies we know today. 
Futurologists extrapolate technological design, ‘effects’ and so on into ‘the future’ as 
a ‘place’ that will or will not be like that which we already ‘know’. So we are 
informed that.
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You know those badges you see on Star Trek, well they’re technologically 
possible, as is voice activation....size is not a problem, even conventional 
phones are tiny now and the future will be similar to devices we see now, 
like Palm Pilots...WqW with 1®^ generation...we// generation phones
will look very different. They can be anywhere, and you could personalise 
the look of your device, as all that matters is the chip inside (Interview 
with Futurologist, Emphasis added).
Mobile technologies then are something we in the Western world ‘know’. They are 
understandable to us. Via technological determinism what we think of as their 
‘inherent properties’, a personalised tool for varied forms of communication with 
those not co-present, can be extrapolated to the future and used to render that future 
more coherent. Technological determinism is a key device to make the future more 
understandable. Technological determinism intermingled with a linear model of time, 
as noted above, makes the future seem even more comprehensible. The list below is 
from the ‘Telecommunications’ section of the ‘Tomorrow: The Future - What If?’ 
Internet site. It asserts a ‘logical’ line of technological progress,
BT Technology Timeline -  towards life in 2020:TeIecommunications
1 Terabit/s on single fibre over 250 miles 1999
Portable videophone 2000
Use of passive picocell 2000
Unified personal numbering for everything 2000
1 billion cellular users worldwide 2000
TV on mobile phones 2000
100 million hosts connected to internet 2000
500 million internet users worldwide 2000
Enhance data rate GSM evolution systems 2001
Audio transmission at 2.4 kb/s, quality = analogue telephony 2001
Free format payload in packet communications 2001
Cordless home networks using Bluetooth, Piano or Jini 2001
50 million internet appliances 2001
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Go-anywhere personal numbering 2002
75 million km of single-mode fibre installed inland worldwide 2002
70 M European computers connected to Internet 2002
Multiple channels of 100 Gbit/s on single fibre 2002
Most internet access via internet appliances 2002
EBOX home hub for security, computing and energy control 2002
UMTS launch
2002-
2003
10 Terabit/s on single fibre 2003
ANT based services 2003
Home intranet 2003
Global terabit network 2003
600 million mobile communication devices worldwide 2003
1 Gbyte optical fibre loop memory 2005
Video download over network at 10 x normal speed 2005
Global broadband fibre based network 2005
ANT based network management 2005
Intranets dominate over Internet 2005
Neighbourhood intranets 2005
1 billion mobile communication devices worldwide 2005
Video surveillance built into phone boxes 2005
Terabits per second on optical fibres over long distance 2007
Phone boxes using optical wireless 2008
Photonic crystal fibre 2009
90% of traffic on mobile networks will be data 2010
Domestic demand reaches 100 Mbit/s per home 2010
90% of calls tetherless 2010
All optic integrated logic, switching below 1 ps 2010
Use of high density wavelength multiplexing for trunk 2010
Multizone phone boxes with various classes of radio link 2010
Light detection sensitivity exceeding shot noise limit 2011
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Use of WDM in local access 2015
Internet achieves 75% penetration in UK 2015
Electronic ATM switches largely obsolete & replaced by photonic versions 2020
Simultaneous data delivery in the City 2020
Cyberspace covers 75% of developed world 2020
(Figure 1: ‘Tomorrow: The Future: What If?’ www.bt.com/btti/tomorrow/index.htm. 
August 2001).
Technological determinism is apparent here, with different technologies affecting 
what happens, when. Looking at technological developments is undertaken so that the 
futurologist can imagine what the ‘social world’ will be like.
If we know the development rates of many different technologies, we can 
anticipate many of the things that will be possible and when they are 
likely to happen. Considering the interactions between the many 
technologies and society along the way, we can also foresee many 
potential consequences on business and social life. 
(www.bt.com/btti/tomorrow/index.htm. Introduction, August 2001).
The relationship between technology and society here is posited as one of 
‘interaction’. This may appear to amount to a move away from technological 
determinism towards giving equal weight to social and technical factors in the shaping 
of ‘the future’. Yet the ‘consequences’ of the technology/social interaction are on 
‘business and social life’, not on the technology side of this ‘interaction’. Again the 
fundamentally dichotomous way in which the social/technical is thought about 
resurfaces, here in the form of future-orientated technological determinism. There are 
several examples of technological determinism within the interview I conducted with 
a prominent futurologist. In this instance technological determinism is mainly 
employed as a resource to build a dystopic picture of the future,
Karenza (K): Do you think some of your ‘blurred visions’ are deemed a 
threat by some groups in society?
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Futurologist (F): They already are. Like with GM (genetic modification). 
There have been many cases of these crops being destroyed. Yes GM is a 
prime example. Technology will win in the end though. Development o f  
technology is incremental, and things like GM will creep in. Soon people 
won’t care if their tomatoes in Sainsburys are GM or not. It’s about 
repackaging the ideas...
K: Repackaging?..
F: Well, umm, there’s always opposition to technologies in the short term 
and then the fuss dies down and the issue is presented in a different way.
With GM if it’s highlighted that it’s a technology that could help alleviate 
starvation in developing countries then people will think ‘Oh, that’s OK 
then’ and then some other benefit will be shown and then people will just 
accept it. We can see the same thing happening with cloning. Before, as 
soon as cloning humans was mentioned everyone just said no 
straightaway...no debate. Now with these scientists who have said they 
will do it, there is a debate (Interview with Futurologist, Emphasis added).
The ‘interaction’ between the technical and the social is depicted as a battle and the 
futurologist can be likened to a war journalist who has gone to the no-mans land of 
‘the future’, a place of limbo that exists beyond the past and the present. Reports back 
fi*om the front tell us that technology will win in the end but not fi*om an explicit 
attack on the ‘social’. It will win bit by bit, since the development of technology is 
‘incremental’. The ‘technical’ is clearly located external to the ‘social’ here and is 
posited as having an ‘affect’ on society. However this takes the form not of a tidal 
‘wave’ (Toffler 1980) or a meteoric ‘impact’, but of a slow creeping ‘virus’ that we 
will not even realise is there until it is too late. Since the ‘time-lines’ involved in 
building up a version of the fiiture of this sort may either be unspecified, or relatively 
long, this ‘virus’ metaphor contains more resonance than a severe impact metaphor. It 
also distances the author from more sensationalist accounts of the impact of 
technology (here on ‘the future’).
An examination of futurology as a discipline, as a methodology, and 
futurologists as ‘knowledge’ creators, has so far proved fruitful in thinking about the 
ways in which ‘the future’ has come to be constructed as an object of knowledge. The 
ways in which ‘interpretative communities’ (Fish 1980) understand new technologies
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is crucial to ‘making artefacts mean’. A consideration of futurology as a discipline 
leads us to think about how accounts of the future in relation to technology attempt to 
define the ways in which both ‘the future’ and ‘mobile technologies’ can be spoken 
about meaningfully. In this research there has been an imbalance so far in the 
troubling of ‘the future’ and ‘mobile technology’. ‘The future’ through the work of 
Adam (1990) and Brown, Rappert and Webster (2000) among others has been 
problematised. ‘The future’ is posited as a socially constructed, malleable entity and a 
temporal abstraction enlisted by various actors to stabilise their version of ‘truth’. 
Mobile communication technologies in contrast have been left in relative peace. In 
order to properly analyse ‘versions of the future’ in relation to mobile technologies it 
is vital to examine one’s epistemological stance towards technology per se. During 
the process of investigating the work of futurologists, it became clear that this 
research’s approach to ‘mobile technologies’ contained some of the ‘residual 
technism’ criticised by Grint and Woolgar (1997). Technology has remained a ‘black- 
box’ that seems somehow external to the social. In the next chapter the focus is on 
interrogating corporate material about ‘the future’ in relation to mobile 
communication technologies. Corporate material offers concrete examples of the 
ways in which accounts of the future are built up within texts, the sorts of devices that 
are used to make them appear authoritative, and the assumptions that are contained 
within them. The challenges anti-essentialist approaches make to the technical/social 
divide are also considered in more detail, and offer the opportunity for scrutinising the 
‘black-box’ of mobile communications technologies.
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Chapter Six: BT Exact and Philips: Two Corporate Versions 
of the Future
The Future’s Bright, The Future’s...?
In the week commencing the 10th of April 2000, Florence played host to the Gartner 
Group Symposium on Mobile E-Commerce, now known as M-Commerce. Chris 
Green of Computing magazine, notes the various ‘predictions’ made by the speakers.
I’ve already sat through various sessions listening to the analysts drone on 
about the virtue of a future where mobile devices with the ability to 
connect to the Internet will be as indispensable as our wallets...The phone 
will be used as a transaction tool by simply pointing it at a coke machine 
to buy a fizzy drink, ordering food and other goods online, and taking 
advantage of geographical special offers that appear on the screen as you 
approach the vicinity of a shop or area...the future of mobile 
communications is going to be vastly different from what we are currently 
used to (Greenscreen Column, Computing, 13* April 2000:61).
Whilst this writer takes up a somewhat sceptical position about the future as 
envisaged by speakers at the Gartner Group Symposium, with the use of the words 
‘drone on’ flagging up his cynical stance, others involved in the ‘new technologies’ 
arena are less cautious. Indeed commenting on what ‘the future’ will be like in light of 
technological developments has become big business. The visions of imagineers are 
not confined to in-house publications and corporate videos, but form part of more 
general media discourses about ‘the future’. As Wise notes.
Socially and culturally, corporations are playing an increasingly central 
role, and this is especially true of the social space that the vision of a new 
technological assemblage presents us with (Wise 1997:151).
How do the assumptions made by corporations, embedded in the very make-up of the 
‘visions’ promulgated, construct what contemporary society is and supposedly will
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be? David Mercer, a prominent futurologist and Director of the Millennium Project in 
Britain^^ gathered the views and expectations about the future from representatives of 
more than a thousand organisations, including multinationals. Summarising the 
findings in Future Revolutions: Unravelling the uncertainties o f  life and work in the 
21st century (1998), Mercer notes how.
Almost all groups mentioned that communications will be totally mobile 
(by 2015); with comments such as ‘mobile phones include a miniature 
video screen’. . .‘Global communications will, at long last, create the 
global village - among IT users - and this should open all borders and 
allow for better understanding between peoples and nations’ (Mercer 
1998:75).
There is much to criticise in Mercer’s work, although here is not the place to go into 
detail. Suffice to say that such an approach to studying the future, and the resultant 
data, contain a number of assumptions about our social world that sociology has long 
been questioning, in particular assumptions made about ‘technological progress’. 
Wise (1997) makes a similar point in his study of a 1993 promotional video from 
AT&T entitled ‘Connections’ which describes life in 2014, or at least AT&T’s vision 
of it. He indicates a striking feature of the video, namely the assumption that ‘The 
agency of individuals in the future society has greatly expanded through their 
technology’ (Wise 1997: 151), particularly through the figures of the Intelligent Agent 
and the Internet,
Present in most discussions of the future of the Internet, the Intelligent (or 
sometimes ‘virtual’) Agent is representative of the great power that the 
new technological assemblage may grant us. It is, in fact, the latest in a 
long line of labour-saving devices that promise us more leisure time. It is 
this power, the power of agency, that is so seductive about those scenarios 
and about these technologies (Wise 1997:151).
The difficulty is that by examining individuals’ ‘visions of the future’ there is a 
tempting tendency to decontextualise the impact these writers’ views may have. It is 
not asserted here that corporate imagineers deterministically govern the ways in
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which we, as members of modem society, envisage the future. Rather their 
speculations can be thought of as forming part of our popular imaginings and our 
understandings of the society we live in. As Westwood proposes, when writing about 
the contrasts between the Habermasian (1989, 1991) view of modernity and those of 
writers such as Said (1979) and Foucault (1977, 1978),
The duality of modernity is reproduced in writings on the future, 
expressed in the contrast between utopian and dystopian accounts. 
However, both are imbued with the modem emphasis upon the power of 
reason and the rise of science (Touraine 1995), foregrounded in 
constmctions of the future. These discourses are not confined to the 
sociological community but are also part of the popular imagination, 
demonstrating the interplay between sociological discourses and common- 
sense accounts (Westwood 2000:186).
It is easy to be dazzled by these futurologists and corporate imagineers, and by what 
seem like the exciting possibilities of the new technologies they write about. This 
‘dazzling’ effect seems to be linked to the confidence many futurologists display in 
their predictions about the future. In the face of certainty about the value of 
‘technological progress’, and such conviction about the ‘impact’ these technologies 
will have on the ‘real’ world, it becomes hard not to be seduced by promises of near 
nirvanas, or argue against their positions without feeling ‘irrational’ and something of 
a killjoy. Against this it helps to recall the social and cultural contemporary contexts 
of which such ‘visions’ are part, as well as the history of ‘imagineering’ and 
futurology (Wise 1997). It is tactically useful to remain sceptical about these visions 
whilst acknowledging their appeal and exploring their place in our popular 
imaginations. A critique of the diverse visions of the future indexed to ‘new 
technologies’ does not have to entail following a wholly dystopian path, or retreating 
into ‘technophobia’. However, it is vital to be thorough in a critique of the discourses 
of the ‘mobile future’ that ‘futurologists’ promulgate. If as has been contended, the 
very idea of ‘the future’ is socially constituted, then one must look at the complex of 
institutions, disciplines, social actors, textual materials and technologies which are 
involved in the matrix, or more simply, the social setting, that produces these ideas 
(Hacking 1999). The ways in which ‘the future’ is constituted could be otherwise. It is
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not inevitable for example that ‘278 million Europeans will have a feature-rich mobile 
device in their pocket by 2007’^ ,^ although within certain industry reports, and 
between various technology journalists, one may assume this is the case.
The presumed inevitability of certain predictions has to be studied to 
understand how these presumptions are constituted in ways that make them seem 
inevitable. Saying that something is not inevitable however is vastly different from 
saying that something is not possible, as one would do if one wanted to argue that 
certain predictions are not true. Hacking (1999) notes that one of the key theses of 
social constructionism is that X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, 
or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable 
(1999:6). In terms of ‘the future’ then what would putting forward this thesis involve? 
It entails the argument that the predictions that futurologists make are not inevitable. 
These predictions make up the version of the future that is portrayed. These 
predictions, or the versions of which they are part, are not determined by the nature of 
things, that is by a future that is bearing down its ‘truth’ on the present and makes 
things so.
In what ways can we say that certain futures are not inevitable, and how can 
we work towards an understanding of how versions are made to seem inevitable? An 
example is helpful here. A futurologist may indicate that if one extrapolates from 
recent research into gender divisions with regard to digital gaming, those most likely 
to spend time and money on mobile gaming will be boys, and men. Content 
developers adapt their game content with a male audience in mind as they assume that 
this will be the key market that the mobile network operators will be aiming for. 
When Java enabled handsets come to market a year later a female consumer surveys 
the range of games available and decides that she would rather just borrow her 
brother’s Game Boy Advance as most of the games seem (to her) quite similar to 
what is already available. This purchase decision is not the ‘fault’ of the futurologist, 
nor is it the ‘fault’ of the content developer, or the handset manufacturer, nor does the 
female consumer need ‘re-education’ about mobile gaming. However, in this 
hypothetical situation, a particular version of the future was produced (by multiple 
players so to speak) and intermeshed with certain gender assumptions. That version 
was implicated in the way in which a person was later to experience ‘gender’ and 
leisure. In this example a complex of institutions, designers, usability studios, market 
research offices and imagineering departments ‘in their sheer materiality (made)
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substantial differences to people’ (Hacking 1999:10). We need to think about the 
ways in which ‘the future’ as it is presented in multiple versions, may be part of the 
systems of knowledge that make significant differences to humans, and non-humans, 
through the assumptions (about gender, progress and technologies) that are embedded 
within them about what is, and is not, future-possible. Studying how versions are 
made to seem inevitable is part of this process of understanding.
Examining Corporate Versions of the Future
This chapter primarily deals with ‘versions of the future’ as they are represented by 
corporations involved in (mobile) telecommunication technologies. Some of the links 
that (British) government departments and supranational bodies, such as the European 
Commission, have with telecommunication corporations are also examined in relation 
to the production of versions of the future. For example, the European Commission 
has funded several projects dealing with aspects of mobile telecommunications, which 
have drawn on material from industrial and academic sources to create European 
Union guidelines and recommendations for regulation of future technological 
developments^^. There is a vast body of governmental and corporate literature on the 
future in its most general sense and the future in relation to mobile technologies. This 
is an interesting phenomenon in itself, particularly as one of the questions posed in 
my research is why time, effort and money are invested in producing ‘versions of the 
future’. This question relates to how versions may be consequential in that they 
delineate the meanings and actions that are possible in relation to certain domains of 
social life.
The research arms of firms such as Anderson, Datamonitor, Forrester and 
Gartner all publish extensively on issues relating to ‘the future’ of mobile content and 
services. Recent publications include ‘Mobility and location: the next privacy 
battleground’ (Gartner 2001), ‘Wireless gaming, playing on the move’ (Datamonitor 
2000) and ‘Mobile Youth’ (W2Forum 2002). These documents tend to be pay-to- 
view, with prices that are well out of the range of many academic institutions. The 
sheer volume of summary documents, dashboard industry profiles, state of the art 
reports, and news/comments from organisations such as Durlacher and Euromonitor is 
overwhelming, and is added to by the media output of the mobile network service 
providers, content providers, handset manufacturers and software design companies.
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In the aforementioned European Commission document for example, 125 references 
were given for various kinds of reports on the future-possible of global mobile content 
and services, including 28 from Forrester alone. There are a huge number of players 
involved, although a number of ‘corporate giants’ do spring to mind when considering 
the mobile industry; Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia and Siemens for handsets. Orange, 02 
(formerly BT Cellnet), Vodafone and T-Mobile (One-2-One). The listing of ‘key 
players’ here demonstrates the UK-centric nature of this research, given that across 
the rest of the world, different countries have different key players, with cross­
national partnerships, buy-outs, mergers and acquisitions occurring on a regular basis. 
Any definition of the ‘key players’ in the global mobile telecommunications industry 
is open to constant re-evaluation.
My sample consists of some of the key texts and materials available that are 
theoretically useful to this research and that help develop ways of looking at ‘the 
future’ as a contested entity from a sociological perspective. Analysis focuses on that 
which is simultaneously most high profile (BT and Orange for example are well- 
known telecommunication corporations) and most theoretically illuminating 
(concerned with ‘the future’ and mobile telecommunications). The result is an 
investigation which resonates with the key themes flagged up in this and other 
chapters, and which remains in keeping with the analyses performed on other types of 
material. It must be remembered that this chapter is concerned with ‘corporate 
narratives’ of ‘the future-possible’ of mobile telecommunication technologies, and not 
with the future-possible of the corporations themselves (often as told in strategic 
documents and estimates of ‘consumer spend’). This research is concerned with the 
ways in which ‘the future’ in relation to mobile technologies is told by the 
corporations under scrutiny. Clearly however there is overlap between the stories that 
these corporations tell about future-possible products and services, and the stories that 
they tell, and that are told about them, as ‘organisations’ (and all the presumptions 
about corporations as independent entities that this entails).
In Chapter Four the relevance of Internet sites to the production of versions of 
the future, and the particular considerations that need to be taken into account if texts 
from Internet sites are to be analysed, was noted. The notion of construction conveys 
a number of vital elements that alludes to a particular approach to language and the 
ways in which language is employed to construct versions of the social world.
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including versions of the future of that world. Construction implies that accounts are 
built out of a variety of linguistic resources, which are themselves subject to change in 
the course of use within discourses. Construction implies active selection, with some 
resources being employed, whilst others are left out. However, construction does not 
have to automatically convey deliberate action. Language conventions and the 
deployment of discursive resources are social in nature and do not spring from the 
individual speaking subject. Finally construction emphasises the potent and 
consequential nature of accounts of truth, reality, technologies and the future. 
Constructions are orientated towards audiences whilst constructing a narrative 
involves work to make it intelligible to significant segments of contemporary culture 
and/or target populations (a particular group of researchers, or a sector of business for 
example). Yet the notion of constructions of accounts remains ambivalent until a 
concrete example is worked through, as is now done using the example of BT Labs’ 
Internet site (www.labs.bt.com).
BT Labs’ Internet Site and Media Output
Beginning at the end so to speak, accounts usually have to establish a valued 
endpoint, that is establish a goal (telling what the future may hold for mobile devices 
for example), or set out to explain an event (such as the advent of third generation 
devices). The selected endpoint is typically rich with cultural value and here the 
cultural context is vital. The endpoint of an account is likely to be a goal that is 
already established as desirable, such as the development of ‘anywhere, anyone, 
anytime’ communication, within the cultural context. It may also be undesirable 
within the cultural context, for example the continuing lack of technical 
standardisation in relation to domestic products and the difficulties this implies for 
‘networked homes’ or mobile gaming. The textual deployment of a given endpoint 
can serve to reiterate the desirability or otherwise of said goal. Only from within a 
cultural perspective can ‘valued events’ (in the present, or of the future) be made 
intelligible. The accounts of the future in relation to mobile communications that I 
analyse in this section established such end-points and this seemed to be general to 
other accounts of the future I have read^ .^
The selection of valued endpoints is a useful starting point to begin the 
analysis of texts from BT Labs’ web site. The thread running through this and other
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analyses of corporate materials will be the ways in which the future is constructed in 
relation to mobile communication devices and so texts and quotes have been selected 
to demonstrate best how these constructions are built up and made authoritative. BT 
Labs Internet site’s ‘home page’ (as viewed in August 2001) focuses on BT Exact 
Technologies, an arm of British Telecom concerned with ‘advanced communication 
technologies’, predominately for business clients. A sombre site in blue and brown it 
includes an historical introduction to BT Exact, links to information about its 
consulting practices (technical and strategic), to books, conferences and seminars 
linked to BT Exact, to researchers’ home pages and to community projects. The main 
valued endpoint in the text of BT Labs’ home page is the need fo r  the future to be 
predicted as best or as closely as possible in order to gain or retain competitive 
advantage in an extremely aggressive market. Competitive advantage in the 
marketplace is already framed as a ‘desirable goal’ and little work is done within the 
texts to (re)establish this endpoint. However, what is worked at is the selection and 
construction of a series of ‘events’ that, if followed with the guidance of BT Lab’s 
international expertise, should culminate in this desirable endpoint. This quote is 
taken from the web page of BT Exact’s consultancy arm.
Future technologies and the way we use them will have a profound impact 
on society and business. The ability to embrace these opportunities will be 
key to success. At BT Exact Technologies we have learned to surf this 
tidal wave and we can offer you the chance to do the same. We have some 
of the world’s leading technology experts in fields such as Knowledge 
Management, Web Technologies, CRM, Mobility, e-Solutions and 
Technologies of the Future, to name just a few (www.c2g.bt.com. August 
2001).
Once an endpoint has been established, in BT Labs’ case the desirability of 
marketplace competitiveness and its attainability through ‘knowledge’ of the future, 
events relevant to the endpoint are selected. The selection of these events is highly 
dependent on local context and the established (here desirable) endpoint. An 
intelligible account is one in which events serve to make the goal more or less 
probable, accessible, important, and/or vivid. ‘The future’ is produced here as a realm 
of threats and risks, opportunities and possibilities. The threat aspect of the future is
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less explicit but is nonetheless implied in the ‘tidal wave’ metaphor. Present trends 
and future technologies are portrayed as threatening to engulf unsuspecting and 
unprepared businesses. Having set up the future as a difficult ‘place’ in which to 
survive, it becomes ‘logical’ to present the reader with a solution to this threat (of 
non-survival). Key events or stages are to be followed if the future is to be changed 
from a threat to an opportunity.
Allow our Consultants to come work alongside your business, helping you 
to understand the impact that technology changes will have on you and 
your competitors. Then with the backing of the rest of BT Exact 
Technologies deliver that future and thus gain that strategic advantage 
(www.c2g.bt.com. August 2001).
Quite aside from ‘deliver that future’ being grammatically incorrect, the notion of 
delivering a future presumably in the present is difficult to grasp. In a sense this 
relates to the notion of ‘the future’ being a realm that can be ‘colonised’ through 
‘knowledge’ about ‘that future’. As Brown and Michael (2003) note part of the 
analytical challenge of looking at, rather than into, ‘the future’ is to examine ‘the 
forms of action and agency through which the future is both performed as a temporal 
representation and colonised as a spatial and temporal locus’ (2003:3). The above 
excerpt relates to this notion of ‘colonisation’ through its promise that a desirable 
future can be grasped through the application of ‘expert’ knowledge and delivered in 
the present, again gaining competitive advantage for those involved. Overall this page 
from the BT Exact Technologies’ web site highlights the way in which ‘the future’, as 
a malleable temporal concept, can be enrolled by corporations to encourage potential 
clients to purchase services. BT Exact builds its account around the ‘fact’ that it has 
‘surfed the tidal wave’ of future technologies, an example of the corporate borrowing 
of Internet-based metaphors that have become part of popular parlance. The 
advertisement slogan ‘Surf the Net, Surf the BT Cellnet’ is one example of this 
corporate employment and (re)creation of Internet metaphors.
As the narrative continues ‘the future’ is produced as a ‘deliverable’, as 
something that a corporation can create and subsequently deliver to its clients. 
Competitive advantage then is produced as residing not only in knowledge of ‘the 
future’ (in advance of competitors), but also as residing in the ability to ‘deliver the
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future’ to those clients. The text constitutes consultants as humble, yet expert, helpers 
in this process. It is not implied that prospective clients of BT Exact are lacking in 
foresight. Rather the account suggests that the potential client may already possess the 
knowledge (in their own field) to tackle the future. Yet this knowledge may be 
hidden. It takes an expert to extract it. The future needs to be made explicit before the 
client can safely proceed, ‘helping you to understand the impact that technology 
changes will have on you and your competitors’ (www.c2g.bt.com. August 2001. 
Emphasis added). The account employs an imperative clause to produce its version of 
the future as ‘real’. The inevitability of the future impact of technology, with 
technology constituted as the driver o f social change is thus built into the account to 
press the urgency of the matter and lead the reader to the desired conclusion; that BT 
Exact’s services would be of use to them. The following chain of events is set up 
within this account, but of course the account can break down at any time if  one point 
on this chain is challenged,
1. Knowledge o f technology leads to knowledge o f the future
2. This knowledge leads to knowledge o f the future impact o f technology
3. This knowledge o f the future impact o f  technology leads to knowledge in 
advance o f  that future
4. Knowledge o f  the future leads to the possibility o f creation o f  the future which 
in turn results in the delivery o f the future to gain strategic advantage 
resulting in the application o f strategic advantage to gain competitive 
advantage (implied: in monetary terms)
A  paradox is overcome at the end of the excerpt above. If everyone knows the impact 
of future technological changes for both themselves and their competitors, then who 
will be left with any competitive advantage? ‘Strategic advantage’ replaces 
competition in the last sentence, so knowledge of the future can be strategically 
employed in order to gain competitive advantage. Linking to the peculiar pliability of 
time-lines in relation to the future as a temporal extraction is the textual emphasis on 
knowledge of the future well in advance of that future actually ‘arriving’.
Our team provide insight into the future. More importantly, we work with 
customers to understand the impact that technology changes will have on
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their business. And we help them to plan now to ride the technology wave 
rather than being overwhelmed by it
(www.c2g.bt.com/strategic/index.htm, August 2001. Emphasis added).
Here knowledge of the future does not necessarily imply that this future can be 
changed. The future is posited as something abstract that already exists in some 
advance temporal moment. The suggested tactic is forward planning. The conflation 
of technology with the future is also apparent in the above paragraph. Technological 
changes are the future.
To summarise, the future is produced by BT Exact Technologies’ web site as a 
threat, an opportunity, as something that can be delivered, and as something that just 
has to be planned for by following expert advice on its probable composition. In a 
sense contradictions within the texts are overcome by the production of the future as a 
malleable temporal abstraction. The narrative that is built up is made intelligible to the 
relevant segments of contemporary culture through a variety of textual devices 
(Gergen 1994). Among these devices are the establishment of a valued endpoint, the 
selecting of events relevant to that endpoint, and the ‘common-sense’ sequencing of 
events to be followed in order to reach that endpoint. Once a goal has been established 
relevant events are selected. This goal must be valued within the local context. If it is 
yet to be established as a valued end-point within a given local context, texts tend to 
work at producing the value of an end-point as commonsensical in itself. Recent 
reports on emergent mobile entertainment services often begin, for example, with 
establishing the existence (and ‘growth’) of mobile entertainment services as a valued 
end-point. This is fi-equently achieved through stating the future-possible revenues 
that the consumer adoption of such services ‘will’ bring.
The ordering of the events selected as a series of steps that must be followed to 
reach the valued end-point is crucial to the potential authority of the text. Events are 
placed in an ordered arrangement, usually in a linear temporal sequence. Bakhtin 
(1981) argues that there are a number of literary conventions governing time-space 
relationships or what he calls ‘ground essentials for the respectability of events’ 
(1981:250). Events become, or are made to be ‘respectable’ if they correspond with 
the conventions of time-space relationships that seem commonsensical to the reader. 
BT Exact encourages the reader to.
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Look at our site, read about our consultants, our products and our 
achievements. Then contact us and begin to exploit tomorrow, today 
(www.c2g.bt.com/strategic/index.htm. August 2001).
Future-present actions are encouraged (‘Look at our site’, ‘contact us’) with the 
assumption that this chain of actions will lead to a desired endpoint. However, what is 
interesting is the way in which a future-moment (tomorrow) is produced as available 
in the present (today), and is presented as an object that can be ‘exploited’ via the 
knowledge and expertise of BT Exact. Bakhtin (1981) maintains that within 
normalised time-space relationships yesterday should precede today, and that the 
future proceeds from the present. He maintains that these are concrete conclusions 
demanded only by culturally specific norms. It would seem that these norms are being 
challenged by organisations that aim to constitute themselves as future-orientated. For 
BT Exact and its clients ‘tomorrow’ is produced as accessible in the here and now. 
However, this challenge remains peripheral to the normative ordering of events (past - 
present - future) that the business consultancy narrative (re)produces. This predictable 
(linear) element of BT Exact’s account of the future makes sense in the context of the 
(perceived) continued existence of the imperatives of capitalism (to survive, to remain 
competitive, to create, secure and exploit consumer markets and so on). These 
imperatives are embedded (and usually go unquestioned) within corporate versions of 
the future in that they are assumed to be part of the unchanged context in which 
corporations must act. Similarly competitive advantage through the use of 
‘knowledge’ and expertise to plan for the future is secured as a valued end-point in 
the context of Western capitalism.
Adastral Park Internet Site: Corporate Identity and the Future
On BT Lab’s home page is a photo of BT Exact’s ‘home’, namely Adastral Park, an 
impressive structure and the workplace of over 3,500 BT employees. Adastral Park 
has its own web site (www.btexact.com/adastral-park/index.htm) set up as a link to 
BT Exact’s site. Adastral Park is constructed as the physical site of the production of 
technologies of the present and future and the construction of ‘knowledge’ about the 
future that has been pre-selected as so important to the attainment of competitive 
advantage in the marketplace. The key to creating this ‘knowledge of the future’
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appears to be the need to extrapolate, to ‘think beyond’ present trends. Thus 
knowledge of the future is created in the moment of transcendence of contemporary 
versions of the social world.
Thanks to ongoing licence auctions, mobile communications continues to 
be the media topic of the moment. But after the initial whirlwind of 
excitement associated with the awarding of new licences and the ‘3G 
vision,’ the dust is beginning to settle. And those within and outside the 
industry are starting to ask the question ‘what’s next’? 
(www.btexact.com/brochure/mobile/overview.htm, August 2001).
Following Bakhtin (1981), the normative ordering of events is vital to the 
construction of a believable and authoritative narrative. Here we see the past, present 
and future interwoven in a narrative that moves towards the local endpoint that has 
already been established within discourses of Western consumer capitalism as 
desirable (competitive advantage in the marketplace). The past is represented as a 
period of hyperbole, the present as a period of diminishing hyperbole, and a point of 
departure from the ‘whirlwind of excitement’ surrounding third generation (3G), and 
the future as a place where sombre reflection will render investments in 3 G profitable. 
It is a story of success, both technological and organisational. It is a temporal ordering 
of events that discursively mediates risk. It serves to minimise the risks taken in the 
past (massive investment in licences) and construct the risks of the future (reduction 
of competitive advantage) as amenable to manipulation through greater and better 
knowledge of that future. In addition, it is clear from this excerpt how texts refer to 
other accounts of events, and (in this case implicitly) use them as a resource with 
which to construct their own versions. The British media is referred to as an 
institution concerned primarily with the present state of affairs, ‘the media topic of the 
moment’, a textual device of implicit comparison which serves to re-establish BT 
Labs as a forward thinking institution. The assertion of difference from others is a 
discursive resource used in the production of (here corporate) identity (Derrida 1978).
Criticism is often most effective rhetorically when it appears to be coming from 
a neutral, and unbiased source, daym an (1992) labels this phenomenon ‘attributional 
distance’, and demonstrates how it is frequently found within texts through linguistic 
formulations such as ‘newspapers say’, or ‘some people claim’. Within the BT Exact
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text on Adastral Park two examples of attributional distance are manifest. Firstly the 
£100 billion spent by network operators on licences. Notice that the general term 
given to the purchasers here deflects attention from the sum that BT itself spent. It is 
not that this information is unavailable^^, but within the text it would undermine the 
task of producing an authoritative account if the money spent by BT on a 3G licence 
was highlighted. Similarly we learn that ‘the industry has to start delivering some big 
returns’. A second example of attributional distance is apparent in the extract 
examined here, as we are told that ‘everyone’ is concerned about whether 3G will 
fulfil its expectations. Mobile communication companies such as BT have invested 
heavily in 3G in both monetary and discursive terms. High expectations of 3G 
technology have been produced within the discursive sphere of the future of mobile 
technologies. Many accounts in the popular press attend to the ‘promise’ of 3G, often 
juxtaposed with the supposed ‘failure’ (in terms of technological performance and 
consumer take-up) of WAP devices. For BT to admit to doubts about the viability of 
3 G and the returns that it will produce would be unacceptable at this point of financial 
and discursive investment:
With over £100 billion having been spent by network operators to secure 
new licences, the industry has to start delivering some big returns on its 
capital investment. Not in the dim, distant future. But soon. At the same 
time, everyone from service providers to end users is wondering if the 
great promise of new technology will be fulfilled. Innovations such as 
WAP have given a taste of things to come, but have yet to catch the 
imagination of the mass of consumers. In the final analysis, hi-tech 
innovations are subject to the same golden rule of marketing as any other 
product or service: if it isn’t good, it won’t sell - however clever the 
advertising, however high-profile the hype
(www.btexact.com/brochure/mobile/overview.htm. Innovation and 
Technology link from Adastral Park web site, August 2001. Emphasis 
added).
In terms of temporal understandings, the future would appear to be an especially fluid 
concept. In the above excerpt we see this fluidity at work. Discursively bringing the 
future closer to the present, ‘not in the dim, distant future. But soon’, can serve as a
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device to render the task at hand, namely the creation of revenue from 3 G technology, 
ever more urgent. The trope of consumer-led innovation is apparent here, ‘if  it isn’t 
good, it won’t sell - however clever the advertising, however high-profile the hype’. 
The authenticity of the text itself is being constituted. It proposes that this text ‘tells it 
like it is’ and can be seen as the last and by association most important ‘word’ on the 
subject, ‘In the final analysis, high-tech innovations are subject to the same golden 
rule of marketing... ’ (emphasis added).
The consumers who have caught onto the innovation that is WAP (supposedly 
early adopters) have tasted the future with the help of telecommunication 
corporations. They have been ‘given a taste of things to come’. A piece of the future, 
almost a preview or ‘prequel’, is produced as being embodied in WAP. Here we see 
WAP being constituted, made to mean, as a technology that is nearly the future but 
not quite. Just as technologies can be produced as being ‘futuristic’, so certain 
technologies can be constituted as technological indicators of the path to the future, 
whilst not necessarily being themselves constructed as futuristic. They are as near to 
‘the future’ as is presently possible.
Suchman (2003) is in the process of writing up an ethnographic account of 
everyday working practices at Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) following 
twenty years there as a researcher. One of the questions she asks is ‘How is the 
research centre, as a site for the creation of new knowledge and innovative 
technological forms, produced and reproduced through on-going practices of strategic 
boundary work, affiliation and differentiation?’ (Suchman 2003:4). Following 
Suchman I argue that part of this process of (re)production and management of 
corporate identity is related to the versions of the future that such corporations 
construct. Adastral Park is itself constituted, through its ongoing production of visions 
of the future, as a distinctive site of future-orientated expertise. In order to achieve 
this construction it must seek to differentiate itself from others. As Suchman notes.
As a worksite, the research centre offers close proximity with other 
creators of new technologies (or more grandiosely, future worlds), at a 
distance from those outside (including those who would be the eventual 
users, or inhabitants, of those technologies and worlds). To achieve and 
maintain this position, the centre constructs the boundaries o f  inside and 
outside that constitute it as a distinctive ‘place o f knowledge ’ (Ophir et al
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1991)...The centre in this sense depends not on fixed but rather on 
flexible, shifting boundaries that can be reconfigured in ways analogous to 
the model for the reconfigurable workplace, of the machine itself 
(Suchman 2003:4. Emphasis added).
How do Suchman’s observations about Xerox PARC relate to my consideration of 
Adastral Park? The identity of British Telecom as a corporation relates to the versions 
of the future that its various ‘arms’ produce. The authenticity of Adastral Park’s and 
BT Exact’s claims vis-à-vis 3G, mobiles, broadband, and (future-orientated) 
‘expertise’ in general, are all related to BT’s corporate identity. Adastral Park 
distances itself from marketing, although this text could itself be thought of as a Web 
Advertisement Feature^®. It also distances itself from ‘hype’, which has connotations 
of irrational, confused and even purposefully misleading thought. This move away 
from marketing and hype is relatively easy to make since Adastral Park’s research and 
design focus has already been worked up in the introductory text as below, even 
before one moves to the links (the aforementioned Innovation and Technology link for 
instance),
ABOUT BT’S ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 
CENTRE
Adastral Park is home to BT’s Advanced Communications Technology 
Centre and the Martlesham Teleport. In the Advanced Communications 
Technology Centre, BT has brought together people from disciplines as 
diverse as sociology, cosmology and theology to work alongside world 
experts in mobile and broadband networks, the Internet, software 
technology, multi-media and - most importantly - the development of 
communications-intensive products and services. Their task is to make the 
rules, not follow them. To be the architects o f change ... both fo r  BT and 
fo r  its customers.
(www.btexact.com/adastral-park/intro.htm, August 2001. Emphasis 
added)
To relate this point about identity to the progression of narratives we can turn to 
Gergen (1994). In order for a narrative to work, that is for it to be accepted as
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authentic within a certain cultural context, characters or objects in the story usually 
have to possess a continuous and/or coherent identity across time. Causal forces (such 
as technological progress or agreement on standardisation) may be introduced that 
bring about change in an object that the story produces. For dramatic effect with 
regard to technical artefacts for example, a putative identity may give way to ‘the 
real’. So the humble mobile phone, currently a mere communication tool, becomes a 
‘personal life facilitator’, and computers become ‘IPAs’. The excerpt below comes 
from a web page linked to the BT group’s Internet site which presents the work of Ian 
Pearson, a prominent futurologist.
By 2010, some of today’s industries will be dead, mostly those with 
‘agent’ in the title, replaced by computer programmes running for free.
Many tasks in every job will be automated in much the same way. 
Computers will become intelligent personal assistants, greatly boosting 
our productivity.
fwww.srouDbt.com/snhere/insishts/nearson/evervdav.htm. August 2001. 
Emphasis added).
In future-orientated talk, the potential of the machine’s ‘essence’ is produced as being 
locked away. Its potential is not unlocked until an event, basically the event that is the 
arrival or perhaps even the creation of ‘the future’, occurs. Until then the identity of 
the object supposedly remains stationary (‘everyone’ currently ‘knows’ what a 
computer ‘is’). This building up of an event (the future) which brings about change in 
the identity of a corporation/artefact discursively obscures the work that goes into the 
production of these identities, and their partial instability in present times.
One feature of future-orientated talk in this context is the way in which the 
production of the stability of (corporate) identity, in this case the identity of BT’s 
Adastral Park, has to work in projected temporal moments. It is no good having a 
Research and Design park whose facilities are useful in contemporary but only 
temporary times, but which falter if asked to venture into unknown future times. 
Stability and ‘common-sense’ knowledge in the present is produced as a guarantee 
that the organisation will be around in ‘the future’, and will continue to be, in a sense, 
a ‘firm ground’ on which to place a ladder to the future. This representation of 
stability as integral to corporate identity is also apparent in the no nonsense approach
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of the quote, Tn the final analysis, high-tech innovations are subject to the same 
golden rule of marketing as any other product or service’ 
(www.btexact.com/brochure/mobile/overview.htm. Innovation and Technology link 
from Adastral Park web site, August 2001). Here the text works to establish BT Exact 
as an organisation not dazzled by the hyperbole related to ‘futuristic’ high-tech 
innovations through the re-iteration of its adherence to well-established business rules 
(‘the same golden rule of marketing’). The text works at producing BT Exact as a 
stable, ongoing enterprise that is not duped by futuristic hyperbole, whilst 
simultaneously contributing to the production and circulation of future-oriented 
(technological) visions.
I have noted that WAP is presented as a prequel (‘the taste of the future’). This 
prequel must be followed up with a main showing (3G perhaps), and hopefully a 
sequel. Could this be 4G? The excerpt below demonstrates that the remaking of ‘the 
future’, and what is produced as representing that future, is produced as a relentlessly 
continuous process.
Whilst network operators and service providers now are concentrating on 
deploying 3G networks and the development of business models, 
applications and services, systems suppliers and vendors are now turning 
their attention to next generation (4G) mobile systems (Eurescom 2001).
Within BT’s Internet pages, BT Exact and Adastral Park are produced as the sites 
(metaphorical and physical) where ‘the future future’ comes about. Hence 
corporations in future-orientated talk must possess (or rather have built for them) 
continuous or coherent identities that work in ‘the future’ as well as the past/present. 
If the future brings change, then corporate identity has to change with or ‘ahead’ of it, 
since BT (and clients) will have been the very architects of that change. The ‘logical’ 
progression of the narrative is seen as being already located in the future. ‘Brightstar’ 
is a so-called incubation centre situated at Adastral Park where engineers are given 
freedom to develop potentially commercially profitable ideas (note again the concern 
with future markets) that would not necessarily be considered suitable for 
development in BT’s mainstream research and development departments. In this 
description of Brightstar’s mandate, we are told how research leads to innovative new 
technologies, which can in turn lead to new profitable companies, all backed by BT
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resources. The key aspect of the future-orientated talk here is the rapid ‘speed’ at 
which each stage of the story (from idea to market) ideally takes place. According to 
this version, the future has to be reached out for. Yet we are also ‘spinning’ towards 
it. Here ‘the future’ is also represented as a kind of ‘force’ that requires fast responses. 
Inventions have to be downstreamed quickly, or else competitive advantage will be 
lost.
Essentially, we are giving our people the space to spin-out their ideas 
quickly, in a relatively safe ‘start-up’ environment. Incentives for success 
vary from idea to idea but will typically include equity stakes in the ‘spin­
out’ company for key individual participants as well as for BT as the 
parent company. Where this works they will downstream their inventions 
quickly, get new products to market faster to meet customer demand - and 
quickly grow the return both to the people who initiated the spin-out and 
to BT and BT’s share-holders. Clearly we are confident this will work 
because any Brightstar idea which gets through to incubation is 
advantaged over most other ‘spin-ups’ through its access to BT’s 
resources. But we’re also confident because we’re growing on earlier 
downstreaming success such as the spin out of Wireplay into 
GamePlay.com (www.bt.com/innovation/report/evolution.htm, BT Exact 
and Adastral Park link. Emphasis added).
It becomes easier then to build a coherent account of what will happen in the future as 
assertions in part constitute and are constituted by the future-orientated corporate 
identity of BT Exact and Adastral Park, and ‘spin-offs such as Brightstar. Indeed 
Brightstar serves further to strengthen the future-orientated corporate identity of BT 
Exact since small ‘start-ups’ are perceived (linked to discourse surrounding the 
Internet) to be flexible, and willing to take risks that may or may not pay off. This 
version of the future relates to the themes of threats and opportunities. BT is produced 
as a corporation that is prepared to take risks, but which overall provides stability for 
its clients. Again their stability and deployment of ‘common-sense’ knowledge is 
presented as a guarantee that they will be around in the very future that it is claimed 
they are producing. We can see here the deployment of the supposed linearity of time 
and a coherent corporate identity that continues to exist from the past, to the present
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and through to the future. BT can utilise its position as a company with a strong and 
reliable past to position itself as a stable base from which it, and others associated 
with it, can ‘launch’ into the future, rapidly respond to the future, and indeed create 
that future. The key point here is the ways in which telecommunication corporations 
employ ‘the future’ as a way of strengthening their corporate identity. By conflating 
their activities with the creation, and concomitant control, of the future, and all the 
positive connotations this implies, corporate identity is lent a forward-looking, 
purposeful edge that is in turn related to competitive advantage in present and fiiture 
marketplaces.
Phone Boxes: The Future Redemption of an ‘Old’ Technology
I now consider the occurrence of technological determinism within corporate versions 
of the future. Again I concentrate on a text produced by BT, here BT Sphere which is 
BT Group’s technology ‘E-zine’^ \ The technological determinism that has become 
such an academic pariah may be alive and well in certain (future-orientated) contexts 
albeit in a different form. It would seem that future-orientated technological 
determinism requires the deployment of slightly different sociological tools by which 
to comprehend its workings.
In the academic context, what has the setting up of technological determinism as 
unacceptable led to? Grint and Woolgar (1997) argue that the supposed rampant 
technological determinism ascribed to writers such as Blauner (1964) and Woodward 
(1958) led to a swing towards a form of social determinism which in turn fuelled a 
backlash against ignoring technology altogether. Technologies were made to 
disappear. The resultant model is based on the avoidance of extremism in either the 
technological or the social direction and instead opts for a ‘pluralistic net’ (Grint and 
Woolgar 1997:14) containing many elements, some social and some technological, 
with varying degrees of influence. It could be argued that this is the model ostensibly 
used by futurology, since many of the texts analysed contain reference to social and 
technical elements ‘impacting’ upon the future, whist retaining that recognisable 
dualism between the social and the technical so criticised by anti-essentialists. Grint 
and Woolgar note.
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...it (socio-technical systems theory) still tended to carry the implicit 
assumption that the nature and capacity of technology remained beyond 
the remit of sociological analysis; in effect, the nature and capacity of 
technology was treated as given, objective and unproblematic. We call 
this assumption technism (1997:15).
Technism reproduces the same received wisdom that the capacity of technology is 
unproblematic, and most importantly still assumes an ‘essence’ within the machine, 
just as mobile devices can be constituted as somehow ‘inherently futuristic’. This 
section charts an example of the continuation of a technical/social divide in writings 
about the future of telecommunications, and the continuation of ‘technism’, that is the 
assumptions of essentialism with regard to technology.
A paper entitled The Future o f the Phone Box linked to BT Sphere’s Internet 
site considers the possibilities for the retention and improvement of what remains a 
familiar part of the British landscape. What is fascinating here is the manner in which 
the technical/social divide is played out in ‘the future’ as a speculative space. Phone 
boxes, we are told, are in danger of becoming obsolete given the challenge posed to 
them by mobile phones.
Phone boxes have changed in the past decades - the colour has gone from 
red to grey, and now (they) accept other means of payment. Other than 
that they are still basically just a phone in a box. In the future we can 
expect more change. Many former phone box users now have their own 
mobile phones and don’t use phone boxes anymore. The phone box can’t 
offer the convenience o f a mobile phone. Many other mobile devices will 
be available in the future too, so that people will be able to access services 
by means of devices that they have with them...As mobile penetration 
increases, the number of phone box users will decline. We could just 
accept that the need is declining and allow them to become extinct. But a 
case can be made for their continued e x i s t e n c e . . . boxes will remain 
and adapt to a changing need (Pearson and Wilson 2001:1. Emphasis 
added).
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A battle between an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ technology is played out, with the former 
needing to adapt to the autonomous, inherent ‘future-suited’ forces of the mobile. This 
text is a micro-example of the play of difference involved in defining what is to be 
considered ‘new’ and what is to be defined as ‘old’, a play of difference that the 
teenagers who participated in the focus groups (see Chapters Seven and Eight) also 
dealt with in detail. This point alludes to the ways in which technological progress is 
constructed as a linear movement from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’, which obscures the 
interpretative work that goes into producing technologies as one or the other. 
Telecommunication corporations are implicated in this process of continual re­
definition.
Moreover within some corporate future-orientated texts, some technologies are 
constructed as liminal. Liminality is a term coined by the anthropologist Victor 
Tumer^^ from his work on the ‘social structures’ of Ndembu peoples in Africa. The 
term was popular in the 1960s and 1970s and was used by Douglas in her work on 
rituals and taboos (Douglas 1970, Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). WAP is an apt 
example of the liminal space a technology can be placed in by those who speak for it. 
Since the ‘advent’ of 3G, WAP has been displaced as the ‘new, wew’ technology, and 
is currently being made to inhabit a space where it is constructed as neither ‘old’, as 
analogue phones and phone boxes are, nor ‘new’, as the proposed 3G multimedia 
services are. The same may happen if 4G devices are made to mean ‘the future’ in the 
future! This is not a prediction, more an indication of the continual process of re­
definition that technologies endure, and another recognition of the socio-culturally 
mediated nature of risk in relation to the production of predictions.
In the above extract (Pearson and Wilson 2001:1), the multiplication of mobile 
devices and services, ‘Many other mobile devices will be available in the future’ is 
cited as reason and impetus enough for phone boxes to adapt. The (supposed) 
quantitative proliferation (in penetration terms) and ‘inherent’ qualitative adaptability 
of mobiles is used as a textual device to assert the text’s main ‘endpoint’: the need for 
adaptation on the part of phone boxes. Interpretations of technology can serve as the 
basis for calls of action. The interpretations of these two technologies, one new and 
‘futuristic’, the other old and in need of adaptation (the section is titled ‘Adapt or 
Die’) are key to the formation of a technical/social divide, and to the (re)appearance 
of technism in accounts of technology, which incorporates the assumption that 
machines contain inherent capacities within them that have independent effects on the
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social sphere and on what is ‘coming’ in ‘the future’. There is talk of perhaps ‘just 
accepting that the need is declining’ (Pearson and Wilson 2001:1). Here the social is 
interpreted as consisting of ‘needs’ which rise and fall in conjunction with 
technological change. Technological change remains the main driver of patterns of 
social life.
The physical immobility of phone boxes does have a restricting influence over 
actors. However, as Grint and Woolgar (1997) note,
...the social constructivist argument does not deny that material artefacts 
have constraining influences upon actors. But it does hold a question mark 
over what these constraints are. Such constraints - or enablers - do not 
acquire their significance without interpretative action on the part of 
humans, hence there can be no self-evident or transparent account of 
‘material constraint’ (1997:23-24).
In The Future o f the Phone Box, future-orientated corporate texts speak (for) a 
technical artefact, and propose a solution to the impasse that mobile technology has 
‘caused’. These two technologies are constructed in divergent ways, and in ‘the 
future’, convergence is proposed as a way of ‘overcoming’ the supposedly inherent 
constraints of the phone box. In other words the phone box is to learn and draw ideas 
from the mobile’s example if ‘it’ wishes to survive the future. In terms of the playing 
out of a technical/social division, the mobile is deemed to have inherent capacities 
that have impacted upon people’s usage of phone boxes. The point is not to argue 
about whether this is ‘true’ or otherwise. Instead we can look at the ways these 
technologies are made to perform and what calls for action these performances lead 
to.
Technologies should at no point be assumed to have fixed meanings. They are 
not stable entities (Woolgar 1988). What does this imply? Future-orientated texts can 
be seen as one example of the ways in which the possibility of technological change is 
bound up with the interpretations of (future) technologies and the continual flux of 
meanings that Woolgar (1988) alludes to. ‘The Future of the Phone Box’ is but one 
example of a text that aims to ‘rescue’ the meaning of an ‘ailing’ technology that is 
fast becoming connoted as obsolete and basically useless. New meanings are 
suggested for it, and the possible ‘impact’ of this rejuvenated technology (or rather the
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impact of these newly created meanings) on the social sphere (as it is depicted in the 
future) is considered. Here we are getting to the nub of the issue. The past, present 
and future-possible meanings of technologies are produced within the discursive 
sphere and circulated by texts. The relative success of an account (here of the future 
of two types of telecommunication technologies) depends in part on the acceptance of 
three temporal aspects of the account: the acceptance of the produced version of the 
past (telephone boxes slow to change), the acceptance of a certain analysis of the 
present (phone boxes in danger of becoming defunct), and the acceptance of a given 
version of the future (phone boxes to become multicellular communication centres)^^. 
It is in this way that versions of the future not only construct the past and the present, 
but in doing so also produce possible interpretations of material artefacts and their 
place in the social sphere. So ‘the future’ and ‘mobile technologies’ are both 
problematised. The social sphere is produced through (future) technology talk and 
vice versa. A division between two spheres (technical/social) and the retention of 
residual technism is challenged if future-orientated texts are (re)interpreted in this 
manner.
The Mobile Device Acting In and On the Future
Grint and Woolgar (1997) note in their exploration of the relationship between 
technology and work, ‘it turns out to be difficult to identify straightforward examples 
of technological determinism...’ (1997:11). However, I suggest that when ‘versions 
of the future’ are brought into the equation, one can see relatively clear examples of 
technological determinism, particularly in terms of the ways in which imagined 
technologies will ‘impact’ upon imagined communities (Anderson 1983). When the 
familiar technical/social binary is played out in the future by being worked up in the 
present, future-orientated texts tend to take refuge in technological determinism. This 
is an example of artefacts being discursively constituted as actors, and produced as 
going beyond an intermediary role, into being actors in their own right.
Third generation devices are being built up as a repository of action in the 
future. Forms of talk treating technology as an autonomous force - as an actor in its 
own right - reside alongside talk of technology as an instrument and tool (for 
communication). An actor is defined as an intermediary that puts other intermediaries 
into circulation, as an entity that takes the last generation of intermediaries (texts.
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artefacts, human skills, money) and transforms these to create the next generation 
(Gallon 1991:140-142). Mobile companies combine technical artefacts (mobile 
devices), texts (futurology/marketing, PR), embodied skills (engineers, call centre 
workers, futurologists) and money (billing, intellectual property, contracts with 
service providers) into goods (3G devices) and consumers. So intermediaries can be 
(re)translated as actors, and vice-versa, although it is predominately within discourse 
that this occurs, here within the discourse of the technological ‘revolution’ that is the 
‘3G roll-out’. Constructing (3G) mobile communication devices as actors and as 
having an autonomous force of their own is linked to the ongoing production of 
authoritative versions of the future.
Within future-orientated talk about the most ‘appropriate’ packaging and 
presenting of 3G^, there resides an indication that new technologies do not sell 
themselves and that they do not have an essential character or function that is 
immediately obvious to consumers. There also resides the belief that consumers have 
their own ideas about technological developments that corporations have to take into 
consideration^^ Alternatively, it could be said that the assumption is that the general 
public, in their role as consumers, sometimes just do not ‘understand’ technological 
development and the benefits it brings them. Their ‘ignorance’ involves not 
understanding the essence o f the machine. The notion of repackaging then becomes 
linked to ideas about ‘pure communication’. Consumers are taken as not 
understanding the benefits of a technology due to misinformation. If only the 
‘essence’ of the machine could be spoken correctly, even communicated directly, then 
consumer resistance would dissolve.
So whilst technological determinism in its strongest form may be a myth, 
when technological progress is mediated through different versions of the future, the 
myth of its inherently unstoppable nature, and of technology somehow existing 
outside of social life, lives on if in more subtle forms than a straight criticism of 
technological determinism can cope with. Criticisms aimed at technological 
determinism have sought to trouble those accounts which assert that machines alone 
govern human action and determine social trends, or those which maintain that 
machines have inherent properties and an essence of their own, external to human 
mediation. However when the temporal context is shifted to the future, technological 
determinism becomes easier to disguise and harder to criticise. This is just one 
justification for looking closely at the essentialist assumptions of the versions of the
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future that corporations produce. Not in order to ‘catch them out’, but in order to think
about why technological determinism and technism set in ‘the future’ may require a
slightly different set of analytical tools to those needed for past and contemporary
versions, and to look at how notions of the past/present and future are at work within
actor-networks. One corporation’s ‘vision of the future’ (namely that of Philips) as
presented on their web site is now analysed in detail in order to explore further the
issues raised so far. In addition I concentrate on this particular version of the future
since some of the images downloaded from their web site were used as stimuli for
discussion within my focus groups with young people (see Chapters Seven and 
Eight).
Philips Vision of the Future Project
Philips’ Vision of the Future project (www.design.philips.com/vof/tocl/home.htm) 
was created in 1996, and the first series of the ‘Vision of the Future’ magazine (posted 
online) was finalised in 1997. The site is a link to both Foresight’s and Philips’ home 
pages. Relatively speaking (in web terms) this site is ‘old’, and it is not really made 
clear whether or not the ‘Vision of the Future’ magazine made it to a second series. 
The Vision of the Future web site has a dark blue background and a moving ‘jelly- 
baby’ figure as a motif at the top of the home page (See Appendix 1). The home page 
of the site appears spacious and uncluttered, with little text and a few images (the 
motif and the front covers of each issue of the magazine). On the lefi-hand side direct 
links to the eight online issues of the ‘Vision of the Future’ series are available, with a 
short text underneath explaining their content. Each issue is summarised below.
Issue 0: Background Information, includes information on research into 
possible future technologies, future lifestyles and comments from experts 
about their views on the future.
Issue 1: Home Life, presents a home of the future, and describes possible 
products and services found there.
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Issue 2: Street Wise, asserts that new infrastructures in public and semi­
public spaces will provide people with ‘unlimited possibilities for 
communication, information and entertainment’.
Issue 3: Personal Touch, demonstrates personal devices such as emotional 
containers and enhanced jewellery that Philips predict for the future.
Issue 4: Hospital Network, describes how the hospital will become a 
networked environment, where new technologies will enhance doctors’ 
medical skills, ‘Imagine a pair of glasses that enable you to look right into the 
patient’, manage complex data-systems, and entertain patients.
Issue 5: Kids Play, where children are described, as they often are, as being at 
ease with new technologies. Playing and learning are the focuses of the 
devices presented here.
Issue 6; Quality of Life, asks what is important for people when new 
technologies are being developed. Quality of life is defined in the following 
terms:
When products or services reduce the time or amount of tasks needed to be 
performed.
When they increase our enjoyment, entertainment or reduce tension.
When they give us information to improve our knowledge or our wellbeing.
Issue 7: En Route
Virtual and physical travel with devices that will mean we are ‘always in 
touch’ is explored here.
After clicking on one issue, you are taken on a ‘virtual tour’ of that particular domain 
of the future. Images of the devices that are part of Philips’ vision are most prominent 
and have their names, for example ‘Shiva’, attaehed to them with an explanatory text 
below (see Appendix 1). The online ‘magazine issues’ are organised around what are 
contemporary culturally conventional divisions between different domains of the 
social world. The public/private dichotomy so well established in Western discourses
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of individual rights and privacy resurfaces in these visions of the future, where the 
‘home’ and the ‘street’ are separate domains. HomeAVork and Adult/Child binaries 
dominate. The focus of each section is primarily on the devices that will achieve 
Philips ‘Vision of the Future’. As with much future-orientated discourse, technology 
is assumed to enhance quality of life through its (inherent) labour-saving capacities. 
Issues zero, three and seven are the focus here; the first in order that more general 
aspects of Philips vision can be analysed, the other two because they are primarily 
concerned with mobile (communication) technologies.
Issue zero, ‘Background Information’, details the aims of the project, and 
consists of various sub-sections including ‘Validation and Assessment’ and 
‘Communicating the Results’. Under the heading ‘Foreword: A New Modernity’, 
Philips vision starts to take shape. Its version of the future reiterates many of the 
themes that have been discussed in this chapter. Information technology is seen as 
synonymous with progress in all spheres of life. Hence we have the technical/social 
divide that Grint and Woolgar (1997) challenge so thoroughly repeated, with 
technology acting upon the social to improve it in terms of communication, stress- 
reduction and time-management. The time-frame employed in the text is limited to 
2005 through the introductory question, ‘What will life be like in 2005?’. The 
narrative that follows attempts to provide an answer. The introductory text first tells a 
story about why Philips has an interest in answering this question.
What will life be like in 2005? What will people want to do in the future?
What will interest them and make their lives more fulfilled? Companies 
like Philips, wanting to help shape the future, are in a position to propose 
ways in which new developments in technology could improve the quality 
of people’s lives.
(wvnv.design.philips.com/vofvofsiteO/voflevl/intro 1/intro 1 .htm)
Philips positions itself in this extract as a partner and a somewhat philanthropic 
company that ‘wants to help shape the future’. Quality of life (QOL) is immediately 
linked to technological development and a desirable endpoint (the improvement of 
people’s quality of life) is established. However, one opposition to this technology - 
improvement of QOL nexus is that technologies developed in isolation of people’s 
‘needs’ in no way improve QOL and may even worsen it, as acknowledged in this
186
version^^. Such a challenge is pre-empted by Philips’ assertion that the social has an 
input in developing the technical,
Traditionally, new products have been introduced mainly through 
technological innovation. Today, however, to make products and services 
which will come closer to meeting human needs and desires, we need to 
redress the balance, looking more carefully at this increasingly complex 
relationship between people and technology
(www.design.philips.com/vofvofsiteO/voflevl/introl/introl.htm.
Emphasis added).
The version of the future that Philips produces purports to pay attention to the (social) 
‘needs’ of humans, read potential consumers, and in doing so, aims to avoid the 
pitfalls of technologically driven design. This echoes the view of the BT futurologist, 
who states, ‘If people don’t want it then it won’t sell’ (Interview with Futurologist). 
Concern for shaping technology in light of ‘human needs’ seems laudable, but it must 
be remembered that Philips fashion consumer products on which its profit margins 
depend, although this point does not assume that (consumer) ‘needs’ are malevolently 
created and/or manipulated by corporations (Dant 1999:26-29). Further, as Grint and 
Woolgar note,
...the technical/social divide is but one example of a more general 
phenomenon: the dilemma of locating the origin of action and behaviour 
either in the essence of an entity or in circumstances antecedent to the 
entity (1997:69).
Philips claims to endeavour to uncover the (future) needs of human and incorporate 
them into the designs of their products. Behaviours of end-product users are assumed 
to be unproblematic since those end-users will have already had some input into the 
design of said product before it is brought to market. Production and consumption 
remain firmly separated. Action and behaviour is therefore located in circumstances 
antecedent to the entity (market research, usability trials), and also becomes produced 
as an ‘essence’ of that entity. So ‘the social’ is assumed to have been built into the
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design of the product via research into consumer needs. Consumer needs and desires 
are conflated with what has been produced as the social sphere.
Philips proposes that technology can provide a solution to a number of social 
and environmental problems faced in contemporary times. Given that technology 
(industrial production, genetic modification for example) is much maligned in these 
same contemporary times, how does Philips build up an account of the future which 
supports this technological-fix’ assertion? This account has to be worked at and 
Philips uses a number of intra-textual devices and discursive resources to do this. This 
does not have to be seen as a conscious process however. Narratives serve to unite a 
given version of the past with the present and to signify future trajectories. In order to 
maintain intelligibility within (here Western) culture, the stories told about the future 
must employ commonly accepted rules of narrative construction.
Narratives offer a range of discursive resources for the social construction of 
versions of the future. One is not free to have simply any form of ‘future-history’ but 
there is a great deal of flexibility and challenge to these rules (as with some science 
fiction writing). Narrative conventions do not, then, command the form versions of 
the future can take, but they do invite certain versions and discourage others. Philips’ 
Vision of the Future project predominately uses one variety of narrative form that is 
frequently relied on in writings on technology, namely the ‘progressive’ narrative. 
Narratives can very roughly he divided into six more or less stable types (Linde 
1993). These include stability, where nothing changes, progression where something 
gets better, regression whereby something gets worse, tragedy, which involves 
progression followed by rapid regression, happily-ever-afrer, where progression is 
followed by stability and the heroic saga in which a series of progressive-regressive 
phases battle it out. Phillips’ Vision of the Future project portrays a present in which 
we are becoming more open to alternative and holistic views of the world. In 
beginning the narrative in this manner, Phillips positions itself as concerned with the 
same issues as ‘we’ are. There is no ‘Them and Us’, only a single global system.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, our perception of the world has 
changed. Before that, for most of us the known world was limited to our 
side of the Iron Curtain. True, we were aware of life on the other side, but 
we knew little about it. Now, we are learning to see the world as a single 
system
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(www.design.philips.cûm/vofrvofsiteO/voflevl/forewl/forewl.htmL
The symbolic victory of capitalism over communism is chosen as the time-marker 
for a new vision that ‘alT are now involved in. Dissenters from the free market 
capitalist economy are effectively silenced via incorporation through inclusive terms 
such as ‘We’ and ‘Us’. The stage has been set for a progressive narrative. The past is 
represented as a time of ignorance and limited vision. The present is constructed as a 
success story (the gaining of insights into the world following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall). This ‘naturally’ implies a future of continued advancement. The passing of 
time is produced as one of linear progression.
Demarcation signs are an important aspect of the process of building culturally 
coherent narratives. The use of certain narrative components would appear to be vital 
in creating a sense of reality in accounts of the future, what can be called the 
achievement of the ‘future-real’. One example of the importance of narrative 
conventions is the work that goes into framing a narrative by various devices that 
indicate one is entering the tale-world’. Within versions of the future, narratives tend 
to be framed in two related ways; we are asked a direct question, ‘What will the future 
be like? and/or we are asked to ‘Imagine a device which could...’. These conventions 
demarcate that one is entering the ‘realm of the future’. They encourage readers to 
become receptive to the following versions of the future, and set up an ‘interactive’ 
element to subsequent accounts, with readers being directed to ‘imagine’ and ‘wonder 
about’ the future, within the parameters set out, as the text proceeds. So the 
progressive narrative continues. However, if progress is deemed to be an entirely 
given aspect of the future then the main tenet of this introductory text, that Philips has 
a role in this progress narrative, would be undermined. As it is, we move into a 
‘heroic saga’ narrative with a twist. Progress continues in the social sphere, but 
aspects of this progress are marked as regressive,
...life at home and at work are (also) changing at an increasingly rapid 
rate, the individualisation of society having loosened national and family 
ties. Increased mobility has weakened our sense of community, of 
belonging to a particular place. And work calls for flexibility: nowadays, 
few people can expect to stay in the same line of work all their lives. All
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of this means that the search for new models and new qualities of life is 
never-ending
(www.design.philips.com/vofrvofsiteO/voflevl/forewl/forewl.htm).
Having firmly located the problems of modem living in the social sphere, particularly 
linked to demands on time and work pressures and community breakdown, the 
introductory text sets up the conditions for the acceptance of its ‘version of the 
future’. Technology is (will be) at hand to solve the problems presented.
The notion of balance is introduced with reference to the aforementioned 
‘world system’, ‘However, that system seems in many ways out o f  balance. Every 
night, through the medium of television, we become eye-witnesses to what is going 
on around the world, both good and bad’ fwww.design.Dhilips.com. Emphasis added). 
So a battle between progressive and regressive tendencies is set up as constituting the 
social sphere. Technological innovation is produced as being able to redress this 
imbalance. Technology could have an ‘impact’ (here for the better) on this 
imbalanced world. The introductory text continues its story about the state of the 
modem world, and interestingly sets up ‘relentless industrial progress’ as a problem:
We have grown up in a world based on the Modemist vision of relentless 
industrial progress. We are now beginning to appreciate that we need to 
take a more holistic, more global view of progress. A sustainable society 
would be one capable of developing new and renewable sources of 
energy, conserving finite resources and respecting the natural and man- 
made environment
(www.design.philips.com/vofrvofsiteO/voflevl/forewl/forewl.htm).
This would appear to be a contradiction to the overall endpoint of the narrative. Yet a 
closer look reveals that the type of progress that Philips proposes, namely sustainable 
is juxtaposed with 'industrial progress’ that in Westem contemporary culture, with its 
semantic linking to the Industrial Revolution, conjures up images of smoke stacks and 
air pollution. Philips aligns itself with an altogether cleaner revolution. Sustainability 
then is a term which can be employed in several divergent, and sometimes mutually 
exclusive, contexts. Philips specifies what it labels a utopian vision, and then sets 
about answering the question of how to attain this utopia (of sustainable progress and
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world system balance). The answer, we are told in the extract below, is staring us in 
the face.
One of the most striking phenomena in the world today is surely 
information technology. Information technology is a natural development 
within industrial society. It basically continues the process of automation 
which began many centuries ago, though it does so in a way that takes it 
along a radically new path and at a vastly accelerated pace. It has been 
growing, like a natural system, in a scattered, unstructured fashion, 
without any overall motivation to give it direction. But if  we now place 
the needs of a sustainable society alongside the opportunities offered by 
information technology in areas such as communication, health care and 
entertainment, we see a number of points of convergence. 
(www.design.nhilins.com/vof/vofsiteO/voflevl/forewl/forewl.html
Not only is the solution already available to us if we can ‘converge’ it, but it is part of 
‘nature’ and thus can be semantically linked to sustainability in its ‘environmental’ 
form. Indeed the text asserts that information technology can go some way to solving 
environmental problems ‘through its highly efficient use of energy and materials’ 
(www.design.philips.comI. Industrial society is part of the old, yet still natural, order, 
whilst the Information society, is its ‘natural’ successor. Talk of succession 
(succession to the throne for instance) implies a birth (or even God given) right that is 
part of the ‘natural’ order of things. It is within this textual context that Philips is able 
to produce an authentic and above all, seemingly ‘commonsensical’ account of the 
future as balance of sustainability driven by new information technologies.
Embedding the Future in Material Forms
Phillips aims to set out in material form its version of the future. The inscription of a 
particular vision of the future in material form serves to strengthen networks and 
make them seem more inevitable than would be possible if the onus were placed 
entirely on textual and human (skills) as intermediaries and actors in that network. So 
within the Phillips Vision of the Future project, each of the four domains stated as a
191
focus of this vision (Personal, Domestic, Public, and Work and Mobile) is given 
various material forms. It is to these material imaginings that we now turn.
Miller (1998) sets out a detailed agenda for material culture studies, arguing 
that academics should strive for understanding and empathy through the study of what 
people do with objects, since that is the way the people (and networks) we study 
create a world of practice (1998:19). He refers to Simmel’s (1968) assertion that 
human values do not exist other than through their objectification in cultural forms, 
which include texts and technical artefacts. A study of mobile communication 
technologies that concerns itself with the questions raised by material culture studies 
attends not only to the ways in which these articles are made to mean through 
technology-talk, but also to the ways in which they are used within everyday life as 
material artefacts, that is what people do with them. The case of Philips’ Vision of the 
Future and the textual representation of a (future-possible) material artefact sits 
between these two approaches. These artefacts are yet to be used by anyone (unlike 
mobile technologies) yet they are made to mean with reference to existing consumer 
technological devices. They are not currently (if ever) available to consumers, yet 
their capabilities are described with reference to an imagined future user existing in 
imagined future contexts, or specific domains such as ‘Home’ and the ‘Street’. So we 
are lead to ask how does the embedding of Phillips’ future vision in visual and textual 
representations of material artefacts produce the (imagined) user, the (imagined) 
context and the (imagined) device?
Sotoro Miyagi, of Miyagi Design in Japan is quoted on the Philips’ web site as 
saying ‘The machine replaced human labour and now human brainpower. But I think 
technology’s next step will be to work fo r  the spirit, the heart’, 
(www.design.philips.com/vofrvofsite3/vof3main.htm. Emphasis added). This 
evocative line is the only text, apart from the products’ proposed names, that is fixed 
on the main page of Issue Three: Personal Touch. Humans (and that means also 
imagined users) are produced as a layering of the mind, the body and the soul, a 
familiar three-way splitting of what is nonetheless assumed to be a unified individual 
subject. Concerns about technology, subjectivity and the rebellion of the machine 
against its master (sic), are well documented, and are a frequent feature of popular 
science fictional Yet the supposed ‘replacement’ of the human by the machine poses 
no problem in this narrative. This is mainly due to the assertion that this ‘replacement’ 
always involves human control over what could be presented as the threat of the
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machine: the machine works for its owner. Issue Three: Personal Touch consists of 
five different devices all designed to ‘work for the spirit, the heart’ (as above). These 
include emotional containers, a make-up box with a difference, Shiva, virtual 
experiences and magic pens. A mystical theme runs through the texts accompanying 
all these devices, especially Shiva,
Named after the many-armed Hindu god, Shiva is a personal multi-tasking 
tool which integrates communication, information gathering and 
entertainment...These devices will adapt to their user’s way of working 
and will learn and grow with use, establishing their own distinctive 
identity
(www.design.philips.com/vof/vofsite3/vof3 lev 1/shiv 1 /shivl .htm).
Again the theme of technology as time compressor is emphasised, as Philips’ version 
of the future presents an ever-faster world in which multi-tasking is the only way to 
stay afloat. This is a common characteristic of ‘new era’ thinking. Thrift (1996) 
details characteristics of the ways in which communication technologies have been 
thought about in the past, when the telegraph and the fixed line telephone were ‘new’ 
(Marvin 1988). He argues that commentators tended to fix on extremes, ‘Thus the 
usage of a new electronic telecommunications technology in one particular way 
would be extended to how it would be used overall and everywhere’ (Thrift 1996: 
146). This seems to fit in with Philips’ proposals for the usage of Shiva, but with an 
interesting twist. Philips proposes that the device itself {mà presumably the network 
services used) can be used overall and everywhere, but that it will always be personal 
to you. The ‘extremes’ which Thrift (1996) comments on are present, but here in the 
form of extreme convergence, between machine, human body, brain and soul. 
Personalisation is vital to Philips’ representation of the future, as it functions 
semantically to distance Philips from the ‘one size fits all’ mantra of the dirty 
industrial revolution.
People are becoming more ‘multi-dimensional’. They are developing a 
wide range of interests, taking in old and new ideas, exploring their own 
and other cultures, and participating in a variety of lifestyles. In line with 
this trend, products will become more personalised. We will start
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interacting with them in more natural, human ways. They will be able to 
learn from us. At the same time, miniaturisation will result in tiny objects 
that can almost become part of us, worn as a ‘second skin’ 
(www.design.philips.com/vofrtocl/home.htm).
Intelligent agents that learn and adapt to user behaviour are presented as the ultimate 
in personalisation. New electronic communications technologies are frequently 
presented as a coherent, consistent and cumulative whole. Here the technology and 
the user are presented as becoming a coherent whole through the twin processes of 
personalisation and miniaturisation. The latter is a key ‘marker’ of versions of the 
future, as part of the m antra‘Smaller, faster, more’.
Philips’ Vision of the Future is rendered ‘commonsensical’ by the earlier 
assertion, and its constant reiteration, that the pace of life is ever faster, and will 
continue to become ever faster in the future. Again this is a feature of ‘new era’ 
thinking (Philips’ version of the future is set in ‘New Modernity’) that Thrift (1996) 
points to. Without some form of personal intelligent agent to learn all that the user 
needs to keep up with this fast-moving world, the user would be left in the slow-lane 
so to speak. Users, presented as humans in general, are (re)produced in this version as 
snail-like and vulnerable without the aid of technology. Personalisation acts as 
protection from this ‘natural’ vulnerability. The production of ‘deus ex machina’ 
within the Personal Touch texts and images is apparent, even explicit in the naming of 
a number of the devices (Shiva Butterfly, Shiva Devil, Shiva Compact) after a Hindu 
deity. Grint and Woolgar (1997) write,
Deus ex machina is a term drawn from the world of Greek and Roman 
drama...(it) refers to the timely appearance of a god to unravel and solve 
the plot. Deus ex machina refers to the convention of the god appearing in 
the sky, an effect which was achieved by means of a crane (Greek: 
mechane) drawn up over or on the stage and containing an actress or actor 
in the role of a goddess or god. The symbolic nature of a divine spirit 
being encased within a machine represents a typical response by many 
people to technology itself; indeed the Enlightenment was, and 
modernism is, very much movements bound tight to the idea of freedom 
through reason, a reason often manifest as technology (1997:2).
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Philips’ Vision of the Future project asserts that it represents an attempt to advance 
the arrival of the future in the shape of a desirable ‘New Modernity’. Devices such as 
Shiva are mooted as a step on a technological road-map to the future, where freedom 
will be attained through reason. Whilst Shiva obviously does not appear from the sky 
akin to some Greek tragi-drama theatre device, freedom through reason is produced as 
manifest within Shiva. A deity does appear within this machine.
Each of the designs for devices presented in Philips’ Personal Touch, Vision 
of the Future project, are produced as de novo. It is assumed that they will replace 
technologies that have gone before, and are portrayed as ‘revolutionary’. The notion 
of ‘technical revolution’ involves the obscuring of the past technologies which have 
been produced and were implemented in producing the ‘new’. Serres explains this 
point succinctly.
In order to say ‘contemporary’, we must already be thinking of a certain 
time and thinking of it in a certain way...so let’s put the question 
differently: What things are contemporary? Consider a late-model car. It 
is a disparate aggregate of scientific and technical solutions dating from 
different periods. One can date it component by component: this part was 
invented at the turn of the century, another, ten years ago, and Carnot's 
cycle is almost two hundred years old. Not to mention that the wheel dates 
back to Neolithic times. The ensemble is only contemporary by 
assemblage, by its design, its finish, sometimes only by the slickness of 
the advertising campaign surrounding it (Serres with Latour, 1995:45).
Imagined technologies such as Phillips’ Shiva can only be portrayed as new if the past 
is either not spoken of at all or if  the past is represented as out-dated. The notions of a 
‘technological revolution’ and a ‘New Modernity’ work within Philips’ and others’ 
versions of the future, as they produce a future which has broken radically with the 
past and the present. However, versions of the future also speak of technological 
evolution, which would seem to be a more apt way of thinking about the history of 
electronic communications as ‘long and sinuous, as evolutionary rather than 
revelatory’ (Thrift 1996:146). Yet the mythical beast of technological determinism 
tends to rise again in technological evolutionary discourse. Evolution is (re)presented
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as an inevitable, albeit long and slow, march towards a particular goal, a goal that 
history always knew, and has always ‘progressed’ towards: the goal of perfect 
technology. ‘Perfect technology’ can only be produced as such if ‘old’ technologies, 
with their faults and breakdowns, are either ignored, or are taken as part of the ‘old’ 
order. The latter strengthens calls for the ‘new’ and the ‘arrival’ of ‘the future’ as fast 
as possible. Philips’ Vision of the Future implies a revolutionary break with a faulty 
past, a break that will sweep away previous inconsistencies.
Issue seven: En Route deals with physical and virtual travel in Philips’ Vision of 
the Future project. The former deals with the need to keep in touch whilst travelling 
whilst the latter deals with ‘travel’ via virtual reality (VR),
Travel in the future will be both physical and ‘virtual’. Satellite links, 
combined with the continuing miniaturisation of portable equipment, will 
mean that we will always be in touch, wherever we are. Multimedia will 
make physical travelling more pleasurable. Virtual Reality equipment will 
allow us to experience places we would otherwise never see 
(www.desisn.nhiliDs.com/vofyvofsite7/index.htmT
The ‘Anyone, Anytime, Anywhere’ dream of perfect, ‘always on’ communication 
between various entities is a now standard part of versions of the future in relation to 
mobile communication technologies. The text produces a new ‘space’, a new 
dimension coming into existence, that of pure communication and information. This 
multi-dimensional space is represented as ‘virtual, densely webbed and infinitely 
complex, a vast and sublime realm accessed through the mediation of our imaginative 
and technical representations’ (Davis 1993:86). Using the devices in Philips’ Vision 
of the Future project, consumption of other cultures becomes possible at home as 
devices offer the opportunity of virtual tourism. Experience is reduced to seeing 
(Rojek and Uny 1997). However, in keeping with this research’s focus on mobile 
communication devices, what version of the future does Philips’ produce in relation to 
physical travelling?
Firstly despite its purported concern with sustainability and environmental 
issues, the car is mooted by Philips’ Vision of the Future as the key mode of transport 
in the future. Improvements to in-car facilities and standardisation between a number 
of mobile devices and the car’s on-board computer are put forward as vital to
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achieving the future dream of ‘anywhere, anyone, anytime’ communication. Other 
devices include the video postcard,
... a flat, postcard-sized piece of film in which a chip is embedded. The 
chip can store a short clip (5-10 seconds) of sounds and moving images. It 
can be treated as a postcard and sent via conventional post, or it can be 
used to store short messages for friends or relatives like a photograph 
today
(www.design.philips.com/vofrvofsite7/Dostcard/index.htmT
The ‘social’ side of these technologies is produced as being embedded in the devices 
themselves. The uses that they are meant to be put to (emotional containers: storage of 
emotions in order to give to a recipient, video postcard: storing of memories and 
communications, Shiva: storage and retrieval of information) all involve networks of 
actors and intermediaries. These include the devices themselves, the people 
information is garnered from, the skills involved in producing that information, 
family and friends which share memories, knowledge and so on. These devices are 
portrayed as making the user more sociably adept.
Mobile technologies are produced here as a purified technological system, but 
this production is only possible because ‘society’ is depicted as a smoothly 
functioning whole through which these technologies can pass unproblematically. No 
postal strikes ever occur, emotional containers are given as a gesture of love rather 
than hate and video postcards do not malfunction, whilst traffic jams, car crashes and 
pollution are smoothed over with the help of the car’s on-board computer. The 
network that Philips’ Vision of the Future depicts is uncannily stable. This depiction 
of society and the representation of mobile devices as part of a purified technological 
system is vital to the production of an ‘authentic’ and ‘commonsensical’ version of 
the future. Not only is the technical and the social split again, but the future is 
produced as a ‘space’ in which technology will fix the problems of ‘the social’, whilst 
those same problems of ‘the social’ are never allowed to interfere with the smooth 
running of ‘the technical’.
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From Corporate to Consumers’ Versions of the Future
In this chapter I have concentrated on the various devices and resources that corporate 
versions of the future employ to produce ‘commonsensical’ and authoritative accounts 
of times to come. I have predominately looked at the ways in which sociologically- 
orientated researchers can analyse instances of technological determinism and 
residual technism in these accounts of the future. I have also looked at the ways in 
which versions are constructed, through the deployment of culturally accepted 
narrative forms such as ‘progression’ for example. The selection of valued end-points 
and the discursive ordering of sequences of events that indicate ‘progress’ towards 
such endpoints have also been studied using BT and Philips as empirical probes. 
Valued endpoints are culturally resonant, for example the retaining or gaining of 
competitive advantage and the ‘colonisation’ of ‘the future’ to minimise risk in that 
future. ‘The future’ is produced as a threat, an opportunity, something that can be 
‘grasped’ and ‘delivered’ and something that has to be planned for through the use of 
‘expert’ knowledge. I have studied the manner in which ‘the future’ is depicted as 
having an active force in the ‘social’ sphere, in particular through the mediation of 
‘futuristic technologies’. I have also elaborated the ways in which notions of ‘the 
natural’, . ‘nature’ and evolution’ are enrolled to strengthen the stability of given 
versions of the future in relation to mobile communication technologies.
Corporate versions of the future may be used to strengthen the ‘forward- 
looking’ identity of large corporations. Corporate identity is related to the boundary 
work involved in producing versions of the future, which involves processes of 
affiliation and differentiation. Within these corporate versions of the future 
technological determinism is deployed to make ‘a future’ that is depicted as both 
‘commonsensical’ and ‘inevitable’. It has also been noted that social/technical 
dichotomies form for the most part the basis of corporate versions of the future, and 
that these dichotomies involve certain assumptions about human and non-human 
actants. Corporate versions of the future form part of the future-orientated discourses 
that both shape and are shaped by mobile communications technologies as socially 
constructed ideas and material artefacts.
I now turn to the ways in which young people produce versions of the future 
in relation to mobile communication technologies. What resources do they use and 
how do they manage the ‘task’ of imagining the future in relation to what, to many of
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them, is a mundane technology? We now move from corporate versions of the future 
to the accounts of a group of ‘consumers’ (as they tend to be depicted in the corporate 
sphere).
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Chapter Seven: Teenagers and Humour in Versions of the 
Future
People of the Future?
Chapters Seven and Eight focus on what the young people who participated in my 
focus groups said about the future in relation to mobile communication technologies. 
In keeping with the rest of this research, these chapters tackle the issue of how 
versions of future-possible technologies and future-possible scenarios are built up. I 
explore what resources participants use. I ask what rhetorical devices they employ. 
How do they reach a consensus or otherwise about possible futures? What might their 
accounts about the future and future possible technologies be said to be ‘doing’ within 
the interaction that is the focus group encounter? What might their accounts of the 
future say about their notions and assumptions about the past and the present?
This chapter focuses on one particular resource that these young people 
employed to imagine ‘the future’ of mobile communication technologies. This 
resource is the humour that was deployed during the focus groups. Following an 
introduction to the ways in which young people in general are spoken about in 
relation to technologies and the future, I examine the manner in which the groups of 
young people who participated in my research managed the ‘task’ of producing 
versions of the future. To re-iterate, it was not their future that I asked them to 
discuss, but rather the future of mobile communication technologies, although they 
did bring notions of what their future may be like to the discussions that ensued. I 
undertook these focus groups as a way of balancing my research between looking at 
those who are thought to ‘produce’ future mobile technologies (i.e. corporations 
within the telecommunication industry) and those who are thought of as consuming 
(future) mobile technologies, namely young people.
The sophistication of the accounts the teenagers in the focus groups produced in 
response to the ‘task’ set demonstrates that these young people do have something to 
say about ‘the future’. Their future-talk amounts to more than mere regurgitation of 
the versions of technologists, media commentators, popular science fiction and so on. 
Within the focus groups conducted, participants all had something to say about ‘the 
future’, firstly in terms of the possibilities for their own lives.
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George: They might invent teleporters or something. You could just walk into 
them. Like Star Trek.
Leader (L): Would you do that?
Claire: No.
Dan: Yeah that would be well good.
Claire: You’d turn into a fly.
(laughter)
George: Imagine you wouldn’t have to get from Canvey to Southend^s every day.
L: Never be late for a lesson.
Claire: I ain’t gonna be living on Canvey in 50 years time. God.
George: It would have been blown up by terrorists by then.
(laughter) (Focus group 2:4-5. Emphasis added).
Here Claire actively imagines and strenuously rejects a future in whieh she is still 
living on Canvey Island, Essex. Secondly, in addition to imagining ‘personal’ futures 
the teenagers also talked about future-possible devices,
Sam: I think it would be like the Star Trek badge. I can’t imagine like pressing a 
button and talking to anybody I know, Like very strange (Focus group 1:8).
Thirdly the teenagers talked about possible future socio-technical scenarios, although 
clearly elements of all three concerns (personal, technological and social) are not so 
simplistically delineated within the focus group data.
Gemma: Oh that thing they were gonna put satellites in the air...if there were any 
bombings they were...I don’t really know how it works but they were gonna send 
missiles and stuff.
L: Yeah. Missile defence system.
Samina: Space stations so we can all live on the moon.
Dan: Who’d wanna though?
George: The world is over-populated though, so people would have to live on the 
moon.
Samina: I think I’d like it (Focus group 2:5. Emphasis added).
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So how are young people themselves talked about in relation to the future? I suggest 
that we oscillate between framing them as ‘the good, the bad and the ugly’. Young 
people are discursively constituted as ‘good’ in the sense that they supposedly 
represent hope for and in the future. We hope that they will somehow be ‘better’ than 
the generations before them, that is better educated, better at handling change, more 
able to recognise and celebrate differences, and better at adapting to the ‘new’ 
technologies whose coming is constituted as being inevitable as time passes. Various 
organisations and initiatives aim to ‘consult’ young people about the future, and in 
particular their future^^. Visions Online is a prominent example of this notion of youth 
being heard through debate about their hopes, desires, wishes and fears for the future. 
Monitoring the Future is a ‘continuing study of American youth’ and an apt 
example of the discursive production of young people as the future, albeit here a 
rather dystopian future^\ Whilst Sefton-Green’s (1998) work focuses primarily on 
children, the points he makes can be extended to what is socially constructed as the 
‘young adult’ years.
Children both represent and quite literally embody our, or at least our 
societies’ future. Of course the platitudinous truthfulness of this statement, 
that children will grow up and become adults in the future, tends to 
obscure its ideological construction (1998:1).
Jenks (1996) maintains that it is not so much the physical children (or young people) 
that represent the future but rather our notion of childhood itself. Young people are 
also represented as ‘bad’. They are represented as a ‘social problem’, a difficult group 
in society that must be coerced, persuaded, and moulded into responsible future 
citizens. Then there are the ‘ugly’ ones, the killers of Jamie Bulger and Damilola 
Taylor, who are ontologically separated out from ‘normal’ young people. 
Representing young people as a source of hope and of despair rests on a 
developmental model of age and the passing of time which James et al (1998) argue 
pervades our everyday thinking about the relationship between past, present and 
future. Developmental notions of childhood tend to stress the difference between 
children, young adults and adults. Harden et al (2000) point out that the assumption 
that such differences are inherent encourages the development and use of standardised
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tests to assess child development, whereby children of different ages are in different 
stages of development towards adulthood (Harden et al 2000:2).
The representation of children and young adults as ‘the good, the bad and the 
ugly’ folds in with fears and hopes which are couched in terms of this developmental 
model of age and the passing of time, the fear being that somehow children and young 
adults will develop into undesirable adults, and the hope being that they will grow up 
into decent social beings. It becomes clear that childhood and young adulthood (and 
of course this separation of the two within language is a example of this point) are 
predominately relational terms, grounded in their relationship of perceived difference 
with adulthood (Jenks 1982). Over the course of at least the last hundred years, 
children have increasingly become a ‘project’ for parents, the state and its 
ambassadors, and possibly corporate organisations (Beck and Beck-Gersheim 1995). 
The social sciences are part of this apparatus as children continue to be the objects of 
the sociological gaze (Harden et al 2000:2), whilst recent sociological thinking about 
childhood and development suggests that we should focus upon children and young 
adult’s lives, perceptions and activities rather than viewing children as adults of the 
future, with all the assumptions about development and a linear model of time the 
latter entails. It is helpful to highlight the assumptions about childhood that the 
developmental model entails since it also has more immediate implications in relation 
to my decision to focus upon young people with regard to the future and mobile 
technologies. To think reflexively about my decision involves admitting that 
conceptions about childhood, young adulthood and mobile technologies have shaped 
this research. The (pre)conceptions held relate in part to my immersion in (corporate) 
literature about mobile devices and the future that has thus far been the focus of this 
research.
It would appear that within talk about and from the mobile industry, both 
developmental and ‘tribal child’ (James et al 1998) approaches are drawn upon to 
comment on young people’s possible role now, and in the future, in relation to ‘new’ 
mobile technologies. Teenagers in particular are constituted as a cohort unto 
themselves, with their own distinct tastes and (consumer) habits which, through 
market research, must be discerned. They are also constructed as a point on a 
developmental scale, meaning that they will develop into tomorrow’s (consuming) 
adults. Thus teenagers (and sometimes pre-teens^^) have come to represent, for mobile 
companies, a potential future market, ‘The mobile market is not for corporate big
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shots anymore. While professionals rang up all the business in the early years, its 
future is now in the handsets of kids and casual u s e r s P red ic t io n s  for possible 
fiiture technologies and their take-up often pinpoints teenagers as the most likely 
potential users, ‘Wearable computers will be popular with teenagers in just five 
y e a r s T e e n a g e r s ’ supposed enthusiasm for ‘new’ technologies is being employed 
as justification for continued technological development. Indeed images of children 
gazing rapturously at a computer screen or getting involved in science experiments on 
Blue Peter’^  remain powerful since not only do they encapsulate the hopes and fears 
of popular narratives about childhood and adolescence, but they also materialise the 
parallel story of technological progress.
Industry research fi-equently posits young people as the obvious saviours of a 
mobile market that by 2001 was being represented as somewhat shaky. Under the 
heading ‘British Teenager’s Fuel Mobile Boom’, The Guardian reports.
Despite persistent gloom and massive job cuts in the global mobile 
industry, the number of British households owning at least one phone has 
leapt to almost 70% from less than 50% in the past year. The boom, 
according to JD Power and Associates’ annual mobile phone survey in the 
UK, has been fuelled by the insatiable demand for pre-paid mobiles, 
which accounted for 90% of new phone sales in the past 12 months. The 
pre-paid craze, in turn, is being driven largely by 16-17 year-old 
consumers {The Guardian, May 2001/^.
Here teenagers, and their ‘insatiable’, implying forever continuing, taste for 
(predominately pre-paid) mobiles, are produced as secular saviours of a faltering 
industry. An entire age cohort is presented as a strong and by inference, future-secure, 
market. A Nokia commissioned study of teenagers provides another example of the 
way in which young people are produced as an authority on the future and as 
‘naturally’ approving of technological development,
A new study undertaken by the HPI Research Group on behalf of Nokia 
has highlighted the potential for the mobile entertainment services in 3G.
The study demonstrated that the core mobile-phone market (16-45 year 
olds) was excited by the pace of technological changes, which they
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expected would make life more fun and stimulating.. .Among the younger 
respondents, enthusiasm was even greater, with nine out of ten 
‘definitely’ wanting at least one of the entertainment features {3G Press, 
December 2001. Emphasis added)^^.
So young people are framed as ‘the future’, whether they are taken to represent a 
threat to, or hope for, that future. However, the teenagers within my focus groups 
voiced an alternative perspective to the intertwining of the young with technology and 
progress. This was voiced specifically with regards to who would be prepared to buy 
‘futuristic’ devices. Their conviction that it would be ‘others’ who would purchase 
‘high-tech’ devices in the future goes against an industry construction of ‘the 
teenager’ as the key future mobile device market. It is not that one wishes to 
demonstrate that either the industry, or indeed the teenagers, are ‘wrong’. Rather these 
differing constructions of future mobile consumers reveal the ways in which 
perceived attributes of social groupings (the teenagers, the business person) are 
produced within and through talk about new technologies. The clearest example of 
this practice arose in conversation about the images of ‘futuristic’ devices presented to 
each of the groups towards the end of each session,
Alex: Mm. What do you think of that one? (Image 2)
Paul: I think in terms of product design, which I am interested in, it is very nice.
Nice looking, but you still wouldn’t catch me buying one. Yeah I can see the 
attraction definitely. I can see the attraction. Of course, it is a powerful tool and if 
you’re a businessman and you need that kind of equipment then fine, but I don’t.
I’m not bothered.
L: So it depends if you need to arrange meetings and stuff?
Paul: Yeah. (Focus group 10:3).
Paul cannot imagine buying such a device now but it is unclear from the excerpt 
whether he could imagine himself as a businessman in the future and thus imagine a 
time (in the future) when he could conceivably ‘need’ such a device or become its 
user. Paul, as commentators on new technology industries are also inclined to do, 
constructs this future user, and demarcates the user’s possible actions through a
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bricolage of future technical and social needs and attributes (the business/waw with a 
powerful tool).
Some of the participants in the focus groups presented themselves as having a 
pragmatic approach to mobile devices (see extract below). Again here they are linking 
the ‘Other’, in terms of a different age cohort to themselves, as ‘being bothered’ about 
certain dimensions of future-possible mobile devices. From this we cannot infer that 
they would not (or would) purchase such device. Rather, the point of interest here is 
the way in which (their) age is invoked as a defence against what is, in their view, 
essentially a clever marketing ploy,
(On showing Shiva image 6 to Focus Group 5, see Appendix 2)
L; This one is a funny shape, based on the shape of a butterfly. If you could have 
a phone...
Sophie: I would like it just...normal.
Sarah: That’s ideal for younger children.
Hayley: As long as it was like small.
Sarah: Not necessarily children but younger teenagers and stuff. It’s nice for them 
but because we’re grown up and stuff a phone’s a phone.
Hayley: At the end of the day you get too...I get bored of things so quickly though 
and it was like £100...
Sophie: That’s a really good marketing thing though, if they’re going to change the 
design all the time and they’ll be like “Oh I don’t want the butterfly one anymore, I 
want the snake" or whatever.
L: Or a Harry Potter one.
Hayley: Every time something new comes out they’ll be like “Ah”.
Sarah: That’s a really good marketing ploy...that would definitely work. (Focus 
group 5:11).
Here their own age is deployed as a source of cynicism about changing phone designs 
as an indication of progress. Again it is the ‘Other’ (i.e. children) who may consume 
such devices in the future, as the participants attempt to exclude themselves from the 
technology-consumption-progress loop, and profess their preference for the ‘normal’, 
namely the shapes of today rather the possible shapes of tomorrow. What they are
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comfortable and familiar with in the present is imported to the future and used to 
differentiate themselves from those younger than themselves.
It is argued that there are a number of inter-linking discourses about young 
people and new technologies with one constituting the other as vital to progress. Here 
‘progress’ takes on several forms: to ‘progress’ in life, young people must tap into 
their ‘natural’ ability with technologies in order to ‘get on’ in an increasingly 
technologically driven age. For new technology industries to ‘progress’ in terms of 
profits, teenagers as a particular age cohort and consumer segment, need to be studied 
and understood so that their ‘natural’ interest and enthusiasm for technological 
devices continues and is nurtured. Technological development is constituted as 
dependent on the interest and enthusiasm of consumers, and since young people are 
composed as consumers of the future (whether or not they see themselves in this 
manner), it falls upon them to have an interest in technological innovations.
In a sense this inter-linking of young people and technology forms part of 
what Donna Haraway calls ‘secular salvation history’ (1997:10). Figures and stories 
inhabit Western histories that give shape and produce our understandings of scientific 
and technological cultures. Auerbach’s (1953) study of mimetic practices in Western 
literature argues that, ‘Figurai interpretation establishes a connection between two 
events or persons in such a way that the first signifies not only itself but also the 
second, while the second involves or fulfils the first...they are both contained in the 
flowing stream which is historical life’ (1953:64). Stories and figures of possible 
futures inhabit this same ‘historical life’, and serve to constitute history as a humanist 
totality, whilst ‘...the overwhelming power of the images that promise fulfilment (or 
damnation) on earth infuses secular histories of progress and apocalypse. Secular 
salvation history depends on the power of images and the temporality of ultimate 
threats and promises to contain the heteroglossia and flux of events’ (Haraway 
1997:10). Discourses of genetics, information sciences and in particular computer- 
mediated communication are replete with instances of such (Christian) figurative 
realism that remains barely secularised. Such discourses reduce the experiential 
multiplicity of time and of techno-science to a linear binary temporality of success 
and failure, hope and despair, progress and nihilism, rationality and irrationality. 
Developmental time is part of, indeed fundamental to, these discourses. Foucault 
(1978) gives shape to his theoretical concept of biopower through depicting the 
nineteenth century figures of the hysterical woman, the homosexual, the fallen child.
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and the reproducing heterosexual couple who constitute and are constituted by 
administrative and surveillance practices. These historical figures’ temporality is 
firmly developmental and discourses of ‘progress’ inscribe their bodies and mould 
their stories (what can and can not be said about them). Haraway (1997) maintains 
that, ‘developmental time is a legitimate descendant of the temporality of salvation 
history proper to the figures of Christian realism and technoscientific humanism’ 
(1997:11). The intertwining of the figures of the child, the young adult and 
information communication technologies (ICTs) is but one organising practice within 
this secularised salvation historical epic.
In an intensely circular fashion, technology is to save young people from 
exclusion firom our ‘technological age’ and young people represent hope for the 
continuation of technological progress and even the ongoing viability of certain 
technology industries. A fragment of the ‘meta-narratives’ through which young 
people and technology are constituted has been explored. We now turn to the stories 
that the participants in the focus groups told about themselves, mobile technologies, 
and the future. In particular I study the resources that these young people deployed in 
order to tell these stories in a coherent, culturally resonant manner.
Humour and Versions of the Future
When transcribing data from the focus groups it became clear that one of the most 
pertinent ways in which accounts of the future in relation to mobile communication 
technologies were produced was through the use of humour. The focus groups were, 
above all, funny. Jokes were told, laughter bubbled up as a participant described a 
future-possible device or service and ironic hand gestures were made fi-equently. 
What, if  anything, can the social researcher say about this phenomenon? Will an 
examination of humour turn something wonderful into something dull and boring?^^.
Research on humour within psychology and communication studies suggests 
that humour serves a variety of functions in interpersonal relationships (Graham, Papa 
and Brooks 1992). Over 100 psychological theories of humour have been documented 
(Gruner 1978, Ziv 1988). Hobbes’ (1651/1958) work is seen as the cornerstone of 
modem superiority theories (Foot 1986, Morreall 1983). Hobbes contended that we 
laugh at those who we perceive to be weaker than ourselves in order to strengthen our 
sense of superiority over them. Wynne (1996) claims that.
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Laughter, for Hobbes, is the result of ‘sudden glory’, achieved when we 
realise that our situation compares favourably with that of others, 
particularly when those others suffer misfortune. Our situation can also 
compare favourably with that of our former selves; we can laugh at past 
mistakes but only if we have surmounted them (Wynne 1996:5).
Derision is posited as the key to understanding humour which uses disparagement, 
involving the elevation of the joker above the target of humour (Zillmann 1983). It is 
possible that the humour and laughter that was evoked amongst the teenagers by their 
parents’ attitudes to mobiles (as reported by the teenagers), involves the use of 
disparagement,
Simon: My mum can’t even shut down a computer coz she’s stubborn and she 
won’t learn.
Steph: Yep. My mum’s the same.
Simon: Our computer will end up in the garden if it don’t work (mimics throwing 
action).
(laughter)
James: My mum shows me how to use mine. She did a course.
(laughter)
Phil: Ah. (Focus group 8:15).
The laughter provoked by James’ comment appears to spring from the perception that 
parents, particularly mothers, are unlikely to know more about computers than the 
teenagers ‘naturally’. Indeed James mentions that his mother had to do a course in 
order to reach the dizzy heights of being able to show her son how to use them. James 
employs an essentialist generational discourse here and, via self-depreciation and 
disparagement, produces laughter amongst the group.
The second broad perspective on humour, namely relief or arousal theories, 
falls into psychological and physiological domains (Morreall 1983). Here laughter is 
perceived as a release of repressed or unused energy, with Freud’s work framing 
subsequent research of this type (Freud 1905/1960, McGhee 1979). When released 
from social constraints, it is posited that we are able to give vent to normatively
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forbidden thoughts and feelings. This release from constraints allows us to laugh at 
insults, expletives and indecency, but it offers little contextual explanation as to why, 
at a certain point in time and space, this release is ‘allowed’ to occur.
Finally incongruity theories, which seem best suited to the forms of humour 
performed during the focus groups, argue that humour results from the discovery of an 
incongruity and our subsequent reaction to that discovery (Berger 1976, Nerhardt 
1976). Morreall (1989, 1987, 1983), a keen advocate of incongruity theory, maintains 
that ‘amusement is the enjoyment of something which clashes with our mental 
patterns and expectations. We are the only species that enjoys incongruity, it is 
suggested, because we are the only species capable of rational thought’ (1989:1). 
Incongruity theory is a relatively rigid structure with which to look at the humour that 
occurred during my focus groups so at points I break out of this structure to make my 
own observations in relation to humour.
One of the problems related to understanding humour through the lens of 
incongruity is the notion of a ‘discovery’ of an incongruity. This difficulty is in 
keeping with the theory’s neglect of the significance of language. I suggest this notion 
of ‘discovery’ is problematic since within the cognitive psychology literature there 
seems to be little thought given to what exactly makes something incongruous. 
Incongruity becomes something of a given entity which exists prior to interaction, 
rather than something that is produced by participants who are part of a wider socio­
cultural context within which certain things are viable or otherwise. Morreall claims 
that humans enjoy incongruity due to our capacity for rationality. As an evolutionary 
psychologist Morreall has little time for the possibility that ‘rationality’ (that which is 
deemed ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’) is itself embedded in the historical and cultural 
context in which we humans live. However, Morreall’s assertion is helpful in that it 
points to the possibility that the hilarity present within the focus group discussions 
drew on and played with notions of what can be deemed ‘rational’ and/or 
‘commonsensicaT and what can be thought of as ‘irrational’ and ‘nonsensical’. By 
juxtaposing the ‘rational’ and the ‘irrational’ through humour, the teenagers built 
versions of the future which made sense to their own culturally constituted models of 
rationality, but this was only possible through the humorous examination of the flip 
side of this binary, namely the ‘irrational’.
Wynne (1996) states that within incongruity theories, humour is viewed as the 
result of being jolted from one mental attitude to another, incongruous to the first, or
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when connections are made between events that we did not expect (1996:7). The latter 
notion of incongruity as a tool for generating humour resonates with the material from 
my focus groups. Connections were made by the participants between possible events 
in the future if a future-possible device they had talked about ‘really’ existed, but their 
experiential understandings of their present world formed the framework for their 
creation of these possible events. Thus connections, between their present worlds and 
future-possible worlds, were made that they may not have expected and laughter was 
generated by the incongruities this clash of temporalities produced.
McGhee’s (1989, 1980, 1979, 1979a) work is helpful when pursuing the 
possibility that dealing with incongruity through amusement may be a useful way of 
thinking about the focus group interactions, although perhaps not in a direct fashion. 
He maintains that humour starts in the second year of a child’s life when he or she is 
able to represent objects in his or her imagination. To turn an activity into humour, 
McGhee (1979) proposes that a child must be able to imagine one thing while dealing 
with something else, that is treating the real thing as i f  it is the imagined thing. The 
incongruity children experience between the thing before them and the way they are 
treating it can, according to McGhee (1979), please them, and that pleasure is their 
first humorous amusement which stays with them throughout their lives. A case from 
Piaget’s (1962) work is cited to substantiate this claim, in which a child picked up a 
leaf and held it to her ear, talking as if it were a telephone.
This is indeed a humorous gesture but what neither Morreall (1989) nor 
McGhee (1979) question is exactly why this involves incongruity. One has to think 
about the artefacts (both imagined and ‘real’) involved in this example. The child’s 
action is incongruous precisely because we expect certain artefacts to have particular 
attributes and to serve particular functions. We ‘know’ that the telephone is an 
instrument of communication and should be placed next to one’s ear if  one is to use it 
‘properly’ and we ‘know’ that a leaf is not such a communication device. It is our 
culturally constituted knowledge about the ‘inherent’ properties of artefacts that can 
become the source of incongruity when we are asked to imagine future-possible 
devices. We can demonstrate the central role that ‘knowledge’ about the ‘intrinsic’ 
characteristics of mobiles as physical artefacts, and as devices that can do (and not do) 
certain things in the social world, plays in the generation of humour about future- 
possible, imagined devices within the focus group interactions. If, as McGhee (1979) 
argues, humour centres around the exploration of incongruity involved in treating the
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real as the imagined, what occurs when the imagined (the future in relation to mobile 
technologies) is treated as ‘the real’? Fantastical communication devices (the 
imagined) are placed in everyday, contemporary scenarios (the ‘real’) by the 
teenagers who use humour to deal with culturally-constituted incongruities.
These theories are examined here as they mark a useful starting point for 
thinking about the humour (in terms of jokes and laughter) that occurred within the 
teenage focus groups. Work on humour as disparagement seems to connect with 
generational discourses (in terms of age appropriateness) in relation to use of, and 
ease with, technology that is dealt with in more detail below. Incongruity theories, 
whilst somewhat rigid in the framework they build, seem best suited, with 
modification, to explaining the humour produced by discussions about future-possible 
mobile devices and what their existence might mean for (future) everyday life. 
However one difficulty with the above (predominately psychological) approaches to 
humour is that the scientific measurement of instances of humour and the search for a 
comprehensive theory of humour (La Fave, Haddad and Maesen 1976) remain at the 
fore. Here one can draw upon the work of Mulkay (1988) and this research’s 
empirical material to offer a more sociologically informed, (con)textual analysis of 
humour.
Producing the Future-Possible and the Future-Impossible
In 1988, Michael Mulkay, in his book ‘On Humour: Its Nature and Its Place in 
Modem Society’ noted that little work has been undertaken on humour within 
sociology. More recently, articles in The International Journal o f Humour Research 
(IJHR), an interdisciplinary periodical, demonstrate that this situation is changing^^ 
Mulkay, through Sack’s (1978) empirical study of humour and Pollner’s (1974, 
1974a) work on ‘mundane reasoning’, argues that the humorous mode of discourse 
can only be understood via its juxtaposition with ‘serious discourse’. Pollner (1974, 
1974a) claims that most of us, most of the time, inhabit a social world that we 
presuppose we have in common with those around us. When we reason about the 
world we take it for granted that we are dealing with objective phenomenon that other 
people understand in the same, or at the very least a similar, way to ourselves. This 
does not preclude the existence of divergent accounts of this ‘objective, shared 
reality’, but Mulkay (1988) states that when such discrepancies come to our attention.
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we usually treat them as unwelcome and deal with them by assuming that some 
mistake has been made,
Participants are very seldom willing to give equal credence to 
contradictory accounts. Rather they choose those accounts which they 
take to be the most reliable and to represent most accurately the real state 
of affairs (1988:23).
Thus because serious speech (as opposed to a humorous mode of speech) assumes the 
existence of a single, organised, independent world, serious speakers are compelled to 
avoid speaking in two contradictory ways at once (James 1950:290). Consequently, 
when disagreements about the ‘reality’ of events of that world become noticeable, 
further interpretative work is usually undertaken to explain how it has occurred, even 
if that interpretative work merely involves conceding that one should ‘agree to 
disagree’. When ‘reality disjunctures’ (Pollner 1974) occur, one usually assumes that 
these discrepant versions of the world cannot originate ‘in the world itself, but must 
be due to some human failure to observe and report on that world accurately. Paradox, 
ambiguity and inconsistency do occur within serious discourse but are usually 
employed as grounds for questioning or rejecting the assertions to which they are 
attributed.
How does the notion of ‘reality disjunctures’ relate to talk of ‘the future’? In a 
sense as the teenagers talk about the future they are producing accounts of what they 
think ‘the future’ could ‘really’ be like. They are doing this by dealing, through 
debates about what is deemed future-possible and fiiture impossible, with paradox, 
ambiguity and inconsistency. A ‘dis-juncture’ implies a point where ‘reality’ is 
challenged and alternative interpretations become possible. The teenagers have a 
number of cultural representations (popular science fiction and industry predictions 
for example) with which they can work, refuting such claims to the ‘real’ future as it 
is constituted by ‘others’. Further these ‘future-reality’ disjunctures and the debate 
they provoke relates to the perceived riskiness of the task of speculating about the 
future. The teenagers seem to be keenly aware that their ideas about ‘the future’ could 
be deemed to be wrong. After all, as they humorously point out, other people have 
frequently made mistakes in the past about what the future (i.e. their present) would 
be like. The teenagers are also reflexive about what they voiced as being stereotypical
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indicators of the future. Here the teenagers talk about Image 2, a prototype ‘picture 
phone’ by Nokia (see Appendix 2),
Chris: And to be perfectly honest I don’t think that’ll go with anybody’s outfit unless
we all start wearing silver.
(laughter)
Hannah: That’s a good point.
Samantha: It’s meant to be futuristic.
Chris: I dunno.
Allen: Coz you want to look like a spaceman.
Samantha: It was the Millennium colour wasn’t it?
Hannah: Everyone is going to turn into one big piece of bacofoil^o. I mean my
phone is silver...I wanted blue but they sold out.
Chris: No I like the silver. It’s good. It’s futuristic, it’s chrome, it’s metal. It’s nice.
(Focus group 3:21).
Commenting on the future’s ‘capricious nature’ (Margolis 2000:14), Margolis 
ironically states, ‘More disappointedly in this January 2000 suburban panorama, there 
were no flying cars, no spangly Lurex space suits, no orgasmatrons, nobody wearing 
strange metallic hats which doubled as space aerials...’ (Margolis 2000:14). The 
teenagers’ awareness of how future speculation can easily be debunked links in with 
the wider cultural trope of futurologists (and others involved in predicting the future) 
getting it wrong. Brown and Michael (2003) note that we all have memories of the 
future. They maintain that these recollections of how the future was once represented 
are part of our ‘interpretative registers’ which we deploy to build expectations and 
comprehend change (2003:3). These teenagers remember past representations of the 
future and are aware of the riskiness of predicting the future.
In Margolis (2000) Noam Chomsky is quoted as saying, ‘Perhaps the most 
plausible prediction is that any prediction about serious matters is likely to be off the 
mark except by accident’ (Margolis 2000:14. Emphasis added). It is suggested that by 
making ‘serious matters ’ humorous the teenagers were able to produce predictions 
about the future without ridicule, whilst displaying to their peers their ‘senses of 
humour’ and hence gaining peer admiration. They may also have been dealing with a
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culturally embedded incongruous situation in that they were being asked to imagine 
the future of what to them is a very mundane, everyday technology^ \
The concept of predictions simply not (be)coming true is inextricably attached 
to Western perceptions of time as linear. Adam (1995) argues that ‘Our’ time 
continues to constitute and be constituted by models of ‘Other’ time. Studies of 
‘other’ time, be they historical, anthropological or sociological, dichotomise societies 
into the modem and the traditional. Understandings of temporality are fundamental to 
the constmction of the ‘Other’. Making explicit these binaries in order to interrogate 
them, Adam (1995) sets out the most common antinomies,
‘Our’ times ‘Other’times
historical traditional
linear cyclical
irreversible reversible
changing stable
quantitative qualitative
clock-based task/event based
calendar-based nature-based
decontextualised embedded
abstract measure ecological measure
‘hot’ society ‘cold’ society
organic solidarity mechanical solidarity
diachronic study synchronic solidarity
(Adam 1995:29-30).
‘Common-sense’ understandings of time as a linear flow from past-to-present-to- 
fliture inform notions of futurology as a risky business. Time as a harbinger of change 
and progress, and even the notion that ‘the present’ and ‘the future’ can ‘break’ from 
‘the past’, constitute our understandings of what it is to predict the future as a possibly 
unknowable realm. This also links in with notions of one’s assumptions about the 
world held from a ‘present’ viewpoint being the source of a potential comedy of 
errors in predictions. Margolis states for example.
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Visions of the distant future tend to be shaped and coloured by 
experiences and prejudices o f the present', they go out o f  date and look 
and sound old-fashioned long before the time they were trying to predict 
comes around (Margolis 2000:13. Emphasis added).
The teenagers who laughed at the ‘old’ predictions of aluminium foil futures were 
able to criticise these as mistaken precisely because they are able to work with 
culturally normative concepts of time ‘coming around’ or ‘passing’ since the 
speculations were made. Adam (1995) maintains that Western understandings of time 
emerge with a number of clustered characteristics:
An abstract, spatial quantity that is divisible into single units; as a two- 
dimensional, linear, directional flow or succession of equal rate that 
extends from the past to the future (or vice versa); and as something that 
passes or can be saved, sold or wasted (Adam 1995:33).
In previous chapters the models of time and notions of past, present and future that 
infuse future-talk about mobiles, and with which those involved in the mobile 
technology industries (including commentators) work, were examined. These models 
are adapted specifically to talk about possible mobile futures but the backcloth of such 
talk remains a linear model of ‘our’ time. The teenagers in the focus groups employed 
‘our time’ to understand and produce their ‘future-possible’, and to flag up their 
awareness that prediction is (due to the passing of time) a risky, but fim, business.
‘Reality disjunctures’ are managed in speculative talk about the future much 
as they are in talk about the ‘known present’. It is vital that paradox, ambiguity and 
inconsistency are managed within future-talk precisely because of notions of ‘linear 
time’. ‘Reality disjunctures’ are deemed problematic in future-talk but they have a 
slightly different quality to those Pollner (1974) discussed. They are potential reality 
disjunctures which may arise given ‘our’ notions of time as passing in a linear 
manner. When ‘the future’ does arrive what was said about it may be viewed as 
farcical, in that what was speculated did not happen. The ‘reality disjunctures’ 
involved in future-talk are predicated on perceived ‘gaps’ between past, present and 
future knowledge. What was said and done in the past can be wrong, so it is likely 
that what is said and done in the present is likely to be recast as wrong in the future.
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and that includes predictions about that future. The passing of time is thus deemed 
‘automatically’ to challenge present ‘versions of reality’ of the future. This may seem 
counter-intuitive but if time is seen as passing, then ‘the future’ can be as ‘real’ a 
‘place’ as the present. Some things will ‘really’ happen in the fiiture and others will 
not, just as some things are deemed to be ‘really’ happening in the present.
Paradox, ambiguity and inconsistency have to be managed in future-talk due 
to ‘Our’ (as opposed to the ‘Other’) notion of time as linear. If ‘the future’ is deemed 
to flow from the present then there is the possibility that predictions will be proved 
wrong by the very passing of time as the future that one predicts ‘arrives’. Managing 
the task of imagining the future, as the teenagers in my focus groups did, involves 
tackling potential ‘reality disjunctures’ (Pollner 1974), that is the points of 
disagreement that make up contradictory accounts of the future (within the focus 
group interaction). As I have argued, by making the ‘serious’ task of predicting the 
future ‘humorous’, the teenagers are able to tackle the trope of linear time that could 
render their predictions nonsensical and open to ridicule. ‘The future’ could prove 
them wrong, a ‘fact’ of which they are acutely aware.
Humour as a Rhetorical Move, or Knowing When to Laugh
Mulkay (1988) argues that the basic principles and practices of what he terms the 
humorous mode of discourse are the reverse of those that operate within serious 
discourse. In the latter ambiguity, inconsistency, paradox and interpretative diversity 
are managed as problems to be overcome so that the unitary ‘reality’ that people share 
is maintained. In contrast humorous discourse depends on these features and on ‘the 
discursive display of opposing interpretative possibilities’ (Mulkay 1988:26). Within 
the focus group interactions, participants worked with different interpretative 
possibilities to constitute a future-world through humorous discourse. They 
challenged their everyday assumptions about the one (present) known-in-common 
world by controlled non-sense. Their jokes and witty asides about future-possible 
devices such as holographic communication, implants and the like were not complete 
nonsense but rather were understandable in terms of the special requirements and 
expectations of the humorous realm. Koestler (1966) argues for example that the 
production of humour must involve ‘the perceiving of a situation or idea in two self- 
consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference’ (1966:35). It is argued that
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the teenagers’ present ‘reality’ (a world were telecommunication implants and 
telepathy ‘really’ do not exist for example) was perceived through a future-possible 
frame of reference via the asking of ‘What if?’. The frames of reference they 
employed namely the ‘reality’ of the present world and the ‘unreality’ of a future- 
imaginable world, remained self-consistent but habitually incompatible precisely 
because of the temporal distance perceived between the (present) real and the (future) 
possible. The humour displayed repetitively within the focus group interactions was 
possible since two or more incongruous ways of viewing a situation could be 
juxtaposed (Paulos 1980:9), as the following excerpt demonstrates:
Michelle: They’ve got new phones that can play actual songs rather than tunes 
like ‘Beep’.
Shannaz: Sony ones ain’t they?
Hannah: I wouldn’t...I’d think that my Walkman had gone off in my bag and I’d be 
singing along to it.
(laughter)
(Focus group 6:3)
Here Hannah forms a joke by juxtaposing the incongruity of having a mobile which 
plays songs (rather than ‘beeps’) for a ring tone and the possibility that she would 
mistake this for her Walkman. Here she answers the ‘What if?’ question by 
highlighting the paradox of having a phone that (for her and most of the group) did 
not behave as she would expect it to (i.e. like a phone). Focus group eight discuss 
what will happen to language in the future,
James: I expect there’ll be less languages. They’ll be like a universal language 
because communication opens up so much...there’ll be less words as well.
Phil: Esperanto doesn’t really work.
(laughter)
Clare: It’s all gonna be shortened as well and more slang.
L: Like 2 instead of too?
Clare: Yeah.
Phil: I still think Esperanto...
(laughter)
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James: English I guess. Like universal.
Ian: Coz it’s made up of every other language I suppose.
James: Yeah like when we took over the world 
(laughter)
Phil: Yeah we should do that again. Or Italy should.
(laughter)
Phil: Future of the world...expresse.
(laughter)
Phil: Or America.
Clare: That would be good.
Phil: What if America took over the world?
Clare: Yeah.
Steph: Why?
Ian: No it wouldn’t.
James: Go on...we’d have loads of George Bushes running about.
(laughter)
Phil: Overweight and over...
(laughter) (Focus group 8:14-15).
Here we see how a mundane serious discourse, essentially in sociological terms about 
globalisation, is transformed into an occasion for humour since serious discourse does 
not offer enough opportunities for the participants to explore the possible multiple 
interpretations of changes in communication in the fiiture. Humour is generated 
through the suggestion that we should return to a colonialist era by the perceived non­
sense for the participants of this suggestion, that is we would not want to anyway, 
and/or even if  we wanted to as a nation we could not as colonialism belongs firmly in 
the past. The joke about colonialism ‘works’ in the context of the exchange about 
English being/becoming the universal language in the future. Further punch-lines in 
this exchange (about George Bushes populating the world) ‘work’ following a 
previous exchange within the group about cloning, and given the sense (as opposed to 
non-sense) that America as a future-possible global ruler makes in light of the shared 
‘reality’ of this group (and of course other people) of America as a superpower 
(particularly following the events of September the 11^ )^^ .^ As Mulkay notes, ‘The 
overall structure of the joke must be understandable because, otherwise, the joke
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would be fragmented into two separate segments of discourse. It would cease to be a 
joke’ (1988:29). Phil’s comment about Esperanto being a possible universal language 
in the future works since everyone ‘knows’ that Esperanto was, is and will almost 
undoubtedly remain, an unused and useless way of communicating. Mulkay 
continues, ‘An effective punch-line introduces a new perspective which deviates from 
the rest of the text, yet which retains some kind of interpretative coherence’ 
(1988:29). This is exactly why Phil’s comment ‘works’ as humour. His comment is 
not only funny, but also, importantly, understandable in the context of cultural 
‘knowledge’ about Esperanto, languages and communication in general.
We may ask what makes something obviously humorous during a particular 
interaction? That is, what are the semantic clues to the presence of humour? How do 
we ‘know’ when to laugh? One may have found something that the participants said 
funny when they were trying to be deadly serious. Hay (2000) in her comparative 
study of male and female humour maintains that the researcher must look to clues 
provided by the group. She maintains that one has to rely on context and audience 
reactions to determine the speaker’s ‘intentions’. Tannen (1993) points out that the 
true intention of any (humorous) utterance cannot be established from the 
examination of the linguistic form alone. One does not necessarily need the notion of 
‘intentions’ which implies some type of rational and volitional calculation going on 
‘inside the participants head’ so to speak. Since the ‘audience’ was essentially myself 
and other focus group participants, when we laughed, it could be seen as an indication 
that we shared a similar sense of what is frmny with the speaker, and what may or 
may not have been ‘intended’ becomes a moot point. Work on the interactional nature 
of humour in predominately informal settings illuminates this conundrum. Jefferson 
(1979) applied conversation analytic techniques to laughter within conversations 
arguing that recipients of humorous discourse can be provided with recognition points 
by the speaker that serve as invitations to laugh, one of which is giving a short laugh 
themselves. This ‘invitation’ may be accepted or declined but Jefferson’s research 
demonstrates that people laughing is not somehow intrinsic to the utterance, but may 
be at least partially dependent on the context and minutiae of interaction.
It could also be that the interaction itself, that is participation in a focus group, 
was itself a ‘humorous situation’. Firstly, it was the first time we had met. I suggest 
that I occupied a role that was not quite student, not quite teacher. As an ‘outsider’ I 
was asking them to discuss issues which were not explicitly part of their subject
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curriculum and this may have represented a intellectual ‘holiday’ for them, a time 
where they could chat and joke with members of their peer group^^. Participation in a 
focus group, something which, according to my gatekeeper, they had not done before 
in college, was in itself (aside from the topic) a potentially humorous situation,
L: OK, so we’ve got implants and things like that. Cool. OK. You’re all 16-17? 
Imagine in 2010, you will be my age...
(laughter)
Samina: You look younger 
(laughter)
L: Cheers. So in nine years time you’ll be my age. What do you think 
communicating with a friend will be like then? What might you be able to do with 
them?
Claire: I’m thinking.
L: Thinking is good.
Dan: You can’t hear it on the tape though.
(laughter) (Focus group 2:3).
The teenagers in focus group two used being recorded in a focus group by an 
‘outsider’ to structure their witty comments. Off-tape several witty comments were 
made about the video camera used to record the interaction pertaining to surveillance 
cameras being introduced to the school and it being like Big Brother Mark II.
Secondly it is suggested that the topic we were discussing provided a 
framework for the humorous possibilities that were indeed taken up by the teenagers. 
Predicting the future is, in the wider cultural context, viewed as a somewhat 
ridiculous exercise. Predicting the future is noted by many as a ‘risky’ exercise^"*. This 
came through in the manner in which the teenagers in these focus groups ridiculed old 
predictions of the future,
Charlotte: It would be fun to predict the future.
L: Like a futurologist?
Kevin: A futurologist? That would be cool.
Charlotte: But then when you watch the old films and it’s like set in the future and 
you’ve got things like going through tubes and things like that...
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(laughter)
Charlotte: ...that’s what they predicted. We’re not iike that. We don’t go through 
tubes.
Kevin: It’s all speculation anyway. You can’t prove it ‘til it happens. But they have 
to base it on something. Like films we’ve seen.
Matt: TV...like science fiction and stuff...Star Trek, Star Wars. Imagine if all the 
stuff they do (on television?) actually becomes reality. (Focus group 1:9)
The group, through their pragmatism, invoke a realist ontology about ‘the future’. 
Nothing is real until it has been proved and shown as such, ‘You can’t prove it ‘til it 
happens’. This invocation of realism is related to the perceived risk involved in 
making predictions about the future, ‘It’s all speculation anyway’, and if  it is ‘all 
speculation’ then one can easily make mistakes since ‘speculation’, following this 
excerpt, is only loosely based on ‘facts’ and the ‘truth’. For something to ‘actually 
become reality’ one presumes it would have to be manifest in a physical form in terms 
of a visible object or in terms of a service provided that had ‘visible’ and possibly 
physical effects such as a ‘matter transporter’ of the sort presented in Star Trek^K 
Unfulfilled promises of future technologies are the source of humour in this excerpt 
from focus group eight,
L: Ok, that’s in terms of 10 years time. What about in fifty years time? You’ll be 
sixty to seventy in fifty years time.
Phil: I won’t make it to fifty years time.
Simon: I dunno though coz you can’t really tell. Like when you look back at 
programmes in the 1960s and in the year 2000 we’re all in space and stuff and it’s 
like...
Phil: We’ll all have silver suits and stuff.
(laughter)
Simon: It’s really silly 
(laughter)
Phil: Yeah that’s a good point? Whatever happens in the future it all has to be 
made of bacofoil.
(laughter)
(Focus group 8:8)
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The humour here springs from the incongruity of past prediction with the present state 
of affairs as the participants view them. In a sense it ridicules even the possibility of 
ever predicting thé future ‘correctly’, disparaging those who got it so wrong. The 
perceived fluidity of ‘the future’ as, to a certain degree, the realm of the unknown and 
perhaps unknowable, produces concrete future prediction (especially for 50 years 
time) as a particularly hazardous undertaking. The participants in this study seem to 
be working through this hazard and attempting to overcome it through the use of 
humour.
It is possible that the framing of certain future-prediction activities (the more 
fantastical work rather than sombre forecasting activities) as ‘blue skies research’ 
serves as a cultural enabling device. It enables actants to explore long-term future 
possibilities without the constraints of ‘rationality’^^  that circumscribe such activities 
in the present and fo r  the near-future^^. The labelling of certain research activities as 
‘blue skies’ could be performing a similar function to the numerous examples of 
humour within the focus groups transcripts. Labelling certain predictions as ‘blue 
skies’ amounts to a formal mechanism that acts to tackle a similar difficulty faced by 
participants in the focus groups: how to make predictions without sounding silly. The 
‘blue sky’ tactic overcomes the dangers of making far-future predictions by actually 
drawing attention to (or signalling to the reader) its fantastical qualities. The use o f  
humour could be seen as a rhetorical manoeuvre which allows participants to voice 
their imaginative ideas about the future without losing face within their peer-group. 
By using incongruity, paradox and ambiguity to their advantage through humour, the 
teenagers managed the ‘risky’ task of imagining the future,
James: I suppose in 50 years you’ll be able to get like a hologram projection or
something.
Phil: You put your phone down and you get 'em full-3D. That would be pretty cool.
Ian: That’s quite a good idea actually.
Phil: You could actually talk to 'em like they’re there having a conversation with
you. Just like projected. I dunno how it works though.
Ian: Projected onto a board.
Steph: Or a screen.
Ian: Like projected onto a board, a white-board.
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Steph: Yeah but you’d have to always be in front of a board though.
Ian: Yeah.
Steph: It would be like having a personal conversation wouldn’t it?
Ian: You can’t literally shake their hand could you? I mean they could invent it so 
you did get the sensation like someone was there.
James: It would make a funny face if you were drunk or something 
(laughter)
Helen: That would be really scary. But then I’ve got family in America and that 
would be really nice to see them...
James: Someone called you accidently and you were about to commit murder or 
something.
L: Or you forgot and you quickly answered your phone out the shower.
(laughter)
James: Yeah. I could think of worse things you’d be doing.
(laughter)
James: Yeah and your mum phones.
(laughter)
L: We’re on an American Pie script now.
Ian: Good point
Steph: I dunno. You always “see that kind of thing on TV but you don’t know if it 
actually works.
(Focus group 8:9-10).
The participants managed the task of imagining the future through the deployment of 
humour. This took the form of participants pointing out the difference between the use 
of an imagined technology i.e. a phone with a holographic display, and the barriers to 
using it in this way (people seeing you naked). By pointing out the incongruity 
between the imagined and the ‘real’ (with its implications of social embarrassment for 
example) participants were able to express fantastical visions about future devices, but 
were then able to pull apart these fantasies and tackle the apparent paradoxes within 
them through the use of humour. The teenagers are trying to understand and work 
through a problem, namely the task given them to imagine a ‘mobile-future’. In 
working through how a device would ‘actually’ work, they embed it in what they do 
know (everyday life) and see what it does there. Hence humour works almost as a
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way of preserving a degree of ‘rationality’ and the ‘commonsensical’ whilst 
‘allowing’ the participants to put across fantastical visions.
Practices of Resistance to Location-Based Services Through Humour
In terms of topics within our discussions about mobile technologies, the idea of what 
is known as ‘location-aware’ or ‘location-based services’ (LBS) evoked a number of 
witty exchanges. Location-based services involve the use of cell identity^^, enhanced 
observed time difference (E-OTD)^^ and assisted GPS (A-GPS)^° to pinpoint a mobile 
user’s position at a given time. Such information forms the basis for the provision of 
various services to users whereby location relevant information can be supplied to 
them at a price. Possible location-based services include up-to-date travel information, 
for example airport arrivals and departures, supplying local weather and news, the 
ability to pinpoint the location of friends, family and/or work colleagues, and currency 
conversion using real-time exchange rates, all to be delivered via WAP and GPRS. 
Advertising via LBS is viewed as one of the most exciting and challenging 
opportunities, since a targeted advertisement delivered to a targeted user at the ‘right’ 
time and place is likely to command a high price. An example of this would be a 
cinema which, ten minutes before the start of a film, faces the prospect of having half 
the seats empty. To be able to target potential customers in the immediate vicinity, 
perhaps offering them a discount, and excluding those outside ten minutes of 
travelling time to the cinema, could be a very profitable exercise.
By 2000, it was being claimed that the implementation of mass-market location- 
based services was imminent^\ and questions about the implications of such services 
were being raised within the popular media, with questions such as ‘If I call in sick, 
should my boss be able to call up a web page to see where I am?’, and ‘How am I 
going to delegate authority for the school to track my children’s whereabouts at 
certain times during the day but not others?’^ .^ Such issues, essentially about the 
possibilities of surveillance (by the mobile companies, by state agencies and by 
significant others), were also raised by the participants in the focus groups.
The participants’ responses to LBS involved a combination of expressions of 
potential annoyance at what is perceived as a possible intrusion into their right to 
privacy and humorous remarks about future-possible scenarios if such services were 
developed. Concerns about surveillance in terms of companies being able to pinpoint
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a person’s location via their mobile device were interspersed with witty asides which 
serve, within this interaction, as a resource to register their disbelief that this would 
actually be under consideration by those within the mobile industry. Dan’s insistence 
below that one would have to ‘bring in the law’ for such an idea to work underpins a 
‘Why bother?’ and a ‘If it’s not broken don’t fix it’ approach to future-possible 
mobile devices and services which is evinced throughout the transcripts. In a sense 
such protestations by the teenagers demonstrate a concern to preserve the status quo, 
for phones to remain as phones, which seems to reside alongside their interest in 
technological change, innovation and convergence in particular.
Karen: Like the mobile phone companies are working on stuff so they can pinpoint 
where you are, as a phone linked to a person...if you walk past a shop, like in 
Lakeside^^ or something...
George: So they could ring you and say like...tell you to come inside or whatever.
L: Location based marketing.
George: Yeah, but whafs the point coz you'd just ignore them anyway wouldn’t 
you?
Gemma: I think it would be funny.
George: Er, No!
Dan: You could just block all their numbers.
Gemma; I think it’s a good idea. They might say we’ve got a special deal today.
Dan: Yeah but then they’d bring in the law...you’d have to have permission to ring 
people...
Gemma: Nah, they’d just say Turn to the left’ sort of thing...it would be quite 
good. If you don’t wanna know you just say no thanks don’t you?
Dan: Yeah but like you don’t want to get called every time you walk past a shop... 
Gemma: It would be funny...
Dan: Like in town you get called twenty times. Yeah like every time you’d be like... 
Gemma: Yeah but it’s like street sellers innit?
Dan: Yeah but you might get one of those.
George: You’d be popular though wouldn’t you?
(laughter)
George: Like every time you’re down the high street you’d be like...Mmmm 
(pretending to look at mobile phone)...you’d get rung.
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L: Yeah you’d walk past McDonalds and you’d be like ‘I don’t want chips, go 
away’.
Dan: They’d say ‘I saw you looking in. Interested?’
(laughter)
George: Yeah like ‘We’ll give you a pound if you come inside’.
(laughter)
Gemma: ‘Need the toilet? Why not come inside’.
(laughter)
Dan: Or if you’re in your car and you drive past a big sign saying ‘You’ve just 
missed your turning!’
(laughter) (Focus group 2:9. Emphasis added).
The humour here is generated by the teenager’s ‘playing with’ the future-possible 
incongruity of receiving attention from companies and the possible resistance ploys 
they could make to undermine such attention. The participants imagined a future 
scenario where knowledge about their movements and possible needs and desires (i.e. 
needing a toilet or some food) were shifted from being a private matter to being a 
public matter. It may be that the humour here was invoked as a way of dealing with 
the possibility that control over what are commonly considered private matters, 
decisions and rather embarrassing mistakes (missing one’s turning on a motorway), 
would be wrested from the ‘individual’ and become part of public discourse.
Dan’s joke, ‘Or if you’re in your car and you drive past a big sign saying 
‘You’ve just missed your turning!’ is also very relevant to a problem with location 
based services that arises out of a lack of consideration of cultural and social context. 
Spatial co-ordinates are judged to be a sufficient guide to users’ information ‘needs’, 
be it the location of a restaurant, or warnings about traffic jams. What information 
about location does not establish is the vagaries of the socio-cultural context of the 
user. A user may be sent information on the basis of their location about which 
junction turning they should take but if the driver is going too fast and fails to move 
across the traffic in time then that information becomes useless. You may receive 
messages based on your current location next to a McDdonalds but if  you are not 
hungry, do not like fast food or are a vegetarian, then this information is at worst 
annoying and at best funny. Dan, in his joke, plays on the incongruity of having 
services predicated on location-based information with no ‘knowledge’ about the
227
related socio-cultural context. In a sense the teenagers are doing lay social science 
through a humorous lens.
Further, humour is being used here to manage and to voice possible practices 
of resistance against banal consumption; the efforts of corporations to entice 
customers into their premises are ultimately couched in humorous terms as they are 
produced here as somewhat desperate and ultimately funny since as an ‘individual’ 
and supposedly rational consumer, one could always ignore their advances. Gemma’s 
insistence that ‘It would be funny’ points to the ways in which amusement is being 
used here as a resource to deal with a possibly novel situation, where a negative 
emotion such as fear, or perhaps puzzlement, is not deemed appropriate or even 
necessary since benefits may be procured by the person on the receiving end of such 
attention, i.e. ‘They might say we’ve got a special deal today’. Indeed the possibility 
of humour within the situation forms the basis of Gemma’s argument against Dan’s 
concerns. Gemma voices her perception that if ‘It would be funny’, it would be worth 
having just for the possibility of procuring a laugh from it. In contrast Dan points out 
that the element of surprise, ‘Yeah but you might get one of those’ (i.e. a street seller) 
is fundamental to a lack of annoyance about a perceived intrusion from location based 
marketing and advertising. If you know that you would receive a message ‘like every 
time’ then, for Dan, the possibility of a humorous situation is undermined. It takes 
George’s witty comment, ‘You’d be popular though wouldn’t you?’ and the group’s 
laughter it extracts, to overcome Dan and Gemma’s impasse in ways that the group 
can understand, namely an acknowledgement that receiving multiple phone calls is, 
within the cultural context, deemed as a marker of positive social repute (Ling and 
Yttri 2002:161-162). In a sense George’s inteijection, which Dan almost immediately 
yields to, is an example of how humour is again being used by participants to manage 
the group interaction and to move on the discussion away from potentially tense 
exchanges. The above excerpt could simultaneously be viewed as a way of working 
through the worrying consequences of constant surveillance via the mobile device, 
and constructing, as a group, a set of possible avoidance tactics.
Ultimate Convergence and the ‘Cute’ Carphone Warehouse Mobile
In several of the focus groups a television advert by the high street retailer Carphone 
Warehouse was mentioned as a humorous future-possible device. The teenagers
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talked playfully about the mobile featured in the advert, which basically 
anthropomorphises a mobile phone, providing it with legs, arms and feelings^" .^ For 
example in one television commercial the mobile phone or ‘Mobili’ is pictured 
wandering about a rain-slicked city street clearly abject about its owner’s lack of 
interest in it (apparently due to it being an ‘old’ model). The advert forms the basis of 
several verbal exchanges in the focus groups about what I shall call ‘ultimate 
convergence’. This takes the form of surreal discussions about phones which could 
perform multiple tasks and would have multiple functions. The notion of one-device- 
for-everything is pushed to an absurd logical conclusion by the teenagers again via 
witty asides and humorous remarks about the future-possible. Following a debate 
about having the ‘real’ Internet on a phone, with WAP cast in terms of its limitations 
rather than its affordances, talk turns to what services a future mobile device could 
offer,
L: What about in terms of what you want your phone to do in the future?
Chris: Your shopping.
Samantha: Automatic texting.
Allen: The housework.
(laughter)
Samantha: Automatic texting.
Hannah: Like you could just talk into it so you don't have to talk to the other 
person.
Chris: Your phone as a vacuum cleaner.
(laughter)
Hannah: I know it defeats the object of having the phone to talk to people but it’s 
quicker and cheaper to text.
Allen: I want a phone like in the new Carphone Warehouse advert...it’s got little 
legs and he walks around.
(laughter)
Samantha: Ah...he’s so cute.
Chris: But he’s huge.
(laughter)
Allen: No. You know the little one which you know walks around the table and falls 
off the end.
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Hannah: No, not the huge one that stands next to her.
Chris: You’d have to shout to talk...you know hugging it. Nah, forget that. (Focus 
group 3:5).
Here Allen draws on historical discourses of labour saving devices to produce a 
future-possible mobile. The laughter his remark provokes could be interpreted 
through the aforementioned incongruity theory, namely that to have a mobile (which 
is assumed to be a personal communication device rather than a domestic labour- 
saving device) doing one’s housework, would be an incongruous situation. Moreover, 
as a young male, Allen may be drawing on his gender position, as someone who is not 
meant to be worried about such things, to strengthen the wittiness of his remark. Why, 
for example, did he not suggest ‘Washing the car’ or ‘Mowing the lawn’, activities 
still thought of in the wider cultural context, as men’s tasks? Indeed as Samantha and 
Hannah attempt to make more ‘serious’ suggestions, Allen’s joke and Chris’s 
interjections serve to divert attention from the girls and establish the boys as the 
current managers of the interaction. Further on in the interaction following a debate 
about noticeable changes in technology, Allen returns to the Carphone Warehouse 
‘Mobili’ (See Appendix 3),
L: So you notice changes in technology? Like the little icons 
Samantha: Yeah I mean it looks nice but what’s the point?
Allen: Same thing innit? At the end of the day it does the same job.
Samantha: Yeah but if things are more attractive you’re gonna want them more.
Allen: Like that little dancing phone. Carphone Warehouse. I realiy want that.
(laughter)
Chris: I really want a dancing mouse...
(laughter)
Chris: ...rather than a dancing phone.
Hannah: Give me your phone and I’il make it dance.
(laughter)
Allen: It ain’t gonna dance though.
Hannah: Well I’ll poke it.
(laughter)
Chris: You could get it to run, go speak to your mate and come back again.
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Allen: Genius. It would be so easy to cheat in exams. Put it on the floor...go off...
(laughter)
Chris: Your mouse?
Allen: Nah. Your phone.
Chris: No a mouse.
(laughter)
Allen: Oh you're talking about mouse, nice now. I’ll go home.
Chris: Like that Aeros^s thing.
Hannah: I want a mouse.
Samantha: I’li buy you a mouse for Christmas (turns to Chris).
Chris: Thank-you. It’s gotta be able to dance though. It’s not very relevant though
is it?
(Focus group 3:16).
Again Allen uses the Carphone Warehouse character ‘Mobili’ to summon laughter 
from the group by playing the role of the fool who will consume even the most 
(culturally speaking) ridiculous items (i.e. a dancing phone). Here nonsense serves to 
degrade reason (Wynne 1996:6) as it is defined by the group and within the cultural 
context from which they speak. Bergson (1911) for instance contended that the comic 
character (a role which within focus group three Allen played throughout) can be 
defined as someone with a fixed idea or obsession. Here Allen, backed by Chris, 
returns again and again to the Carphone Warehouse mobile character for comic effect, 
an effect which is strengthened by the context of the previous more ‘serious’ 
discussion about technological change and the future. Finally it is up to Chris to get 
the group back ‘on topic’.
Even within these surreal exchanges about having phones with legs, the 
advantages and disadvantages of future-possible fantastical scenarios are being 
worked through by the group. By adding every-day life-world context to futuristic and 
technologically deterministic predictions, the teenagers achieve a form of ‘lay’ social 
science that is ‘critical’ in the sense that it highlights (‘present’ and ‘future-possible’) 
contradiction. The participants demonstrated a concern with the practicalities of future 
devices and their possible uses. If ‘versions of the future’ could be said to have been 
produced within these exchanges, they amount to the (often humour driven) practice 
of reining in the fantastical (telepathy, implants, matter transporters) through talk of
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practical considerations, even if the fantastical idea was deemed to be ‘cool’. It is to 
this practice that I turn to in the next chapter.
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Chapter Eight: Fantastical Pragmatism and Embedding the 
Future in the Present
Processes of Fantastical Pragmatism
The previous chapter began by maintaining that the teenagers produced particular 
‘versions of the future’ that were ‘commonsensical’ to them. Following an analysis of 
the data it is suggested that to talk of ‘versions of the future’ is perhaps slightly 
misleading in the context of focus group interactions. The idea of a ‘version’ of the
future relates closely to notions of ‘story-telling’ and linear narratives. Of course a
story can be told by and within a group, but it is proposed that ‘version’ is less helpful 
here due to the nature of focus group interactions than it is when dealing with 
corporate and governmental visions of the fixture. If ‘version’ is to be retained it needs 
to be recast here as the product of an explicitly interactional exercise. In a sense the 
teenagers are ‘building up’ versions through interaction, albeit multiple and 
fragmentary ones. It is suggested that one of the main ways in which the participants 
built ‘versions of the fixture’ is through discussions about the advantages and 
disadvantages of the fixture-possible devices they were contemplating together. In this 
instance ‘versions of the fixture’ are explicitly collaboratively produced. Consider the 
following,
L: Imagine what mobiles might be like in 10 years time.
Dan: You’d have a really thin stick to press the buttons. (Disadvantage?)
Gemma: Do anything, like all-in-one Internet thing. (Convergence)
Ciaire: MP3 players and stuff. (Convergence)
Dan: Then you’d only have one thing to carry around with you. (Convergence 
and advantage)
Karen: Yeah. Compact. (Advantage)
George: If you lose it.. .you should tie it to yourself. (Disadvantage)
Claire: Television.. .(Convergence)
Dan: Screen size. You wouldn’t be able to see it. (Disadvantage)
Samina: You could like project it onto a wall or something. Have little projectors or 
something. (Possible solution)
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George: You could have like a TV on your mobile...and you've got a screen. 
(Convergence)
Dan: And you’d have like glasses or something...and you could plug it...like 
charge it from the TV and then when you go out...and you’ve got a radio as well. 
(Convergence)
George: You could have like a holographic screen. (Convergence and possible 
solution to screen size problem)
Claire: You’d get used to it wouidn’tyou? (Domestication)
Dan: You’re still looking at something in front of you. (Disadvantage)
Gemma: I dunno if I’d watch something iike that coz if people walked through it, it 
would be really annoying (Comic disadvantage).
(Laughter)
(Focus group 2:3-4. Emphasis and codes added).
In the above exchange the ostensible topic is future-convergence. However, the 
participants do not accept or reject ‘convergence’ as a term explicitly. Indeed the 
word ‘convergence’ arose only rarely throughout all the groups, despite its popularity 
and rhetorical force within the mobile technology industry. Rather, in debating the 
pros and cons of having a variety of features within one device, they manage to 
produce that device, without ever giving an outright description of ‘convergence’. It is 
maintained that this process, of debating advantages and disadvantages of certain 
features, results in particular ‘versions of the fixture’. Yet to reduce such debates to a 
list of what the participants thought the fixture in relation to mobile technologies 
‘would be like’ does not do justice to the lively process through which coherent 
versions of the fixture were created. Nor is it the case that they were re-producing 
accounts of the fixture which they had heard elsewhere. They did discuss popular 
science fictional versions of the fixture for example but not in an unquestioning 
manner.
It is contended that part of the process of debating the pros and cons of a ‘new’ 
technology is to embed that imagined technology in some hypothetical ‘everyday life’ 
situation. Again this helps the groups to imagine the fantastical whilst holding on to 
some notion of what is ‘rational’ and ‘commonsensical’. Below group three debate 
videophone watches as demonstrated by this excerpt.
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Chris: What would be quite good...the only downside to that, erm, video-watch 
thing...my one...there...would be, if you were in a club or something and you’re 
dancing and you’re swinging your arms around, how are they gonna...you’d be 
like ‘Woah’ (flings arm around and pretends to try and look into his watch).
Allen: Would you really be on the phone if you were dancing in a club?
Chris: Yeah you’d be like (gestures with arm).
Allen: Surely you’re gonna stop and speak to them.
L: Very practical. (Focus group 3:18).
Going to a night-club is a part of most of these teenagers’ everyday life-worlds. It is a 
recognisable and understandable activity, whereas owning and using a video-watch 
phone is presumably not. The teenagers here, and in numerous interactions during all 
the focus groups, use mundane activities from their everyday lives such as going 
shopping or a bus ride to college to try and construct understandable future scenarios 
in relation to mobile communication technologies. As Du Gay et al (1997) maintain in 
relation to the Walkman,
What makes the Sony Walkman a part of our culture...is not only the 
‘work’ which has gone into constructing it meaningfully, but the social 
practices with which it has become associated. We do various things with 
the Walkman (Du Gay et al, 1997:17. Original emphasis).
Bull (2000) attempts an ‘ethnography’ of the use of personal stereos in everyday life, 
concentrating on what people do with their personal stereos and how music mediates 
urban, experiences. When talking about ‘versions of the future’ in which future- 
possible devices and events are constituted through talk, humour, speculation and so 
on, it can seem counter-intuitive to talk about people ‘doing’ something with 
technological artefacts and media. Clearly the teenagers cannot ‘do’ anything with the 
future-possible devices they imagine but I suggest that through talk they make these 
imagined devices meaningful by constituting social practices with which such devices 
could, in the future they are envisioning, become associated. They do various things 
with an imagined holographic device, such as chatting to an absent friend who is ‘half 
the world away’ and in doing this, through talk within the focus group interaction.
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they make, for them, a fantastical artefact potentially viable, as this extract 
demonstrates,
Paul: There’ll probably be things like holograms. You know like a holographic 
image, iike coz they’ve got videoconferencing now and with the Internet so like in 
50 years time they’ii probably be developing something like that, you know you 
could have a video and you couid make it...you could see the other person.
Hayley: A hologram person.
Paul: It would be quite weird.
(iaughter)
Hayley: You would be chatting to your friend who’s like half the world away and 
they would be sat next to yah. Our main senses are like our eyes, our sight.
Paul: It makes you feel more secure as well If you can actually see someone 
there.
Hayley: And you feel like you’ve progressed, technology wise if you have a 
picture. Like before phones it was just sound. Now you’re working on two sense 
rather than one and you might build up to touch or something, or whatever, or just 
carry on like that and they feel like they’ve progressed.
Amanda: It’s just like that force of habit when you’re talking, you like, you use your 
hands and facial expressions and they can see you and see what you’re doing 
and it would be easier to communicate that way. Like some of my mate’s 
comments, you can’t think of anything to say. You just do a faciai expression and 
it’s a bit stupid on the phone.
Jackie: It would make it a bit more naturai as weil. Having someone there to talk to 
makes it more natural and people might be more iikely to accept it.
Hayley: If you’re bored or something with the conversation you can’t just go like 
that (puiis a face). And you can’t say something to someone eise about the person 
if they’re sitting there.
Amanda: I feel it’s a bit weird coz iike it’s an invasion of privacy. If you want to talk 
to someone on the phone, like if someone randomly phoned you up, like a saies 
company or something you don’t want to see them. You don’t want them coming 
into your home.
(iaughter)
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Amanda: Yeah like strangers phoning up and they’re there. It would be quite 
worrying.
L: You’d have to have some kind of block basically...so only people you wanted to 
see.
Ok. So in 50 years time you think there might be holograms. What about the 
, phone itself?
Hayley: I think there’ll be like a little disc thing to stand on or something. People 
would pop out of it.
(laughter)
L: Like a 10p piece with like a genie coming out of it.
(iaughter)
Paul: I would be something iike Star Wars, iike there’s a circular table and the 
image comes up and it can walk along backwards and everything.
L: Like the bit where he goes fuzzy and the data gets interfered with.
Hayley: People who phoned could follow you around.
(laughter)
L: You’d be like ‘Get off. Ok, what about in 1000 years time. The year 3000? How 
will people be communicating?
(laughter)
Jackie: I don’t think we’li have phones and stuff like that. I think we’ll just transport 
to other places and things iike that. So you could talk to ‘em properly face to face. 
(Focus group 10:7. Emphasis added).
The teenagers not only ‘do’, through talk, everyday social practices (talking to 
friends) with the fantastical device they have produced as a group, but they also 
debate what ontological implications such a device might have for them. So Paul says, 
‘It makes you feel more secure as well if you can actually see somewhere there’ 
(Focus group 10:7). Consideration of such issues by the teenagers denotes their 
concern with what might be thought of as the ‘social and personal impact’ of a given 
‘new’ technology. It is not that they are imagining a technology and then applying it 
to an abstract notion of ‘society’ in a simplistic fashion. Rather by embedding the 
technology, through talk, into their everyday lives, they are able to give consideration 
to how it could come to be part of, and perhaps change, everyday socio-technical 
practices (i.e. long distance communication).
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Another point to pick up on here is related to comments about visual 
manifestations of a person being an emotional indicator of progress, for example ‘And 
you feel like you’ve progressed, technology wise if  you have a picture’. Such 
comments on the primacy of the visual employ wider cultural discourses about 
technological progress, in which, for example, teleconferencing has long been 
constructed as an indicator of the ‘high-tech’. Throughout the focus groups, the 
future-possibility of having visual representations of data and/or the person with 
whom one is communicating, was frequently used as an ‘indicator’ of the future, and 
in a sense the teenagers expressed the view that once such visuals are possible ‘the 
future’ may have ‘really’ arrived. Furthermore, as Hayley’s comment demonstrates, 
one ‘future-signifier’ for the teenagers was the possibility of all one’s senses being 
stimulated during a communicative act. Again this draws on technological 
development discourses of virtual or altered reality with computer-mediated 
experiences being deemed somehow more ‘real’ if  all one’s senses are involved. To 
‘build up to touch or something’ implicitly employs a sensorial hierarchy (perhaps 
from sound to sight, to touch and even smell) that, as additional senses are used, 
becomes more and more ‘futuristic’. Intrinsic to this sense of the ‘futuristic’ is a move 
(via greater sensory experience) to more ‘naturalistic’ communication (see Jackie’s 
comment above). Here ‘the fixture’ is produced as somewhere or something where 
technology is essentially unobtrusive, and an imitation of what is here thought of as 
the most ‘natural’ mode of communication, namely face-to-face interaction.
However, despite their apparent enthusiasm for visual (and other sensorial) 
representations vis-à-vis telecommunication, the aforementioned processes of 
pragmatic considerations of fixture-possible technologies and of the verbal embedding 
fixture-possible devices in their everyday life-worlds still occurred, as with James’ 
humorous illusion (Focus group 8:10) to the possibility that your mother could catch 
you masturbating if you answered your videophone in a hurry. Here we see one of the 
ways in which versions are built up in relation to mobile communication technologies, 
that is through ‘fantastical pragmatism’. These imagined technologies are made to 
‘do’ something in an imagined social world, albeit a world understood through a 
contemporary lens.
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Temporal Aspects of Fantastical Pragmatism
Holographic screens were mooted by the teenagers as a possible solution to wanting 
to add multimedia applications to phones (television programmes, films) without 
having to enlarge the whole device to accommodate a bigger screen,
George: You could have like a holographie screen.
Claire: You’d get used to it wouldn’t you?
Dan: You’re still looking at something in front of you (Focus group 2:4. Emphasis 
added).
Claire’s simple line ‘You’d get used to it wouldn’t you?’ which has been highlighted 
is fascinating in that it reflects debates about the domestication of technology and how 
a technology can ‘become mundane’. What Claire expresses relates to the temporal 
aspect of domestication or appropriation, meaning that over time, with enough 
everyday life-world practice one may ‘get used to’ a ‘new’ and at first strange 
technology. Part of this process of ‘getting used to’ a ‘new technology’ involves 
imagining what changes these ‘new technologies’ will bring to a person’s everyday 
world and to wider society. Here future social practices are thought to emerge as a 
result of the impact of future-possible artefacts. As constituted through the teenagers’ 
talk about future-possible mobile devices, people ‘getting used to’ an unfamiliar 
technology is presumed to involve a shift in social practices to ‘fit in’ around a new 
technology, rendering it familiar as it becomes part of everyday life. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, two (now to us) familiar technologies, the telephone and the 
electric light, were in the process of being imagined and envisioned by a wide variety 
of social groupings. Marvin (1988) explores the imaginings of people in that era, 
noting.
Discussions of electrical and other new forms of communication in the 
late nineteenth century begin from specific cultural and class assumptions 
about what communication ought to be like among particular groups of 
people. These assumptions informed the beliefs of nineteenth-century 
observers about what these new media were supposed to do, and legislated
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the boundaries of intimacy and strangeness for the close and distant
worlds they presented to their audiences (Marvin 1988:6).
‘New technologies’ do not have ‘becoming old’ and/or familiar intrinsically built into 
them. Both the electric light and the telephone in the era that Marvin (1988) studies 
were viewed as fantastical and possibly dangerous innovations. Fears about the 
‘impact’ these inventions would have on individuals, families and communities were 
expressed as people struggled to come to terms with the unfamiliar. It is worth 
pausing here to think about how mundane these two technologies are to us in the 
Western world circa 2003, and about how resonant some of the fears voiced about the 
telephone at the end of the nineteenth century are to those currently produced about 
the Internet and mobiles. How does something perceived as fantastical come to be 
viewed as familiar, and related to this, how can the mundane still be cast as 
fantastical?
Marvin (1988) argues that secure in the perception of (historical and 
technological) continuity, actors are able to embrace the unfamiliar through their 
understandings of present technologies, employing those understandings of the 
familiar to comprehend ‘new’ and unfamiliar technologies, particularly how they may 
‘fit in’ to the everyday ‘commonsensical’ world. Marvin maintains, ‘People often 
imagine that like Michelangelo chipping away at the block of marble, new 
technologies will make the world more nearly what it was meant to be all along. 
Inevitably, both change and the contemplation of change are reciprocal events that 
expose old ideas to revision from contact with new ones’ (Marvin 1988:235). Thus 
fantastical imaginings may perversely be part of the process of rendering the 
unfamiliar mundane. As change for the mobile is imagined, so the mobile in its 
current form becomes more familiar.
The temporal aspect of domestication and appropriation is often buried in the 
related literature, whilst people’s ideas about how a technology becomes domesticated 
and familiar are hard to access directly. In a sense the conundrum of how a 
technology such as the mobile can be viewed as simultaneously mundane and in 
certain forms, ‘cutting edge’ and ‘fantastical’ relates to this temporal aspect of 
appropriation in that different time-frames can be employed to understand what are 
viewed as similar and/or related technologies. WAP for example was familiar to the 
teenagers, and they were able to criticise it quite comprehensively. 3 G however was
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unfamiliar as a term to them, although the 3G prototypes showed (see Appendix 2) 
were familiar to them mainly in terms of the design. It would be fascinating to ask 
these teenagers in five years time whether the term 3G was familiar to them. As Adam 
(1995) asserts, it can be difficult to think and talk about time reflectively precisely 
because it forms such an integral part of our lives. Time is profoundly implicated in 
our ideas about how technologies change and ‘develop’, and about what is viewed as 
familiar and what is viewed as fantastical. MacDonald (2001) showed a variety of 
mobile phone handset images to participants asking them to place them on a scale in 
terms of bi-polar characteristics, including bulky-vs-compact, sturdy-vs-fragile and 
modem-vs-traditional styling. Her work focuses on how these meanings are 
developed through use of mobiles in everyday life, but what goes unsaid in her study 
is the manner in which the aesthetics of the mobile form are grounded in notions of 
‘old’ and ‘new’ design. For the participants, ‘modem styling’ was signified by a 
smaller (Nokia) handset through its opposition to a larger (NEC) handset, whilst the 
same NEC silver handset was deemed to signify ‘high-tech’ and ‘exciting’ in 
opposition to a bulkier and black ‘basic’ and ‘dull’ Nokia. Handset aesthetics then are 
embedded in notions of ‘old’ and ‘new’ designs with certain aesthetic qualities 
produced as being futuristic or otherwise. The teenagers in my focus groups 
extrapolated ‘the future’ from their notions of the ‘history’ of handsets thus far. This 
point is reiterated later on in this chapter, whereby the teenagers in the focus groups 
vehemently argue that small is ‘the future’ in relation to mobile devices.
Silverstone et al (1992) propose a framework for distinguishing ‘four non­
discrete elements or phases in the dynamics of the household’s moral economy^^ as it 
is constituted in the transactional system of commodity and media relations’ 
(1992:20). These elements are set out below as,
• appropriation
• objectification
• incorporation
• conversion (Silverstone et al, 1992:20-21).
Silverstone et al (1992) argue that appropriation is the point at which an object^^ is 
sold, and is taken into possession of an individual or household and owned. For them
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appropriation stands for the whole process of consumption (1992:22), which includes 
the consumption of media such as telephone services, which are continually 
appropriated and are constantly made to mean through appropriation within the 
context (moral economy) of the household. Objectification ‘reveals itself in display 
and in turn reveals the classificatory principles that inform a household’s sense of its 
self and its place in its world’ (1992:22). Thus a teenager’s mobile may be placed in 
her room, near her bed in a case from Topshop or Claire’s Accessories^^ This 
objectification through display reveals the ‘classificatory principles’ of the household; 
teenager, need for private space, assertions of independence through consumption, 
concern with fashion and so on. Whilst objectification focuses on media and 
information technologies as artefacts, incorporation, according to Silverstone et al 
(1992) involves incorporating the services that the artefact provides into the moral 
economy of the household. Thus a mobile may be used to ‘save time’ by a teenager 
calling her parents to pick her up when a couple of stations away from her stop. 
Finally conversion, as with appropriation ‘defines the relationship between the 
household and the outside world...without the display and without the acceptance of 
(private, personal) meanings outside the home, the work of mediation remains private: 
inaccessible and irrelevant in the public realm’ (1992:25). Teenagers talk about their 
mobiles within public spaces such as schools and colleges. Mobile talk amongst 
teenagers, or say talk about TV programmes in work environments, are examples of 
conversion, ‘the boundary across which artefacts and meanings, texts and 
technologies, pass as the household defines and claims for itself and its members a 
status in neighbourhood, work and peer groups in the ‘wider society’ (1992:25).
Within lay formulations of the domestication of ‘new’ technologies (be they 
deemed new in a general cultural sense or perhaps ‘new’ to a given household or 
individual) it is posited, as with Claire’s quote, that ‘given time’ we will get used to a 
technology. This point I relate to the conundrum of mobile communication 
technologies being widely viewed as simultaneously ‘mundane’ and ‘cutting edge’. A 
‘new’ technology may be appropriated in the domestic sphere (which can include 
public and private spaces), and ‘given time’ (i.e. time must pass before the next 
‘stage’ occurs), become familiar and mundane. Getting used to a technology seems to 
imply here that visceral ‘shock’ at its ownership will ‘eventually’ subside. A scratch 
may appear on one’s once shiny and ‘new’ Nokia. One may ‘forget’ what it was like 
to be without a mobile and wonder how one used to do without it. We even become
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‘used to’ the constant ringing of mobiles in public spaces. Thus the passing of time is 
essential to the appropriation of a technology.
However, as re-formulations of the now ‘old’, ‘contemporary’ or appropriated 
technology take place in the wider socio-cultural sphere, through invocations of 
future-possible adaptations (such as convergence and 3G), a ‘familiar’ technology is 
produced as having the capacity to be ‘cutting edge’ once again. Hence the possibility 
of concomitant normality and cutting-edge. Domestication may at first glance appear 
to be a relatively simplistic linear movement from the fantastic to the ordinary 
through the embedding of an artefact and/or service within the domestic sphere and a 
person’s everyday life-world. Yet only through thinking about the future-possible and 
the ways in which we may ‘get used to’ a technology which can once again be re­
produced as fantastical, can we understand the ways in which domestication is an 
ongoing, active and non-linear process.
Another way in which the temporal dimension of domestication was expressed 
within the focus groups was through the notion of a ‘critical mass’. This involves the 
argument that ‘enough’ people must have certain new technologies (videophones, hot 
badges) for them to be ‘worth’ having them at all. This may be specific to certain 
technologies. I suggest that this is deemed relevant to mobile devices due to the 
communicative capacities they are imbued with. Regarding the possibility of 
picture/video messaging, it would appear that without ‘enough’ people to send images 
to, this experience is rendered useless. It is the sharing of the experience with a wider 
audience that is inherent to its perceived worthiness. In terms of adoption, this notion 
moves us beyond the perceived quality or usefulness of a technology towards a 
consideration of the quantity of people that adopt. For a future technology to be 
perceived as viable, inferences must be made about not just the type of possible future 
user, but also the possible number of future users. This form of ‘fantastical 
pragmatism’ also involves the production of the notion of ‘pioneer users’ or ‘early 
adopters’; the latter being a term frequently used by those within the mobile industry. 
Pioneer, or early users, a supposedly distinct group, are positioned as those who will 
drive technological change and be open to new innovations,
...there are those whose preference is for the newest product lines and 
innovations and who are particularly attracted by whatever embodies the 
latest technology. Such consumers are most probably technophiles of one
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sort or another...In addition, IT technophiles may find their enthusiasm 
doubly relevant to the process of acquiring the new, as the products 
themselves may serve as an important channel of information about recent 
developments, just as they themselves may serve as trailblazers for other, 
less technophiliac, consumers (Campbell in Silverstone and Hirsch 
1992:56).
A trope of ‘newness’ as being highly relevant and somehow inherent to ICTs means 
that those early adopters who purchase the latest models can be constructed as the 
arbiters of novelty. Expressed within the mobile industry as ‘early adopters’, and we 
see a temporal aspect coming into play again here, it is presumed that if they consume 
a ‘new’ technology it will almost always inevitably ‘trickle-down’ to other ‘sections’ 
of society. Presumably if  there are ‘early adopters’ the rest of the adopters are ‘late’ 
ones, but of course it is rarely specified at what ‘point in time’ adopters change from 
being ‘early’ to be being ‘late’.
So ‘enough’ people must have a technology for it to be ‘worth’ having in the 
‘critical mass’ argument. How many ‘enough’ is perceived to be is a difficult process 
to understand, and must be a notion embedded in people’s everyday worlds rather 
then be an ‘objective’, quantifiable matter. Sacks (1970/1992) uses the example of a 
conversation about the aftermath of a car crash that one of his study’s participants saw 
to note that people use a variety of devices to ensure that their story is ‘tellable’. The 
teller uses terms such as ‘smashed into such a small space’. Sacks also points to the 
convention of characterising how long one is stuck in traffic jam as ‘just for a 
second , seemed like hours or quite a while’. Such devices are used as judgements 
by the recipient of the story and are used to ‘decide whether a correct story is being 
told’ (Sacks 1970/1992: 234). A story may be utterly conventionalised by the teller in 
that he or she says such a thing that everyone knows happens (whether or not it 
happened is another matter) or by other means. In a sense participants in the focus 
groups are telling stories about future-possible worlds that are lent more plausibility 
through the argument that when ‘enough’ people adopt a ‘new’ (now fantastical) 
technology, it, that is the technology and the future-possible world, will become 
mundane. What are the means, referred to by Sacks, through which they achieve 
tellable’ futures? Sacks (1970/1992) maintains that series of measures are employed 
in stories (i.e. ‘quite a while’), and that through this employment of ‘usualness’
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measures, people can exhibit their competence at observing scenes, or here imagining 
future scenarios. Sacks suggests.
They are types of usualness or normalness measures. Each such term 
comes from a package of terms which are specifically used to characterise 
a scene so as to say that a scene was as it usually is, or that it wasn’t what 
it usually is, but some variation of what usually is...So by virtue of the 
fact that you employ these usualness measures, you’re asserting that you 
know how to watch wrecks. And by virtue of the fact that the other is 
figuring out what you are telling them, they will have been required to 
also employ such sorts of information such that they can see that you’re 
possibly competent at observing wrecks. (1970/1992:235).
In a sense it is perhaps better for story tellers not to use ‘precise’ measurements, for 
example precisely when early adopters ‘become’ later adopters. In terms of stories 
about the future this point also relates to the perceived ‘riskiness’ of predicting the 
future. Saying that when ‘enough’ people possess a ‘new’ technology it will become 
familiar renders the participants’ stories tellable at the same time as it avoids the risk 
of precise prediction. By avoiding precise measurements one can, ‘offer the product 
of what can be seen to have been specifically done as an educated analysis, and 
thereby be seen to have been done by someone who knows how to look if  it is told to 
someone who knows how to hear’ (Sacks 1970/1992: 236). ‘Usualness’ or 
‘normalness’ measurement systems (i.e. ‘enough’ people, rather than say ‘70% of 
people’) render a story more tellable and less open to precise criticism. In terms of 
future prediction, ‘usualness’ is far less ‘risky’ a measurement system than precision 
given the notion that the ‘passing of time’ can render precise predictions laughable. 
By being vague one may show that one has measured the thing in an appropriate way 
(here future-possible consumption patterns), and by virtue of this can be ‘trusted’ to 
tell a plausible tale.
Over the course of this research I have lost count of the number of times 
people say that ‘everyone’ has a mobile phone nowadays, which is of course 
statistically speaking mistaken. The teenagers expressed the possibility that once 
‘enough’ people possess a certain technology (however fantastical it may seem now) 
it can become mundane. It ‘takes time’ for ‘enough’ people to possess a ‘new’
245
technology before it can be perceived as a relatively ‘old’ technology. Time must pass 
but one does not have to say exactly how much time. This point indicates that a 
technology does not have some intrinsic quality that means it will ‘naturally’ move 
from being a ‘new’ technology to being an ‘old’ or mundane technology. Processes of 
domestication, and the perception of ‘enough’ people having to possess a technology 
(without having to be precise about what and when is ‘enough’) before it becomes 
‘normal’ to do so, indicates how socially embedded are notions of the ‘new’ and the 
old’ in relation to technologies.
Emotional and Informational Overloads; The Fragile Device and Technological 
Progress
In his paper ‘Configuring the User: the case of usability trials’ (1991), Woolgar 
discusses the ways in which we attribute particular capabilities to what are presumed 
to be different entities. Whilst we are able (i.e. find it commonsensical) to say that a 
robber may have intended (or not intended) to fire a gun, we cannot ‘rationally’ ask 
whether the gun wanted or agreed to be fired. This points to a socio-cultural hierarchy 
of animate and non-animate entities linked to what we take to be legitimate accounts 
of behaviours and actions, ‘...the point is that the distribution of attributes is 
institutionalised in conventional practice...the distribution of attributes is sanctioned 
in virtue of conventions for correct/normal usage’ (Woolgar 1991:62). However, as 
Woolgar argues, there is no simple division between the attributes that we ascribe to 
animate entities and those we confer on inanimate entities, since we are able to speak 
‘metaphorically’ about the animate qualities of inanimate objects and vice versa 
(Woolgar 1991:63). What I demonstrate in this section is the way that a hierarchy of 
attributes of the animate and inanimate was produced by the teenagers within the 
focus groups conducted. One may pursue this notion of a hierarchy of attributes 
precisely because the participants used it to construct certain future-possible devices 
and the roles that such devices may play in their interactionally composed ‘versions of 
the future’.
Woolgar points out that we speak of inanimate objects such as cars and 
computers as being ‘temperamental’ (1991:63) whilst animate entities can be said to 
have behaved ‘mechanically’, often as a way of expounding a theory of non-volitional 
behaviour, i.e. a person ‘automatically’ defends themselves when threatened.
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Advertisers frequently play on this hierarchy of attributes to confer feelings and 
volition on inanimate objects. The aforementioned Carphone Warehouse campaign 
featuring ‘Mobili’ (See Appendix 3) is an apt example of this. ‘Mobili’ is attributed 
with feelings (of rejection by his owner’s apparent lack of concern for his well-being) 
and with a ‘life of his own’ Note how we can move from ‘it’ to ‘his’ as soon as 
animate attributes are conferred on the inanimate. Part of the teenagers’ identification 
with this character involved feeling sorry for the device, whereas normatively 
speaking, it would seem bizarre to speak of ‘feeling sorry’ for an inanimate object 
such as the mobile phone.
Some of the fiiture-talk that occurred within the focus groups involved 
attributing (metaphorical) animation to fiiture-possible inanimate entities. This 
animation of future devices involved their perceived unreliability. For the teenagers a 
device could have so many (and how many was too many is unclear from the data) 
functions that it would become more and more temperamental, and ultimately 
unreliable. This notion of machines being ‘overloaded’ and subsequently unreliable 
and even dangerous is a popular socio-cultural trope. Convergence was seen as 
problematic since the increased complexity of a device meant, for the teenagers, that 
it was more likely to become volatile and take on a ‘life of its own’,
Chris: Like a built in Walkman?
Samantha: Yeah you can...
Chris : You can get that. The new 83-10’s that innit? Like it's got FM radio and aii 
that stuff.
Samantha: But it’s really expensive.
Allen: I don’t think so coz I don’t even iike phones.
L: Don’t you?
Hannah: What would you do without your phone though?
Chris: It’ii put Walkman outta business.
Allen: I don’t think thafil happen though, iike with the mini-disc business. For a 
while everyone wanted a mini-disc, I don’t know if that’s stiii going on but for a 
while everyone wanted a mini-disc...and er they wouid have to make phones that 
big and that wide (gestures with hands) and I don’t know...combining too many 
things realiy.
Chris: More stuff to go wrong innit?
247
Hannah: Short-circuiting.
Chris: Yeah.
Aiien: Like everything crammed into one and you’ve got too many buttons 
Samantha: The technology’s so advanced that It will explode If you do something 
wrong and you’d need so much battery power just for the phone just to cali 
somebody. (Focus group 3:8. Emphasis added).
Here conferring animation on inanimate devices is employed via the familiar 
discourse of ‘technology out of control’ (Winner 1977). These future-possible devices 
are attributed with the potential for becoming uncontrollable, even dangerous, as a 
result of their complexity and incomprehensibility (‘so advanced’) and as a reaction to 
user mistakes. Future-possible devices were constituted as being fragile in two ways. 
Firstly, as above, their complexity was deemed to be problematic in the form of 
possible ‘information overloads’. Secondly, the teenagers voiced the danger of 
‘emotional overloads’. In the following excerpt, focus group five discuss the 
possibility of recording and sending emotions through communication devices,
L: What about this? (Image 4)
Sarah: What’s the point of that?
Hayley: I think that’s cool but...
Sophie: What about recording your emotions?
Sarah: Recording memories is a good idea.
Hayley: Could it do that?
L: I don’t think so, but what if they could record and send, like actual memories?
Sarah: Yeah that’s a good idea. Like when my boyfriend proposed to me and I 
could record that whole night.
Sophie: Emotions as well?
Sarah: Yeah everything, the whole...coz even like a video camera couldn’t 
capture what I was feeling and stuff.
Hayley: It would probably blow up on that day Sarah.
(laughter)
Sophie: Overload, overload.
Hayley: She came Into college and was like...It would probably blow up.
(Focus group 5:10. Emphasis added).
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Here the ‘overload’ involves the perceived possibility that devices would not be able 
to ‘cope’ with human emotions. This belies the view that technical artefacts are 
‘meant’ to deal with ‘information’, and even then they may not be able to deal with 
‘too much’ or ‘too complicated’ information, whilst humans are meant to, and indeed 
are able to, deal with strong emotions. So whilst animate attributes are being 
conferred on inanimate objects, the teenagers still work with a ‘commonsensical’ 
hierarchy of what entities can ‘process’ and what they can ‘naturally’ do or not do. 
Here it is suggested that Sarah is also using the discussion about future-possible 
technologies to present to her peers just how excited she was and is about her future 
marriage.
Another way in which this animate/inanimate divide was employed was through 
the expression of concern that what is perceived as reliance on inanimate objects 
would somehow make us inanimate in the future,
Hannah: Everyone relies on the computer, mobile, the Internet nowadays. You 
can’t go anywhere without being bombarded with new technology.
L: Is there...?
Hannah: The cloning. God. They cloned the first baby thing. That’s quite scary. I 
dunno it’s just totally false isn’t it? They’re just making things...they should just 
leave it. We’re happy as you are.
Sarah: It’s like we’re gonna lose all our values aren’t we? We like do it all in Media 
Studies. You probably do it as well (to Hannah). Stuff like the Internet changes like 
your social skills and stuff. If you’re shopping on the Internet you don’t have to go 
out. You could stay at home and do everything. And it’s gonna destroy the way 
people act, the way they behave.
Michelle: People aren’t gonna talk to each other. We’ll turn into robots.
Shannaz: No.
Michelle: Coz you’re not gonna have communication skills, like we wouldn’t be 
able to sit down like this. (Focus group 6:6-7).
Here we see that the perceived danger of ‘becoming like robots’ is the loss of 
communication skills. The teenagers employed a dystopian discourse of losing skills 
attributed to animate entities (i.e. the ability to communicate with other people) and it
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was this perceived loss of skills, which in their view make us animate, that enabled 
them to talk about the danger of ‘becoming like robots’ in the future. Talk about 
future devices and the ‘impact’ that the teenagers thought they would have on 
‘society’ revealed in part their notions of what it is to be ‘human’ as a ‘social animal’,
L: So kids now...
Phil: I think...
Steph: I...
Phil: No go on.
Steph: I think they will be more spoilt you know what I mean because they have 
so much more stuff...
Ian: I think they'll be like girls when they have babies...when they have those 
stupid talking dolls and they cry...
Steph: And like Tamagotchi^s things.
Clare: They went in and out quickly.
Phil: Kids are just getting lazier and lazier.
Steph: Yeah I agree with that.
Phil: It used to be go out, kick around in the street. Like my little cousins, they’re 
into computer games, well there’s one that’s into football, he loves football, but the 
rest they just like computer games and not do anything.
James: We used to build dens and stuff.
Phil: They’re all be overweight. Like podgy things.
Simon: Back in the aid days on the farm.
(laughter)
Ian: Even Scalelectrics^oo, although it was a game, we used to build tracks and 
stuff and build dens.
L: So does it worry you about communication technologies?
Simon: We’ll all end up like the Americans, sitting on the couch getting fat. That’ll 
be it really.
(Focus group 8:16. Emphasis added).
This ‘being human’ involved a certain distancing of the animate from the inanimate. 
To have ‘too much’ technology, or to rely on ‘too much’ on technology was perceived
to signify a danger to what ‘being human’ is all about, that is leaving the couch and
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doing something other than interacting with technologies (be it a Playstation or the 
television). Part of this discourse of the ‘impact’ of technology on human relations 
involves nostalgia for a (mythical) bygone age, presumably not that long passed since 
the participants ranged between 16 and 18 years of age. This was not a simple form of 
unproblematic nostalgia but involved a degree of reflexivity, which generated 
humour, about the ‘false’ romanticism involved in such sentimental yearning for the 
past, i.e. ‘Back in the old days on the farm’.
Wyatt et al (2000) note how a utopian and dystopian polarisation often features 
in debates about new technologies. This is particularly marked in talk about new 
technologies and what they might ‘do’ in the future (within ‘society’ for example, or 
to certain groupings within that society such as children). The teenagers worked 
through this polarisation within their future-talk. Thus whilst producing ‘dystopian’ 
worlds of robotic-like humans who are unable to communicate face-to-face, they 
simultaneously produced accounts of a future world where we will communicate 
more and where communication will be easier,
Michelle: Coz you’re not gonna have communication skills, like we wouldn’t be 
able to sit like this.
L: So face-to-face communication will suffer?
Shannaz: But in a way it will be easier for long distance because they’re making 
new technologies and that, coz you’ve got phones that can see people and that. I 
think it’s a bit sad but we’re living in the best age because we’ve got the best of 
both worlds. Earlier on you didn’t have the technology and later on I think we’re 
gonna have too much. (Focus group 6:7).
This excerpt demonstrates how utopian and dystopian versions of the future are 
blended within future-talk, and also how vital temporality is in the production of 
accounts of the future. Here the past is produced as technologically deficient, the 
future is produced as simultaneously better and worse than the present, whilst the 
present is produced as a temporal balancing act between the two. Too heavy a reliance 
on technology, or being without technology completely, is presented as undesirable. 
Here focus group ten discusses what worries them about mobile technologies in 
general,
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Jackie: We rely on it so much. It does so much for us.
Hayley: Yeah, coz if it all suddenly died we’d be stuck sort of thing.
(laughter)
Paul: Yeah.
Hayley: If it all suddenly crashed. We wouldn’t be able to contact anyone. We 
wouldn’t know what to do or how to live.
Alex: That’s exactly why I don’t depend on it.
Paul: It’s like those satellite things.
L: In a way everyone has to.
Hayley: Even if you try not to you are still surrounded by it. Like I mean lights. Try 
living without light bulbs.
Alex: No true, but I can’t see without light but I can live without a mobile phone, 
you know.
Hayley: It’s still technology though.
Paul: Yeah but it’s technology from way back.
Hayley: It’s still technology, and It’s being Improved with these like new energy 
saving llghtbulbs that last for a hundred years. It’s still being Improved now.
Alex: Anything that’s been man-made.
Hayley: Yeah and we’ve evolved so we can’t live without it anymore.
L: Yeah have you seen that Shipwrecked thing, or Su/v/Vor?ioi The novelty is that 
they haven’t got any of these technologies.
Hayley: Yeah. (Focus group 10:4-5. Emphasis added).
So far I have focused on what the teenagers think ‘the future’ is and will be in relation 
to mobile technologies, but above we get a fascinating insight into what they think 
technology is. The human and the technical are dichotomised through the teenagers’ 
talk, in that the technical is something that humans rely on, but the human and the 
technical are also subsumed together, in that the participants constitute humans as 
having evolved with and through technology (hence our not being able to live without 
it). Again, technologies are placed in a hierarchy which is profoundly temporal in 
nature; the teenagers constitute ‘old’ technologies such as electric light as being 
fundamental to human existence and survival, ‘Try living without light bulbs’, whilst 
‘new’ technologies such as the mobile phone are constructed as not necessarily a 
requisite of human life, ‘...I can live without a mobile phone, you know’. Here the
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teenagers are drawing on, and challenging, wider discourses about mobile 
technologies which produce them as artefacts that enhance communication and thus 
enhance our ability to live. In the process of building (partial and fragmentary) 
versions of the future the teenagers engage with utopian accounts of the emancipatory 
and beneficial ‘impact’ of technologies on contemporary and future-possible social 
worlds. Through the process of fantastical pragmatism, whereby imagined 
technologies are embedded (via talk and interaction) in some ‘everyday’ hypothetical 
life situation, they also deal with dystopian versions of the future. The teenagers 
expressed concern over the ‘danger’ of humans becoming too reliant on technologies; 
technologies which are deemed liable to go ‘out of control’ if allowed to intrude into 
areas of social life in which humans are ‘naturally’ capable (i.e. the expression of 
intense emotions). They work with notions of balance (now and in the future) between 
the ‘natural’ and ‘the technological’, the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ to build versions of the 
future that are coherent within their socio-cultural context.
Small is Beautiful?
I now concentrate on the advantages and disadvantages, as discussed by the focus 
group participants, of mobile communication devices becoming smaller. I focus upon 
this aspect of the focus group discussions since size was deemed by the participants as 
a key signifier of ‘the future’. The teenagers draw here on wider cultural discourses of 
progress whereby the ever-diminishing size of a technology is oft presumed to be an 
indicator of its ever-evolving nature. Frequently concurrent with this diminishing size 
equals progress trope is perceived increase in the capacity or capability of a 
technology. The computer-chip (and related processing power) and recent 
developments in nanotechnology are two examples of this ‘smaller size-greater 
power-more capacity/capability’ nexus.
After initial discussions about whether they had mobile phones, and whether 
they had pre-paid or were on contracts, my first question to each group was what they 
thought mobile phones might look like or be like in the fxiture. The resounding 
response to this question by all of the groups was, in summary, small or smaller.
L: Right. Ok, so in terms of what phones might look like in the future, have you got 
any ideas about what they might look like?
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Kay: They’ll probably be small.
L: Right?
Jessica: Yeah but what’s the point of 'em being smaller? You can’t...
Kay: I don’t know but they keep getting smaller and smaller. (Focus group 4:3).
L: Ok. What do you think mobile phones might look like in the future?
Sophie: They’ll Just be so small.
Hayley: They’ll probably be little chips or something, or like earphones or 
something.
Sarah: They probably will though won’t they?
Sophie: Yeah like you’ll just say ‘Sarah-call’ and like...
Hayley: Yeah like little chips or something. Like a tiny little badge or something, 
(laughter)
Sarah: They’ll definitely get smaller.
(Focus group 5:1).
L: Ok. What do you think mobiles will be like in the future?
Steph: Tiny.
Simon: Smaller.
Phil: I saw this programme where the police had like this necklace. I think they’ve 
got the technology to do it now. (Focus group 8:2).
Natalie: You could have like radio on it.
Amie: I think you can can’t you?
L: Some of them you can but I think they’re quite expensive. So have you got any 
ideas about what mobile phones might look like in the future?
Natalie: I think they’ll be tiny, really small.
Emily: You’ll be able to do loads of stuff on them.
Adam: You’ll be able to see people on the screen.
Natalie: Yeah.
Tim: But if they got smaller they’ll be about that big (gestures with fingers), 
(laughter)
Stuart: Yeah you’d have to squint. (Focus group 9:2. My comments in brackets).
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The teenagers were all adamant that in ‘the future’ mobile phones would be smaller. 
Here the teenagers are extrapolating from what they ‘know’ about mobile phones of 
the past and present moment (that is that they have been, and are ‘getting smaller’), 
thus producing another (future-possible) artefact through the invocation of ‘new’ or 
rather ‘newer’ technologies which are ever diminishing in size. This process of 
miniaturisation seemed to be viewed as inevitable by the teenagers but was debated 
fiercely in terms of its perceived advantages and disadvantages. Again the teenagers 
could not be said to be blithely re-producing versions of the future as constructed by 
mobile companies and the popular press. Instead they imagined what such tiny future- 
possible devices would be like to have and/or use in everyday life. The main difficulty 
they voiced was that (future) users’ corporeality would be at odds with smaller (i.e. 
smaller than contemporary) mobile devices. Users of these future-possible tiny 
devices would have to squint to see a small video-phone screen for example (Focus 
group 9:2, as above), and the size of people’s fingers was deemed to be a problem if 
the devices became ‘too’ small,
L: Ok, imagine in ten years time, you’ll be about 27 or 28 by then. What do you 
think mobile phones will be like then?
Anna: Microscopic. Even now, like my brother’s got a new mobile phone and I 
can’t do it at all coz the buttons are so small.
Melissa: You’d lose it. (Focus group 7:2).
Hannah: They go out of date too quick.
L: Sam I know you don’t like your phone but...
Samantha: It’s not that...I’ve only had it about four months...
Allen: They’re always updating them. You have one for a month and then there’s a 
new one out.
Samantha: And it’s like crap already.
Hannah: Mine’s like a brick now. It’s horrible.
Samantha: Mine’s really heavy and old.
Allen: I don’t mind at all...I like my phone size coz if it gets any smaller I’ll lose it.
Maybe a bit thinner.
Chris: Yeah coz everyone wants the iatest new phone...I just keep the same 
phone...
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Hannah: Yeah like if they’re too smaii some like men’s fingers are too big for 
them...too many buttons.
L: Fat fingers.
Samantha: It's always the businessmen sitting on trains going...(gestures with 
hands).
Allen: Beef.
Chris: My dad’s got one of those thank-you very much.
Hannah: Yeah and you need a pen to touch it.
Allen: They’ve got one of those touch-screen ones with the pen and ali that 
nonsense.
(Focus group 3:3. Emphasis added).
Here the technical artefact and the ‘natural’ (gendered) human body are produced as 
possibly being incompatible with one another in the future if  ‘they’ (designers, mobile 
corporations) continue in their pursuit of the ‘small is beautiful’ trope. An additional 
technical artefact (pen) is suggested to overcome this perceived predicament, but 
again this suggestion is challenged as being ‘nonsensical’. Why use a pen when you 
have fingers that can ‘naturally’ press buttons? Hannah expresses the view that to 
possess a phone that is ‘too big’ is also an inconvenience and an embarrassment. 
Again the practicality of unspecified measurement is employed, whereby Hannah 
declares that her phone is ‘like a brick now\ Size is thus configured as a relational 
ontology. A technological artefact is produced as too big (or too small) both in 
relation to the ‘natural’ human body and in relation to the time it exists in. Hannah’s 
phone might not have been deemed to be ‘a brick’ in the past when its size was in 
keeping with what was available at that particular point in time (in the past). 
However, in the present moment, i.e. ‘now’, she deems it to be ‘a brick’ (implying it 
is too big) in relation to the size of contemporary devices. Hannah denotes that whilst 
it may have been a ‘reasonable’ size at some unidentified point in the past, now, given 
the general trend towards miniaturisation, this can no longer be said to be the case.
Moreover in the context of the debate about mobile phones going ‘out of date 
too quick’, the teenagers were able to produce a resistant position to miniaturisation as 
a representation of technological progress through oppositional talk about such 
phones being too small in practical terms. They therefore positioned themselves as 
being concerned with practical rather than aesthetic and stylistic matters, and
256
distanced themselves from what they seemed to think is the excessive commercialism 
of mobile phone producers, a form of ‘them and us’ in future-talk.
The teenagers in the focus groups expressed the possibility that phones would 
become so small that they could no longer be ‘a phone’. They followed through the 
‘logic’ of the miniaturisation argument so that the future-possible devices they 
produced took on the physical form of badges, lapel pins, necklaces and earphones. In 
a sense they are exploring the possibility of incoherence of certain versions of the 
future, that is that continuing miniaturisation has an ‘illogical’ end-point whereby 
devices will become so tiny they are rendered unusable. The teenagers work through a 
possible ‘practical’ solution to what they perceive as the problematic nature of 
continuing miniaturisation by simultaneously expressing the disadvantages of so- 
called ‘wearable computing’,
L: Ok, what do you think mobiles will be like in the future?
Steph: Tiny.
Simon: Smaller.
Phil: I saw this programme where the police had this necklace...! think they've got 
the technology to do it now.
Clare: What and you’d go...(gestures talking into her necklace).
Phil: Yeah, nah it was so small it was on the necklace. Can’t remember. I think it 
was a two piece...you put a bit in your ear.
L: Would you like that sort of thing?
The boys: No.
James: You would be constantly going...(gestures talking into chest).
Helen: It would be too easy to lose as well.
Phil: Is it? How do yah work that out?
James: It would vibrate or something.
Helen: No like if it fell off or something or you’d be more likely to leave it
somewhere or not grab it in the morning.
Ian: If you jump in the shower in the morning and it was round your neck you’re
gonna have to get it wet.
Simon: Yeah.
Ian: You’d electrocute yourself, yeah.
(laughter)
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L: So you think they’re gonna get smaller?
All: Yeah.
Ian: A lot smaller yeah.
James: Some of 'em are too small though so you can’t push the buttons.
Ian: Yeah like yours (to Phil).
Phil: Nah my one’s fine thank-you.
(laughter)
Ian: Too small.
Phil: Yeah my one’s small but...
James: If they got really small you’d have to plug it into something else to get your
phone numbers or something.
Ian: Yeah. (Focus group 8:3).
If communication is to be possible anywhere, anytime, with anyone, one of the key 
visions produced by discourses about ‘the future’, then further miniaturisation makes 
‘sense’ given that mobility would be eased by smaller devices. Embedding 
telecommunication devices into objects that are currently thought of as mundane 
(necklaces, badges, earrings and so on) represents a solution to the ‘need’ for greater 
mobility and the ‘problem’ of smaller devices being impractical to use (due to human 
corporeal ‘limitations’). Yet the teenagers do not simply accept wearable computing 
as an ‘obvious’ solution to the ‘need’ for greater mobility and contactability. The 
(wearable) devices they produce through future-talk are also deemed to have 
disadvantages, mainly in terms of how inappropriate they would be to use in certain 
social contexts. Talking to one’s necklace for example is constituted (through 
humour) by the teenagers as a ‘strange’ (socially inappropriate) behaviour. This is 
related to the social norm that phones are for communication whilst necklaces are 
(currently) used for decorative purposes and normatively speaking are not expected to 
have communicative capacities. The teenagers in the focus groups produced a 
possible fixture of further miniaturisation of mobile phones, wearable computing 
(badges, necklaces) and of ‘invisible’ phones. If telecommunication devices can be 
embedded in clothing, why not embed them in the person as well or instead?
L: Ok. Urn. Do you think...what do you think mobile phones will be like in the 
future?
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Hannah: They’ll be non-existent They’li be programmed into our head or 
something.
Shannaz: Yeah like...
Amy: They’ll be like that big (gestures with fingertips). You’ll Just have little 
earpieces for it.
Hannah: Either that or we’ll have little microchips.
Lee: A microchip?
Shannaz: That’s going a bit extreme innit?
(laughter)
Hannah: What a microchip? Yeah I would. You’d have it ringing in your head.
(Focus group 6:4. Emphasis added).
The participants in the focus groups produced a future, through debates about the 
viability and desirability of miniaturisation, wearable computing and implants, 
whereby mobile devices would get smaller and smaller to the point of invisibility. 
Why did these debates feature so prominently in the focus group data? In the 
following section, still focusing on size but more concerned with the relational 
ontology of ‘old’ and ‘new’, I argue that without talk of ‘old’ technologies, there 
would be no (workable) notion of ‘new’ technologies. The teenagers constituted ‘old’ 
mobiles primarily in terms of their size. In a sense it is through the juxtaposition of 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ that discourses of technological progress come to be used and 
make themselves heard in future-talk.
Signifiers of ‘the Future’
Diminishing device size is a key signifier of ‘the future’, but of course diminishing 
device size cannot be said to be ‘naturally’ a futuristic signifier for technologies. 
Televisions for example are widely denoted as ‘futuristic’ if the screen size is large 
(larger than previously available televisions sets) and usually flat, perhaps linked to 
ideas about bringing the ‘cinema experience’ into one’s home. In terms of mobile 
devices it is through talk of ‘old’ mobiles as being inordinately large and their 
juxtaposition with their current or future-possible counterparts as being ‘small’ to the 
point of invisibility, that these debates about device size and ‘the future’ become 
understandable. Mobile devices that become smaller and smaller are deemed to be
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futuristic precisely because they are being compared to ‘old’ mobile devices which 
are deemed to have been large,
L: So in 9 years time...in 2010...well do you remember what mobile phones used 
to look like?
Chris: They were massive.
Sam: Like bricks.
Simon: Yeah like a brick. (Focus group 1:2).
Samina: Yeah but it’s like anything. It’s like fashion innit? Like clothes. It’s gotta be 
designer...like the best one.
Gemma: Like image 2.
Samina: And the smallest one.
L: Why do you think small is important?
Samina: It shows how the technology improves. They can cram more into it.
Claire: It just looks nice. Rather than having a massive...
Gemma: Brick.
(laughter)
Dan: Yeah like the old ones.
L: Have you seen pictures of what they used to look like?
(all nod)
Dan: Dom Jolly (comedian). “HELLO” (pretends to shout into a huge mobile 
phone).
Karen: I had one of them. I had those Erricson...the big brick.
Samina: My boyfriend had the first pay-as-you-go one and it was like that big 
(gestures with arms wide apart).
Karen: You might as weli take your home phone around.
(Focus group 2:2).
The teenagers, in common with wider discourses about mobile technologies, use 
another artefact, i.e. a brick, to describe these archaic phones. Inferences about ‘old’ 
mobiles draw on the qualities of what we ‘know’ about bricks, that is that they are 
larger (than ‘new’ mobiles), that they do not easily fit in one’s hand or pocket, and 
that they are heavy.
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Ian: I don’t care as long as I can phone someone.
Phil: Yeah. Phone and text. That’s it. As long as it’s not a brick.
Steph: Yeah.
Phil: You know what I mean. Quite iight. (Focus group 8:19).
Further because bricks are in a sense ‘inert’ technologies (that is they perform no 
communicative function), it ‘makes sense’ for ‘old’ mobiles to be likened to them. Of 
course ‘old’ mobiles did have communicative capacities, but due to their perceived 
faults (heavy battery, unreliable connections and so on), the teenagers liken them to 
being closer to bricks than to what they now ‘know’ to be ‘a mobile’. Again a 
hierarchy of artefacts is being employed through talk by the teenagers in that ‘old’ 
mobiles are being constituted as ‘less live’ than ‘new’ ones. This works in the context 
of wider discourses about communication networks ‘going live’ (digital TV for 
example). Interestingly the teenagers also used the brick metaphor to describe and 
constitute future-possible devices, but in this context it was the Lego brick (clearly 
tiny in comparison to a house brick) they called upon to make sense of ‘new’ devices,
L: Ok, so Is there anyway you can imagine what mobile phones will look like in the
future?
Allen: Smaller.
Samantha: Tiny.
Chris: They’ll probably be the size of a Lego brick.
Hannah: Like inner-ear ones.
Samantha: Yeah. (Focus group 3:3-4).
Chris: Can I just show everyone? (Image 2)
Hannah: Oh dear. It looks like Lego from where I am.
Chris: They look like toys. (Focus group 3:23).
Here a form of relativistic comparison is occurring which allows the teenagers to form 
a ‘commonsensical’ version of the future, precisely because it differs from a past that 
is presented as being archaic. Generational discourses are employed by the teenagers
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to highlight just how old these ‘brick’ mobile phones are, by locating them, literally in 
another era, that of their parents,
Jessica: Yeah like 20 years ago...those big car ones. My Dad used to have one of
them. They’re so funny. He’s still go it somewhere in the loft.
(laughter)
Jenna: He should hang on to it. Like a brick thing?
Jessica: It was about the size of that sofa.
L: Like a briefcase?
(Focus group 4:4).
The teenagers were also reflexive however about this idea of technology progressing 
purely because it becomes smaller, as demonstrated below:
L: So phones in 50 years...what do you think they might look like?
Michelle: I think you won’t be able to see 'em. They’ll all be in your head.
Something crazy like that.
Shannaz: They’ll look like a pencil or...
Hannah: Everyone will be giving it “In my day they looked like bricks”
(laughter) (Focus group 6:7).
Here Hannah overcomes through humour, the ‘arrogance of the present’ and identifies 
the relativist nature of changing technology and what we think of as being ‘old’, 
contemporary and/or ‘new’ and ‘futuristic’. Each group was asked a variant of the 
question ‘What do you think mobile phones will be like in the future?’. What is 
fascinating is that the participants were rarely troubled by exactly when ‘the future’ is 
or will be. In a sense ‘the future’ was treated by participants as an abstract temporal 
entity that is ‘common-sensically’ distinguishable by virtue of it not being either the 
past or the present. Further, the teenagers seemed to work with a measure of ‘the 
future’ as being when, and only when, certain technological changes take place. When 
we have tiny mobile phones, implants, holograms and so on; that will be ‘the future’. 
This belies how fundamentally perceptions of technological change and ‘the future’ 
are conflated with one another. Generally speaking the teenagers constitute ‘the 
future’ as being when certain technological changes are seen to occur. However, some
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group members did consider what and/or when ‘the future’ is or will be in a reflexive 
manner,
James: This is meant to be the future...the year 2000. You know what I mean?
Phil: I thought it might be all futuristic but it isn’t.
Ian: It’s all the same innit?
Simon: It’s always the future though in nit?
Phil: It’s just...
James: 2030, or something. That’ll be the future.
(Focus group 8:3).
Here the teenagers deal with the apparent paradox of living in a time that was 
produced as ‘futuristic’ (the turn of the millennium, 2001 and so on). This relates to 
their perception of the present’s somewhat boring (to them) continuity with a past that 
they already know and find rather familiar and dull, as in ‘It’s all the same innit?’ Phil 
points out that the present is something of a disappointment in that it is not ‘all 
futuristic’. This seems to be linked to the wider socio-cultural production of ‘the 
future’ needing to be recognisably different from ‘the past’ to be futuristic at all. 
Within wider socio-cultural ‘versions of the future’ certain ‘future-indicators’ are 
produced (hover cars, robots, everything being silver and so on). When these ‘future- 
indicators’ are not present in the present, a time or era cannot ‘logically’ be deemed to 
be futuristic. This shows that entities are not inherently ‘futuristic’ but rather that 
certain artefacts, social processes, perceived changes in society and so on, are 
constituted, through ‘future-talk’ as being futuristic. It is this that the teenagers in the 
above excerpt are struggling with.
Within corporate versions of the future, which include the writings of 
futurologists, the activities of marketing departments and so on, ‘the future’ is often 
produced as ‘arriving’ at the advent of a ‘new’ technology. If this ‘new’ technology 
fails to live up to the promises and expectations it is imbued with, then the very nature 
of what ‘the future’ is has to be adapted (as with the example of WAP being nearly 
but not quite the future, and 3G being closer to ‘the future’). As discussed by the 
teenagers, if fantastical ‘new’ technologies fail to ‘arrive’ then, given the intense 
intertwining of technological progress and ‘the future’, the future cannot be said to 
have ‘really’ arrived. Certain technologies are thus deemed (both within the corporate
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world and by the teenagers) to be signifiers of the ‘arrival’ of ‘the future’. Given the 
continuous process of producing versions of the future, one could argue that in a sense 
‘the future’ (at least in terms of ‘new’ technologies) may never ‘arrive’ since in a 
sense other ‘newer than the newest’ technologies will always be posited as ‘better’ 
indicators of ‘the future’. This point relates to the way in which ‘the future’ as a 
temporal abstraction is continuously being (re)created in the present moment.
As long as ‘new technologies’ are produced as harbouring the possibility of 
radical and fundamental change and their ‘essence’ is deemed to have the potential to 
usher in a new era for the whole of ‘society’, the present can continue to be produced 
as ‘not futuristic’ since it will always continue to remain recognisable to those living 
that present. To deal with the conundrum of a present that was meant to be futuristic 
but, for the teenagers here, clearly is not, James suggests another, far-off date (2030) 
as a time when it will ‘really’ be the future. Thus ‘the future’ can be indefinitely 
postponed, but it is still assumed that at some point ‘it’ will happen. What 
implications does this have for how the teenagers dealt with changes in mobile device 
design and size when talking about past, present and friture? It is maintained that 
through talk about ‘old’ mobile devices and their juxtaposition with current and 
future-possible devices, the teenagers produced a version of technological progress 
that was workable despite their scepticism about whether ‘the future’ has, or would 
ever ‘arrive’, or if it did, whether it would always and inevitably bring improvements 
to mobile technology.
One of the ways in which the teenagers came to understand the future-possible 
and produce versions of the future was via the invocation of perceived ‘old’ or 
contemporary technologies^^l Du Gay et al’s (1997) work on the meanings and 
practices that brought the ‘Walkman’ into being is highly relevant here. Du Gay et al 
(1997) ask how the Walkman was produced as a meaningful object, how it was made 
understandable to the potential consumer and how the consumer made it mean as a 
socio-technical artefact. They note how journalists for example struggled to make this 
‘new’ device intelligible to themselves and their readers. An audio-editor of the 
magazine Radio Electronics is reputed as describing the ‘new’ device in 1979 as ‘a 
smallish stereo-headphone cassette-player’ (Klein 1979:72). This description only 
works if the audience understands words such as ‘stereo’ and ‘cassette-player’. A 
more contemporary example is the ways in which the mobile industry is attempting to 
make picture/video messaging understandable (and attractive) to consumers. As such
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we already understand the notion of messaging through our use of text messaging. 
Visually-based messaging is understandable through its comparison with its ‘older’ 
textual equivalent. Short-Messaging Services (SMS) are produced as having ‘evolved’ 
from words to visuals with the advent of Multi-Media Messaging (MMS). The 
similarity of the acronyms make the ‘new’ services understandable whilst 
simultaneously highlighting their different ‘more advanced’ capabilities. Du Gay at al 
(1997) postulate that,
We map new things in terms of, or by extension or analogy from, things 
we already know.. .And since we can always add new meanings or inflect 
old meanings in new ways, the chain of meaning has no obvious point 
where meaning began - no fixed point of origin - and no end...So, we 
represent the ‘new’ by mapping it to what we already know. Or we build 
meanings by giving old meanings new inflection (‘a Walkman is rather 
like a stereo tape-deck only very small and more mobile’). Or we contest 
meaning, by replacing an old meaning with a new one (1997:14).
Here Du Gay et al (1997) focus upon a technology which has basically already been 
produced and, which for those involved in making it meaningful, already ‘exists’ as a 
physical artefact. For those imagining fiiture-possible artefacts, much the same 
meaning-making process occurs. Within the focus groups, ‘old’ or ‘current’ 
technologies were invoked as resources to help produce and imagine future-possible 
devices. Here members of focus group three struggle to understand the image (Image 
4, Appendix 2) that I have presented to them,
Chris: I think my one’s a load of rubbish. It’s Image 4 and it’s a thing where you 
can walk around and record yourself if you are absolutely, really, in love with 
yourself. You can walk around going Tm just going to the shop’.
(laughter)
Allen: I love me.
Chris: I suppose it would be really boring after a while, coz like you know those 
little things that piay back to you when you taik to them?
Hannah: Why would you...?
Allen: What like in Home Aione?
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Samantha: What like a dictaphone?
Chris: Like everyone’s bought those things where you just go ‘Blah, blah, blah’. It
gets really boring.
(Focus group 3:18. Emphasis added).
Through their irreverent talk (i.e. Tt’s rubbish’) this group draw on ‘old’ technologies 
to make the ‘new’ understandable. Further they embed this ‘new’ device in an 
everyday scenario and work on what it may do there. This process of embedding a 
future-possible device into a mundane ‘everyday’ scenario was, it is proposed, one of 
the key ways in which the participants produced versions of the future in relation to 
mobile communication technologies. In this way they can draw in what they ‘know’ 
viscerally about their ‘everyday world’ as an aid to making sense of the previously 
(for them) unintelligible. By arguing that a future-possible device would be ‘like’ 
something, the participants were able to construct viable accounts of the future 
through their commonsensical understandings of past and present technologies. Here 
focus group four talk about the possibility of watching TV programmes, films and so 
on, on one’s mobile phone,
Jessica: What would be the point of watching TV on a tiny screen?
Jenna: That’s like those pocket TVs you can get. They were really stupid.
Jessica: Yeah.
Rob: But it’s like playing Gameboy innit? Gameboyms only small.
Jenna: Yeah but it was different with a Gameboy.
Jessica; Yeah like a telly and a Gameboy. Completely different.
Kay: She has a point. (Focus group 4:7).
Such production-through-invocation of perceived ‘old’ or ‘contemporary’ 
technologies is a fascinating instance of how ‘new’ technologies, their perceived 
capacities and possible uses become stabilised through meaning-making processes on 
the micro-scale of interaction.
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Generational Discourses and the Myth of the CyberKid
Facer (2000) notes how concerns about the so-called ‘Information under-class’, those 
on the wrong side of the ‘Digital Divide’ tend to be focused on the adult 
population attempting to grapple with unfamiliar ‘new’ technologies such as the 
Internet,
Young people, it is popularly assumed, are part of a new ‘digital 
generation of cyber kids’. News reports increasingly generate a dialectic 
between ‘old people’s’ fear of computer use and ‘young people’s’ 
enthusiasm.. .(Facer 2000:2).
The participants in the focus groups conducted, all aged 16-18, generally subscribed 
to what Facer (2000) calls ‘the myth of the cyberkid’ or the ‘whizzkid’. There appears 
to be an interesting dynamic at work within this general adherence to the belief that 
the younger generation will always be ‘better’ with ‘new technologies’ than the 
generation proceeding it. First some demonstrations.
Matt: It took 'em (parents) ages to work out how to use 'em (mobiles).
Kevin: My Dad’s hopeless.
Matt: My Dad doesn’t even know how to use the phone book yet. He’s like, "Er, 
how do you do it?’
Jessica: Young people are quick to learn. Like the older generation had to change 
currencies didn’t they?...my Mum still doesn’t like that. She still refers to the old 
currency.
L: Like 10 shillings?
Jessica: And she doesn’t know how to use the video recorder. They learnt how to 
change the currency when she was young, so it’s easier for younger people to 
change their ideas. (Focus group 1:7).
According to Jessica, younger people are better than older people with technology. 
She links this to their apparent ability to ‘change their ideas’. Her mother not being 
able to use the video recorder is taken as evidence that she is not ‘good’ with 
relatively ‘new’ technologies. It could be assumed that Jessica is distancing herself
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from this ‘older generation’ that is rather inept with technology. Here essentialism 
(with regard to adeptness with ‘new’ technologies) is deployed to construct difference 
between age cohorts. In one sense she is but as the discussion continues another 
dimension is added,
L: Imagine if you had children...
Simon: They’d probably be better than us with technology.
Jessica: It would be like second nature. I mean by the time we have children there 
will be technology everywhere...more advanced than we know, but it’ll be like 
second nature to them (Focus groupl :8).
This and other extracts from the focus group data share some similarities with the 
findings of Facer (2000) in his work on ‘the myth of the cyberkid’. One quote from 
Facer’s work exemplifies this well.
Slide 11. Jack and Simon aged 13 and 1 4 : 1 think it’s hard for us. The younger 
generation now...to get into computers. But like when we have kids it’ll be just like 
really natural won’t it? It’ll be natural for them because they’ve grown up with it, 
but we haven’t grown up with it....And they won’t know any different, they’ll be 
using it from when they’re really small. (Facer 2000:7).
Facer (2000) maintains that the figure of the ‘cyberkid’ is an ‘endlessly deferred 
possibility’ (2000:7) which is re-presented for subsequent generations as each 
generation grows familiar with and identifies their own difficulties and problems in 
using new technologies. Here each generation is expected to cope with the 
inevitability of technological change. This assumption of inevitable technological 
progress is apparent in Jessica’s account, ‘I mean by the time we have children there 
will be technology everywhere...more advanced than we know’ (Focus group 1:8. 
Emphasis added). For Jessica, technology may have ‘evolved’ so rapidly that it will 
be outside the current scope of contemporary knowledge. In a sense Jessica’s 
formulation of technological progress follows Arthur C. Clarke’s infamous quote, 
‘Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic’. The 
possibility of technology being ubiquitous, ‘everywhere’ according to Jessica, also 
lends support to the notion of the ‘cyberkid’. If these technologies are everywhere, it
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will only be those who have ‘grown up’ with that situation who will feel at ease and 
‘natural’ with it. In a sense, having to learn about a technology, after its coming into 
being, after it being ‘everywhere’, somehow implies that it would be near impossible 
ever to be ‘natural’ about using it. Here, as Facer (2000) maintains, technological 
competency is essentialised as an intrinsic property of youth.
Participants in this study used examples of younger siblings, cousins or nieces 
and nephews to validate the notion of the younger generation naturally being ‘better’ 
with ‘new’ technologies. In terms of members of the ‘older generation’, it was 
mothers who were portrayed as least comfortable with new technologies. The Internet 
in its current form appeared to still be considered relatively ‘new’, as the extract 
below demonstrates,
Amy: My mum don’t know how to use a mobile phone nor ever has it switched on. 
Shannaz: My mum’s just worked out how to use it and you know how you shorten 
things (in text messages) she’s trying to do that and put smiley faces at the end.
It’s so sweet.
Sarah: When my mum first got her mobile, I had to help her. She was like ‘How do 
you make a phone call?’ Like because we’re used to it we just know don’t we?
They have to be taught.
Hannah: I think people younger than us, like they’re gonna be whizz-kids like 
they’re gonna know the Internet from when they’re younger like we’re ]ust getting 
used to it sort of thing.
Amy: Yeah we don’t know how to search property.
Hannah: They’ll be like (imitates fast car). Technology freaks.
Amy: They’ll probably get taught it at school. We missed out on all this learning 
literacy and all that stuff.
Hannah: My little brother...he’s six years younger than me.
Amy: Yeah primary school kids are brighter than us.
Hannah: Yeah and he’s all like into all that and he knows how to use mobiles 
already. He hasn’t got one but he wants one though. He knows how to go on the 
Internet at school. He’s all like information technology...
Michelle: They can sit there can’t they and you just put a computer game in front 
of them and they just know. It’s really strange. I mean I sit there coz my 
boyfriend’s got a Playstation, sitting there trying to do all this stuff. Like Tony
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Hawks (skateboarding game) I just go skate down and don’t do anything. I just 
about keep ‘im on the skateboard but little kids they can sit in front of it for five 
minutes and they know how to do everything. (Focus group 6:9-10. Emphasis 
added).
The students also spoke of their parents’ ineptitude with current mobile devices. This 
helps to constitute their (essentialised) generational technological superiority. The 
‘latest’ generation is posited as being ‘naturally’ more accepting of the latest 
technologies. Below Chris seems to be saying that ‘newness’ is relative to the 
chronological time and that the naturalisation of technologies is a recurring process,
Hannah: My mum refuses...she hates... 
Samantha: My mum likes hers. 
Chris: That happens with every generation don’t it? The newer generation accepts 
it. 
Hannah: My mum uses it a lot but she says 7 only want to phone people’ and she 
is happy to have a phone that was made in like 1980. (Focus group 3:12. 
Emphasis added.)
Hannah’s last comment indicates that whilst her mother may use the phone a lot, this 
apparently (rather embarrassing) blip in the assumed generational differences with 
regards to new technologies is rescued by the ‘fact’ that her mother only wants to 
phone people. For Hannah, in this extract at least, her mother’s wish to only phone 
people is an indication of her mother’s anachronistic ways. What about texting for a 
start? Ring tones? Snake? Even picture messaging? All those other things one can do 
with a mobile device. By establishing that her mother’s phone was ‘made in like 
1980’, her mother’s use of the phone becomes less of an anomaly. The model is 
posited as being so ‘old’ anyway it almost does not really count as a ‘new’ 
technology, or even as a mobile for that matter. Jenna on the other hand tells the 
opposite story. Her mother has,
Jenna: ...the best phone in the world. Well it’s a good phone. It’s like this one but 
you know the next one up. She doesn’t know how to use it. She only rings me to 
check I’m where I say I am. (Focus Group 4:6).
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Here the anomaly of Jenna’s mum having a new model is dealt with by her inability 
and perhaps reluctance to use it, apart from, according to Jenna, to check up on her 
daughter. There was much evidence within the focus groups of participants 
disapproving of their parent’s use of mobiles, and it is suggested that by voicing such 
opinions, the teenagers are able to distance themselves from both the ‘older’ and 
generally technically inept generation, and from the ‘whizz-kid’ younger (than them) 
generation who will be ‘technology freaks’. In a sense this generational discourse in 
relation to mobile communication technologies is a way of dealing with temporality 
and uncertainty. If different generations are produced (through future-talk) as having 
essentialised relations to technologies, then the teenagers are able to posit their current 
position as ‘natural’ and by implication ontologically correct in the temporal scheme 
of the social world.
Interestingly there were some examples provided of ‘old people’ who are able 
to use new technologies, but these were often presented in the form of jokes in terms 
of how surprising and seemingly incongruous this is with normative expectations. 
Both quotes here demonstrate the participant’s assertions about the apparent 
impracticality of an ‘old person’ having a mobile device,
Jessica: My Granddad’s got a mobile phone. It’s so funny he doesn’t know when it 
is ringing. He’s a bit deaf. We go ‘Your phone is ringing’ and he’s like ‘Where did I 
put it?’, (laughter) (Focus group 4:6). 
Allen: Yeah like my Granddad’s got an 82-10 yet he can’t bloody see the thing 
without putting his glasses on (Focus group 3:19).
Here, in Jessica and Allen’s accounts, as with Hannah’s and Jenna’s accounts (Focus 
groups 4 and 3 respectively), normatively ‘surprising’ stories are told about age and 
use of mobile technologies. Humour is deployed within these stories as a way of 
downplaying the challenges they present to the notion of essential generational 
differences in relation to ‘new technologies’. Essentialised generational discourses are 
used to make sense of present and future-possible technologies and social groupings’ 
(in terms of age) usage of them.
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Dealing with a ‘Risky’ Task
In his work about the current interest in the future, evidenced for him by the rise of 
‘futurology’ and the popularity of science fiction, Hottois (1981, 1984) argues that 
this indicates a shift in conceptions of temporality in the West. Crogan (1999) with 
reference to Hottois (1984), Virilio and Lotringer (1983) and Derrida (1982) on the 
‘aporia of speed’, maintains that concepts of temporality are being challenged and 
perhaps overturned to a degree that has not been experienced ‘since the “Judeo- 
Christian vision” supplanted the mythical temporality which preceded it’ (Crogan 
1999:162) What Hottois (1981,1984) finds most revealing about futurological studies 
are the reservations expressed, usually in prefaces to works, about the accuracy of 
their predictions. Through a consideration of such disclaimers, Hottois (1981, 1984) 
contends that accounts of the fiiture cannot be rendered clearly visible since its 
unforeseeablity is radical, not merely to the order of minor miscalculations of present 
tendencies. Hottois (1981:77) roots the source of this ‘opaque’ future in contemporary 
techno-science that can be differentiated from science of antiquity,
...deductivist, conceptual, speculative,- thought must in principle be 
capable of securing knowledge by deducing without surprise, a priori, the 
body of science from premises. Logical and speculative, the former 
science was in some way intemporal (1981:77).
Hottois contrasts this with contemporary techno-science which he describes as 
entirely ‘in time: the time of research and of construction’ (1981:77). If recent results 
and experimentation are reacted to over and above deduction from founding 
principles, then the future is no longer the guarantee or end result of predictions, but 
instead (the future) is rendered always limited and contingent. In Hottois’s view the 
opaque, unforeseeable nature of the techno-scientific change means that the future 
cannot be justifiably predicted. Furthermore, the opaque nature of ‘the future’ means 
that techno-science has to retroactively legitimate its ‘developments’, which amounts 
to a ‘desperate measure of the predictive Enlightenment discourses of progress in the 
face of their increasing irrelevance today’ (Crogan 1999:163).
As demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, corporate visions of the future, and 
versions produced by futurologists and ‘blue sky’ researchers contain disclaimers.
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also identified by Hottois (1981, 1984), about the viability of predicting the future. In 
Chapters Seven and Eight I have examined the ways in which the teenagers also 
produce disclaimers about producing viable versions of the future, whilst nonetheless 
being able to say something about the future by firmly embedding it in their 
commonsensical understandings of . their own experiences of technology. The 
disclaimers were not the brutal denials of the viability of projecting a history of the 
future that some futurologists and corporations express. Instead, the teenagers in the 
focus groups utilised various subtle devices, including humour, to deal with the task 
they were asked to undertake, that is to imagine ‘the future’ in relation to mobile 
telecommunication devices. They rarely questioned exactly when the future is or will 
be, treating ‘it’ instead as an abstract temporal entity that is what it is through its 
distinction from the past and present. However some group members did question 
when the future is or will be, basing this on their local experiences of living through 
the millennium, a time which, in their words, was ‘meant’ to be the future.
They tackled the difficulty that Hottois (1981, 1984) identifies with aplomb, 
using humour in particular to overcome the perceived ‘riskiness’ of predicting a 
perhaps unknowable future. The risk for them was firstly in taking part in a peer 
group interaction whereby their suggestions for the future-possible could be laughed 
at. This they dealt with by using humour to distance themselves from their future 
visions. They also tacked the riskiness of prediction by highlighting (again 
predominately using humour) the ‘mistakes’ that past predictors had made, to 
demonstrate their knowledge such mistakes can be made, even by ‘experts’. By 
embedding future-possible devices in their own everyday life-world, they worked 
through the risk of predicting the future, and demonstrated their scepticism of 
technophilic visions of the future, whilst still managing to employ the ‘logic’ of 
technological progress narratives (that devices would ‘inevitably’ get smaller and 
have more and faster applications for example). Technological progress was 
challenged by the teenagers in talk about their fears for the future, and in their 
questioning of the utility of devices produced and used by ‘ others ’.
By invoking contemporary and familiar technologies, the participants in these 
focus groups were able constitute viable and, for them, understandable versions of a 
‘mobile future’. It has been suggested that only through the invocation of discourses 
about ‘old’ technologies (their size, their ‘faults’ and so on) can ‘new’ technologies be 
envisioned and described in ways that were meaningful to the teenagers. Here the
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‘passing’ of ‘our’ time, and notions of the past leading onto the present and the future 
in a historical teleology, proved to be fundamental to making versions of the future 
‘commonsensical’ and viable. In the last four chapters I have explored the ways in 
which versions of the future in relation to mobile communication technologies are 
produced by those within the corporate world, and by groups of teenagers who are 
constituted as ‘consumers’ within that corporate world. I have explored the ways in 
which ‘the future’ is presented and understood, which includes the ways in which 
continuities (between ‘the present’ and ‘the future’ for example) and contradictions 
(between diminishing size of devices and the ‘limitations’ of the ‘natural’ human 
body for instance) are dealt with in future-talk. I have looked at the ways in which the 
‘task’ of producing viable accounts of the friture is managed: through humour, 
irreverence, generational discourse and the embedding of imagined devices in ‘real 
world’ situations for example. I have also noted how versions of the future delineate 
what is deemed future-possible and future-impossible, lending meaning to both 
contemporary and imagined mobile communication devices. To conclude my research 
I now turn to the wider significance of my work and explore the possibility that it has 
implications for sociologically-orientated researchers with an interest in technologies 
and the future.
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Chapter Nine: Towards a Sociology of ‘the Future’
Beyond the Mobile Into the Future
The mobile device, convergent or otherwise, warrants the attention of sociologically- 
orientated researchers given its position as a key socio-cultural and technical artefact 
in contemporary times. Mobile devices are imbued with continually shifting meanings 
across and within different time frames, from ‘yuppie’ status symbol to gaming 
device, Internet portal and mundane communication tool. Mobiles are frequently 
talked about in terms of their potential. This current and future-orientated ‘potential’ 
is sometimes cast in positive terms, with the mobile produced as a tool to facilitate 
fast, effective communication and as a means to procuring context relevant 
information. At other times mobiles are construed as a negative force whereby they 
are classified as debilitating ‘real’ communication and disrupting the flow of 
traditional social interactions. Talk about ‘potential’ is in a constant state of flux. 
Different social groupings continuously enrol evidence and counter-evidence to 
strengthen their production of certain versions of the future in relation to mobile 
communication technologies.
One of the implications of my research is related to the ways in which we 
study (‘new’) technologies and technical discourses. By focusing on the future- 
possible claims made when technologies are talked about we create a window through 
which to view the assumptions that are made about technological pasts, technological 
trajectories and their supposed ‘impact’ upon our social world. In addition we are able 
to explore the ways in which new technologies are ‘made to mean’ through the 
discursive production of the future-possible.
So future-talk is an integral part of rhetoric about the so-called ‘mobile age’ 
(Myerson 2001). I have highlighted the need to fully engage with this future-talk as a 
way of understanding the mobile’s place in present times. This research has explored 
how versions of the future from a variety of sources contribute to making present and 
future-possible mobile communication technologies meaningful. In turn I have 
studied how mobile communication technologies are deployed to make ‘the future’ a 
meaningful temporal entity. For instance by imbuing mobile communication 
technologies with supposedly inherent ‘futuristic’ qualities, ‘the future’ can be said to
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‘arrive’ when such technologies become commercially available. Rather than a fixed 
point in linear time, ‘the future’ is mediated through the ‘logic’ of technological 
transition and progression and in this sense can be viewed as something of a ‘moving 
target’. Within the focus groups for example the teenagers employed ever-shifting 
notions of when the future ‘is’ (such as when they themselves were older) or took ‘the 
future’ as an unidentifiable point in time, that is as an ‘entity in itself, not coherently 
linked with a particular date. ‘New’ and ‘futuristic’ technologies become recast as 
‘old’ technologies, and the time-line ‘arrival’ of ‘the future’ changes yet again. It is in 
this way that one can argue that ‘the future’, as an abstract temporal entity is 
continuously (re)made in the present moment.
My principal research question asked how 'versions o f  the future ’ are built up 
in relation to mobile communication technologies and what these versions do in our 
social world. I have refrained from arguing that versions somehow ‘impact’ upon the 
meanings and actions that are possible in our contemporary social world. This line of 
argument would imply that versions are outside of the social sphere. Rather versions 
serve to delineate the meanings and representations that are thought 
‘commonsensical’, thus making certain actions and certain outcomes seem more 
feasible and desirable than others. To give an example, corporate versions of the 
future seek to produce corporate identities that feature ‘future-orientated’ elements:
‘forward-thinking’ new technology incubators such as BT Exact, or the historically 
‘cutting-edge’ reputation of MIT (Suchman 2003). Such concern with presenting a 
future that is ultimately knowable through expertise rests on the valued endpoint of 
competitive advantage through control and colonization of that future in a Western 
capitalist society.
The first of my specific research aims was to explore the ways in which ‘the 
future’ in relation to mobile communication technologies is presented in 
contemporary times, including the contradictions and continuities present both within 
and across versions. I have sought to ‘trouble’ our notions of the future as simply an 
unrealised point in linear time. Rather I have argued that ‘the future’ can be thought of 
as an abstract temporal entity that is imbued with meaning by the production of 
versions of ‘it’ as an object of knowledge in the present moment. The implication of 
viewing ‘the future’ in this manner is that we can explore the ways in which ‘the 
future itself is made to mean, troubling our concepts of linear time in which the 
future ‘naturally’ continues on from a given past.
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One of the ways in which ‘the future’ is made to mean is through the 
construction of ‘futuristic’ technologies. The mobile is the prime example here. What 
is it about mobiles that renders them amenable to production as inherently futuristic 
technologies? Could I have taken any technology as a meaningful focus for this 
research? There does seem to be something peculiar to talk about mobile 
communication technologies and the future in comparison to other ‘mundane’ 
technologies such as dishwashers and microwaves. I suggest that discourses about the 
supposedly time and space changing capacities of mobile technologies serves to 
construct them as more feasibly ‘futuristic’. The Internet is another primary example 
of a technology that is constantly being infiased with time and space changing 
capacities. Other ‘new’ technologies such as clinical biotechnology (including a wide 
range of genetic therapeutic and engineering applications) and nanotechnology are 
also currently being posited as somehow ‘essentially’ futuristic, perhaps in part due to 
the discourses of expectations that produce them (Brown and Michael 2003). To 
expect something of a ‘new’ technology involves producing futures whereby those 
expectations are fulfilled, and in so doing, the very properties of these technologies, 
be they mobile, genetic or atomic, are permeated with futuristic elements that are 
worked up to seem inherent and essential. The expectations surrounding the ‘impact’ 
that they will supposedly have on what it means to be ‘human’, whether in terms of 
communication and sociability, or the quality and longevity of life, are, I suggest, part 
of what makes them amenable to futuristic connotations.
Thinking about the future as an abstract temporal entity imbued with meanings 
in the present moment has several implications for sociologically-orientated research. 
Rather than thinking about the future as a moment in time which will ‘bring’ change 
to our social world, we can interrogate ‘the future’ as a discursive domain that is made 
meaningful through the accounts of various social groupings. Rather than seeking to 
predict the future, we can aim to understand how future predictions are constructed. 
This amounts to a move away from looking into the future, to looking at the future as 
a discursive domain. Whilst the focus here has been on mobile communication 
technologies, it is clear that my research has implications for other areas of socio­
cultural life. To give an example, one domain that is ripe for investigation in terms of 
future-orientated discourse is the near term and long term ‘effects’ of recreational 
substance use amongst young people (Moore 2003b). Through future-orientated 
discourse, policy makers, health service providers and young people themselves
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construct differing versions of the future, based on their present day assumptions, 
about the ‘correct’ behaviours, attitudes, and policies to ‘deal’ with what is cast as 
either a social problem or a leisure pursuit that needs justification. ‘The friture’ 
features as a contested space in a wide variety of domains of social life.
‘The future’ first has to be produced an object of knowledge. Through an 
investigation into the ways in which futurology polices its disciplinary borders, I have 
argued that ‘the future’ is presented as an entity about which there can be certain 
forms of ‘knowledge’, with some forms being constructed as more valid than others. 
The process of making predictions, whether through the use of positivist scientific 
tenets, or through ‘imaginative’ work, is couched in terms of making ‘the future’ 
knowable so as to better control it, or at the very least be prepared for its vagaries. 
When predictions are made in relation to mobile technologies, the assumption of the 
perceived success of a prediction relies on understandings of technological progress 
and change. Via technological determinism what are thought of as the ‘inherent’ 
properties of the mobile, a personalized tool for varied forms of communication with 
those not co-present, are extrapolated to the future and used to render that future more 
coherent. As ‘new’ meanings are produced for the mobile so the known future 
changes as versions are continually revised (in light of this ‘new knowledge’) in the 
present moment. Ever-changing notions of what the humble mobile can and cannot 
do, might and might not do, are testimony to the human/social work that is put into 
such technologies, and highlights the essentialist assumptions we hold about them, 
and those that consume them. A consideration of futurology and corporate future-talk 
demonstrated how accounts of the future in relation to technology define the ways in 
which both the future and mobile communication technologies can be spoken about 
meaningfully. The two are intimately interrelated in a continual process of definition, 
reconsideration and re-definition.
Within the various versions of the future that this research examined, ‘the 
future’ was constructed in a variety of different ways. The teenagers in the focus 
groups for example imagined, through the deployment of essentialist generational 
discourses, the friture as a place in which their superior ‘mastery’ of technology (in 
contrast to their parents’ generation) would eventually be surpassed by the skills the 
future’s ‘whiz-kids’ will hold. They also imagined a friture in which people will be 
somehow ‘less human’ as we become over-reliant on technologies such as mobiles, 
televisions and the Internet.
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So as an object of knowledge, ‘the future’ is constructed as something, or 
someplace, that we can ‘know’ something about. Firstly the future is produced as a 
realm of risks, threats, opportunities and possibilities. As a risky realm the future is an 
entity that needs to be controlled through the production of knowledge about ‘it’. This 
risky realm is formed as a temporal abstraction that contains within it possibilities, 
that is the possibility of danger and of opportunity. From my work on corporate 
versions of the future for example I noted how the future is simultaneously constituted 
as a threat (if plans are thwarted or if risks are not fully accounted for and controlled) 
and as an opportunity (to improve profit margins and competitive advantage if  future 
possibilities are properly understood and made use of). The future is produced as 
something that can be grasped and ‘delivered’ and as something that has to be planned 
for through the creation and use of ‘expert’ knowledge.
The future is also constituted as something that may ‘arrive’ at the advent of 
new technologies that are produced as being inherently futuristic. Indeed ‘the future’ 
may never arrive if the technologies so closely associated with ‘it’ fail to materialise. 
Again this point belies the essentialist assumptions that we hold about certain 
technologies in that their ‘natural’ capacities are presumed to hold the ‘key’ to 
unlocking certain future possibilities. The implication of this is that the ‘arrival’ of 
certain technological capacities, with their attendant ‘impact’ on our social world, is 
taken as a future-signifier. The story goes that once these capacities are fully realised 
(through the breakdown of current technological barriers, or contemporary consumer 
resistance), that realisation will herald the ‘real’ future. The interrelation between 
technological determinism and notions of what and when ‘the fixture’ is remains 
apparent here.
‘The future’ as an abstract temporal entity is posited as the harbinger of 
change in itself. The future is presented as bringing changes in the ‘identity’ of 
material artefacts that again obscures their constant remaking through discursive 
means in the present moment. The future is deemed to be an active force in the social 
sphere, a force which can ‘impact’ upon what we ‘know’ to be social life in the 
present. Further, notions of the ‘natural’, ‘nature’ and (technological/social) 
‘evolution’ and even ‘revolution’ are enrolled to strengthen the stability and perceived 
viability of certain versions of the future. Mobile technologies are produced as 
bringing with them a ‘revolution’ in communication. They are simultaneously 
produced as ‘evolving’ into what they are ‘really’ meant to be, and it is within the
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production of this process of evolution that their ‘essential’ properties are located. 
Again as technologies evolve they are assumed to be able to bring with them ‘the 
future’, whilst conversely ‘the future’ is constructed as a ‘natural’ point in time that 
will herald the realization of technological change.
Continuing to look at the implications of the ways in which ‘the future’ is 
presented in relation to mobile communication technologies, I have suggested that 
versions can also incorporate certain mandates for action. This point relates to the 
ways in which, through the very processes of their production, versions may do 
something in the social world. However I remain sceptical about the possibility of 
arguing that versions have a tangible and quantifiable ‘impact’ upon the present 
moment. Rather I suggest that versions can create mandates for actions through the 
delineation of representations and meanings. To give an example, those within the 
mobile industry maintain that particular roaming standards must be set if the ‘real’ 
and ‘revolutionary’ capacity of 3G is to be achieved in the near future. This indicates 
that when versions produce certain futures whose realization is deemed to be desirable 
(here a future in which mobile customers can use their 3G-enabled device anywhere 
and anytime in the world), certain attendant actions are constructed as desirable. The 
construction of the desirability of such actions is based in turn on the meanings that 
are given to current mobile technologies, for example as somehow presently lacking 
due to their capacities being constrained by national boundaries. The linear 
construction of time in relation to mobile communication technologies casts the past 
as exciting but naive, the present as imperfect but better ‘evolved’ than the past, and 
the future as (near) perfect if the ‘correct’ path is pursued.
So by asking how versions are made to perform, how they are circulated and 
what uses they are put to, one can grasp their consequential nature whereby the 
delineation of possible meanings can amount to a call for action. To give another 
example, as the mobile phone is being redefined as an entertainment, as well as a 
communication, device, so the ‘need’ for interoperability to facilitate cross-network 
mobile gaming becomes ‘self-evident’ in and through this redefinition process. As the 
future is produced as a risky realm, so the process of redefinition of new technologies 
which may ‘exist’ in that future serve to make this possibly unknowable realm seem 
less opaque. If the ‘arrival’ of certain technologies heralds ‘the future’, the advent of 
4G for example, that future appears to become easier to identify, control and possibly
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colonize through technological (expert) knowledge and the inexorable logic of future- 
orientated technological determinism.
Another of my specific aims was to look at how the task of producing versions 
of the future is managed and how resources are deployed in order to render these 
versions ‘commonsensical’ within local socio-cultural contexts. Here I argued that 
one might think of ‘social interests’ as being built up in local contexts through future- 
orientated texts and talk rather than being part of the ‘essential’ identity of the actors 
and social groupings involved. This perspective leads us to question what benefits 
producing a particular version of the future bring to those involved by detailing the 
ways in which certain versions produce that future. By casting the human actant as 
principally a ‘consumer’ of technological goods for example, research into ‘consumer 
lifestyles’ becomes a search for ‘knowledge’ that will aid the process of consumer 
adoption of new technologies. The focus on young people within (corporate) research 
on mobiles ‘works’ in the local context in the sense that this age group are assumed to 
be the most profitable ‘market segment’, whilst others (such as older ‘financially 
constrained’ users) become almost invisible within future technologies (and market) 
research.
Versions of the Future iu Diverse Settings
Above I asserted that the future is produced as a risky realm. Producing versions of 
the future is also deemed to be a risky task. Given the linear notion of time that 
predominates in Western thought, with the present perceived as leaving behind the 
past and the future proceeding from that present moment, prediction of that future is 
deemed liable to criticism from the very future that one is attempting to predict. One 
can, as the teenagers in my focus groups held, and the caveats added to the work of 
futurologists demonstrate, be proved wrong by the very ‘passing’ of time. Predicting 
the future can also be seen as a risky task dependent on the context of its production. 
To give an example, the production of the future as a ‘risky place’ in which 
businesses may succeed or fail (often perceived as depending on their ‘knowledge’ of 
future-trends) renders the task of imagining the future risky, in that if one ‘gets it 
wrong’ there will be consequences that will ‘arrive’ when ‘the future’ does. In 
addition, producing the future may be viewed as a ‘risky task’ in that there will 
always be others who proffer alternative views of the future, rendering other versions
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‘nonsensical’ in a given context if the alternative becomes accepted as viable. The 
resources deployed to produce viable versions of the future, for example humour and 
the embedding of the future-possible in ‘known’ material forms such as the Star Trek 
badge, were used in a particular manner precisely due to the perceived risk involved 
in the task at hand.
Within the corporate discourses I examined, there exists a socially embedded 
requirement to be ‘futuristic’. This requirement relates to the aforementioned benefits 
that go alongside being perceived as a forward thinking, future-orientated discipline 
or organisation. It also relates to the socially valued endpoint of striving for 
competitive advantage whereby knowledge of ‘the future’ is produced as an 
invaluable tool for the continuation or establishment of corporate success. For 
futurology, disciplinary boundaries are policed, and methodologies are built up with a 
view to upholding the disciplines’ position as the principal means to producing 
meaningful versions of the future. Here technological determinism is deployed to 
make the resultant versions more commonsensical, given the ways in which (mobile 
communication) technologies are constantly being imbued as inherently futuristic. As 
technologies and their ‘impact’ upon our social world are experienced by many as 
inevitable, if  not always desirable, resting versions of the future on the advent of 
certain technological developments adds weight to those versions’ coherency. 
Versions of the future are rendered more comprehensible in light of our 
understandings of technological progress and change over time.
Concepts of risk are significant here in two senses. Firstly by employing 
technological determinism, futurologists and corporations dealing with the future- 
possible are able to minimize the risk that is involved in predicting the future, that is 
the risk that one can always be proved ‘wrong’ by the ‘arrival’ of a future that is not 
the one predicted. The risky task of predicting the future is minimized precisely 
because the technologies that were meant to bring change can be recast as still 
lacking. Certain technologies are produced as heralding the ‘arrival’ of the future. If 
those technologies are yet to arrive (in the form predicted) then it is often presumed 
that it was not the predictions that were wrong. Rather the assumption is that technical 
di^culties (or consumei^esistance to those new Jechnologies) have prevented the 
arrival of that future.
This ‘logic’ is apparent in talk of WAP and 3G. Whilst WAP was cast as being 
a ‘technology of the future’, when it was released it was discursively produced as
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lacking in certain futuristic capabilities. Now 3G is heralded as the ‘real’ futuristic 
technology. Here we see how notions of technological progress dovetail into exactly 
what and when the future is. Predicting the future becomes a less risky task given that 
the future can be produced as never having arrived. The designation of technologies 
that are supposed to ‘be’ the future constantly changes. When a technology that was 
meant to herald the future does eventually arrive, another ‘new’ and ‘futuristic’ 
technology can be constructed as its replacement in the future. Thus ‘the future’ 
becomes a constantly moving target, and predicting the future, when it rests on the 
‘logic’ of technological determinism, becomes a less risky task.
In addition the future ‘itself is viewed as a risky realm, full of threats and 
dangers. In producing versions of the future the risk associated with the future, and in 
that future, is minimized. Versions provide predictors with models that seek to control 
and colonize the future. If a version succeeds in being viewed as the most feasible and 
‘commonsensical’ of the versions on offer in the present moment, then colonization of 
that future may be (momentarily) achieved. Of course the ‘success’ of a version is 
never guaranteed, as there will always be competing versions to contend with. 
However by being able to persuade others of the feasibility of a certain version, one 
can minimize the risk associated with the ultimate unknowability of the future. To 
make the future an object of knowledge involves seeking to control that future 
through the knowledge that is produced about it.
For the teenagers who participated in my research, the future as a ‘risky realm’ 
had different connotations. To begin with they were invited, rather than required, to 
think futuristically about mobile communication devices. Such an invitation differs to 
the demands to be futuristic that futurologists and corporations are faced with. Firstly, 
versions of the future were produced by the teenagers within the context of a focus 
group. My gatekeeper informed me that these young people had never, to her 
knowledge, taken part in such an exercise. Whilst I made the focus groups as informal 
as possible the participants were slightly wary of the situation and may have been 
worried about giving the ‘right’ answer, despite my reassurance that in this context 
there were no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ responses. The use of humour for example served as 
a ‘safe space’ in which the teenagers could explore their ideas and voice their 
opinions without risking ridicule from their peers. Predicting the future for the 
teenagers was a risky task precisely because of their own acknowledgement that one 
can be ‘made a fool o f  and ‘proved wrong’ by the future. They demonstrated this
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within the focus groups by highlighting the mistakes made regarding past millennium 
predictions. Such ‘mistakes’ link to the wider production of the future as something 
which ‘arrives’ in the present moment, as heralded by particular technologies in this 
context. ‘Futuristic’ technologies of the past can be recast as laughable attempts at 
prediction when they do not ‘arrive’ (such as the silver hovercraft cars imagined by 
the focus group participants).
One key difference between the young people’s versions of the future and 
those from the corporate world is that mundanity was less of a production strategy for 
the corporate visionaries than for the teenagers. As detailed in Chapter Eight, the 
teenagers used what I have termed ‘fantastical pragmatism’ to explore the 
practicalities, in the context of their own life-worlds, of future-possible mobile 
devices and services such as a holographic data displays. By embedding fantastical 
devices in their own experiential realities and seeing what they may do there they 
were able to work through possible advantages and disadvantages, surrounding 
convergence for example. In contrast futurologists and those that produce corporate 
versions of the future rely more on notions of ‘expert’, and in particular technological, 
‘knowledge’ to produce viable and ‘commonsensical’ versions. So whilst the 
teenagers did in a sense add ‘disclaimers’ to the versions they produced, they were 
subtler in their strategies of disavowal. The participants employed humour to distance 
themselves from their future visions, whereas some futurologists and corporations 
seem more likely to attach direct disclaimers to their versions. There are research 
implications related to such differences in the resources and strategies employed 
within the production of versions of the future. The social researcher needs to be 
mindful of the context of production of a version of the future, and in turn attempt to 
understand the ways in which using certain resources ‘works’ in that particular 
context. Some resources (such as humour) may ‘work’ in one context and not in 
another.
Wider Implications for Social Research
I now turn more specifically to the implications that my work has for the social 
sciences and in particular sociological studies of ‘the future’ and technologies. 
Through the interrogation of material concerned with the future capacities and 
capabilities of a technology, we can find a way into the ongoing debates about what a
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technology ‘is ’ and what it can, and could do. In so doing we apply the constructivist 
question to both ‘the future’ and ‘technologies’, whilst opening up a space for the 
consideration of the ways in which versions of the friture play a part in this ongoing 
interpretative process. Versions of the future continually work at being ‘viable’, 
‘commonsensical’ and even ‘inevitable’ in various settings. In so doing, technologies 
are continually being ‘made to speak’ in ‘new’ ways, and made to perform in a 
manner that complements (and adds meaning to) the versions in which they are 
embedded. The meanings of mobiles are constantly subject to change, not because 
progression and transition are ‘naturally’ built into their materiality, but because 
technologies can only be understood through human discourse. They must be named 
and explained and made to do something in the (assumed to be separate) ‘social’ 
realm before they become comprehendible in the (now troubled) past, present and 
future, as we have seen with the ways in which the teenagers embedded fantastical 
devices in their everyday life-worlds.
When interrogating versions of the future we need to be acutely aware of the 
contextual nuances of versions as they are produced, and as they appear, in different 
settings. The resources deployed by actants for the production of versions has been 
shown to differ according to the context of production. Within the focus groups, 
humour was used to manage the ‘risky’ task of creating predictions, to manage a (for 
them) unusual social interaction, and to cope with (socially constructed and imagined) 
incongruities, such as the ‘invasion’ of a person (via a videophone or holographic 
display) into one’s private domain. Humour was less evident in the corporate versions 
that I put under scrutiny. There, technological ‘knowledge’, technical ‘expertise’, and 
historical precedents of a corporation controlling the future, as with BT Exact’s prose, 
were deployed as discursive resources to produce ‘viable’, ‘commonsensical’ and 
‘inevitable’ futures.
The ways in which people produce versions of the friture differs then 
according to local context, but there are also similarities with regards production 
which cut across context. This point underlines how I have found it possible to say 
that producing versions of the future can be viewed as a ‘risky’ exercise given, for 
example. Western notions of the passing of time, and the ‘arrival’ of a future which 
could prove predictors wrong. Corporate futurologists tend to add caveats and 
disclaimers to their work, displaying their prior ‘knowledge’ that ‘the future’ may 
prove them wrong. The teenagers in the focus groups also added disclaimers to the
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visions they produced through interaction, by highlighting their disappointment with 
the ‘sameness’ of the world post-Millennium, a time they were told would be ‘the 
future’, again demonstrating their prior ‘knowledge’ of the ultimate ‘unknowability’ 
of the future. So resources for and within the production of futures differ according to 
the context and perceived ‘purpose’ of versions, yet there also exist continuities in the 
ways in which ‘the future’ is engaged with across diverse settings. Further study 
needs to engage with these similarities and contrasts of resource deployment.
I suggest that a coherent approach to the sociological study of ‘the future’, that 
is looking at ‘the future’ as a contested entity, rather than looking into it as a 
predictive exercise, has yet to be fully developed. This research has used mobile 
communication technologies as a ‘case study’ to see how such an approach could be 
used to think about how ‘the future’ is constructed in contemporary times. In addition, 
thinking about how this now troubled notion of ‘the future’ is produced in 
contemporary times enables us to interrogate the assumptions that are made about 
those contemporary times (as they are presented within versions of the friture). The 
extrapolation of current trends in, and perceptions of, social life into the future worlds 
we create, as with Philips’ version of a ‘sustainable future’ in which the motor car 
remains the principal mode of transport, can be investigated using ‘versions of the 
future’ as a research framework and sociological lens. The assumptions of our age are 
embedded in our versions of the future, and by scrutinising these versions we may 
better understand how such assumptions (such as the reductionist discursive 
construction of humans as ‘consumers’) can be produced as ‘natural’ and ‘factual’.
So the process of the production of ‘the future’ draws on normative 
understandings of ‘the present’, simultaneously constructing ‘the present’ in certain 
ways to ‘speak’ the future. This is apparent in the ways in which versions tend to 
highlight some ‘lack’ or problem in the contemporary moment, typically producing a 
future in which this (current) ‘lack’ or problem is overcome, through the application 
of technical expertise to surmount a ‘barrier’ for example. Normative positions taken 
about ‘the present’ are upheld through the deployment of versions of the future, for 
instance the position that if we wish to ‘reach’ a future deemed desirable, we must 
continue on our present ‘commonsensical’ path. Here we can see how the production 
of the future is performative, that is versions are performances which (attempt to) 
achieve certain things in the present, such as establishing legitimacy for a speaker 
who has special insight into a ‘unknowable’ realm through the application of technical
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knowledge. Versions the future are performative in this sense given the existence of 
concomitant notions of the value of certain endpoints, such as competitive advantage, 
and perceptions related to the very fabric of wider society, such as the expectation of 
the continued existence of Western capital markets, national governments and 
multinational corporations. Nuances within the ways in which versions present the 
future can be implicated in this performative element, such as when immediate action 
is ‘demanded’ by a dangerous future that is constructed as being proximal to the 
present moment. The study of versions of the future is vital then if we are to more 
fully comprehend the ways in which our contemporary world is discursively and 
materially produced.
Studying versions of the future in relation to mobile communication 
technologies has shed new light on the continuing role of technological determinism 
in our understandings of technology, technological trajectories and the ‘separating 
out’ of ‘social’ and ‘technical’ domains. The role of technological determinism in 
producing ‘viable’ and ‘commonsensical’ versions of the future is implicated in the 
ways in which technologies are expected to have ‘time-traj ectories ’, where a 
technology is ‘makes progress’ as time passes (or indeed become ‘naturally 
obsolete’). Technologically determined time-traj ectories are also apparent in versions 
whereby a certain technology is produced as being expected to ‘arrive’ at a certain 
time in the future, with its ‘arrival’ produced as heralding the ‘real’ future. Again the 
work that goes into producing a technology as futuristic is obscured by the 
assumption that technologies have inherent characteristics that make them ‘naturally’ 
futuristic. The human work that goes into producing a ‘viable’ version of the future 
(that is ‘viable’ and ‘commonsensical’ in a given local context) is also obscured by 
linking ‘naturally’ progressing technologies to that future.
Technologies are made to ‘speak’, and concurrently ‘speak’ the future, from 
an enviable position of seeming inevitability. Technologies are made to make that 
future seem ‘real’, particularly when future-possible technologies are given material 
forms, through design prototypes or references to science fiction artifacts for example. 
Alternative futures become hard (but never impossible) to construct in the face of the 
production of certain technologies as ‘really’ being the future. Future-orientated 
technological determinism is also implicated in the way we can speak of technologies 
as ‘evolving’ (implying some natural progression and transition), and notions of 
technological ‘revolutions’ which imply the definitive ‘splitting’ of the past, present
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and future through the ‘impact’ of the ‘technical’ on the ‘social’, or vice versa. ‘Old’ 
(the public phone box), ‘new’ (3G) and ‘newer than the new’ (such as 4G) 
technologies are made to mean through the production of versions, with technologies 
constantly being compared to one another in terms of their ‘futuristic’ characteristics. 
Notions of the ‘new’ are meaningless without concomitant notions of the ‘old’. 
Discursive work is undertaken to define the ‘new’ and the ‘old’, the ‘cutting-edge’ 
and the ‘obsolete’. Such characteristics are not inherent to particular technologies. I 
have demonstrated that future-related technological definitions rest on the continued 
assumption that technologies have ‘essential’ characteristics that exist ‘outside’ of the 
human/social work that goes into producing them as meaningful artefacts.
I have identified future-orientated technological determinism as a phenomenon 
that is currently under-researched within the social sciences. Future-orientated 
technological determinism takes shape in assumptions about technologies being the 
determining factor in human relations in ‘the future’. Technological determinism and 
the characteristic separating out of ‘social’ and ‘technical’ domains also amounts to a 
production of what human relations are expected to be like in that future. Thus no 
description of a ‘futuristic’ technology is ‘innocent’ in its related notions of ‘social’ 
domains and human relations. Versions work at making a technology meaningful 
partially through invoking contemporary understandings of social life, and partially 
through implicating a ‘new’ technology in what these ‘new’ forms of social life will 
be, once the future-possible technology ‘arrives and/or reaches its ‘true’ potential. If 
the future can be said to be a reasonably unknown entity then, as a temporal 
abstraction, it is relatively easy to produce ‘it’ as a place where technology is the 
determining factor, especially in terms of human relations. Given the (perceived) 
prospect of the ultimate ‘unknowability’ of ‘the future’, actants have to seek resources 
that will offer the possibility of ‘knowledge’ of a realm that has something of a 
mysterious status. Technological determinism offers a semblance of certainty in an 
otherwise uncertain future.
Thinking about versions of the future in relation to mobile communication 
technologies has offered an insight into how, as social researchers, we can continue to 
develop and extend our critique of technological determinism. How technologies are 
talked about in relation to ‘the future’ should be an essential part of any critique of 
technological determinism, particularly given the fact that little attention is paid to 
this form of technological determinism in current literature. Similarly, within
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sociology surprisingly little research has thoroughly considered ‘the future’ per se. 
The reason for this absence may be that a ‘metaphysical’ version of the future exists, 
unchallenged because of its presumed ethereal nature. ‘The future’ is produced as 
mysterious, as unattainable and almost impossible to research. If sociology does not 
wish to go down the route of making predictions about the future, how else can this 
ethereal temporal abstraction be studied? In my view, ‘the future’ is yet to be properly 
interrogated by sociologists. I have made ‘the future’ a more mundane, everyday 
entity which we can seek to investigate through the deployment of a wide variety of 
research tools, such as narrative analysis and discourse theory. Social research has 
sought to understand the ways in which technologies are socially constructed. I offer 
sociologically-orientated researchers a ‘foothold’ into issues related to the ways in 
which ‘the future’ is socially constructed and the ways in which future-possible 
technologies are discursively produced.
This research had concentrated on mobile communication technologies. It 
would be possible to use other (relatively) ‘new’ technologies to systematically 
explore differences or similarities in the ways in which ‘versions of the future’ are 
built up when they are the focus. Possible case studies include other consumer 
technologies, such as DVD and MP3 players, ‘new’ medical technologies and more 
‘left-field’ scientific fields such as nanotechnology. However, looking at versions of 
the future does not have to be restricted to the visions which produce ‘new’ 
technologies. The visions produced in relation to other areas of socio-cultural life can 
be subjected to a similar analysis. I have made ‘the future’ more researchable through 
casting it as mundane and ‘this-worldly’. In so doing the significance for social 
science occupied with the study of other realms of socio-cultural life should be 
apparent. Futures are not only imagined in relation to technologies.
Ling (2000) has examined health care futures. He notes how statements of the 
rising cost of, and demand for, health care in the Western world, coupled with 
‘changing popular values, new technologies, demographics and epidemiology’ (Ling 
2000:253) are used to produce a future which demands action today regardless of the 
particular wishes of the key players in the NHS. The politics of immigration policy, 
joining the Euro and paying for higher education are just some examples of possible 
domains that include elements of future-orientated discourse that could be studied 
with the research framework developed here.
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It is possible to think of ‘the future’ as an everyday ‘mundane’ undertaking, 
engaged with by all groups of social actants. This being the case, the study of versions 
of the future is widened yet further to include the ‘foresight activities’ we carry out on 
a day-to-day basis. This could take two interrelated forms. Firstly the researcher can 
explore, through qualitative methods such as interviews and focus groups, the ways in 
which people talk about their ‘personal’ futures. How is career progression envisaged 
amongst young professionals for example? What futures do new parents envisage for 
their offspring? Clearly such visions are embedded in the contemporary socio-cultural 
context so will always reveal the assumptions of the present moment and will be built 
up using a variety of resources just as the technological futures I chose to examine 
were. Relationships between people’s ‘personal’ accounts of ‘their’ future with 
notions of self identity and experiential understandings of the world, and with other 
versions of the future of social organisations and institutions such as the industrial and 
military complex and ‘the family’, can be explored by social researchers, helping us 
understand the role of ‘the future’ in Western society.
In addition, from a socio-cultural studies perspective, we may scrutinise the 
versions of the future produced within the various domains of popular culture, which 
could be an illuminating task. An article in a recent ‘women’s magazine’ proclaims 
‘Get a Lara Croft Body’ {More magazine, August 2003:56-57). This (familiar) 
proclamation involves a ‘vision’ (of ‘creating’ the ‘perfect’ body, of a ‘better’ and 
healthier person through adherence to a diet and exercise plan) that the reader is 
encouraged to take as viable and ultimately possible if the correct actions are 
undertaken. Promises are made, and produced as ‘realistic’, with the underlying 
suggestion that the reader should act now or in the near-future to obtain a slimmer and 
supposedly sexier body in that future, ‘Do you want Angelina Jolie s stunning, 
athletic bod? Here’s the scoop on Ange’s training programme -  you might not get 
paid megabucks to scale skyscrapers, but hey, you can still have her thighs’ (ibid:56). 
This example demonstrates the ways in which ‘the future’ could be said to be 
‘everywhere’ in our contemporary lives, that is as part of our mundane lived 
experiences. Versions of the future, be they in relation to mobile technologies, social 
policies or better bodies, are both shaped by and shape our social world and for that 
very reason warrant further attention from sociologically-orientated researchers.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Examples of screen shots from Philips ‘Vision of the Future’ project
(See http://www.design.philips.com/vof/tocl/home.htm)
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Appendix 2: Images used in focus groups (Images 1 to 6 respectively. 
Seehttp;//www.motorola.com/mot/doc/0/293_MotDoc.pdf for more information 
on Motorola images)
Image 1 : The Motorola 3G Concept Model -  The Video Phone 
Image 2: The Nokia 3G Terminal Coneept III 
Image 3: The Motorola Video-wateh Phone 
Image 4: The Motorola ‘Life Recorder’
Image 5: The Motorola ‘Hearing Hand’
Image 6: The Philips’ concept mobile: ‘Shiva Butterfly’
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Notes
 ^ The Tifeworld’ is taken here as the world experienced as a lived environment, endowed by our own 
and others meanings, which is lived from within and experienced through layer upon layer o f our own 
interpretations, ‘A commonsense stock o f knowledge orientates people to apply meaning to their own 
actions, those o f others and the events they encounter. The lifeworld thus exhibits the basis for a 
primary experience that enables people to orientate their actions through taking its self-evidence, or 
pre-reflexive constitution, for granted’ (May 1999:2). ‘Lifestyle’ primarily rests on the supposed 
‘depth’ o f the former over the later. ‘Lifestyle can be thought o f as ready-made templates for a 
narrative o f self which act rather like a fictional genre; you remain the ‘director’ o f your story but 
within certain ‘lifestyle’ confines, and relate to everyday decisions about what to wear, consume etc 
and how we position ourselves as one kind o f person or another (Gauntlett 2002).
 ^See www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,837494,OO.html for the online version.
 ^I.e. ‘Mobiles will be forced to carry health warnings’. The Observer, 30* April 2001.
See http://www.mthr.org.uk/ for more details.
 ^A discussion on this issue formed part o f the agenda for the European Parliament’s ‘Public Hearing 
on Information Society: Recent Developments and Future Scenarios’ in Brussels that I attended on the 
28* January 2003.
® This story was told by a participant at the ET telecom ‘Wireless Gaming’ conference in Barcelona 
which I attended between the 22"'^  and the 23'^ '* October 2002.
 ^The Open Mobile Alliance for example develops technical specifications and standards for those 
working in the ‘mobile arena’. Typically these standards have three phases; Candidate Enabler 
Releases, Approved Enabler releases and Interoperability Releases, the last being multiple enablers that 
have passed phase two with end-to-end interoperability test reports, and information about use cases.
At each phase considerable time and effort goes into agreeing the exact nature o f these specifications.
 ^I attended an MGIF workshop on 7* November 2002.
 ^BREW: Binary Runtime Environment for Wireless.
From conversation with the Standards Co-ordinator o f TTPCom on the 7* November 2002. See 
www.ttpcom.com for more information on this company.
See www.mgif.org, particularly the specifications outlines.
In the 2000 BT Genie advertisement, a computer generated man surfs a representation o f the ‘Mobile 
Internet’, moving from information space to information space in seconds, in a form o f dual mobility 
(mobile due to the handheld artefact and mobile within the information space represented as being 
within the handset).
’ Notes from meeting with MEF representatives on the 6* December 2002.
Barnes, B. (1981) ‘On the ‘Hows and Why s’ o f Cultural Change (Response to Woolgar), Social 
Studies o f  Science V ol.l 1, pp. 481-98. MacKenzie, D (1981) ‘Interests, Positivism and History’, Social 
Studies o f  Science Vol.l I, pp. 498-504. Woolgar, S. (1981a) Critique and Criticism: Two Readings of  
Ethnomethodology’, Social Studies o f  Science Vol 11, pp. 504-14.
The process by which liquids or very small particles are taken into the cell.
The term ‘Yuppies’ is an example of the naming process which Barthes alludes to. ‘Yuppies’ were 
identified as a distinct social grouping and were attributed with particular mannerisms and behaviours. 
So were are told that ‘Young Urban Professionals (Yuppies) turned spending into an art form, loading
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the trunks o f their BMWs with cellular phones, PCs, and other pricey, high-tech toys’.
(www.women.com/generations and innovations/decades/1980.htm, 15th May 2002, p .l).
Following terrorist acts on September 11*, 2001,on the World Trade Centre, New York and the 
Pentagon, Washington, USA, the world’s media have put forward countless future scenarios about the 
‘War on Terrorism’ that US President Gorge Bush declared. See Dartenell, M. (2001) Hyperterrorism, 
Kroker, A. and Kroker, M. (2001) A Hostile Universe, Dennis, D. (2001) The World Trade Centre and 
the Rise o f  the Security State, and Kroker, A. and Kroker, M. (2001) Terrorism o f  Viral Power, all at 
www.ctheory.net/default.asp, for various theoretical perspectives on the implications o f the events of  
September 11*, 2001.
Within the focus groups conducted during this research (see Chapters Seven and Eight) the teenagers 
drew on talk o f ‘old’ technologies to understand the ‘new’. ‘New’ and even ‘futuristic’ technologies 
were made to mean partially via their comparison to the design and perceived (lack of) capabilities o f  
‘old’ technologies.
Here ‘layering’ is taken to mean the simultaneous existence o f various versions o f the future, some in 
basic agreement with each other, and some in complete disagreement with each other. The range of 
versions o f the future involves those that deal exclusively with what is represented as the near (or 
proximal) future or the far (distal) future, and others which portray aspects o f both the proximal and the 
distal concurrently. Further this layering o f versions involves those which deal exclusively and 
explicitly with technological ‘developments’ (the technological projectory o f 3G technology for 
example) whilst others extrapolate from (assumed) technological developments to construct arguments 
for or against social change and ‘developments’.
The Manhattan Project was the code name for the US effort during World War II to produce an 
atomic bomb. Although the project took place mainly in New Mexico, it was named after the 
Manhattan Engineer District o f the US Army Corps o f Engineers, based in New York City, where 
much o f the early research was done (Moody 1995). The project lasted 4 years, between 1942 and 
1946, and cost about $1.8 billion. Today, this amount would be equivalent to over $20 billion (Parshall 
1995). There are many versions o f what occurred during this period (i.e. Stoff et al 1991).
From ‘Think Drastically, Implement Steadily’ in The Guardian, 
www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,577392,OO.html, 20* October 2001, p .l.
^ “It seems to be part o f my nature to be wrapped up in visions o f the future,” says Tachikawa, who 
anticipated the explosion in the Internet while head o f NTT’s planning department. His latest vision is 
illustrated by DoCoMo’s 3G promotional video. It depicts a world in which mobile phones are used by 
parents to cheek on their children while at work, to carry out e-money transaetions, to control home 
security systems and a host o f other purposes”. From ‘Think Drastically, Implement Steadily’ in The 
Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk/business/stoiy/0,3604,577392,OO.html, 20* October 2001, p .l.
^ Discussed on the Today Programme, BBC Radio 4, 2*“* May 2001.
‘BT in Emergency Call to Investors’, Daily Mail, 11* May 2001, p .l5 .
Here I take the ‘colonisation’ of the future to involve the discounting o f alternative versions o f the 
future through the construction o f versions that are made to appear inevitable, or at least more viable 
than alternatives. ‘Colonisation’ may also involve the pre-emptive action against possible criticisms 
aimed at certain versions o f the future.
Performativity is the process for individuals of repeating and mimicking societal markers. It is most 
commonly thought o f in relation to gender (Butler 1990), as part o f an overall theory that shows gender 
to be constructed. If gender is a performance, then there is no preexisting true or false identity by 
which to judge an individual’s acts or traits.
These focus groups were run in Central London, in May 2001, as part o f ongoing work by The 
Jigsaw Group for BT Cellnet. Two sessions were attended and notes were taken on the proceedings.
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‘Church Phone Masts Given Carey’s Blessing’, Church Net UK, 
www.churchnet.org.uk/news/files5/newsl25.html, taken from The Times, 30* November 2000, p.1-2.
Ibid.
^Mbid.
‘Bush’s axis o f evil is wild, hyperbolic and silly’, 8* November 2002, The Guardian, 
www.guardian.co.uk.
See ‘Neighbourhood Statistics: Southend-on-Sea, Canvey Island and Basildon’, 
http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk.
See Essex County Council’s document ‘About Essex: Economic Status’ at 
http://l 94.129.26.30/applications/indepthsites/economv&Labour.htm for more details.
By this I mean the portrayal o f the devices themselves, o f content providers and provisions, o f users 
and uses and the contexts o f the latter, trains for example.
For example in scienee fiction films such as The Matrix (1999) Directors: Andy Wachowski and 
Larry Wachowski, Matrix Reloaded (2003) Directors: Andy Wachowski and Larry Wachowski 
and Star Trek: Insurrection (1998) Director: Jonathan Frankes.
ABC Media (2004) Summary Report: The Daily Mail, (eleetronic) available at
http://www.abc.org.uk/cgi-
in/gen5?runprog=nav/abc&tvpe=main&breadcrumbonlv=v&df=v&p=&menuid.
Telephone conversation with Barry Allsop, Circulation Manager for the Daily Mail, 16* March 
2004.
This quantitative information tells us little about the actual consumption practices o f those who 
purchase newspapers. We can probably assume that the newspapers are read at some time during the 
day o f the purchase, although it is possible, especially with large weekend supplements, that papers are 
read over a slightly longer period. Whether the purchaser reads every single article is also information 
that is unavailable to us from circulation figures, although estimated readership figures alert us to the 
possibility o f multiple readers of one purehase, presumably other family members. The circulation data 
came from two sources that I have cross-referenced. The first set o f figures originated from World 
Press Trends compiled by Zenith Media and the World Association o f Newspapers. These figures took 
the form o f a table of the top 100 daily European newspapers for 1998 and 1999 {Campaign Magazine, 
12* November 1999, p.6-7). The second source came from the Audit Bureau of Circulations and 
consisted o f a smaller table o f figures concentrating on British newspaper circulation figures for all o f 
October and November 1999 {Press Gazette, 14* November 1999, p.32).
It was decided that these artieles should not be included by virtue o f the concentration o f STEMPEC 
on mobile communication and mobile phones over and above other ostensibly ‘mobile’ technology.
40 See www.btexact.com/aboutus/people for more details o f those involved in BT Exaet.
The Foresight programme, run by the UK government, aims to produce ‘visions o f the future using 
science-based expertise’ and ‘to increase UK exploitation o f science’. See www.foresight.gov.uk for 
more information.
By this Wise (1997) means the conjunction o f the military establishment and the arms industry, both 
inflated, in the US at least, by Cold War demands. As Wise notes, the task o f imagining the future fell 
to this combination o f the military and industry, ‘once Rand, and other money-intensive think tanks, 
started spinning out their range o f possible futures (focused around the use o f nuclear technologies 
usually)’ (1997:150).
43 See for example ‘Future Phones Could be a Hard Sell’, BBC News, 2"^  June 2002.
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The World Wide Web is a user-friendly interface on the Internet, it runs on the Internet (a global 
network o f interconnected computers) and can be thought o f as it’s ‘popular face’ (Gauntlett 2000).
The groups broke down in terms o f gender as follows:
Group I: Five females, three males (Total-eight)
Group 2: Two females, four males (Total-six)
Group 3: Two females, two males (Total-four)
Group 4: Three females, one male (Total-four)
Group 5: Three females (Total-three)
Group 6: Five females, one male (Total-six)
Group 7: Seven females, one male (Total-eight)
Group 8: Three females, four males (Total-seven)
Group 9: Three females, three males (Total-six)
Group 10: Three females, two males (Total-five)
This temporal dimension has too facets. Firstly the focus groups amounted to a series o f interactions 
over a period o f time, with each taking place at a particular ‘point in time’, and secondly we were 
discussing ‘the future’ from some perceived present ‘point in time’.
This matter was discussed at the PsyPag group workshop at Loughborough University’s DARG 
(Mike Billig, Derek Edwards and Jonathon Potter) on the 6* January 2002. Billig pointed out in the 
plenary session that the level o f transcription that was necessary depended primarily on the form of 
analysis the researcher wished to undertake.
A  detailed method o f notation for transcripts to be analysed using CA was developed by Gail 
Jefferson, who has edited much o f Harvey Sacks work. The transeription conventions are an evolving 
set o f symbols designed to catch for the reader the interactional nuances o f talk (Boden and 
Zimmerman 1991). Clearly for the type of analysis I wish to perform on my focus group data, the 
Jefferson system goes into too high a level o f detail. For those unfamiliar with the Jefferson system it 
ean be diffieult to read excerpts from transcripts.
For example the use o f Delphi research methodology by the Advanced Communications Technology 
(ACT) consortium within Hong Kong Polytechnic University on school use o f the Internet and 
intranets. See www.ic.polyu.edu.hk/posh97/private/research/methods-delphi/example01.html for more 
details.
Science Net UK (www.sciencenet.org) is a web service and freephone UK helpline on seientific 
issues and careers in various scientific areas. The site contains a database o f previously answered 
questions, an ‘Ask a Question’ service, current scienee news service and book reviews.
www.plausiblefuture.com offers news and analysis for future studies and scenario planning. It offers 
conference announcements, a news service, book reviews, reports and artieles in the fields o f future 
studies, scenario planning, learning organisations, the network economy, information warfare, 
nanotechnology and biotechnology. As well as the website, there is a Plausible Future newsletter.
52 www.innovate.bt.com/people/pearsonid is a link to Ian Pearson’s foresight work as part o f BT Exact.
Conversation with Entertainment Product Marketing Manager o f Motorola UK and MGIF member, 
18* November 2002.
54 See ‘Mobile Youth’ report, W2Forum, 2002.
The Millennium Project is the United Kingdom node o f the American Committee for the United 
Nations University (AC/UNU) Millennium Project. In the UK it has been sponsored jointly by The 
Strategic Planning Society and DEMOS.
‘’Europeans Set to adopt ‘feature-rich’ mobiles by 2007’,
www.nua.ie/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&art_id=905358580&rel=true.
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See ‘Digital Content for Global Mobile Services’, European Commission D-G Information Society, 
February 2002 for an example o f industry/governance legislation documentation.
For example the BWCS (2002) report ‘Play Away; The Future o f Mobile Entertainment’.
See ‘Phone Sell o ff Brings Government £12 Billion Surplus’, 20* June 2000, The Guardian, 
www.guardian.co.uk.
^^Advertisement Feature refers to the practice o f businesses paying for advertising space in a 
newspaper, magazine etc that is written in the style o f the publication (i.e. Elle, FHM, Marketing Week) 
but remains essentially an advert. Some ‘free papers’ consist almost entirely of advertisement features 
for mainly local businesses.
An ‘E-zine’ is short for ‘electronic magazine’, often e-mailed to subscribers. According to the 
Internet Marketing Directory ‘E-zines are ‘Often seen on web sites as a technique used to capture 
visitor’s e-mail addresses. Sites set up mechanisms to attract visitors to sign up for a “free” newsletter 
subscription, and use the newsletter as a means to “warm” prospects to the idea o f buying their 
produet’ (http://mn-v. internet-marketing-dictiotuuy. com/ezines.html, January 2004).
^Victor Turner’s theory o f liminality is essentially an anthropologieal tool, an abstract frame of  
reference employed in attempts to further understand actual data. Furthermore, it is not an absolute 
quality o f certain cultural phenomena, but constitutes an attribute seen to be in evidence only in relation 
to the specific cultural context in which it is found, more speeifically, that which is ‘liminal’ is 
precisely that which appears at odds with, or outside o f the ‘social structure’. It makes little sense in 
trying to interpret all cultural phenomena as liminal, as this notion only achieves analytical worth by 
way of the structure:anti-structure contrast. Post-structuralism brought an end to ideas o f  
superstructure.structure and anti-structure, yet if  used in local contexts, say to describe the discursive 
production o f ‘old’, ‘new’, ‘new, new' and ‘future’ technologies, it could be useful.
This does not necessarily have to involve the linear model o f time that has become ‘commonsensical’ 
in the Modem world (Adam 1990). The issue is with how this linear model is embedded within 
versions o f the future, and how it is employed to make technological progress ‘logical’.
^  See http://www.3g-generation.com/3g_offer.htm for an example o f the ways in which it is being 
proposed that 3 G should be marketed to consumers.
As with the Mobile Gaming Interoperability Forum’s discussion about consumer expectations, MGIF 
workshop, conversation with MGIF founder, 7* November 2002.
^  Reeent debates about mobiles and e-mail, and whether Quality o f Life (QOL) is improved or 
worsened by their use is a popular example o f these objections, for example ‘Pick o f the Week’, Radio 
Four, 27* August 2001.
Perhaps most famously in A.C. Clarke's (1968) 2001: A Space Oddessy, London:Verso.
Canvey Island, surrounded by the Thames Estuary and linked to South Benfleet by two road bridges, 
is located about an hour’s bus ride away from the college which is located in Southend-on Sea, Essex.
For example the British Association’s youth foresight exercise, which aims to encourage young 
people to think about the future society they want to live in, and how seience and teehnology might be 
implicated in the creation o f that society. Consultations take place in several British cities. This year 
topics include ‘Visions for the Future o f Energy’, ‘Visions for the Future o f the Ocean,’ ‘Visions for 
the Future o f Transport’, and ‘Visions for the Future o f Construction’. For more detail see 
http://www.sciencenet.org.uk/BAVisions/ukevents.html. Visions Online is a prominent example o f this 
notion o f youth being heard through debate about their hopes, desires, wishes and fears for the future. 
See http://www.visionsonline.org.
70 See http://www.monitoringthefuture.org. Introduction, p .l.
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See http://www.monitoringthefuture.org. The study ‘monitors’ the views o f some 50,000 young 
people in 8*, 10* and 12* grade across the USA. An overview o f the key findings for 2001 are posted 
on the net, whilst work on substance use seems to be the main concern o f the studies.
Cybiko o f Illinois, USA, used the Electronic Entertainment Expo in May 2001 to launch a wireless 
hand-held computer designed specifically for pre-teens (www.smh.cam.au/icon/0105/15/news7.html) 
whilst Agilent Teclmologies in ‘From Lifestyle to Lifesaving: making technology make a difference’, 
write ‘Even without a crisis however, mobile phones and other wireless devices are keeping families 
connected, particularly as teens and even pre-teens get equipped with their own mobiles.
‘Love in the Time o f Mobiles’, http://www.smh.com.au/icon/0112/12/newsl.html, 30* January 
2002.
‘BTexact ‘PhD 100+’ poll signals hot technologies for venture capitalists’, press release from 
BTexact Technologies, 5* December 2001.
Blue Peter is after-school BBCl television show aimed at young people. It frequently has features on 
science and part o f the Blue Peter team include Jenny and Becky, the ‘Science Sisters’. Web chats on 
the Blue Peter site frequently consist o f discussions about space travel, aliens and future technologies.
See http://www.bbc.co.uk/cbbc/bluepeter/experts/science sisters.shtml.
‘British Teenagers Fuel Mobile Boom’, The Guardian, 23”^^  May 2001 
www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3 858,4191054,00.html, p. 1.
‘Nokia Market Study Shows That 3G Mobile Users Want to be Entertained On the Move’, 3 0  Press, 
13* December 2001, p .l, www.3g.co.uk/PR/1435.htm.
Thank you to Geoff Cooper for pointing out this possibility, and to Matt Kemsley for his helpful 
comments on humour.
Recent articles include Wennerstrom, A. (2000) ‘Is it me or is it hot in here? Menopause, Identity 
and Humour’, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp.313-333 and a conversational analysis o f jokes by Norrick, N  (2001) 
‘On the Conversational Performance o f Narrative Jokes; Towards an account o f timing’. Vol. 14, No.
3, pp.255-274.
Bacofoil is a brand o f silver aluminium foil for cooking and storing food stuff.
The mobile as a mundane artefact for the teenagers is evinced by the ease with which they discussed 
(predominately at the early stages o f each focus group as a warm-up exercise) phone models, mobile 
contracts, network features and so on.
These focus groups were conducted shortly after September the 11* and mention was made by the 
teenagers o f this event both within and outside o f the focus group setting.
All the participants knew one another within each focus group since they were selected from a 
mixture o f ‘Keys Skills’ and ‘Tutor Groups’ which meet at least once a week. However it was unclear 
whether the participants in each group socialised outside o f the college environment.
^ In Barry Brown’s introductory chapter to Wireless World for example, he notes, ‘Predicting the 
future is a dangerous game’ and quotes the consultancy firm McKinsey’s prediction (for AT&T) that 
the global market for mobiles by 2000 would be around 900,000 as an apt example o f the mistakes that 
can be made. Brown, B. ‘Studying the Use of Mobile Technology’ in Brown, B, Green, N  and Harper, 
R. (Eds) (2002) Wireless World: Social and Interactional Aspects o f  the Mobile Age, London: Springer.
See http://www.bbc.co.uk/cult/st/interviews/boimanis/page38.shtml for more information on the 
matter transporter as it is represented in Star Wars.
Here I use ‘rationality’ to denote what is deemed culturally plausible or ‘commonsensical’.
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I suggest it is not fruitful or indeed perhaps possible to say when (i.e. in 50 years time) the near­
future ‘becomes’ the long-term future. These time-scales are produced according to the local context in 
which they being worked with.
A mobile s current cell identity can be obtained using SIM Toolkit, which requires a small applet to 
be running on the mobile and an SMS gateway function. The level o f precision available depends on 
location to a certain degree on network topology, so dense urban environments are likely to be better 
served than rural areas, ‘Bringing Mobile Location Services to Market’, see 
www.tdap.co.uk/uk/uk/archive/mob.html, 6* March 2002 for more detail.
This positioning method is based on signal measurements made by the mobile station and location 
measurement units which are essentially stationary mobiles o f known position. To calculate the 
position o f the mobile, the network uses three parameters: observed time difference (OTD), real time 
difference (RTD), and geometric time difference (GTD). GTD is derived from OTD and RTD, and the 
sum gives the mobile’s position. See www.tdap.co.uk/uk/uk/archive/mob.html, 6* March 2002 for 
more detail.
The global positioning system (GPS) provides a means to determine position, velocity and time 
arouiid the world, using signals transmitted to a receiver by a number o f satellites to determine the 
position o f the receiver, see www.tdap.co.uk/uk/uk/archive/mob.html, 06/03/02 for more detail.
See ‘It’s location, location, location’. Guardian Unlimited, 14* December 2000, 
www.guardian.co.uk/archive/article/o,4273,4104957,00.html.
''ibid.
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Lakeside is a large ‘out o f town’ shopping centre located on the Essex side o f the Dartford Bridge. 
See Appendix 3 for images o f ‘Mobili’.
An Aero is a chocolate bar but despite investigation I was unable to glean what Chris meant by this 
comment.
Silverstone et al (1992) drawing on anthropological literature and historical research define the 
‘moral economy o f the household’ as being the sense in which ‘households are conceived as part o f  a 
transactional system o f economic and social relations within the more formal or more objective 
economy and society o f the public sphere. Within this framework, households are seen as being 
actively engaged with the products and meanings o f this formal, commodity and individual-based 
economy’ (1992:16).
Media and information technologies are both media and artefact (a WAP site on a mobile for 
example). Silverstone et al argue that ‘...it is their status as media which distinguishes them relatively, 
if  not absolutely, from objects such as plants and pictures, and other technologies such as refrigerators, 
or hairdryers or hammers’ (1992:15) so media and information technologies are ‘doubly articulated 
into public and private cultures’ (1992:15). However Silverstone et al (1992) do not consider the 
challenge that mobile devices may pose to this private/public dichotomy See Nicola Green’s paper 
‘Who’s Watching Whom? Monitoring and Accountability in Mobile Relations’ in Brown, B, Green, N. 
and Harper, R. (Eds) (2002) Wireless World: Social and Interactional Aspects o f  the Mobile Age, 
London: Springer, for a discussion o f the implications o f the surveillance potentialities o f mobile 
devices on notions o f the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ and on the realms o f the individual/personal and the 
collective.
Two high street chains aimed at young people.
"  Tamagotchis are rudimentary ‘cyberpets’ in the form o f small key-rings. The ‘game’ was to feed, 
cloth and generally take care o f the pet and to keep it alive for as long as possible.
351
Scalelectrics is a game where you can build car tracks from various plastic pieces and then race a 
car around these electrified tracks.
Reality television shows involving participants trying to ‘survive’ on remote islands with minimal 
resources and usually a lot o f group tensions occurring.
The lines between what was considered ‘old’ ‘current’ and ‘new’ by the focus group participants 
were extremely vague. This points to the cultural fluidity o f such terms. For example mobile phones 
that were deemed to be ‘like bricks’ were ‘old’ technologies but mobile phones in more general terms 
were constructed as simultaneously contemporary and possibly futuristic. In a sense the perceived ‘age’ 
o f a technology rested primarily on the context in which devices were being talked about, that is if  a 
technology was being compared to a future-possible device it was deemed old, whereas if  no 
comparative work was being performed by the group, a technology previously deemed ‘old’ could be 
couched in terms o f its contemporaneous nature.
See Kevin McSorley’s work (2003,2003a) for a more in-depth discussion o f the rhetoric o f the 
‘Digital Divide’.
